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Abstract 
 
 
Ideological Contest in Syria’s Revolutionary Moment: The Concept of 
Dignity 
 
 
In this thesis I make use of interpretive methods within comparative political theory for a 
consideration of the idea of dignity (karama) in Syria’s revolution, began in 2011. The state and its 
ruling ideology is, of course, deeply contested in revolutions.  But less attention has been paid to 
how this happens and to the kinds of new ideas—or established beliefs recovered and recast—which 
can rapidly emerge from the ideational periphery.  The concept of karama acts, along with other 
adjacent and related ‘ideas in the wild’, to resist.  It signifies important ‘belief challenges’ to the 
dominant order. 
    
I show the ways in which dignity is used and understood by recourse to the writing and the vernacular 
utterances of Syrian revolutionaries.  I pursue two distinctive ideational exemplars from within the 
revolution: the progressive al-jumhuriya (The Republic) website; and, the armed fighters of the liwa 
al-tawhid (Unity Brigade). My research traces the ways in which divergent Syrian revolutionaries 
share important beliefs in common; ideas which cohere and are clarified, to an important extent, 
around the concept of karama—as it is used and acted upon in the revolution.  
 
I compare the broadly western and Arab conceptual trajectories for this idea, showing points of 
commonality and illuminate the particular instances and context for a distinctive dignity in 
resistance.  I explore a historicised idea of and emergence of a deeply political and radical Fanonian 
dignity in resistance to oppression and tyranny.   
 
The centrality of dignity—as a core organising idea in Syrian ‘thought-practices’ of resistance—
shows us how such ideas can take on a political bent and how powerful they are when harnessed and 
acted on in particular contexts.  My analysis of revolutionary thinkers and fighters therefore sheds 
more light on the actions of people often neglected in state-centric and structuralist analyses.       
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Ideological Contest in Syria’s Revolutionary Moment:  
The Concept of Dignity 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Syria’s revolution—and the violent and totalising put down of it which has now destroyed the 
country— has been relegated to the ‘too difficult box’ by western progressive activists, policy 
analysts, and important parts of the scholarly community alike.  Before the latest round of Arab 
revolutions, knowledge production about contemporary Syria (at least in English) was limited 
to a small group of scholars1 and commentators, most prominently in the USA and the UK, 
constantly seeking to explain and to ‘demystify’ Syria for the wider academic and policy 
community.  Deeper understanding of Syria has oft times been thwarted by its geopolitical 
complexity and an enduring, and sometimes Orientalist, assumption of some kind of 
exceptionalism for Arab countries and Syria specifically.  
 
My starting point in this thesis is that amidst the scholarly production and analysis about Syria, 
busy as it has been attending to the vital macro level state and geopolitical conundrums of an 
important regional and, now, globally significant (failed) state actor, are millions of people in 
their everyday and ordinary lives. Some of these ‘ordinary’ people rose up in 2011 in the name 
of dignity, and their reach for and central assertion of that concept is the focus of my thesis.  I 
set out to show the ways in which this seemingly ubiquitous and polysemic concept of dignity 
emerged and signified a distinctly political turn.  I will show that the idea of dignity (Arabic: 
karama) was so central in the Syrian revolution because it represented a fundamental ‘belief 
                                                 
1 This paraphrases a remark made by Thomas Pierret at the 2013 Syria Studies conference held at St Andrew’s 
University, convened by Raymond Hinnebusch.  Pierret was giving feedback to postgraduate presenters, myself 
included, about the difficulties of doing research on Syria as it suddenly became a global focus of intellectual 
and knowledge production.    
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challenge’ by Syrian revolutionary actors to the Syrian leadership, government, state, and 
systems of coercion and control.  To dig deeper into the actual processes and actions of 
revolutionaries, the research question I pursue throughout this thesis is: what are the meanings 
and uses of dignity in the Syrian revolution?   
 
Choosing to focus my research on Syria’s latest revolution immediately raises the question: 
how do we ‘know’ Syria?  One highly visible way publics have been able to relate to Syria is 
through the tragedy (and spectacle) of an individual life lost, such as Aylan Kurdi’s body 
washed up on a beach.  In a different point of access, much has been made of the Kurdish 
project of liberated Kobani in Syria.2  Most recently, the increasing plight of the Syrian refugees 
has finally become mainstream and a prominent cause for many who had hitherto felt unable 
to grasp ‘Syria’s revolution’.  The other way we ‘know’ Syria now is through a regular (but 
highly mediated) diet of disturbing images of civilian casualties, on our television and 
computer screens.  Perhaps most of all, though, we have come to view Syria  through the lens 
of the nihilism of the Islamic State group (ISIS) and through Syria’s ‘heart-eating’, ‘jihadi’, 
‘extremist’ rebels as they are overly represented and reproduced in a burgeoning field of 
terrorist and extremism studies which has grown since 9/11.  Even when we acknowledge, as 
I will, that forms of Islamist and different forms  of counter-revolutionary extremism took hold 
in Syria’s revolution and liberated regions, we have still  not accounted for (or, rather, have 
chosen to ignore) the revolutionary moment enacted and lived by Syrians under the bombs.  
 
                                                 
2 This despite identical achievements by Syrians elsewhere in the country, and much earlier, in maintaining 
liberated areas – such as the well-known (or, so it has been assumed by the Syrian revolutionaries themselves) 
case of the city of Daraya. 
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What these particular lenses and such partial access paths to ‘ways of knowing’ Syria show is 
how difficult it is to grasp or to gain insight into the important political dimension of Syria’s 
revolution and war.  That is, we have tuned out of politics and we need to tune back in.  Some 
key political elements in Syria’s revolution and the fallout from it have been clear from the 
outset of the uprising.  Syrians stood up to and then fled from a purposively and extremely 
violent crushing of a popular uprising; ISIS maintains a HQ in Syria because of the space and 
the vacuum created by the unspeakable level of state violence and, to quote a respected Syrian 
veteran journalist and former prisoner, the state and security machinery which became an 
‘industrial killing machine’.3 The Syrian Kurds have taken the initiative to advance their own 
cause for self-determination in the ruins of a revolution in which they had taken part alongside 
Arabs, Ismaili’s and Druze, among others.  These are all deeply political events and any 
analysis of Syria and its revolution must attend centrally to such political dimensions.   
 
In conducting research on Syria which is attuned and attentive to the political I mean to say 
that, specifically, we cannot neglect the counterhegemonic ‘ideas from below’ which have been 
produced and promoted by Syrian revolutionary agents.  We need to consider their words and 
their actions as constitutive of an important and alternative realm of the political.  This is 
because these deeds took on a political hue when these Syrians exercised agency and attended 
public and collective protests and sit-ins, organised civil disobedience activities and, over the 
first months of the revolution, developed a radical revolutionary culture and practice. We also 
need to pay attention to the  kinds of ideological commitments such agents advanced, without 
judging or romanticising the idea and practices we come across and without resorting to 
selective examples which we ‘relate’ most closely to.   
                                                 
3 This remark was made by the journalist during a meeting on Syria organised at Chatham House under the 
Chatham House Rule, in summer 2013.  
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This thesis sets out to put aside the kinds of epistemic blind spots I have discussed so far and 
to seek ways to negotiate both the ontological and epistemological limits seemingly imposed 
on our study of and our understanding of Syria.  I do so by bringing research on today’s Syria 
more closely into conversation with a sub-field of interpretive political theory which studies 
political ideologies as the ‘receptacles’ for ‘live’ events and for ideas in train.  In order to 
explore this ideational terrain my research is underpinned by the claim that it is vitally 
important that we reconsider and pay due attention to the political ideologies which serve to 
organise and define our societies by investigating their ‘contents’: that is, the ideas and beliefs 
which they gather in.  
 
I situate my research within, and draw on innovations in, the study of political ideologies and 
the ideas which they comprise, a sub-field of political theory which avoids the normative 
impulse to abstract and generalise and instead is “distinguished by a commitment to studying 
political ideas as they are found ‘in the wild’”.4 That is, as researchers, we ought to look beyond 
the formalised politics of our politicians and parties and engage with the ‘everyday’ 
  
political ideas found in, for example, speeches, statements, debates, interviews, 
pamphlets, newspaper columns, websites, posters, placards, demonstrations and 
performances.5   
 
                                                 
4 Finlayson, A. (2013) ‘Rhetoric and the Political Theory of Ideologies’, Political Studies, 60, 751. 
5 Finlayson, A. (2013) ibid., 751. 
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This way of thinking about ideas guides my methodology in my analysis of dignity in Syria’s 
revolution.  Some words are more special and significant and complex than others and require 
closer attention. Some of our everyday and common words, such as the concept of dignity 
which is central to this research study, can become and act politically in a number of important 
ways.  To help ground and structure my research I draw together the scholarship of two 
prominent political theorists—William E. Connolly and Michael Freeden—to develop an 
approach which attempts to get closer to people and to their ideas.   
 
However, there are two immediate puzzles to pose about ‘getting closer to the people’ before 
I begin the body of this thesis.  First, if we do listen closely to Syria’s revolutionary agents we 
might find (as I shall show in this thesis) that some believe(d) their cause to be ultimately 
apolitical or even, perhaps, post-political/ideological.  This presents a dilemma for the 
researcher keen to listen to what is being said and to take this seriously.  How can I situate my 
study of dignity in Syria’s revolution as being importantly political if some Syrians say that ‘it 
is not about politics’?  Here I rely on Freeden and Connolly in urging for a reconfiguring of 
our very notion of what constitutes the political, whilst also recognising that this Syrian 
rejection of the political is based on the lived experience under an authoritarian system and 
hereditary rule.  We can suspend any resolution of this tension, though, as I examine it in more 
detail in my exemplar studies (Chapters Five and Six). There is, perhaps, nothing more deeply 
political, in the way Connolly and Freeden conceive of this field, than standing up to and acting 
against a repressive system; Syrians have forged a radically new political ethos and dignity 
helps us to name it.        
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The second immediate puzzle is: can we usefully analyse such a potentially ‘slippery’ concept 
as dignity and does it really have any meaningful use given its ubiquity?  Dignity is indeed 
common in our everyday and in our formal legal codes; we find it promulgated in international 
law and at the core of our universal human values, in the speeches of politicians discussing the 
plight of Syrian refugees and in such diverse contexts as ‘dignity in dying’ and ‘dignity in 
labour’.  Some have dismissed the idea based on just this seeming unending polysemy and 
indeterminacy; others have problematised it from competing perspectives.  Religious 
conservatives argue that its innate and God-given nature is under threat in modern science and 
medical advances which interfere with nature.  On the other hand, political theorists have 
argued for its importance based on human law and normative ideas of equal dignity and so on.  
I tackle these issues in detail in this thesis and in particular in Chapter Four.  But I also draw 
on important ontological and epistemological commitments to build an understanding and 
meaning in use which gives central consideration to historical context, to its appearance and 
use by agents, and to patterns which start to show and suggest and clarify meaning-in-use. 
 
I have so far introduced my thesis topic and outlined my central research question and the 
arguments which emerge and which I defend.  I have attempted to address some immediate 
ontological questions and to briefly introduce the basis for my own methodological approach. 
This helps to clear a path for the first two chapters which serve an important function in setting 
up my thesis question and methodology.   
 
In Chapter One I carry out a methodological critique of the most influential scholarship on 
modern revolutions.  I focus on studies from within the discipline of political science, as they 
have been the most enduring and set the terms of our inquiry into revolutions.  I argue that 
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mainstream scholarship on revolutions has tended to adopt a state-centric and causal approach 
which has neglected people, ideas, and agency.  I examine how the study of ideology has 
interacted with that of the study of revolutions.  I negotiate a way out of the unproductive 
debates about whether structural or agental approaches are the right approaches and instead 
argue that it is important to ask questions about and conduct research into people and their 
ideas.  This occurs within revolutionary processes which have, as I show, suffered from relative 
neglect.  I then look at existing attempts to do this and suggest that we can productively build 
on this research. 
 
In Chapter Two I set out how I intend to frame and conduct my research on the idea of dignity 
in Syria’s revolution.  I establish my interpretive approach as coming from that of a sub-field 
in political theory which gives prominence to ideas, or concepts, as important units of analysis 
provided that we do not seek essence of meaning but rather investigate concepts in use and in 
context. Specifically I position dignity, in the Syrian revolutionary context, as a distinctly 
radical and political concept.  To facilitate this approach I introduce the work of William E. 
Connolly and Michael Freeden.  These theorists have, between them, nurtured a more attentive 
study of the complex, political, concepts which serve as the building blocks for the ideologies 
that organise our social and political world.   
 
I build on their scholarship and frameworks in order to fine tune my own methodological 
approach for a non-Western context and for a revolutionary terrain. In doing so I argue that a 
very productive research potential exists in the joining of (western) non-normative, ‘post-
analytic’ Political Theory with the field of Area Studies (within which Syria is most often given 
its scholarly treatment).  I then add the flesh onto the bones of my interpretive method by 
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outlining and reflecting on my own ‘Method and Material’ as I prepare to conduct research on  
‘ideas from below’ with recourse to the ‘concrete’ empirical world of Syria’s revolutionary 
agents.  I elaborate on the selection of material when I introduce the two exemplar studies from 
Syria’s revolution (Chapter Five and Six), each of which represents differing and competing 
currents and offers an ideational picture of new ideas emerging.  
 
In Chapter Three I provide the necessary diachronic backbone to my own study of ideas in a 
time of change and flux.  In historicising the rise and formation of modern Arab ideologies I 
show how the weight of history has weaved and solidified dominant ideological formations in 
the era since Syrian independence.  I give particular focus to the dominating ideology and the 
case of the rise of the Syrian Arab Baʿth Party, but I also briefly touch on other ideational 
currents which have vied for space and have contested hegemonic power,  such as Political 
Islam and a seemingly ‘Civic Republicanism’.  Here I analyse the ideas which underpinned the 
Baʿth project and note the three core concepts—unity, (Arab) socialism, and freedom—which 
featured at the centre of political thinking and writing from prominent ideologues and political 
leaders of the time. I argue that the real potential in the Baʿthist ideals came to be hobbled and 
marginalised by the urges of a ruling elite to maintain the status quo and to ensure that their 
own self-interests were safe guarded.  The chapter shows how important concepts take hold 
and how they can be instrumentalised for reasons of power and coercion and yet still hold 
(unfulfilled) potential in rapid periods of change, as was seen from 2011.  It was the failure of 
the Syrian Arab Baʿth Party, in power, to live up to and maintain its radical ethos and the virtues 
of the Syrian people for unity, freedom and the desire for a socially inspired equality, which 
created the conditions for the Syrian dignity revolution.  
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In Chapter Four I investigate in detail the concept of dignity, to elucidate on distinctive 
historical trajectories and traditions for this.  I explicate the religious, premodern, and modern 
conceptions of dignity, and the meanings-in-use, during different historical times.  In the latter 
part of the chapter I focus in on resistance against colonial rule, including in the Arab region.  
I examine the thought-practices of anticolonial writers and agitators and I draw out some of the 
core concepts which cohere at differing junctures.  In particular, I show how the idea of dignity 
was a core idea and that it often appeared alongside that of freedom and honour.  I argue that, 
in the case of the Arab region, dignity was to become embedded in a ‘politics of resistance’ 
and that this context has vital importance in enabling us to understand the context of resistance 
in which dignity was asserted, again, in the latest revolutions.   
 
In Chapter Five I introduce the first of my exemplar studies of Syria’s revolutionary moment: 
the revolutionary website of al-jumhuriya (The Republic).  Established and managed by Syrian 
intellectuals, academics, writers, and bloggers in support of the Dignity Revolution in Syria, 
this website provides a rich source of ‘raw material’ for an empirical examination of ‘ideas in 
the wild’.  I investigate some of the thinking and ideas of its most prominent cofounder: the 
Syrian dissident and intellectual Yassin al-Haj Saleh.  Saleh is an exemplar of the Syrian 
progressive and leftist current importantly active in the revolution.  I investigate the ideational 
patterns across the material produced by Saleh, and by this collective, and I draw out some of 
the core ideas in their thinking and in their revolutionary culture and practice of resistance.  In 
particular it is apparent that the notion of dignity is central in their revolutionary speech-acts – 
as a name, as an assertion and demand, as a mobilising call, as a human right, and as an 
overarching and ineliminable virtue which is constitutive of their very struggle.   
 
10 
 
In Chapter Six I set out the second exemplar study: the Syrian armed revolutionaries: liwa al-
tawhid (the Unity Brigade).  My focus on this particular brigade stems from it being one of the 
most prominent brigades fighting pro-government forces in northern Syria.  In negotiating the 
complexity of these fighting brigades I begin with an exposition of this fighting unit and of one 
of its most revered commanders: the martyr Mujahid Abdel Qader al-Saleh.  I examine 
mediated content published and available online through Arab television channels and content-
sharing and social networking sites.  I build a picture of this so-called moderate Islamist brigade 
in Syria and find among them the core ideas of dignity, freedom, and armed jihad.  I show how 
this group represent another form of revolutionary resistance and one which is ordered around 
an ideal vision of a future Syria in which a sub stratum of Sunni Muslims is respected and given 
freedom to be Syrian and religious.  This is precisely why the concept of dignity exhibited and 
enmeshed both through a particular ‘local’ religious sensitivity and in a revolutionary 
resistance is so potent an idea and demand.     
 
I then draw this thesis to a close with a concluding section in which I draw together my findings 
and suggest possible future avenues of exploration.     
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Chapter One  
Ideas in Revolution 
 
Introduction  
 My research study is an investigation into ideas in a dynamic and heavily contested state of 
flux in the context of Syria’s revolution, which began in 2011. Specifically, I investigate the 
idea of dignity as it emerged and manifested itself in Syria’s revolution.  The idea of 
dignity—Arabic: karama—was concretely and empirical visible and audible in the 
revolution, appearing and functioning in a number of interesting ways.   
 
The first two chapters in this thesis are importantly linked; both aid in addressing the 
problems in the conventional study of revolution and ideology and some of the potential, as 
well as the shortcomings, in the literature.  Before I can deal substantially with an analysis 
of dignity in use in the Syrian revolution I need to investigate how to draw on theories of 
modern revolutions so as to situate Syria and its latest revolution.   
 
This is an important process as it allows me to consider what conceptual or methodological 
tools might be pertinent to a study of the idea of dignity in Syria’s revolution. The question 
I therefore pose in this chapter is: to what degree might the literature on revolution and on 
ideas, and the ideologies that contain them, provide productive approaches and tools which 
might assist a study of dignity in revolution?   
 
In Section One of this chapter I present an analysis of the canonical work in the conventional 
social sciences regarding the study of revolutions.  I highlight scholarship on modern 
revolutions, in particular John Foran’s analysis of the four generations of research and the 
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varied approaches taken.1  I place an emphasis on the political scientist Theda Skocpol2 
because her research has been immensely influential and is an exemplar of the major 
historical sociological studies undertaken in the latter part of the twentieth century.   
 
I also pay attention to the contribution which the field of social mobilisation theory, led by 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow,3 has made, and discuss some of the conceptual ideas they 
introduced.  The notion of a ‘revolutionary moment’ and a ‘revolutionary situation’ are used 
in the examination of recent revolutions.  I investigate the extent to which the scholarship 
considers the place of people, as agents and actors, and ideologies in revolution.  I pinpoint 
some of the shortcomings in the literature and how it has tended to reproduce state-centric 
and structuralist analyses which neglect people and their political thinking and ideas.  
 
In Section Two, on surveying the field of study of ideology, I examine and summarise its 
historiography in the modern period, starting with the idea as it emerged in the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment period.  I note the influence of Marxist approaches to ideology and 
update them with regard to other developments: such as the linguistic turn.  I include 
reference to the emergence of a school of discourse theory, and in particular the influential 
directions taken by Ernesto Laclau and Chantelle Mouffe 4  which have necessarily 
complicated the picture and opened up diverse ways of thinking about ideologies.  While 
we no longer conduct research on ideology as a unitary phenomenon or object of study, we 
still tend to consider it pejoratively, as something bad and to be rid of.  This closes off the 
                                                 
1 Foran, J. ed. (1997) Theorising Revolutions, London & New York: Routledge. 
2 Her major works are: Skocpol, T. (1979) States and Social Revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, 
Russia, & China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Skocpol, T. (1994) Social revolutions in the 
modern world, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
3 Major works include Tilly, C. (1995) European Revolutions, 1492-1992, Oxford: Blackwell; Tilly, C. & 
Tarrow, S. (2007) Contentious Politics, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers. 
4 I reference here their joint earlier and major work: Mouffe, C and Laclau, E. (1999) Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, second edition. Verso: London & New York.   
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very dynamic political thinking and actions which are produced and disseminated outside 
of ruling elite and state structures of domination.   
 
In Section Three I bring the two scholarly strands of revolution and ideology together, 
looking at ways in which ideologies, and their ideas, have been treated in the study of 
revolutions.  In particular in this section I note the key debates around structure versus 
agency, and therefore the significance, or not, of people and their ideas in times of 
revolution.  To aid in this I draw on a major dialogue between two opposing political 
scientists: Theda Skocpol and William Sewell.5  I show how both paths of argumentation 
illustrate the limits of an either/or understanding of revolutions.  I demonstrate a relative 
neglect of ideas and ideology in the study of revolution, both because of the methodological 
(quasi-scientific) approaches taken and because of the pejorative way in which academics, 
policy-makers and the public have continued to regard ideology.   
 
Finally, in my conclusion, I pull together some of the useful threads in preparation for an 
examination of the idea of dignity in Syria’s revolution.  I therefore do not seek to contribute 
substantively to the scholarship on revolution per se, which (as we shall see shortly) has 
tended to consider revolutions in retrospect and to prefer meta-narratives and generalised 
theories for defining what a revolution is, what causes it, and what constitutes a successful 
revolutionary outcome.  I contend that conventional approaches to the analysis of revolution 
fail to pick up important and interesting currents and trajectories associated with ideas. Such 
ideas, in their concrete manifestations, can offer us insight into the actual wider ideological 
changes which occur in revolution, as I will show in the case of Syria. 
                                                 
5 See my discussion of them later in this chapter, Section Three, regarding ’A Dialogue about Culture and 
Ideology in Revolutions’, in Skocpol, T. ed. (1994) Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge, 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 169-209.  
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This thesis thus aims to avoid some of these epistemic and methodological shortcomings.  
Instead, in Chapter Two, I introduce an interpretive methodology which supports my focus 
on the study of ideas for ideas’ sake and as important units of analysis.  My investigation 
centres on ‘ideas from below’.  This means that I explore the political implications of the 
thought and action of Syrian revolutionary actors which takes place within and from a ‘live’ 
revolutionary moment or situation.  In doing so I anticipate the theoretical critique of the 
study of ideologies made by the political theorist Michael Freeden6, whose work I give 
detailed attention in this thesis. 
 
Relatively little attention has been paid to the consideration of what happens to ideological 
traditions and patterns when revolutions take hold.  In particular, the new ideas – or old ones 
given a new airing – which emerge and cohere at a particular spatial and temporal point.  
We can look at the ideas which are produced, transmitted, communicated, promoted, and 
struggled for.  In this way we can pursue ‘ideas in the wild’ or the ideas produced in myriad 
ways by people in revolutions. 
 
Before we can advance to this stage of the thesis I set out here the pertinent literatures which 
act as a point of reference and departure for my own research.  
 
I The study of modern revolutions   
 
In reviewing the literature and argumentation of revolutions we will notice that three 
enduring questions take a central place.  I argue that this is an important observation because 
                                                 
6 See Chapter Two for an explication of his theory of political ideologies and for his major works. 
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scholarship on revolution remains problematic if the research questions are fixed and if its 
study remains retrospective – that is, looking at revolutions in history.7  These organising 
questions which serve to frame and limit scholarly exploration are: firstly, what is the 
definition of a revolution?  Secondly, what are the causes of revolutions?  And, thirdly, what 
are the necessary factors to make for a successful revolutionary outcome?  Each of these 
questions is given varying levels of attention in the scholarship and I set out some of the 
main instances when each of these questions becomes a central organising feature, and 
constraint, for researchers.  We shall also see a number of sub-questions which emerge in 
the study of revolutions.   For example, in seeking to define revolutions other questions 
come to the fore regarding how we might distinguish between a revolution and, say, a coup 
d’état, uprising, rebellion, changing of the guard and so on.   
 
With this in mind the next section concentrates on the generational shifts in the study of 
revolutions.  For ease of reference I organise the scholarship into ‘four generations’ (or 
waves) of study, a framework used by scholars themselves.8  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 William E. Connolly advances an interesting idea on ‘the politics of becoming’, as in the historical struggle 
of Jews, slaves, and so other groups, as a necessarily ongoing process, rather than the realising of an essence.  
Becoming (or, i would argue, change) ‘proceeds when it is in motion”: Connolly, W. E. (1996) ‘Suffering, 
Justice, and the Politics of Becoming’, Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 20, 256. 
8 Goldstone, J. (1982) ‘The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions’, Annual Review of Sociology, 
8, 187-207. A useful selection of the wide ranging debates and the theoretical shifts is in Foran, J. ed. (1997) 
Theorizing Revolutions, London: Routledge.  On methodological dilemmas see also:  Aya, R. (1979) 
‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence’, Theory and Society, 8:1, 
39-99; and, Goodwin, J. & Jasper, J.M. (1999) ‘Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of 
Political Process Theory’, Sociological Forum, 14, 27-54.  For a regional perspective (which echoes my 
critique of the field in this chapter) see Cole, J. R. I. (1999) Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: 
Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi Movement, Cairo: American University Press, especially 
Cole’s introduction.  A concentrated volume on the emergent theme of contention is McAdam, D., Tarrow, S 
& Tilly, C. (2001) Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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First and second generation 
The first generation of scholarship on revolution consists of what Jack Goldstone refers to 
as the “natural history” generation.9 This historical scholarship was conducted throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s on the so-called great revolutions, such as the French and Russian 
revolutions. The historians describe and provide empirical depth on major revolutions and 
offer descriptive accounts of the socioeconomic conditions which led up to the revolutions. 
So, for example, as Goldstone points out, their findings become almost truisms about the 
conditions we commonly understand revolutions to spring from.  The focus tends to be on 
the ruling elite and social class machinations.  The main criticism levelled at the natural 
historians is that their descriptive narratives fail to get to grips with explaining or analysing 
why revolutions happen.10  
 
The second generation of scholarship on revolution refers to the earliest ‘social scientific’, 
rather than ‘natural history’, treatments of revolution in the academy which persisted 
throughout much of the century until they were challenged and eventually undermined by 
later scholarship.  This second wave is characterised by attention to psychologically-based 
explanations into the causes of revolutions and collective violence.  This approach reinforces 
the notion that revolutions are a ‘volcanic’ eruption by people, as individuals and then as a 
collective, into a violent show of popular discontent.11  Through the 1950’s and 1960’s 
scholars were exercised by a compulsion to fit revolutions into neat, ‘scientific’ schematics 
                                                 
9 As discussed in: Goldstone, J. (1982) ibid., 187-207. 
10 Goldstone, J. (1982) ibid. 
11 Examples of such approaches, some of which I discuss here, can be found in the work of James Davies; 
Ted Gurr; Neil Smelser; Ivo Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, Betty Nesvold; and Chalmers Johnson  See 
discussions in Aya (1979) and Skocpol (1979), op cit. 
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which focused on mono-variables, such as the propensity for people to be violent or 
aggressive.12   
 
Revolution has been treated as a disturbed ‘condition of a society at large’, according to a 
biting critique of this field of study by Roderic Aya.13 Aya argues that the ‘volcano models’ 
of revolution try to psychologise revolutionary violence and to treat political conflict and 
contestation as some kind of illness or social aberration.14 A typical approach, according to 
Aya, is that by James C. Davies whose hypothesis is that revolution is more likely to occur 
when there is a period of prolonged rising expectation and gratification 15  which is 
subsequently reversed, so that there is a gap between expectation and gratification which 
becomes intolerable.16 Davies tests this in his modelling of the J-Curve which plots levels 
of gratification.  As these variable indicators of gratification decline they result in a 
“revolutionary state of mind”.17  Following this method, Aya notes that examples of the 
increasing propensity for violence results in the somewhat incongruous  grouping of the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, the Nasserite ‘coup d’état’ of 1952 in Egypt, and the Nazi 
                                                 
12 As critiqued in Aya, R. (1979) ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective 
Violence’, Theory and Society, 8:1, 39-99; also, Skocpol, T. (1979) States and Social Revolutions: a 
comparative analysis of France. Russia, & China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Zimmermann, E. 
(1983) Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research, Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman 
Publishing Co.; Foran, J. ed. (1997) Theorising Revolutions, London: Routledge.  
13 Aya, R. (1979) ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence’, Theory 
and Society, 8:1, 39-99.   
14 In doing so Aya, following Tilly, argues that scholars were influenced by Durkheim (and the trend towards 
modernisation theories) in analysing the ways in which individuals react to the social tensions produced by 
rapid social change: Aya, R. (1979) ibid., 50-51. 
15 Gratifications included basics such as food and water, as well as ‘cultural’ factors such as standard of 
living and dignity 
16 Cited in Aya (1979) op cit., 53. 
17 As critiqued in Aya, R. (1979) ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective 
Violence’, Theory and Society, 8:1, 39-99 
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accession of 1933 together with Black Power 18  movements in America and campus 
collective actions in the 1960s.19  
 
Aya argues that Davies “compounds a wide variety of gratifications into a one-dimensional 
(and non-empirical) index”.20  Attempts to use this one-dimensional J-curve model as a 
singular thermometer to take “an entire society’s emotional temperature over time” are 
problematic, as it is too blunt an instrument of analysis.  For example, the studies do not 
provide a way in which to distinguish frustrations which led to revolution from those which 
“form the grist of political continuity”.21  Aya is scathing of the volcano models because he 
is troubled by the level to which they are influential and well-regarded in scholarly circles.  
The methods are extended to other studies by scholars, who go on to attempt to quantify the 
triggers for political violence as an empirical basis for a theory/theories on revolutions.   
 
Another example is the major statistical study of Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold,22 
which gathered data on social change and political violence variables for eighty-four nations 
between 1948 and 1965 in order to produce a general theory of revolution.  Their study 
concludes that “systemic frustration” causes people to get angry and revolt.23 The details of 
their methodology have been critiqued as being flawed and over reliant on socio-
                                                 
18 For a reflective article on this period and the work to be done still see Azikiwe, A (2016) Stokely 
Carmichael, ‘Black Power and the age of political oppression’, The Spirit of Biko: Struggles for Black 
dignity continue’, 16 June, Pambazuka News, 790, published online at pambazuko.org., accessed December, 
2016.  
19 Aya (1979) ibid., 53. 
20 Aya (1979) ibid., 53. 
21 Aya (1979) ibid., 53-54. 
22 Feierabend, I.K., Feierabend, R.L., & Nesvold, B.K. (1969) ‘Social Change and Political Violence: Cross 
National Patterns’, in Graham, H.D. & Gurr, T., eds. (1969) Violence in America, New York, London: 
Bantam Books. 
23 Aya (1979) op cit.., 54-5. 
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psychological explanations.24 In particular Aya records how the scholars over-interpret the 
correlations in their data to argue that it confirms a causal link between rapid social changes 
in certain transitional societies.  This confluence creates systemic frustration and spills into 
violence and strife.25  Aya makes a number of other criticisms but, overall, the key flaw is 
that the researchers “presume a direct connection between frustration and revolt” without 
any evidence to prove it.26  In other words, correlation does not necessarily prove any causal 
links.  Roderick Aya concludes his critique of these studies by asserting that the “theories 
themselves are at fault” which, as a result, “steers research analysis down a blind alley”.27  
 
Aya’s analysis and critique of the second generation is multi-layered and the aim of this 
chapter is not to expound on all the details or to agree completely with Aya’s own approach.  
However, there are two key aspects that, so far, we can draw out from reflecting critically 
on these first two waves of study.  Firstly, the scholars seem to set the very idea of resistance 
and revolution in the pejorative – as a deviation, as something that must be understood so 
that it can be stopped and/or predicted and thus avoided.  This is a problem which has 
underpinned the study of modern revolutions and reflects the positionality, or natural bias, 
of the very scholars who undertake the work.  Put simply, researchers seem to start with a 
premise that resistance through rebellion, uprisings and revolutions indicates deviant 
behaviour and a departure from societal norms.  This puts scholars on the side of the status 
quo, and ignores the political thinking, grievances, and moral commitments which might 
motivate revolutionaries.  
                                                 
24 Zimmermann (1983) op cit., 412; see also Foran, J. (2005) Taking power: on the origins of third world 
revolutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 9. 
25 Aya (1979) op cit., 54-55. 
26 Aya 1979) op cit., 57. 
27 Aya (1979) op cit., 39-40. 
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The second problem to emerge from these first two waves of scholarship is that there are a 
number of methodological flaws in the studies conducted on revolutions, as we have briefly 
seen above.  What Aya’s critique points to is that although there is nothing problematic 
about doing quantitative studies on revolutions in and of itself, it has to be recognised that 
the “the juggernaut of Quantitative Method”28 may not always be an appropriate tool to help 
us to answer some of the important questions we might have about revolutions.  The 
problem, it seems, then becomes one in which we might actually be asking the wrong 
questions altogether about revolutions and working with tools which are not incisive or fine-
grained enough to aid a deeper understanding of people in revolutions.      
 
On reflection, it appears that the earliest kinds of empirically-rich historical studies may well 
prove to be more useful sources for our understanding of revolution, in that at least we have 
valuable evidence from the archives, albeit with a focus on elite actors.  By contrast, the 
resultant shift to the second generation has privileged the causative imperative in our study 
and thinking on revolutions which, I continue to argue in this chapter, closes down fruitful 
studies into other important aspects of revolution.  Throughout his critical analysis of the 
early study of revolutions, Aya makes favourable references to what were then new 
developments in the study of revolution.  He references the third generation of scholars.  He 
also notes how it has been left to the historians to seek to explain the political workings of 
revolution, thus indicating the gains made in the emerging historical-sociological 
approaches which we will now examine in detail. However, as I go on to discuss, it is not 
apparent that this third generation offers us a suitable escape route.   
                                                 
28 Aya (1979) op cit., 55. 
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Third generation 
Having exhausted models for isolating and proving a unitary cause for revolutions such as 
a violent tipping point due to a mismatch between what people want and what they get, a 
third wave of study comprised of the advent of the historical sociologists.  These scholars 
sought to conduct research which gave due attention to the historical and social context for 
revolutions. This school of thought departed from the existing ‘natural history’ and socio-
psychological approaches to revolution by examining more complex aspects of revolutions 
in the round.  Studies joining history and social theory enabled more “historically grounded 
comparative studies of revolutions”, as in the detailed scholarly studies produced by Moore, 
Wolf and Dunn through the 1960s and 1970s.29    
 
However, it was to be Theda Skocpol’s landmark historical sociological study comparing 
the great revolutions in France (1789), China (1911) and Russia (1917) with unsuccessful 
ones elsewhere, which represented the most serious scholarly attempt to explain revolutions 
in their political and social milieu.  Although Skocpol herself is clear that she does not aim 
to present a general theory of revolutions, later theorists have followed her approach and 
this has influenced the field to this day, in the way we define and pin down causes, and in 
what we expect to be revolutionary outcomes.  Scholars have engaged extensively with her 
Marxist and structuralist emphasis, and added critically or positively to her contribution, 
thus building the legacy on which current understandings of revolutions have been framed.   
 
                                                 
29 Discussed in Skocpol (1979) op cit., 6; Foran, J. ed. (2005) op cit., 10-11. 
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I give her work detailed attention here as an exemplar of the dominant strand of historical 
sociology in the third generation of scholarship on revolutions.  The main shift was a move 
to not only describe events but to analyse why revolutions happen when they do and also to 
investigate the causes of revolutions by comparing ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ 
revolutions. In this section I briefly outline some of her argumentation which is organised 
around her idea of “conjuncture”: the meeting of different social, economic, and political 
happenings from which revolutions are made.   
 
Skocpol and her adherents believe that revolutions cannot be made by people, but come 
about due to the position and performance of the state or ruling power in the wider economic, 
social, and political system.  A series of such factors produce a certain conjuncture in 
‘world time’ and an ensuing state crisis which paves the way for social transformation 
between the classes.  A key contribution of her work is that it brings the State centrally into 
the analysis of modern revolutions, deepening understandings which hitherto have been 
based solely on the historical description of socioeconomic conditions.30  In a break with 
what has gone before, Skocpol herself notes how she has “successfully hit scholars over the 
head” with what she feels is the obvious “centrality of state power and coercive 
organisations in all revolutions”.31 Undoubtedly the scholarly study of revolution needs such 
a hit over the head, but Skocpol’s choice of ‘weapon’ continues to be contested.   
 
In formulating her definition of revolution, Skocpol argues that complete revolutions require 
social and political transformations to take place due to a coincidence of “societal structural 
                                                 
30 Skocpol (1979) op cit. 
31 Skocpol (1994) op cit. 8. 
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change with class upheaval”.32  Skocpol argues that mere political revolutions happen when 
state structures change but social structures do not – and political revolutions are not 
necessarily accomplished through class conflict.33 She cites the seventeenth century English 
revolution as a good example of a political revolution, as sections of the dominant landed 
classes were in conflict with the monarchy, and this resulting in the introduction of the 
parliamentary system of government.  But, in Skocpol’s opinion, without real transformation 
between the social classes there is no revolution.  Anything outside her stricture on social 
revolutions is merely a changing of the guard, or political revolution, uprising, coup and so 
on.   
 
Skocpol’s own definition of social revolutions has stood the test of time and remains 
influential.  Skocpol’s definition is: 
 
Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class 
structures; and they are accompanied and, in part, carried through by class-based 
revolts from below.34 
 
This definition has remained influential in the analysis of modern revolutions.  Skocpol 
embeds the requirement for social class transformation (that is, a complete transformation 
of social class structures) as an essential component of the definition of social revolutions.  
This does a number of things at once.   
                                                 
32 Skocpol (1979) op cit., 4.  
33 Compare with Hanna Arendt who invoked Condorcet noting that the word revolution ‘can be applied only 
to revolutions whose aim is freedom’, Arendt, H. (1963/2006) On Revolution, Penguin edition, 19.    
34 Skocpol (1979) op cit., 4. 
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First, her definition is fundamentally aligned with Marxist conceptions of revolution. She 
clearly considers class-based struggle and transformation to be a fundamental feature of 
revolutions, although she does depart from Marx inasmuch as she does not see the French 
revolution of 1789 as being merely a bourgeois seizure of power.35  Skocpol gives due 
prominence to the role of the peasants, and thus, the transformation of agrarian structures, 
in the ‘great’ revolutions.36   
 
Second, and of vital importance, Skocpol’s definition requires us, therefore, to only consider 
revolutions retrospectively (and historically), and thus being contingent on the outcomes 
delivered.  This has the effect of occluding important aspects of revolutionary processes and 
situations which cannot be garnered from a study which proceeds to investigate only the 
causes of revolutions which are defined, in retrospect, by their outcomes.   
 
Third, as I have mentioned, her approach serves to relegate political revolutions to the 
periphery because they lack social class transformations.  Defining revolutions as being 
based on transformations between classes of people whereby the workers or peasantry, for 
                                                 
35Tucker, Robert, ed. (1978) The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, London & New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 595.  
36 In this Skocpol was influenced by Barrington Moore’s ground breaking Marxist-influenced study on The 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the making of the modern world, 
published in 1966; and given a sympathetic treatment in Skocpol’s critical review published in 1994 in 
Social Revolutions in the Modern World, op cit., 25-54.  See also: Wolf, E. (1975) ‘Peasants and Political 
Mobilization’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17:4, 385-38; and, for a rational choice theory 
influence see Scott, J. C. (1976) The Moral Economy of the Peasant: rebellion and subsistence in South East 
Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press.  For studies on the peasantry in the context of the Middle East see 
Beinin, J. (2001) Workers Peasants in the Modern Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Lawson, F. (1981) ‘Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt, 1820-1824’, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 13, 131-153; and for Iran see Abisaab, R. J.  (2016) ‘Peasant Uprisings in Astarabad: 
the Siyāh Pūshān [wearers of black], the Sayyids, and the Safavid State’, Iranian Studies, 49:3, 471-492.    
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example, gain power and own or redistribute property resonates historically, and may be 
how some revolutions play out, but this definition may not (and need not) fit all revolutions.  
Skocpol’s influence has resulted in a certain neglect in the scholarship as to transnational 
and differing kinds of liberation struggles which may not be in direct contention only with 
and in a bounded state context.   Generally the structuralist approach occludes any potential 
for detailed analysis of what people were saying and why they made and named a revolution, 
but we return to tackle such issues of popular politics from below later in this chapter and, 
methodologically, in the next chapter. 
 
Having flagged a possible definitional tautology of revolution in which the actual definition 
of revolution itself requires the inclusion of certain criteria relating to outcomes, we can 
move on to summarise how Skocpol maps the complex causal factors for revolution. Central 
to and privileged in her analysis is the state as an autonomous actor in the way it performs 
both in the domestic and in the wider international system.37 Skocpol forcefully argues that 
the state must be considered as the essential macro unit of analysis. In particular the state’s 
‘administrative and coercive organisations’ are a central aspect of her analysis of social 
revolutions.38  
 
Then, the importance of ‘world time’ is regarded as precipitative: historical events collide 
and combine to provide the elements for crisis.  In this way Skocpol pays homage to Marxist 
conceptions of history and the importance of history in ordering events and paving the way 
for crisis and change.  Once the state is in crisis, for example the fiscal crisis in France which 
                                                 
37 Skocpol (1979) op cit., 110-1. 
38 Skocpol (1979) op cit., 32-3. 
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preceded the revolution of 1789, the ensuing class struggle brings about a complete social 
transformation.39 Such crises opened up and worked with other factors to generate pressure 
toward change and led to political contestation from, in the case of France, the nobles and 
bourgeoisie and then the peasants, who seized on the uncertain political climate and the 
return of the Estates General system to advance their own causes.   
 
In summary, Skocpol’s study argues in each of her case studies that a series of unrelated 
macro-level structural factors worked together to enable a revolution to emerge. Skocpol 
concludes that successful social revolutions were “launched by crises centred in the 
structures and situations of the state of the Old Regimes”.40 This ‘conjuncture’ resulted in 
the meeting of a state crisis at home with economic and political vulnerability in the 
international system.  In this sense she offers some generalised patterns for social 
revolutions.  Skocpol thus established herself as the leading proponent of a structural, state-
centric, explanation and analysis of revolutions.  Subsequent theorists have either defended 
and built on her work, such as Jeffery Goodwin,41 or become her critics, such as William 
Sewell, who reflects on the importance of ideology in the French revolution,42 as well as 
Jack Goldstone, who is critical of her structuralist argumentation.43 
 
The structuralist school of thought on revolutions has dominated the literature and the 
theoretical study of revolutions.  Whether intentionally or not, the historical sociological 
                                                 
39 Skocpol (1979) op cit., 23-24. 
40 Skocpol (1979) op cit., 111. 
41 Goodwin, J. & Skocpol, T. (1989) ‘Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World’, Politics 
and Society, 17:4, December, 489-507.  
42 Skocpol, T. (1994) op cit., 169-198. 
43 Goldstone, J. (1980) ‘Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation’, World Politics, 32:3, April, 425-453. 
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study of revolution has set up subsequent research on revolution along the lines of the 
structure versus agency debates.44  This is problematic for two connected reasons.  First, it 
encourages choosing between two supposedly divergent explanatory paths.  Second, this 
binary obscures directions for exploring the dynamic relations between state, institutions, 
political actors, and the public or ‘ordinary’ people.  Later in this chapter I will bring together 
the strands of scholarship on revolutions and ideology.   
For now, I note that such debates have informed moves within academia to further fine-tune 
the methods and tools for the study of revolution.  These developments are captured in the 
fourth wave of scholarship on revolutions.  This new scholarship sought to respond to some 
of the limits in Skocpol’s structural commitments in order to rebalance attention to agency, 
in tune with structural factors, by looking more closely at organised mobilisation and the 
influence of ideas and culture in revolutions, among other variables.    
 
Fourth generation  
Building and improving on the third wave of historical-sociological approaches, political 
scientists such as John Foran nurtured new scholarly contributions in a ‘fourth generation’ 
of study through the 1990s and beyond.45 These studies attempted to pursue inquiry into the 
“somewhat interrelated areas of agency, structural considerations, and the place of culture 
and ideology in revolution”.46 It is in this wave of scholarship that the competition between 
structure and agency gains pace, and from which we witness the emergence of new 
                                                 
44 See Pleasants, N. for problems regarding the structure/agency debate:  Pleasants, N. (1997) ‘Free to act 
otherwise? A Wittgensteinian deconstruction of the concept of agency in contemporary social and political 
theory’, History of the Human Sciences 10:4, 1–28; and a response in dialogue with Colin Hay on same: 
Pleasants, N. (2009) ‘Structure, Agency and Ontological Confusion: A Response to Hay’, Political Studies, 
57, 885-891. 
45 Foran, J. (1993) ‘Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?’  Sociological Theory, 
11:1, March, 1-20. 
46 Foran, J. (1993) ibid., 6.  
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theorising on social mobilisation and political contention.  This last development will be 
given particular and more detailed attention here as it encompasses an influential and, in 
many aspects, productive mode of study.  Finally, I will discuss some of the benefits and 
shortcomings of this generation of scholarship, and the possible application of these 
theoretical and conceptual tools to my own research.  
 
A key driver for reflection on the study of modern revolutions was, of course, the emergence 
of revolutions across the globe and beyond our own Eurocentric confines.  In particular, 
John Foran’s theoretical treatment of ‘Third World’ revolutions such as those which 
occurred in Latin America, Asia and Africa, concentrated our attention on relatively 
neglected and variegated modern revolutions.  Foran recognises that there are problems with 
an imposed duality between structure and agency approaches, and states that he and others 
made attempts to try to ‘explode it’ in a way which opened up new thinking on revolutions 
which “blends culture and political economy”.47 Nevertheless, revolutions, for Foran, are 
still defined by an assumed outcome: “in terms of taking and holding state power long 
enough to engage in a project of social transformation”, and he gives the ‘successful’ 
examples of Mexico 1910-1920, China 1911-1949, Cuba 1953-59, Iran 1977-9, and 
Nicaragua 1977-79. 48  Again, this requirement of outcome in definitions of revolution 
presupposes that only some revolutions are worthy of study, and then only in retrospect. 
Thus it reproduces some of the problematic approaches we see in Skocpol’s study.   
 
                                                 
47 Foran, J. (2005) Taking power: on the origins of third world revolutions, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2.   
48 Foran (2005) ibid., 227. 
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However, Foran’s scholarship is an important advance which ties in with other attempts 
within the scholarship on revolutions which aim to shine a light on the mobilisation of people 
in revolutions.  Within this broadly conceived field of social mobilisation theory, Charles 
Tilly and Sidney Tarrow are prominent exponents.49  They manage to decouple some of the 
distinctive and very different aspects of a revolution and to introduce new conceptual tools 
for its study. 50  They have enriched scholarship and remain pertinent to a study of 
revolutionary actors because the tools they promote offer us some useful ways to look at 
revolutionary processes or revolutions in train. I will therefore examine their ideas in more 
detail.   
 
Tilly and Tarrow treat political contention in the variegated ways in which it is present in 
the everyday, but also in the context of analysing complex revolutions.51  In this section I 
will attend to their later scholarship on revolution and political contention (this will 
necessarily be selective as their research spans decades and makes a number of turns).  I will 
pick out some of the most influential conceptual ideas that have emerged from their work 
and draw out some of its possible limits, at least for the purposes of this research.   
 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s scholarship has given more attention to revolutionary 
processes and to so-called agency dimensions.  We can usefully compare their definition of 
                                                 
49 See the founding study: McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. & Tilly, C. (2001) Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  There are later editions and divergent studies relating to the same, as I discuss 
now. 
50 Tilly, C. & Tarrow, S. (2007), Contentious Politics, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 155. 
51 Casting the conceptual net as wide as to include all kinds of political contention has drawn criticism which 
they have responded to in subsequent publications. 
30 
 
a revolution to that of Skocpol’s, which we discussed earlier.  For Tilly and Tarrow a 
revolution is: 
 
[t]he forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct 
blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some 
significant portion of the population subject to the state’s jurisdiction acquiesces in 
the claims of each bloc.52  
 
As discussed earlier, Skocpol’s method shows a tendency to link the definition of 
‘revolution’ with that of ‘required outcomes’ in her structural treatment of revolutions.  To 
illuminate the refinement in their definition, Tilly and Tarrow introduce new terms so as to 
recognise different aspects of a revolution. For example: a ‘revolutionary situation’ as 
distinctive from a ‘revolutionary outcome’, thus opening up the internal processes of 
revolutions.  In focusing more on aspects of mobilisation, and on the political actors, these 
scholars have helpfully aided a more nuanced understanding of revolutions.  They argue that 
both revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes require an examination of how the 
state interacts with and reacts to political contention, on its various defined levels. In doing 
so they introduce the idea of ‘multiple sovereignty’ which emerges within a revolutionary 
situation and in which differing claims and interests are represented.53 Once contention 
reaches a level whereby it is challenging the state’s legitimacy then a revolutionary situation 
has evolved in which different actors are contending for power.   
 
                                                 
52 Tilly & Tarrow (2007) ibid., 155. 
53 Tilly & Tarrow (2007) ibid., 10-14. 
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Tilly’s and Tarrow’s work remains influential, with the increase in scholarly attention to 
social movements, because it draws attention to the possible investigation of the different 
groupings within a revolution, the interests they seek to protect, and the claims they are 
making.  Tilly and Tarrow thus succeed in moving away from classical Marxist 
configurations limited to class relations to consider a wider variegated set of actors involved 
in political upheaval and contention.  However, their conceptual approach tends to introduce 
other problems, not least in the way they seem to revert to a rational actor model of analysis 
in which individual interests are pursued and isolated.  So we can still find limitations in the 
application of the mobilisation theorists to fully allow for a study of revolutionary agents, 
their political thought and their ideas. As we can see from their definition above, Tilly and 
Tarrow continue to adhere to dominant trends in the study of revolutions.  They tend to tie 
considerations of mobilisation to a research-imperative to pin down the causes of revolutions 
and focus inquiry on the state.54     
 
A revolutionary outcome or complete revolution occurs, according to these mobilisation 
theorists, when there are an increasing number of regime defectors from the ruling elites, 
when the revolutionaries gain arms, and when there are significant numbers of military 
defectors from the regime.55  Significantly, though, and related to the multiple sovereignty 
claims, in their work a central requirement is that revolutionaries gain control of the state 
apparatus in negotiation between regime elements and the revolutionaries. 56  The 
                                                 
54 As does Jeff Goodwin whose definition is thus: “a relatively rapid and fundamental change not only to 
state institutions, but also of the economic, cultural, and associational arrangements among the population 
governed by those institutions”.  In Foran, J. (1997) op cit., 30, n1. 
55 I note here too that this seems to focus our attention on revolutions involving high levels of political 
violence.  I cannot pursue this focus further here but scholarship on the so-called negotiated revolutions can 
be instructive.  See Lawson, G. (2004) Negotiated revolutions: the Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
56 Tilly & Tarrow (2007) op cit., 155-6. 
32 
 
mobilisation scholars continue to reserve the revolutionary name tag for “a revolutionary 
situation with a revolutionary outcome”.57 
 
The approaches outlined here improve on the first two waves of literature which 
concentrated on empirical historical work and a psychological propensity for violence, 
respectively.  The most influential literature has been discussed and the main arguments 
referred to regarding the ways in which political scientists have been influenced by scientific 
approaches to codifying and setting out the essential and variable attributes of a revolution.  
In the third generation of scholarship we see the domination of historical sociology.  
Bringing social and economic history into the analysis added crucially important historical 
context, but it also forced the discipline into studying things that are ‘complete’, as historians 
do, and then relied on and codified the outcomes of these ‘experiments’, as scientists do.  
Anne Norton’s critical essay on the joining of politics with history provides a good basis for 
a critical assessment of the contribution of the historical sociologists, as she asserts the need 
for an “alternative, disruptive, conception of time” to allow for the reality that human 
activity, and politics, “is never smooth, uniform and uninterrupted”.58 
 
The fourth generation sought to accommodate the more messy and contingent business of 
revolutions, in particular through attention to the actions of humans and so-called ‘agency’ 
in tandem with analysis of the state and the social classes.  However, I also noted that despite 
these efforts and advances in thinking about the place of people, their ideas, and the wider 
ideational contexts in which they operate, there is still an over-emphasis on structural factors 
around the role and place of the state and the social classes.  Within this tradition there 
                                                 
57 Tilly & Tarrow (2007) op cit., 155. 
58 Norton, A. (2010) ‘Politics against History: Temporal Distortions in the Study of Politics’, Political 
Studies, 58, 349.  
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remains a compulsion for focusing on causation and on producing a single theory which 
generalises across diverse and complex social and political activity. This wave of scholars 
thus remained wedded, in important ways, to an approach which assumed that it is possible 
to prove and to measure and to generalize, or provide an overarching theory of revolution. 
In such theories, in as much as people or agents have been studied, there seems nevertheless 
to be a tendency to reduce them to units of analysis protecting interests and making rational-
actor decisions. Thus the claims of the fourth wave and of the social mobilisation theorists 
to be bringing agency back in are at best partial if those agents mostly form units of analysis 
for, albeit reconfigured, structural treatments of revolutions. 
 
A constant omission in the study of revolutions has been to simply look at ideas in a 
particular period of time, in this case in Syria’s revolution, to see what is happening, what 
people are saying and what ideas they are acting upon.  This does not require us to prove 
that individual or collective ideas caused a revolution, let alone require it to first successfully 
‘deliver’.  The study of revolution has suffered from and continues to suffer from certain 
methodological ‘blinkers’ which are reproduced by new scholars drawing on the established 
canon of scholarship on revolution.  This has the effect of regurgitating the same narrow set 
of questions and can directly block off other important research avenues.  Revolutions, 
regardless of the final outcomes, always comprise of and institute important political and 
social change (for good or bad).   
 
While we can agree that the macro level social and political factors in revolutions are 
crucially important, not every angle of research must be limited to these methodological 
paths.  For example, it is okay to recognise the macro and structural findings and then to 
investigate something different, especially where this departure might shine a more 
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significant light on the people who do the marching, protesting, organising and fighting in 
revolutions.  This shift to the ‘raw material’, the ideas of collectives and of people rising up, 
requires that we think about the ideological aspects and political dimensions of their actions.   
 
Despite some important contributions and valid argumentation, we are still far behind in our 
thinking on people and their ideas and practices within revolutions.59  This is because any 
analysis of ideas, or the ideologies which contain them, has always relied on the extent to 
which ideas may have caused revolutions.  If political scientists cannot prove that ideas 
caused a particular revolution or show any patterns to illustrate as much, then ideas are 
crossed off the researchers’ list as an avenue of exploration.  This hinders learning about the 
complex processes and practices emerging within a particular revolution. Such knowledge 
is of itself really worthy of study – given the complex political thinking and human sacrifices 
which underpin many revolutions.  However, before we can look properly at this in the 
context of Syria, it is important to set out the conventional scholarship and history of the 
study of ideology.  I do this now. 
  
                                                 
59 Though there has been some welcome new scholarship since I conducted this literature review and in 
particular the latest Arab revolutions.  Much of this has gone to press in the final stages of my writing up and 
thus it has not been possible to incorporate it here. In particular see Chalcraft, J. (2016) Popular Politics in 
the Making of the Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  I discuss this and other recent 
contributions later in this chapter. 
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II The study of ideology 
 
Scholarship on ideology has traditionally emanated from the same political science research 
as that conducted on revolution. 60   Perhaps not surprisingly, then, we can find some 
important overlaps and similarities in their epistemological and methodological approaches 
to the study of revolution and ideology.  In this section I focus on the conventional study 
and history of ideology. This ranges across the historiography of the study of ideology from 
its first appearance in the Enlightenment and French Revolution onwards, and the key ways 
in which the concept was solidified and came to be considered pejoratively in the twentieth 
century. I also show how Marxist conceptions of ideology have been influential. I briefly 
summarise innovations which have emerged in a broadly post Marxist and poststructuralist 
school of thought.  I reference the influence of discourse theory and linguistic philosophy.  
I then move on to join the thinking about ideology to that of the study of revolution more 
explicitly. 
 
The earliest discussion of the word ‘ideology’ is attributed to the scientist Antoine Destutt 
de Tracy in his work on the Elements d’Ideologie which promoted the scientific (rational) 
study of ideas.   The notion of ideology was first considered in the philosophical debates of 
the Enlightenment period and the 1789 French revolution.61 It gained a particular political 
currency when the Enlightenment ‘ideologues’ established a programme for the ‘teaching 
of ideas’ grounded in science and invoking Universalist principles.  In tracing the conceptual 
                                                 
60 Re the problem of ideology for political scientists see Connolly, W.E. (1967/2008) Political Science and 
Ideology, New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction.  
61Stråth, B. ‘Ideology and Conceptual History’, in Freeden, M. & Stears, M. (2013) The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-4. 
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history of ideology, Bo Stråth notes how the subsequent French counter-revolutionary 
period called into question the role of the ideologues - Napoleon saw to it that they were 
undermined and condemned as “whimsical dreamers”.62  The result of this offensive was a 
turn away from intellectuals and the entrapment of politics within the narrowly defined 
political realm of government.  This period is thus notable for the shifting of the position of 
ideology towards a mere “label for unrealistic theories that tried to intervene in the sphere 
of government and political action”.63   
 
In the twentieth century ideology was commonly regarded in the pejorative and this position 
was later sustained, in different ways, through the legacy of Marx and Engels.  In particular 
The German Ideology, once translated and made available from 1932, became influential in 
crafting understandings of ideology until our present time.64  In the first of two volumes, 
written between 1845 and 1846, Marx and Engels discuss ‘ruling ideas’ and also 
‘revolutionary ideas’; terms which signalled their conception of ideas, and ideology, and 
their conviction in the project of communism.  In their analysis (and critique) of capitalist 
societies and the system of the ruling and bourgeoisie elite, ideas are produced and promoted 
by powerful elites to maintain power and domination.  In this sense Marx and Engels make 
an important point about ideas circulating in society in that they “associate ideology [and by 
extension ideas] with class”, that is, a ruling class, but in ways which mean that ideas were 
instruments of control.65 In its classic Marxist conception, ideology, as a pejorative and 
unitary structure, is attached to a bourgeoisie acting to maximise its own interests over the 
working class.   
                                                 
62 Stråth (2013) ibid., 4. 
63 Stråth (2013) ibid., 5. 
64 Here I reference extracts from ‘The German Ideology, Part I in: Tucker, R. C. ed. (1978) The Marx-Engels 
Reader, second edition, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Co.  
65 Freeden, M. (2003) Ideology: A Very short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6. 
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However, as these mentions of revolutionary ideas might suggest, there are possibilities to 
break out of this system of complete oppression.  This can be achieved when the working 
class or the proletariat gain a collective consciousness.  One aspect of Marx’s conception of 
ideology is that the workers are unaware of their ‘false consciousness’ because of a distorted 
social world in which, as in Marx’s camera obscura analogy, the bourgeoisie appears to be 
acting in the interest of the people (the workers, the proletariat) but is merely protecting and 
promoting the narrow interests (the means of production, land and property ownership) of 
the ruling elites.  Those in power use ideology to dominate and control and to create an all-
encompassing truth and validity.66 Once the ideological cover of capitalism is exposed the 
workers can organise and become conscious of their own reality and their own real interests.   
 
There were other influential currents which came later and which provided equally negative 
treatments of ideology.  In the twentieth century ideology came to be primarily associated 
negatively with the worst political excesses of communism, the totalitarian ideologies of the 
Soviet Union and the binaries of the Cold War.  This drive to banish ideologies was, of 
course, further reinforced by the experience of European fascism and the coming to power 
of the Nazis.  In the latter half of the twentieth century a school of thought emerged which 
promoted the notion of the ‘end of ideology’, at least, that is, the end of ideological 
competition and contestation, and the triumph of liberalism. 67   This sentiment was 
reinvigorated with the fall of communism and the Berlin Wall.  After the Second World War 
it was the political ideology of liberalism, in its various strains, that formed the hegemonic 
system of government at home and as part of an international system of states. Increasingly 
                                                 
66 Freeden (2003) ibid., 6. 
67 Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Avon. 
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there has been an assumption that the ‘failure’ of a broadly conceived left and/or socialist 
current (at least in Europe, but also beyond) meant the end of competing and destructive 
ideologies and the triumph of liberalism, leading to declarations of the ‘end of ideology’.68  
 
Challenges to an assumed status quo came in the form of, for example, the events of May 
1968 in Paris, 69  rising feminist movements, as well as the significant decolonization 
processes and the attendant emergence of a critical school of postcolonial studies.70 Despite 
this increasing political contestation, an assumed age of consensus and an end to political 
contest ensued.  From within the scholarship critical responses to a new order, of 
neoliberalism, emerged in particular from the sub-field of political theory which questioned 
the assumptions that underpinned it.   
 
The linguistic turn and discourse theory 
The unleashing of more complex social and political currents paved the way for new critical 
approaches to thinking about ideology and the internal contents of ideologies. 71   New 
academic schools of thought and new methodological approaches emerged from the 1960s, 
influencing and cutting across the different disciplines.  In particular, we saw the so-called 
                                                 
68 For the original thesis see: Bell, D. (1962) The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in 
the Fifties, New York: Free Press. 
69 For a detailed and fascinating journalistic treatment of this see Seale, P. & McConville, M. (1968) French 
Revolution 1968, Hammondsworth: Penguin. 
70 I pick up on this literature and the debates within it and around it later in this chapter.   
71 See discussion by Torfing, J. (2005) ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges’, in 
Howarth, D. & Torfing, J. Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, 
Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 1-32.  Key among the adherents of the earlier school of critical discourse 
analysis was: Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press; and, Fairclough, 
N. (1994) Critical Discourse Analysis, London: Longman. 
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linguistic turn72 in philosophy, and (later) the insight which ‘post-analytical’ philosophy73 
afforded together with post-Marxist directions in political science and theory.  These 
linguistic investigations led to all sorts of philosophical questions about meanings in context, 
and in text, and theoretical innovation in ‘speech-act theory’ and in contextualism;74 shifting 
away from abstract analysis and classical Marxist explanation.  
 
Quentin Skinner developed some of these philosophical ideas; in particular, later 
Wittgenstein and Austin’s speech-act approach, which Skinner refashioned and extended 
for theorising about political thought in history.75  Aletta Norval has conducted an in depth 
analysis of this subfield, in which she notes: 
 
The later Wittgenstein’s understanding of language as a social activity, and Austin’s 
work on the ‘illocutionary force’ of language served to open up new areas of 
analysis, and new methodological approaches to the study of political thought and 
its relation to action in specific historical contexts. Skinner’s work on the role of 
virtú in Machiavelli’s The Prince is a case in point. Of great importance is the 
emphasis on exploring the languages of politics in terms of prevailing conventions, 
                                                 
72 For the idea of the ‘linguistic turn’ , see Rorty, R.M. ed. (1967/1992), The Linguistic Turn: essays in 
philosophical method, with two retrospective essays, Chicago: University of Chicago; and, discussion in 
Cameron, D. (2006) ‘Ideology and Language’, Journal of Political Ideologies, June, 11:2, 141- 152, n1; van 
Dijk, T. A.(1998/2000) Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (reprint), London, California, New Dehli: 
Sage; Norval, A. (2013) ‘Poststructuralist conceptions of ideology’, in Freeden, M., Sargent, L. T. & Stears, 
M. eds. (2013) The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, 155-174. 
73 See the collection by Rajchman, J. & West, C. eds. (1985) Post-Analytic Philosophy, New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
74 On method see Skinner, Q (2002) Visions of Politics: Volume 1: Regarding Method, Cambridge 
University Press; Wittgensteinian contextualism has recently been developed by Charles Travis, see Travis, 
C. (2001) Unshadowed thought, Cambridge MA: Harvard. 
75 Palonen, K. (2003) Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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including shared vocabularies, principles, assumptions, criteria for testing 
knowledge-claims, problems, conceptual distinctions, and so on.76 
 
This illustrates the turn towards thinking about words, or ideas, and to investigations which 
took into account the possible ‘meaning in use’. 77  This meant that the philosophical 
treatment of ordinary conventions or ‘language-games’, 78  was borrowed by theorists 
seeking innovative avenues and modes of inquiry.79 Norval, for example, draws on James 
Tully’s analysis of Skinner to extract ideas about the important connections between 
language and ideology: 
 
expressly argued for in Skinner’s work is an understanding of ideology as nothing 
other than a language of politics deployed to legitimate political action and to 
establish and/or alter a society’s moral identity. From this perspective, the analysis 
                                                 
76 Norval, A. (2000) ‘The Things We Do with Words – Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of 
Ideology’, British Journal of Political Science, 30:2, 319. 
77 See section 43 in Wittgenstein for the origin of this idea: Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical 
Investigations, I, 3rd edn., trans Anscombe, G. E. M., New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 20-21. It has 
been much developed since; see for example Scheman, N. (1996) ‘Forms of life: Mapping the rough 
ground’, in Sluga, H. D. & Stern, D. G., The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 383-410.   
78 See especially sections 7 & 23 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, ibid. 
79 The leading proponents of ‘ordinary language’ philosophy were J. L. Austin, P.F. Strawson, and, to some 
extent L. Wittgenstein himself. Questions on the extent to which the sub-field of political theory has really 
engaged with the work of these philosophers are provoked by Gunnell, J.G. (2011) Political Theory and 
Social Science: Cutting Against the Grain, in which he takes political theorists to task for, he claims, 
superficially employing Wittgenstein in their work.  Some of the poststructuralist theorists (most notably, 
Lyotard, J.F. (1979) La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir. Paris: Éditions de Minuit), certainly 
borrow from Wittgenstein, not necessarily unproblematically, to sharpen their analyses and to productively 
depart from limiting and problematic metanarratives and limiting political discourses.  As we shall see in 
Chapter Two, Connolly is influenced by Wittgenstein and other key figures in the ‘linguistic turn’, and, 
Freeden makes use of Wittgenstein’s ideas such as ‘family resemblance’, but Freeden’s method of locating 
the concept in its ideational context appears to differ from what Wittgenstein's approach would have been; 
see Freeden, M. (1996) op cit., 73 n42, 89-91.  For a more recent, ambitious, analysis of the political 
implications of and possible application of Wittgenstein with reference to the ‘dialogical’ approaches of 
Skinner, Taylor and Tully see Temelini, M. (2015) Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. For some limits to Temelini’s approach, see Harkin, J. & Read, R. (2016) 
‘Review of Michael Temelini’s Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics’, The Review of Politics, 78:2, 329-
331. 
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of ideologies must proceed through a careful, historically informed conceptual 
analysis.80 
 
Skinner’s intellectual oeuvre is vast but he does usefully update and bring his canonical 
contributions together in a volume dedicated to method and interpretation of texts which 
uses Wittgenstein and Austin to argue for analysis which investigates not what was merely 
said but what were agents actually doing and what might they have meant in a particular 
context. 81  This utilises Austin’s ‘performative’ aspect of language, and his helpful 
distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions of ‘speech 
acts’.  In particular the illocutionary force of a word in use can indicate something beyond 
the text.  For example, when a person says ‘I do’ in the ceremony of marriage he or she is 
doing something very significant: entering into a contractual marriage arrangement.82   
  
I cannot elucidate further here and I am not suggesting that these philosophers alone, or a 
unitary reliance on Skinner’s method83, can be used to build a theory or framework for the 
distinctly political project of looking at ideas in revolutions.  Rather their influence on 
political thinking is often implicit in ‘borrowings’ from the language philosophers to 
enhance analytical thinking in political theory.  For the purposes of my research, I flag this 
linguistic turn because language and the study of the politics of language is central to 
                                                 
80 Norval (2000) ibid., 319-320. The quotation continues, “[Freeden’s] approach resonates in important 
respects with the work of other contemporary writers on ideology who draw on Gramscian post-Marxist and 
poststructuralist traditions of thinking.”  I come to dealing with Michael Freeden in Chapter Two.  Norval 
also goes on to link Gramsci’s interest in shared conceptions of the world directly to Wittgenstein’s interest 
in shared forms of language and of life. 
81 Skinner, Q. (2002) Chapter Six: ‘Interpretation and the understanding of speech acts’, Vision of Politics: 
Volume I: Regarding Method, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 103-104  
82 Austin, J.L. (1979) ‘Performative Utterances’, Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
233-252. 
83 Skinner (2002) op cit. 
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understanding ideologies and ideas.  I now look briefly at the subsequent growth of a sub-
field of discourse theory which also tackles the study of ideologies in new ways.   
 
These ideas have provided stimulating modes of inquiry most significantly in the emergence 
of Discourse Theory which has been influenced too by new Marxist directions.  One of the 
most influential writers on ideology since Marx is the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci.84 
One of his contributions was to reconstitute the theory of ideologies so that they could be 
understood on a number of levels.  The idea of state dominance through coercion was only 
one way of understanding the ways in which capitalist societies sustained power.  Another 
important aspect was that the ruling elite were able to garner and maintain continuing 
consent (and therefore domination) through non-state mechanisms.  This hegemony might 
thus be achieved and maintained by the appearance of contest between elites in civil society 
and through the media, for example. Equally, state hegemony might also be contested or 
countered in a number of ways.  
 
The discourse theorists85 were influential in moving beyond a well-established school of 
critical discourse analysis,86 to rethink ideology (beyond critical approaches which aimed to 
‘uncover’ hidden ideological dispositions in our speeches and our texts).  This recognised 
that ideologies are embedded and ubiquitous but that they are not merely formed and 
                                                 
84 Hoare, Q & Nowell Smith, G. eds (1971/1986 reprint) Selections from Prison the Notebooks of Antonio 
Gramsci, London: Lawrence & Wishart.   
85 Norval, A.(2000) ‘The Things We Do with Words – Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of 
Ideology’, in British Journal of Political Science, 30:2, 2000, 313-346; and, poststructuralist approaches are 
well-articulated and put to use by Martin, J. (2005) ‘Ideology and antagonism in modern Italy’: 
Poststructuralist Reflections, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8:2, 145-160; 
also, a useful introductory textbook on poststructuralism is: Finlayson, A. & Valentine, J. (2002) Politics and 
Post-structuralism: An Introduction, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
86 Key among the adherents of the earlier school of critical discourse analysis were: Fairclough, N. (1992) 
Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press; and, Fairclough, N. (1994) Critical Discourse 
Analysis, London: Longman. 
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maintained by ruling elites in formal and party politics, but also in many other dimensions 
of our everyday lives.87 Thus we needed to make efforts at decoding ideologies as “part and 
parcel of the run-of-the-mill thinking about politics”.88 An emerging school of discourse 
theory has subsequently ‘reinscribed’ our understanding of ideologies as being a “decentred 
conception of structure and of subjectivity, developed within the context of a systematic 
engagement with language and the symbolic dimensions of political practices”. 89   In 
particular, the radical ideas of the theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantelle Mouffe exemplify 
the post-Marxist school which sought to unsettle and unseat structuralist and foundational 
analyses.90  
 
These theorists were influenced by Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony but took them in new post-
Marxist directions so as to begin “the process of re-appropriation of an intellectual tradition, 
as well as the process of going beyond it”.91 The work of Laclau and Mouffe needs to be 
considered in the context of their re-articulation of the interaction of the social (ie. social 
classes) and the political (ie. adversarial political contestation).  There is not the space for 
us to elaborate on their expansive and influential work, but it has been a central influence 
and driver of the emerging field of ‘discourse theory’.92  Their critique provides ways of 
                                                 
87 Torfing, J. (2005) ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges’, in Howarth, D. & 
Torfing, J. Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 7. 
88 Freeden, M. (2013) ‘Language, Interpretation, and Ideology’, in Leopold, D. & Stears, eds. M. Political 
Theory: Methods and approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 196-215. 
89 Norval A. (2013) ‘Poststructuralist Conceptions of Ideology’, in Freeden, M., Sargent, L.T. & Stears, M. 
eds. The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 156, 
90 See Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985/2014) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Polity, second edn., London, New York: Verso, xi.  The philosophical aspects are considered in 
Laclau, E. (no date) ‘Philosophical Roots of Discourse Theory’, Archived Papers, Centre for Theoretical 
Studies: University of Essex.  
91 Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985/2014) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Polity, second edition. London, New York: Verso, xi.  
92 Prominent among the theorists on discourse and ideology were Mouffe and Laclau, ibid; see also: 
Howarth, D. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’, 1-23, in 
Howarth, D., Norval, A. & Stavrakakis, Y. eds (2000) Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, 
hegemonies and social change, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
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moving beyond seemingly inadequate classical Marxist and structural frames, towards a 
consideration of the shifting empirical reality of our increasingly complex and globalised 
world.93   
 
Studying ideologies and revolution in the Arab world 
The developments outlined above are pertinent to the study of dignity in Syria’s revolution 
on a number of interrelated levels.  Firstly, the post-Marxist direction helps us to consider 
revolutions beyond Marxist configurations, a problem we discussed in the first section of 
this chapter. In Marxian and classical Marxist formations, revolutions were analysed based 
on assumptions about the nature and role of social classes and the role of the state.  As I 
summarised earlier, this has limited our vision of the full revolutionary picture. In the 
(broadly Gramscian) move beyond formal politics and narrow, unitary conceptions of a 
bourgeoisie or elite-led dominant ideology, we can think productively about more complex 
manifestations of ideology and the ideas that make them up.  We can consider possible 
counter-hegemonic aspects of ideologies: ways that ideas might serve to counter and 
challenge the dominant power.  Centrally for this research project, if we pursue such an 
approach to ideas we necessarily move closer to agents and their thought-practices (and 
positionality).  Along this path, we can explore efforts to interrupt dominant power structures 
and counter embedded, hegemonic discourses.94  
 
However, we might raise the question here concerning to what extent seemingly context-
specific European theoretical projects that stemmed from a crisis in the European left, with 
                                                 
93 For differing applications of DT see the collection in Howarth, D., Norval, A. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) 
Discourse theory and political analysis: Identities, hegemonies and social change, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.   
94 The whole topic of counterhegemonic struggle is covered well by Chalcraft, J. & Noonan, Y. eds. (2007) 
Counterhegemony in the colony and postcolony, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan, especially the introduction, 1-
19. 
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its particular traditions, can be drawn on in the study of a revolution occurring outside any 
properly democratic and party political structures, as is the case with Syria.  There have been 
several very recent studies published reflecting and responding to the full weight of the latest 
Arab revolutions which help tackle such questions and which might accommodate my own 
research approach.  In recent years scholars of the Middle East have also tapped into these 
same poststructuralist debates and offered innovative approaches which move beyond some 
of the most common methods of research based on political economy and state 
authoritarianism.  John Chalcraft and Yaseen Noorani address conceptions of hegemonic 
power in their edited volume: Counterhegemony in the Colony and Postcolony.95  John 
Chalcraft picks up these questions too in his latest work on popular politics in the Middle 
East.  He draws on some aspects of Gramsci to forge the conceptual tools to put to use in a 
study of ‘bottom up politics’.96   
 
Charles Tripp attends to the same question by providing detailed insights into a “politics of 
resistance in action”,97 reinvigorating the field of study and tracing concrete examples of the 
variegated politics and culture of resistance in the Middle East, which has long been present.  
For Tripp these creative ‘paths of resistance’ — from graffiti to art installations and rap 
music, all the way through to taking up arms - feature as resolutely political acts.98  Part of 
this turn to the performative and creative articulations of resistance,99 for example, has 
benefitted from the later theoretical and linguistic developments I have outlined above.  In 
                                                 
95 Chalcraft, J. & Noorani, Y. eds. (2007) Counterhegemony in the colony and postcolony, Hants: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
96 Chalcraft, J. (2016) op cit. 
97 Tripp, C. (2013) The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in the Middle East, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2. 
98 On this, refer to back to my comments in the thesis introduction about agental claims to be apolitical. 
99 See also Tripp, C. (2013a) ‘Performing the Public: Theatres of Power in the Middle East’, Constellations, 
20:2, 203-216; and, Ismail, S. (2011) ‘The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation’, in 
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 11:3, 538-549 
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particular the recognition of the extent to which the whole field of contestation is, to a 
notable degree, fluid: bounded by social and political context, but not radically determined 
or structured in the ways perhaps supposed by Marx or Althusser.100  Such scholarship, 
argues Chalcraft, straddles a vast and rich terrain, attending to “subjectivity, representation, 
cultural creativity, identities, frames and principles”.101  
 
New directions of study of the Middle East region have been limited, hitherto, by a narrow 
focus on, for example, studying the region solely through a lens of economic determinism 
or political economy.  These moves have enriched scholarship over the last decades and the 
latest round of Arab revolutions have served to recalibrate and return scholars to attend to 
such topics.  More broadly, the utility of the canon of western theory and scholarship in the 
study and deepening understanding of the Middle East, or non-western world, is a perennial 
question. I cannot tackle all the methodological issues here but return to this topic again in 
Chapter Two in light of developments in and methodological insight within political theory 
and, in particular, within the framework of Comparative Political Theory (CPT).  
 
To summarise this section, the conventional study of ideology had frequently been premised 
on the idea that ideological competition can be dissolved and a consensus-led, pragmatic 
form of governing society can pertain.  This is reflected in the scholarly study of ideology 
claimed by researchers as an ‘objective detachment’, as if they existed outside this 
phenomenon of ‘ideology’ which they examined. As we shall see in Chapter Two, the 
approach I take for this research raises more general objections to this epistemological blind 
                                                 
100 See Althusser, L. (1971/2008) Chapter One: ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (notes towards 
an investigation)’, On Ideology, London, New York: Verso, 1-60.  
101 Chalcraft (2016) op cit., 16. 
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spot.102  This objective distance is not possible if we consider that ideology, or rather 
ideologies, are ubiquitous parts of our social and political world. In this conception and 
interpretation, ideologies can be positive or negative; they are complex constructions which 
help to organise and define, and therefore distinguish different outlooks, priorities and so 
on.   
 
I have briefly indicated some influential developments in political theory and an emerging 
sub-field of discourse theory in which we find the coming together of the study of ideology 
with the realization that it is necessary to attend both to the ways in which ideologies might 
be understood (which I do shortly, in my discussion of Freeden’s study of ideologies in 
Chapter 2) and how ideas need language.  Language intersects with ideologies and is central 
to the way in which ideas and beliefs are articulated, contested, and may become hegemonic 
as part of an established ideological tradition or pattern. I have then sought to join up this 
thinking and to start to put it in conversation with new scholarship on the Middle East. 
However, before I can set out my own approach to this research study, I first need to bring 
the different strands of ideology and revolution together. 
 
 
III Ideology and revolution 
 
A good starting point in a consideration of the interplay between revolution and ideologies 
is to examine the scholarship on the Iranian revolution of 1979 and, in particular, the specific 
debates which emerged from it in relation to the role that ideologies might play.  The year 
                                                 
102 For discussion on the positionality of social scientists see MacIntyre, A. (1973) ‘Ideology, Social Science, 
And Revolution’, Comparative Politics, Special Issue on Revolution and Social Change, April, 5:3, 321-342. 
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Skocpol’s 1979 study on social revolutions was published coincided with the Iranian (and 
Nicaraguan) revolutions.  Iran later became a subject of her research and of heated debate. 
Skocpol’s paper on the ‘Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution’ was 
published and came in for criticism from Nikkie Keddie, among others.103 In particular 
Keddie criticised her for not giving due attention to the ideological influences on the Iranian 
revolution.104 These debates return us, in part, to the so-called structure-agency conundrum 
which I flagged earlier in this chapter and which I turn to now.   
 
I focus first on Skocpol as a central figure in the structural school.  I introduce some specific 
points she has made about her position regarding this debate, and I then draw in one of her 
main opponents, William Sewell, who has argued for a more considered place for ideology 
in revolutions.  I briefly introduce and discuss other contributions, for example that of Parsa 
Misagh.105  However, the aim of this section is not to resolve this tension between structural 
and agential accounts, but to discover the ways in which the scholarship started to open up 
to a consideration of ideas and ideological forms in relation to revolutions. 
 
Structure versus agency  
It was to be the monumental events in Iran during the lead-up to the overthrow of the Shah 
in 1979 that would put Skocpol’s work to the test and result in her conceding some small 
ground to her critics.  The social and political conditions culminating in the Iranian 
revolution of 1979 had emphasised the importance of competing ideologies through the 
                                                 
103 Republished in Skocpol, T. (1994) ‘Rentier state and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution’, in Skocpol, 
T. ed. Social Revolutions in the Modern World, 241-258. See Keddie’s constructive and helpful critique: 
Keddie, N. (1982) ‘Comments on Skocpol’, Theory and Society, 11:3, May, 285-292.  
104 Keddie (1982) ibid. 
105 Parsa, M. (2000) States, Ideologies, & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua 
and the Philippines, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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communication of ideas within revolutions.106  In a later collection of her essays in Social 
Revolutions in the Modern World, Theda Skocpol’s reflections on her earlier work on the 
Iranian revolution of 1979 are notable for the revised definition of ‘social revolution’ she 
puts forward: 
 
rapid, basic transformations of a country’s state and class structures, and of its 
dominant ideology.  Moreover, social revolutions are carried through, in part, by 
class-based upheavals from below.107 
 
The addition of a ‘dominant ideology’ was a direct result of Skocpol’s recognition that “if 
there ever has been a revolution deliberately ‘made’ by a mass-based social movement 
aiming to overthrow the old order, the Iranian revolution against the Shah was surely it”.108  
This is an important concession from Skocpol as it updates her principle position that 
“revolutions are not made; they come”, based on world historical circumstances and 
structural conditions.109 Nevertheless, Theda Skocpol’s conception of ideology was one in 
which she considered it only inasmuch as it might be instrumental in the causes and 
outcomes of revolutions.  Skocpol still saw ideology as an expression of voluntarism: 
 
or idea systems deployed as self-conscious political arguments by identifiable 
political actors.  Ideologies, in this sense, are developed and deployed by particular 
                                                 
106 Sreberny-Mohammadi, A & Mohammadi, A (1994) Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, 
Culture, and the Iranian Revolution, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Parsa, M. (2000) op cit.   
107 My italics.  Skocpol, T. (1994) ibid., 240.  
108 Skocpol (1994) ibid., 242. 
109 Skocpol Citing Wendell Phillips (1979) ibid., 17. 
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groups or alliances engaged in temporally specific political conflicts or attempts to 
justify the use of state power.110   
 
The revised definition of revolutions, above, and her discussion of ideology were 
presented by Skocpol in a rejoinder to William Sewell’s detailed argument that ideology 
was actually central, both in cause and outcome, to the French revolution of 1789.111 The 
dialogue between Skocpol and Sewell about their understandings of ideology in the case of 
the French revolution in particular, highlights key conceptual matters about which they 
disagree.   
 
Sewell and Skocpol had different conceptions of ideology (and therefore of political 
discourse as used in revolution) and of the arrangement and prioritising of structural factors, 
in their debates.  As we have seen, Skocpol followed Marxist understandings of ideology 
and regarded it as an instrument for power, whereas Sewell appeared to be influenced by 
developments in anthropology which recast conceptions of ideology to extend to matters of 
culture.112  Equally Skocpol adhered to a rigid state-centric approach regarding structure, 
whereas Sewell elicited a more fluid conception which aspired to accommodate the actions 
of people as carriers of ideas, albeit as added variables or units of analysis.   
 
                                                 
110 Skocpol, (1994) ibid., 204. 
111 Skocpol (1994) ibid. 
112 As we shall see in the following chapter, I argue that both these conceptions are problematic, though the 
anthropological influence has been more productive and helpfully echoes some poststructuralist thinking: 
moving away from science and causation generally to consider contingency and ambiguity.  Most recently, 
see Thomassen, B. (2014) ‘Liminal Politics: Towards an Anthropology of Political Revolutions’, in 
Thomassen, B. (2014) Liminality and The Modern: Living through the in between, Surrey: Ashgate, 191- 
213. 
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Skocpol does concede that she was so focused on “reworking class analysis in relation to a 
state-centred understanding of revolutions” that she may not have given due attention to the 
ways in which social revolutions are “ideologically-inspired projects to remake social life 
in its entirety”.113  For Skocpol, “struggles over the organisation and uses of state power are 
at the heart of all revolutionary transformations”.114   The language of politics and the 
dynamic of ideologies in play are recognised latterly by Skocpol, but relegated to a political 
or cultural idiom amidst the broader and more important structural explanation of 
revolutions.  Skocpol argues that there are important limitations to anthropological 
treatments of political and social systems.115     
 
Whereas, Sewell’s interpretation of the French revolution and the central place of ideology 
as formed “in relation to social forces, not in the conscious wills of individual actors”116 
stems from new thinking about ideologies.  In this sense Sewell’s thinking is in tandem with 
Skocpol, as he asserts, in that he agrees that individual actions alone cannot make a 
revolution.  He recognises people as carriers of ideas and that these can become patterns of 
thought which are acted upon or aspired to in a revolution.  Sewell argues that it is necessary 
to complicate the treatment of ideology in the context of revolutions. In doing so he is 
drawing on influential writings on, and critiques of, ideology from within the field of 
anthropology, in particular the work of Clifford Geertz.117  Sewell uses such ideas to argue 
for an understanding of ideology which can form part of a broader conceptual framework 
incorporating international structures, class, and state.118    
                                                 
113 Skocpol, T. (1994) Ibid., 201. 
114 Skocpol, T. (1994) Ibid., 208. 
115 Skocpol, T. (1994) ibid., 202-3. 
116 Sewell in Skocpol (1994) ibid., 172. 
117 Geertz, C. (1973) See Chapter Eight: ’Ideology as a Cultural System’, in The Interpretation of Cultures, 
New York: Basic Books, 193-233. 
118 Sewell in Skocpol (1994) ibid., 173. 
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Both scholars offer insight into problems in the ways in which ideology has been treated.  
Both have, clearly, very different conceptions of ideology and different ideas about how 
much the structural confines can be bent to accommodate ideological aspects of revolutions.  
Despite their differing conceptual and methodological commitments (which are far from 
resolved in the dialogue), both share an epistemological commitment to and privileging of 
structural approaches to revolutions and both focus on understanding causes and outcomes.  
However, Sewell appears to be moving more in a direction which regards revolutionary 
processes, and therefore the ideas which underpin them, as important, whereas Skocpol 
adheres to ‘cause’ and ‘outcome’ as central points in her research.   
 
Instead of seeking to attach ideology to rigid structural accounts of revolution which require 
proofs of causation, it might have been more productive for Sewell to simply argue that the 
ideas that people attach to and act upon, and the ideological patterns which are formed in 
times of flux and in revolution, are important and useful subjects for study in and of 
themselves.  This need not result in rejecting important macro-level social and political 
structural considerations.  Indeed, such a binary approach is not helpful and has resulted in 
a pernicious attachment to studying the question of causation, not to the study of revolutions 
as processes and as the actions of people. 
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Rethinking ideology and revolution? 
Other theories of revolution have noted the relative lack of consideration of ideologies in 
revolutions. Juan Cole’s comparative study of Egypt’s Urabi movement asserts that the 
British occupation of Egypt in 1882 in fact put down a long social revolution which had 
been underpinned by important ideological considerations.  Borrowing from George Rudé’s 
studies of the French revolution, Cole notes that scholars have, increasingly recognised the 
important role played by Egyptian non-elite actors and the ways in which a ‘popular 
ideology’ manifested itself across social strata and against the ‘Old Regime’.119 Likewise, 
Misagh Parsa takes a more nuanced approach to ideology in his comparative study of the 
revolutions in Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines.120   
 
Parsa considers in tandem the structural conditions for the revolutions, together with the 
complex processes involved in vying for power. In doing so he focuses on unexpected 
outcomes in that those who were the most active in the beginning and during the revolutions 
were not the ones who then took up power.121  He draws on extensive empirical evidence in 
order to focus on the collective action of the different actors and groups inside the revolution, 
noting that analysts had often only focused on the ideological patterns of those revolutionary 
groupings who became the successful challengers to power.122   In so doing he echoes 
Skocpol’s caution against elevating ideology after the fact, and assuming an intentional role 
for ideology in the causes and outcomes of revolutions.  That is, it cannot be surmised that 
the ideas that informed the revolutionary processes are the same ones that endured. Equally, 
                                                 
119 Cole, J. R. I. (1999) Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of 
Egypt’s ‘Urabi Movement, Cairo: the American University of Cairo, 11, 23. 
120 Parsa, M. (2000) op cit..  See also Parsa, M. (2011) ‘Ideology and Political Action in the Iranian 
Revolution’, Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 31:1, Duke University Press. 
121 Parsa (2000) ibid., 3-5. 
122 Parsa (2000) ibid., 5. 
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the successful contenders for power do not necessarily represent the early or forming ideas 
of revolutions.  In the case of Iran, Khomeini seized power but the revolution had not been 
about religion and was led by a myriad of social and ‘secular’ groupings.123   
 
Parsa records how it is critical to be aware of “the ideologies of the specific collectives that 
carry out most of the collective actions during conflicts”, and not to assign causal links of 
ideologies to outcomes without a detailed study of all the major social actors.124  Caution 
must therefore be shown so as not to mistake tactical actions for ideologically-based actions, 
and to be aware that ideological debates may be limited or moderated in severely repressive 
situations.125  Parsa does argue that similar structural conditions can result in different 
revolutionary outcomes and suggests that ideology is one variable which can be empirically 
examined in considering the extent to which it is or is not a causal factor of revolutions.  
Parsa’s study strives to build a particular ‘theory of revolution’ based on the structuralist, 
mobilisation and process theorists.126 His study then examines empirical case studies in 
detail, which have helped to update the literature on causes and outcomes by highlighting 
the ‘impact of ideology’.127  
 
Parsa’s study was an important step in showing both the socio-economic conditions leading 
up to the revolutions in Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines, while also considering more 
deeply the multitude of political actors who were proposing their different ideological 
platforms and positions and vying to be the successful revolutionary challengers and attain 
power.  But such empirically-based studies do not fully come to grips with what ideologies 
                                                 
123 Parsa (2000) ibid.,9. 
124 Parsa (2000) ibid.,9. 
125 Parsa (2000) ibid.,9. This point will be very relevant to the Syrian context, as we shall see. 
126 Parsa (2000) ibid.,25. 
127 Parsa (2000) ibid.,10. 
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are made up of and how they actually function, or might function, and change, and be recast, 
in revolutions.  Additionally, Parsa’s approach has added to the burgeoning body of 
theoretical accounts of revolutions which continue to rely on the structural causes of 
revolution, but pay more attention to an ideological component for revolutionary causes and 
outcomes.  Ideology, in his study, appears to serve merely as an instrument or variable object 
of study to consider alongside other variables.  In my study, I want to go beyond such a 
limitation. 
 
A study of the structural causes of revolution is very different from a study of ideas in 
revolution which is what my thesis aspires to be. They start with different questions and 
follow different methods.  The study of ideas in revolution should not be subordinated to or 
necessarily linked to structural analyses of the causes and outcomes of revolutions.  Within 
Skocpol’s ‘macro’ level study of revolutions, her position on ideology is perhaps a logical 
one.  In dismissing ideology as a possible causal factor in revolution, Skocpol is claiming 
that it is simply not possible that any one group or individual political actor, such as 
Robespierre, “deliberately shapes the complex and multiple determined conflicts that bring 
about revolutionary crises and outcomes”.128 This, she grounds in empirical evidence.  But 
if it were to be asked, instead, what kind of ideas were forming in the revolution then a fuller 
understanding of the (contingent) nature of ideologies as being ‘receptacles’ for ideas could 
be pursued. This necessarily takes us beyond considerations of how individuals might act 
(including in their own self-interest), as we find in rationalistic theory-based approaches, 
towards a consideration of ideologies as group systems of beliefs and patterns of thinking 
that become common sense for a collective or for a particular ‘public’ at a particular time. 
                                                 
128 Skocpol, T. (1994) op cit., 200. 
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These arguments will continue to circulate and are probably irresolvable because the 
differing starting points rely on particular ontological commitments and selective ways of 
knowing. What I have set out to show here is that the questions being asked about 
revolutions have been unduly confined by structuralist theorising within the sub-field of 
historical sociology. This is partly because the whole project is underpinned by the urge to 
define and to retrospectively pursue causation and fix outcomes, but it is also because of the 
ideological positionality and (Marxist, or otherwise) commitments of many of the scholars 
themselves.          
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I critically engaged with the most influential literature on modern revolutions.  
I focused on examining some of the methodological limitations in the major contributions 
in the field of political science.  I have argued that the methodological pitfalls found within 
this scholarship do not bode well for the study of live and incomplete revolutions.  In 
particular, the focus on the state as an actor in the wider international system occlude 
considerations of people as actors and of the ideas that move them.  I have shown that when 
we think about language—and how it animates the political—then we can find productive 
paths of inquiry which give due attention to what people are saying and doing within 
revolutionary moments.  I have thus illuminated the ways in which a revolutionary language 
and ideas might serve to undermine and counter dominant hegemonic orders.     
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Overall, there have been some important contributions to our thinking revolution in the 
literature, which have deepened our knowledge and understanding.  In particular, Theda 
Skocpol’s scholarship on successful revolutions helps to show how the conjuncture of a set 
of factors can make for revolution.  These factors include a crisis of the regime or state (in 
the case of France, the Royal seat of power and fiscal crisis), problems in the performance 
of the ruling power or state regarding its political and economic position (problems which 
pertain to ‘world time’ or historical legacy and positioning in the international system), and, 
finally, her focus on the transformation of social classes. Skocpol’s foregrounding of the 
state and social class-based analyses of revolutions places her firmly as a leading 
structuralist influenced by Marxist thinking on revolution and social and political change 
(although, clearly, she departed from economic determinist iterations of Marxism).  This has 
had the welcome effect of drawing scholarship away from a unitary focus on political 
violence as being the main characteristic of revolutions.  Her debt to a comparative historical 
approach shows in that she is able to consider historically contextual differences across the 
countries being examined, rather than graft a universal model for revolutions onto diverse 
social and political landscapes.   
 
I then noted some shortcomings in the structural approach to revolutions, and in particular 
an antipathy towards a consideration of the role of agency therein.  As we saw in discussing 
Skocpol and Sewell, disagreement tended to be ranged around whether or not political 
ideologies, or particular ideas and beliefs, could be held to be a causal factor of revolutions.  
Skocpol’s approach neglected aspects regarding revolutionary processes and the 
mobilisation and practices of revolutionary actors.  We then moved on to look in detail at 
the significant developments in the fourth generation of scholarship on revolutions.  This 
turned our attention to the ways in which people mobilize, and gave space to a consideration 
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of agency and indeed ideas, thus releasing scholarship, to some extent, from the structuralist 
hierarchical ordering in the analysis of revolutions.  Important developments in this fourth 
wave included an opening up to all kinds of contentious politics, and to the multiple 
‘repertoires of contention’ available in different contexts.  In specific regard to completed 
revolutions, mobilisation theorists refine and pinpoint different junctures in revolutions, 
from ‘revolutionary situations’ to ‘revolutionary outcomes’, whilst also taking in the 
complexities of ‘multiple sovereignty’ regarding parties in contention.  While this takes 
some of the emphasis away from the search for definitive causes and definitions, the 
mobilisation literature still tends to focus on the role of the state in relation to the army and 
elite classes in considering a revolutionary transformation and outcome.  This has had the 
effect of reproducing some of the patterns of thinking and assumptions in the mainstream 
scholarship of revolutions that tend to revolve around the state.   
 
Later studies of revolution have included discussion on ideas and culture, but this has either 
i) been subsumed into a structural variable alongside more established causes of revolutions, 
or ii) been relegated to cultural studies of revolutions which attempt to balance the structural 
causation models with a treatment of other possible causal factors of revolutions. So, while 
this latter wave of scholarship has provided new and nuanced avenues for research, there 
have been few effective efforts to properly engage in political and social inquiry which 
focused on the people and on bottom-up popular revolutionary thought and actions.   
 
Trying to bring ideas into the arena of political analysis seems to implicate one in an 
enveloping and circular ‘structure versus agency’ debate.  While political scientists, such as 
Foran, have tried to extricate themselves from this exclusionary binary approach by 
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suggesting that elements from both can merge in explanation, there still remains the problem 
that all is considered within a framework of structural and causal argumentation. The state 
and social classes remain as central explanatory causes, and other elements such as ideas 
and human agency have been shoe-horned into this fixed structure as possible new variables 
or instrumental features of revolutions.  While not wishing to argue for one in exclusion of 
the other, this does have the effect of avoiding altogether any questions of what exactly the 
ideas mean and how they manifest themselves, and why some ideas became more, or less, 
important than others in a time of radical change.  In other words: I believe both that agency 
has been undervalued, and that the very debate itself has often been a damaging distraction. 
 
The problems I have highlighted in the literature have important implications for Syria and 
its revolution in 2011: in the way we might or might not describe it as a revolution; in the 
divergent scholarly presuppositions which underpin the study of ideas in revolution; and in 
the ways in which analyses of people, of revolutionaries, of agents in a particular 
revolutionary upheaval, may be neglected.  These topics have been given attention by 
scholars of the Middle East, some of whom have also drawn on theoretical insight, as I 
indicated in this chapter.  Taking into consideration scholarship on the region and the cross-
pollination of theoretical approaches, I have chosen in what follows two theorists who help 
me to avoid some of the limitations of positivist and behaviourist approaches, as well as the 
limits of structuralist, Marxist approaches to both revolution and ideologies.   
 
Much of the present opening chapter of this thesis has necessarily been by way of a literature 
review, and some of it has concerned approaches which do not end up featuring prominently 
in the remainder of the thesis. This chapter has cleared the ground for and started to build 
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towards the approaches that I do follow. As we will see in Chapter Two, my research draws 
primarily on two prominent political theorists and utilises their methodologies and ideas as 
an alternative way of thinking about the concept of dignity in Syria’s uprising.  Specifically, 
I utilise the early scholarship of William E. Connolly, whose study of political discourse and 
contested concepts provided a radical departure and opportunity for alternative paths of 
thinking about our political world.  Second, I draw on an interpretive approach in the study 
of political ideologies in the work of Michael Freeden.  These theorists provide the tools and 
a framework in which to focus inquiry into the ideas or concepts that emerge, or which 
become contested, during times of upheaval.  In this way I can then follow a method which 
enables me to focus specifically on the concept of dignity and on the ways in which it 
emerged and is used in the Syrian revolution.  This is the subject of the next chapter.   
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  Chapter Two  
Methodology: an interpretive approach to dignity  
in the Syrian revolution 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, a critical review of the study of modern revolutions and the treatment 
of ideology indicated that there were a number of problems with conventional approaches.1 
I showed how political scientists tended to mimic the natural sciences and to rely on 
scientific methodologies in order to define revolutions and to search for and prove their 
causes.2 Also, I noted an emphasis on isolating the fixed and necessary set of outcomes 
which, retrospectively, define a revolution. This has limited the instances in which 
academics might ascribe the term ‘revolution’ and means that studies have focused on what 
political scientists define as revolutions, rather than what people assert are revolutions.  In 
the same vein, structural analyses, which came to dominate the study of revolutions 
                                                 
1In particular, as critiqued in differing ways by Aya, R. (1979) ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: 
Contrasting Models of Collective Violence’, Theory and Society, 8:1, 39-99; and, Takriti, A. R. (2013) 
Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans and Empires in Oman, 1965-1976, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  For detailed references and analysis of the literature on revolution see Chapter One.   
2 For discussion on this see Winch, P. (1958/1977) The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 66-94. I follow Winch in emphasising reasons for action, and 
steering clear of a causal analysis.  It is worth noting Connolly’s criticism that Winch goes too far in his 
proffering of an “extreme alternative” (to Winch’s corrective argument that the study of our social and 
political world might be repaired by removing it from the confines of “the ‘laws of social science”), in 
Connolly, W. E. The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd edn, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 5-6.  Michael 
Freeden makes a similar argument: Winch is right to question attempts at scientific generalization and future 
prediction but Freeden departs from Winch in that he is arguing that we can make some useful 
generalisations about ideas based on a temporal and spatial conjuncture; see Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies 
and Political Theory: a conceptual approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 99-100.  As we shall see 
later in this chapter, this reflects Freeden’s diachronic and synchronic approach in his morphology of 
ideologies and concepts as units of analysis.  
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throughout much of the twentieth century, trained attention on state actors and on centres of 
power rather than the actual people who rose up.3 Consequently there is a lack of attention 
given to the actual thoughts and actions of the people as revolutionary actors.   
 
I then showed that in so far as ideologies and ideas are given consideration, the focus has 
been primarily on how they might, or might not, serve as an auxiliary variable with which 
to help explain the cause(s) of revolutions, reproducing the same scientistic tropes and 
circular, irresolvable questions as to whether structural factors or the ideas and actions of 
people, or the latter subordinated to and in concert with the former, cause revolutions.4  As 
a result, and despite later developments in the field, I claimed that conventional scholarship 
has not really given sufficient consideration to ideologies as the ‘receptacles’5 for the ideas 
that people claim and promote in a time of rapid revolutionary change.6   
                                                 
3 Except where the people were considered as the ‘mob’, thus ascribing a pejorative sense to any collective 
resistance - see Chapter One.  For a counter to this see Rudé, G. (1959) The Crowd in the French Revolution, 
London: Oxford University Press.  As I mention in Chapter One, there are notable exceptions, but they seem 
to go too far in the other direction and lose altogether the contextual and structural aspects, for example: 
Selbin, E. (2010) Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: the power of story, London: Zed Books. 
4 For different perspectives see: Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. & Mohammadi, A. (1994) Small Media, Big 
Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press; and, to some extent, Kumar, K. (1989) Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota; also, Parsa, M. (2000) States, Ideologies, & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, 
Nicaragua and the Philippines, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
5Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A conceptual approach, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 13-14. 
6As I made clear in Chapter One I do not seek to link ideas to causes of revolutions; see my discussion of the 
debate between Skocpol and Sewell, in Chapter One. However, for just such an argument see Israel, J. 
(2014) Revolutionary Ideas: An intellectual history of the French Revolution from The Rights of Man to 
Robespierre, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  A reading of this must be accompanied by a 
scathing critique of it by Hunt, L. (2014) ‘Louis XVI Wasn’t Killed by Ideas: This is what happens if you 
ignore the role of politics in intellectual history’, Book Review published online, New Republic, 28th June.  
In thinking more broadly about ideas and moving towards an interpretive approach we can background 
sociological and Marxist treatments of ideas: Eastwood, J. (2008) ‘The role of ideas in Weber’s theory of 
interests’, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 17,1-2, 89-100; Arthur, C.J. (1974) Karl Marx 
and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, London: Lawrence & Wishart; and, discussion of Bevir & 
Rhodes’ contribution to and application of an interpretive methodology in first part of Finlayson, A. (2007) 
‘From Beliefs to Arguments: Interpretive Methodology and Rhetorical Political Analysis,’ Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, Vol 9,4, 545-563; Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis: A Critical 
Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 205-6.   
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Promising new theoretical approaches which focus on social mobilisation and contention, 
exemplified in the research of Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, are also limited by some 
starting assumptions which might, problematically, give only a limited airing to agents in 
revolutions. This is because such approaches still retain elements of the scientific imperative 
to both explain the rational choices of agents and to consider agents only in as much as they 
interact with the state.7 Therefore the study of revolutions has embedded and reproduced 
some methodological problems and dictated what is or is not a revolution.  Such approaches 
narrow our field of vision8 and lock out any analysis of politics in action and the actual 
processes within a revolutionary contest, regardless of causes or final and successful 
outcomes.9 
 
It is in contrast to these kinds of approaches that I seek to study Syria’s revolutionary actors, 
by attempting, as Quentin Skinner puts it, “to grasp their concepts, to follow their distinction, 
to appreciate their beliefs and, so far as possible, to see things their way”.10 To do so I 
investigate the emergence of the concept of dignity (Arabic karama) in Syria’s revolutionary 
moment and to follow its functions and uses in this context.  I argue here for a conceptual 
                                                 
7 Chalcraft, J. (2016) Popular Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 19-29.  Instead, the author offers a modified “transgressive contention” approach to the 
study of bottom up (popular) political contention.  This book was released too late for me to fully consider 
and incorporate in my research methodology. 
8 Here it is useful to think about insight gleaned by ‘vision’ or ‘sight’, as in the origin and meaning of the 
Greek word theoria (theory) referred to in: Ball, T. (2007) ‘Professor Skinner’s Vision’, Political Studies 
Review, 5, 351. 
9 See Chapter One; my argument and shift away from questions of role or single causation was influenced by 
a discussion on the literature on revolutions with the historian Abdel Razaq Takriti, Oxford, 2013; and, by 
his monograph on the Dhufar revolution in Oman: Takriti, A. R. (2013) Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, 
Sultans and Empires in Oman, 1965-1976, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
10 See Skinner, Q. (2002) Visions of Politics; regarding method, Vol I, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 37.  I borrow from Skinner to situate my research closer to the agents and what they are saying and 
doing.  
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approach to ‘dignity’, which recognises the importance of paying attention to such ideas in 
their variegated spatial and temporal contexts.  The instances and the force of the use of 
dignity in Syria signal at once both some elements of continuity as well as an abrupt 
departure from, revision of, and reformulation of what has gone before. The Syrian 
revolutionary practice of recovering and reinventing the idea of dignity may be considered 
as a “politics of resistance in action”.11 Framed this way an investigation into the idea of 
dignity in revolution requires thinking about the collective will and ideas forged and 
sustained in Syria’s revolutionary moment.  The uses of the idea of dignity in the latest Arab 
and Syrian revolutions are indicative of the ways in which people not only describe but also 
strive to bring about social and political change.  
 
In this chapter I set out my methodological approach and detail the ways in which we can 
conceptualise dignity as it has emerged in Syria’s revolution.12 In order to focus in on my 
pursuit of alternative ways to investigate the kinds of ideas flowing in, through and around 
Syria’s uprising and, specifically, the idea of dignity, I introduce two key theorists: William 
E. Connolly and Michael Freeden.  I discuss their contributions to the scholarship and in the 
final section I elaborate on the ways in which their insights and tools can aid a study of 
dignity in the Syrian context.   
 
The rationale for concentrating on these two theorists lies in the importance of their critiques 
of conventional scholarship and the new avenues of inquiry which their work opens up.  In 
                                                 
11 Tripp (2013) op cit., 2. 
12 In this thesis I try to follow Elizabeth Frazer’s useful distinction between methodology (epistemological 
and ontological commitments) and method (of research – ie interviews, data collection): Frazer, E. (2008) 
‘The boundaries of Politics’, in Leopold, D. & Stears, M. (2008) Political theory: methods and approaches, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 176, n5.   Although, of course, one informs the other. 
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particular, William E. Connolly’s seminal study, first published in 1974: The Terms of 
Political Discourse (TOPD), provided an important critique of positivist assumptions about 
the way political concepts were treated within the mainly North American discipline of 
political science.  Connolly provides an important backbone to this thesis because his early 
work sought to recast the ways in which we study the political concepts we use.  What this 
shows us is how such concepts are an essential part of our political space, and how they 
might also become political.13   
 
Connolly’s thesis retrieved the notion of essentially contested concepts and showed how we 
can seek to clarify their content, or criteria and to recognise this process as an important and 
constitutive part of ‘politics itself’.14 This necessarily, and often essentially contested terrain 
provides the space for conceptual dispute and innovation and, therefore, political change.  
Connolly’s critique also echoes the problems I found within the conventional study of 
revolutions and ideology in Chapter One.  For example, the concept of revolution had also 
been confined and presupposed by scientific imperatives to measure, define, and to promote 
a fixed definition and criteria, whereas revolution is itself a live and dynamic process of 
contestation and conflict, which must be studied beyond the compulsion to fix a definition.   
 
The messy, changing, and contingent aspects of our political world have been attended to 
by the political theorist Michael Freeden in his landmark study of political ideologies:15 
Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, first published in 1996. Freeden 
offers a new research agenda and pathways for scholarship which resuscitates the study of 
                                                 
13 Connolly, W.E. (1974/1993) The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd edn. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2-3. 
14 Connolly (1974/1993) ibid.,30. 
15 Freeden (1996) op cit. 
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political ideologies.  He provides an overarching theoretical framework within which we 
can attend to the meanings and uses of political concepts.  This framework draws together 
the important diachronic, historically sedimented context for ideas with the ‘here and now’ 
of the synchronic appearance and use of concepts.  Freeden adumbrates his morphological 
approach to political ideologies and the ways in which concepts are preferred or excluded, 
for example, through the ideological processes which he calls ‘decontestation’.  Freeden’s 
later scholarship also deepens and expands our avenues for thinking about the synchronic, 
‘vernacular’ forms of political thinking in a particular time and place; this opens a vista onto 
“the varieties of political thinking that societies produce”, as a central element of “what 
societies and their members do”. 16  My methodology benefits from Freeden’s detailed 
critique of the study of ideology, and the research potential he sets out is of critical 
importance in foregrounding the ideas of the people (in a revolutionary situation).   
 
In the following sections I introduce, explain and synthesize the work of Connolly and 
Freeden and their approaches to the study of political concepts as contested and contestable 
units of analysis within the wider and competing ideological landscapes we all inhabit.17 As 
will become clear, my approach is necessarily ‘interpretive’. I try to establish a point from 
                                                 
16 Freeden, M. (2014) ‘Editorial: the ‘political turn’ in political theory’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 19, 1, 
1-2; Freeden, M. (2013) The Political Theory of Political Thinking: the Anatomy of a Practice, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; and, Freeden, M. (2008) ‘Thinking Politically and thinking about Politics: 
language, interpretation, and ideology’, in Political Theory: methods and approaches, Leopold, D. & Stears, 
M. eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
17 Connolly, W. E. (1974/1993) The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd edn. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers; 
Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; Freeden, M. (2003) Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Freeden, 
M. (ed.) (2007) The Meaning of Ideology: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, Oxon: Routledge; Freeden, M. 
(2013) The Political Theory of Political Thinking: the Anatomy of a Practice, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. On various applications of Connolly’s work see Finlayson, A. (ed.) (2010) Democracy and Pluralism: 
The Political Thought of William E Connolly, especially of interest for informing my methodology is the 
introduction, chapters by Howarth and Mihac, and then Connolly’s rejoinder.  See also Chambers, S. A. & 
Carver, T. eds. (2008) William E. Connolly: Democracy, Pluralism, and Political Theory, London: 
Routledge, for the collected works and overview of Connolly’s contribution with part II of the volume 
focusing on Connolly’s ‘agonism’.   
67 
 
which we can hope to contextualise and analyse the concepts chosen by Syrian revolutionary 
actors: intellectuals, fighters and activists. My aim is to situate the idea of dignity historically 
and in relation to its specific usages and functions in Syria’s current revolutionary moment.  
I examine some of the myriad ways in which Syrian revolutionary agents sought to contest 
and to struggle against an authoritarian and corrupt government in Syria. I attend to the 
revolutionary concepts which were harnessed and the functions of these ideas in a particular 
context.  The Syrian revolution provides us with the chance to think anew about people 
rising up, and about the political implications and broader ideational context for their ideas 
and actions, and the performative18 aspects of their revolutionary discourse and practices.19  
  
                                                 
18 See an agential approach through the performative in Tripp, C. (2013) ‘Performing the Public: Theatres of 
Power in the Middle East’, Constellations, 20:2, 203-216. 
19 For different historical treatments and exemplars in the analysis of revolutionary practices see Takriti, A. 
R. op cit; and, Hunt, L. (1984) Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 1984, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
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I William E. Connolly: The terms of political discourse (TOPD) 
 
Setting himself against the mainstream of American political science in the 1970s, 
Connolly’s then ground-breaking study The Terms of Political Discourse (TOPD) promotes 
a more expansive and reflective approach within political science and theory, which 
embraces the uncertainties and ambiguities in our political life.  Concepts deployed in 
political analysis had frequently been assumed to be fixed ideas which were defined and 
then required no further attention.20  In retaining epistemological commitments from the 
natural sciences, these seemingly neutral concepts were then harnessed to get to “the facts 
of political life”, through claims to objective political inquiry.21  Connolly’s critique reminds 
us that we simply cannot treat complex political concepts as we do the more rigid scientific 
concepts.   
 
Rather, Connolly argues that the concepts we rely on in political discourse are not merely a 
‘prelude’ to and neutral medium by which political (scientific) inquiry might then proceed.  
Rather, the concepts we use and the politics of language are, he argues, part of a web of an 
“institutionalized structure of meanings that channels political thought and action in certain 
directions”.22 Connolly’s is not an argument to improve on scientific ways of conducting 
political inquiry. His theoretical thinking proceeds from a position of necessary inter-
subjectivity – in and of the world and clarified through interactions regarding beliefs and 
                                                 
20 Connolly, TOPD. 
21 Connolly, TOPD, 1. 
22 Connolly TOPD, 1, 213. 
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commitments articulated through political language.23  Connolly’s critique of the field of 
study thus marks a radical departure from conventional scholarship. For Connolly, the very 
ways in which we employ complex concepts constitutes a process worthy of political inquiry 
in itself, and shines a light on the oft-neglected but important political implications of some 
ideational aspects of our social and political world.   
 
Connolly begins his critique of the state of play in political science by urging a 
reconsideration and engagement with the provocative essay published in 1956 by W. B. 
Gallie on ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’. Connolly notes three central claims that Gallie 
lists which make a concept essentially contested.  These centre on the possible variations 
there are when a concept is appraisive24 (of a valued achievement, such as democracy), 
when the practice the concept describes is internally complex and exhibits a number of 
dimensions, and, finally, when the ways in which a concept might be applied are always 
open to differing and competing interpretations, and thus involve “endless disputes”.25 
Connolly critiques some of Gallie’s assumptions and some limits to his analysis, but 
nevertheless recovers his central idea of essentially contested concepts, which provides a 
springboard for Connolly’s subsequent argumentation. 26  Departing from the gloomy 
implication that such endless disputes render some concepts impossible to analyse, Connolly 
instead builds a thesis which argues that it is possible and necessary to open up complex 
concepts and to recognise and work with the ambiguity of contestation.  In doing so he 
                                                 
23 For Connolly’s political thought see the introduction in: Finlayson, A. ed. (2010) op cit. 
24 This criterion is necessarily complicated by Connolly in his chapter on essentially contested concepts and 
the discussion on the problem of descriptive-normative analysis which tends to assume there is always a 
close normative link between these two dimensions: Connolly, TOPD, 23.  
25 My italics.  Connolly, TOPD, 10. I discuss this later in this section. 
26 I don’t have the space here to provide a detailed explication and critique of Gallie’s essay but I introduce it 
in brief as this is the starting point for Connolly’s own thesis on essentially contested concepts which 
provides central ways of thinking for my research.  Some of the key issues will in any case be tackled in this 
section as they arise in Connolly’s analysis.   
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shows the ways in which established practices in the study of concepts had fallen short in 
grappling with complexity.   
 
In his reparative approach to essentially contested concepts Connolly argues that we should 
not reject complex or polysemic concepts but find ways to analysis them. He notes how 
conventional analyses thus far fall short as they rely on operational testing and seeking 
precision.  Connolly gives the example of the concept of ‘bachelor’.  The analytic statement 
‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is considered to be a purely definitional matter; whereas the 
synthetic statement that ‘All bachelors are lonely’ would require further testing.27 What 
Connolly alerts us to (among other criticisms) is that this dichotomy has a place but only in 
such instances where the ‘point’ of a concept (i.e. bachelor) is closely related to the ‘criteria’ 
(i.e. unmarried).   
 
Following another example, Connolly draws on the concept of ‘politics’ to argue that 
the ‘point’ of politics does not, in practice, adhere to one definitive ‘criterion’.  So, 
approaches which rely on analytical or synthetic deduction are not adequate when the 
conceptual criteria and/or its interpretation might be contested.  As soon as we enter into 
these disputes about which criteria are in and which out, and about the descriptive, 
evaluative and the normative judgements of such internally complex concepts, we are 
involved in a state of (necessary) contestation. These examples clarify a key point across 
Connolly’s study of political discourse: disagreement over the content and meaning of 
concepts in our political world is healthy and a part of politics itself.   
                                                 
27 Connolly, TOPD, 17. 
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To drill deeper into this important conceptual point, Connolly turns to the moral concept of 
genocide as a way of elaborating on his arguments.  He uses the ‘moral concept’28 of 
genocide to show how problems emerge and how such ideas are open to conceptual contest 
and dispute.  For example, a definition might describe genocide as an act which must be 
planned, and the extermination must be complete.  But, what if the genocide was an 
unintentional effect of a war campaign or the extermination was not fully completed for 
whatever reason?  The answer to these questions surely involves moral judgements, and 
these moral ‘points of departure’ will and do shift over time and in differing contexts.  This 
necessitates conceptual revision, and agitates against an urge to fix the definition with 
complete finality.29  This argument illustrates the contingent nature and the need to pay 
careful attention to the ‘point’ and its relation to a concept’s internal logic or ‘criteria’.30  
Some common political concepts may have a normative/moral point or ‘angle of vision’, 
but some may not.31 Connolly’s approach alerts us to how the ‘point’ of the concept is 
important in relation to its ‘criteria’, and these layers of analysis necessarily keep the 
meanings in use relatively open and subject to change.   
 
Thus Connolly revises our theoretical framing to enable inquiry into the actual processes of 
contestation and to investigate the more internally, and essentially, complex (and contested) 
concepts.32 Connolly usefully considers concepts within a cluster and as part of a related 
                                                 
28 Connolly noted that concepts may or may not have a moral dimension, but that in any case attention to this 
would be an important consideration.  Connolly also seems to show how political concepts can carry internal 
moral dimensions, or be clarified in light of moral and normative considerations.  See TOPD, 22-29.  See 
also Kovesi, J. (1967) Moral Notions, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
29 Connolly, TOPD, 28 
30 Connolly, TOPD, 29, 32 
31 TOPD, 27-29 
32 Connolly, TOPD, 2. 
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conceptual system within which we find the space for conceptual dispute and contestation.33 
To return to our example of the essentially contested concept of ‘politics’, to make it 
intelligible we need to: 
 
 display the complex connections with a host of other concepts to which it is related; 
clarification of the concept of politics thereby involves the elaboration of the broader 
conceptual system within which it is implicated.34 
 
Of central importance in his ‘cluster concepts’ approach is how we can understand complex 
ideas in connection with others. Connolly shows how a list of possible criteria for the 
concept of politics is indicative of a wider conceptual system containing concepts such as 
‘interests’ or ‘values’, for example.  As is becoming clear from the above discussions, it is 
when there is disagreement over the selection of such criteria, in this case in relation to the 
concept of politics, or when there might be disagreement about the interpretation of agreed 
shared criteria, that there is a conceptual dispute. 35   In such instances our differing 
commitments to, and preferences for, some criteria over others signify our different 
conceptions and interpretations of the essentially contested aspects of our common and 
shared concepts. 36    Connolly explains his thinking on the concept of politics and its 
implications in the initial thesis of his book: 
 
                                                 
33 Connolly, TOPD, Cluster concept: 14, 15, 18. 
34 Connolly, TOPD, 14. 
35 TOPD, 14-15. 
36 Connolly, TOPD, 20-21.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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Politics, then, is a concept particularly susceptible to contests about its proper range 
of application.  The internal complexity of the concept, combined with the relative 
openness of each of its unit criteria, provides the space within which these disputes 
take place, and because of these very features, operational tests and formal modes of 
analysis do not provide sufficient leverage to settle such disputes.37 
 
The possible layers of contestation are illuminated here.  Essentially, contested and 
contestable concepts are relationally clarified when we consider the context and related 
concepts or units with which we might clarify and make meaning.  This level of 
contextualism as a way towards the clarification of concepts is also the process in and by 
which concepts might become political.  Connolly gives the example of the way in which 
the commercial interests of big business have been cast outside the traditional study of 
politics.  It is Connolly’s analysis of concepts in use which shows us how these aspects of 
our social world can and arguably should be considered as political, as part of a wider 
conceptual ordering and (re-)framing of our political discourse.   
 
Conceptual change and innovation 
We can also see his thinking in his explication of the notion of conceptual change: Connolly 
draws on the example of the concept of democracy to show where there might be essential 
contestation regarding the internal criteria of a concept.  We may have in mind an assumed 
shared description of democracy, and there may be common (appraisive) agreement that it 
is a good thing to strive for, but scholars may equally have different ideas about what its 
                                                 
37 Connolly, TOPD, 22. 
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internal contents or criteria should be. Some political scientists might argue that a system of 
free and fair elections is a central tenet of democracy, while others might think that the idea 
of social equality is paramount.  Consider Connolly’s scenario38 in which a decision is made 
that only highly educated elites should be able to vote or participate in democratic life.  In 
such a case the concept of modern democracy faces a radical alteration, by which any new 
iteration might come to be considered pejoratively, to be avoided, or it might be revised to 
accommodate and accept this elite model, or, the concept might become obsolete 
altogether.39  
 
Importantly, then, the process of conceptualization and clarification of the terms of our 
political language and discourse do not occur in a void.  Connolly’s consideration of what 
he calls ‘inherited webs’ or ‘the structure of meanings’,40  in our language of politics, 
illuminates how established meanings can become embedded and normative in our 
discourse. But this also provides the potential for breaking out of such patterns of thinking 
and use of language should the circumstances change.  Thus we can find ways of considering 
alternative ideas, taking on new forms, or appearing to indicate novel developments, as we 
might see in a period of rapid change.    
 
                                                 
38 Connolly, TOPD,  
39 Connolly, TOPD, 31-32 
40 Connolly, TOPD, 220.  The idea of  a ‘web’ or ‘systems of meaning’ and its logical constraints is referred 
to by Freeden who notes the work of Quine, W.V.O. (1953) From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge: 
Mass, 42-3, in Freeden, M. (1996), Ideologies and Political Theory: a conceptual approach, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 50n,80n.  As I have mentioned elsewhere, Connolly is influenced by philosophical 
treatments of language and does cite Quine in places: TOPD: 41, n7.  This and other influences are mostly 
implicit (as, perhaps, they should be) in the main text and acknowledged throughout in his notes and in his 
bibliography, in which he provides, in particular, a selective reading list of influential ordinary and post-
analytical philosophers such as Wittgenstein and his adherents: Winch and Pitkin, as well as Strawson and 
others: TOPD, 248-9.  
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Emerging and gaining pace in Connolly’s analysis is the importance of the actual process of 
contestation and the clarification of contested, internally complex concepts, opening up to 
their possible change and revision.  The concepts which make up our political discourse 
must necessarily be open to a process of ‘conceptual contestation’ and ‘conceptual revision’, 
as this is how we can both broaden our inquiry into all kinds of political matters and 
accommodate political change.  As well as the implications at this micro-level of the internal 
content of complex concepts, Connolly’s approach urges consideration of the wider context 
in which contested concepts appear and become embedded.  In our political practices, 
convention has typically had it that one should move quickly to assume a point of consensus, 
to avoid or obscure any contention or conflict relating to our established terms of political 
discourse, and therefore to shut down, in effect, any ‘agonistic’ processes of contesting and 
clarifying ideas as part of the democratic process.  Such agonistic processes shed light on 
the different ideological predispositions and commitments of the parties to a particular 
debate, decision-making process, and so on.    
  
Whilst the potential for an expansive investigation into the ideological dimensions is not 
extensively and explicitly developed in Connolly’s work, it is there.  At times Connolly does 
indicate the ideological implications in the processes of conceptual clarification. Connolly’s 
thesis in the TOPD makes mention of the ideological context in which discourse is formed— 
in the ways we use and interpret the political concepts embedded in it.41  This is because, as 
I have illustrated, throughout Connolly’s work the very nature of clarifying the concepts, or 
ideas, in use in politics involves articulating preferences, organising sets of beliefs, making 
judgements and assumptions, and promoting or preferring values, all of which indicate both 
                                                 
41 He does this in a discussion of the dynamic and interpretation of power and how its forms part of larger 
ideological debates: Connolly, TOPD, 126-130. 
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our individual and collective ideological distinctions or ‘positions’.  This ideological 
situatedness is how the concepts in use are bounded; they are not subject to endless disputes, 
as per Gallie.  They are contained and constrained by, and may be rendered political through, 
their clarifying relation with other concepts and in particular contexts.  
 
Connolly problematised scholarly study and assumptions relating to the terms of our 
political discourse.  His arguments stand the test of time.  Contestation over political terms 
is necessary and healthy and it is hardly ever complete, unless, we wish to claim the 
existence of a world without politics.  Connolly makes a claim for the merit of recognizing 
and dealing with complexity, and avoiding the limiting dichotomy that would suggest that 
all concepts can be determined or fixed by either logical or operational means only, or that 
they are too vague to be worth considering at all.  Instead, Connolly’s thesis encourages a 
dissection of the contestable aspects in the criteria and interpretation of concepts, and 
explores ways of thinking about their complexity.   
 
Although his work is set within a North American democratic context it certainly does not 
mean to say that his ideas on politics are specific to the American democratic system.42  
Concepts or ideas exist and are employed, preferred or judged and become part of a given 
discourse in all societies.  Extending into a non-democratic landscape, and indeed into a 
context of revolution and war, there is much advantage in considering such ideas and the 
discourses in and from which they form and change, in a state of flux.  Connolly’s thinking 
                                                 
42 Regarding the relevance and utility of Connolly beyond his supposed American confines (as distinct from 
confined to a particular context), see discussions in: Finlayson, A. ed. (2010) Democracy and Pluralism: The 
Political Thought of William Connolly, London: Routledge, 1-2, 13; and, Carver, T. & Chambers, S. (2008) 
William E. Connolly: Democracy, Pluralism and Political Theory, London: Routledge, 2.        
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on the terms of political discourse therefore provides a number of important starting points 
and possible directions for my research into the concept of dignity.  Nevertheless, there 
remains a question about precisely how to apply Connolly and his ideas to a very different, 
non-democratic, context – and this is something I will address (in the section below on 
‘Applying the ideas and thinking of Connolly and Freeden to Syria’), after first reviewing 
in some detail the second crucial theorist for my thesis.  
 
II Michael Freeden – ideologies and political theory 
 
We now turn to look in detail at the scholarship of Michael Freeden, who offers a new 
research agenda for our understanding and study of ideology.  Freeden’s morphological 
approach recovers the study of political ideologies from its relegation to the status of ‘a poor 
relation to philosophy’ 43  to being an important part of political thinking and action. 
Freeden’s Ideologies and Political Theory: a conceptual approach served to “demonstrate 
the link between ideologies and political concepts and the significance of this link as a 
framework for scholarly inquiry”.44 Since this early study there remains at the heart of 
Freeden’s thinking a scholarly requirement to deal with the ‘raw material’ of ideas, studying 
political thought as part of the day-to-day empirically observable ‘thought-practices’ which 
can be analysed and interpreted by the scholar of political theory.45 Also, as we saw in the 
scholarship of Connolly, Freeden offers a welcome return to considering the political 
dimensions of our social and political world or, as he phrased it, a ‘political turn’, which 
                                                 
43 Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 13-14. 
44Freeden (1996) ibid., 8. 
45 Freeden (1996) ibid., 22-23.  
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opens up to “investigations into actual and diverse instances of political thought”.46 Such 
inquiry can be pursued if we think about the ways in which political thought develops into 
action or practice and the presence of a ‘thought-practice’, that is a ‘recurring pattern of 
(political) thinking’.47 These ideas from Freeden provide the intellectual scaffolding for my 
methodology and underpin my approach.  
  
Regarding practical tools that I can explicitly put to use, I draw most deeply on Freeden’s 
influential earlier work: his diachronic and synchronic framing, and the useful conceptual 
tools in his morphology of concepts and political ideologies.  I will outline these two 
features in this section and discuss some of the thinking which encompassed the study of 
ideological families, new-forming ideational patterns, and newly emerging specific 
instances in which ideas, or concepts, were subject to change in their meaning and uses.   
 
Freeden’s 1996 study, and his subsequent work, has successfully rehabilitated ideologies 
from the classical Marxist and behaviourist approaches that I discussed in Chapter One.48 
Freeden sets out how the study of ideology has long been reduced to either making truth-
normative declarations or to nothing more than the labelling of belief systems.49 The first 
part of Freeden’s book is taken up with a critique of this field, spanning the disciplines of 
linguistics, philosophy, political science and theory, history, anthropology and psychology.    
As we shall see, it is noteworthy that he was influenced by the language philosophers but 
                                                 
46 Freeden, M. (2014) ‘Editorial: The ‘political turn’ in political theory’, Journal of Political ideologies, 
February, 19:1, 1-14. 
47 Freeden, M. (2003) Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University, 21. 
48 For an example of a particular application of Freeden’s work see Jackson, B. & Stears, M. (2012) 
Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael Freeden; Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
49 Freeden (1996) ibid., introduction. 
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Freeden’s attention to the language of politics should not be seen as a retreat into a purely 
linguistic study of words and texts.50  Freeden moves beyond discourse analyses and avoids 
some of the limits of discourse theory.51  Indeed, regarding the development of critical 
discourse studies and theory, Freeden warns against reducing ideology to a discourse.52 
Ideology can be articulated through discourses but also does other significant work which, 
for the purposes of this research, is, as we shall see, important.53 Freeden asserts that scholars 
should investigate the complex, (contingent) internal structures and the patterns of beliefs 
and ideas which ideologies serve to organise and distinguish between.   
 
Having cleared the ground in providing some context and general observations about 
Freeden’s approach to ideologies, I now introduce in more detail the two central aspects of 
his thinking: the diachronic and synchronic considerations which serve to elicit meaning 
from and between our concepts, and the tools of analysis available for me in Freeden’s 
morphology of political concepts and ideologies.   
 
The longue durée and the everyday  
Here I discuss the influence of conceptual history in Freeden’s work, and how he integrates 
the diachronic aspects of our concepts into their temporal contexts so as to point up 
                                                 
50 In this way Freeden reflects Wittgenstein, for example, who emphasises the importance of action, of 
practice, and not merely of words: in Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations, I, 3rd edn., trans 
Anscombe, G. E. M., New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., sections 7 and 23-25.  
51 For the discourse theory approaches which move beyond a textual and CDA methodology see Howarth, D. 
and Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) ‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’, 1-23, in Howarth, D., 
Norval, A. & Stavrakakis, Y.(eds) (2000) Discourse theory and political analysis: identities, hegemonies and 
social change, Manchester: Manchester University Press.  For an early example of DT put to use see 
Howarth, D. (1997) ‘Complexities of identity/difference: black consciousness ideology in South Africa’, 
Journal of Political Ideologies, February, 2:1, 41-69.     
52Discussed in Freeden (2003) op cit., 105.  
53 Freeden (2003) ibid. 
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important patterns of common usage as well as to underscore the importance of interpreting 
actual ‘live’ concrete happenings and the concepts which animate them.  Freeden’s extensive 
critique of the conventional scholarship on ideology gives space to, among other things, a 
more historicised approach.  Freeden stakes out a framework for the study and understanding 
of ideologies which requires a consideration of the sedimented or established traditions in 
the longue durée.54  Freeden utilises the work of Reinhart Koselleck and scholarship on 
Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history) in understanding the conceptual contents and 
ordering of ideologies.55 In this vein, Lynn Hunt’s study on the French revolution is a good 
example of a close application of a conceptual history approach.56  Her work considers the 
“microtechniques” of the revolutionaries and their revolutionary culture and politics.57  Such 
instruments brought to bear in the French revolution include, as narrated by Hunt, the 
entrance of new concepts like the ancien régime, appealing to another, as yet absent, possible 
future and ushering in a shift from unequal subject to equal citizen.58  For Freeden such 
conceptual change offers us a (not necessarily equal) balance between linguistic innovation 
and the patterns of customary usage.   
 
Political concepts inevitably “bear the accumulative burdens of their past”.59 Of course this 
is different from the idea of determinism or teleological assumptions in which the past 
                                                 
54Freeden (1996) op cit., 97-100.  Freeden, M. (2003) op cit., 2; and, discussion in Norval, A. (2000) ‘The 
Things We Do with Words - Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 30, 314-316. 
55 Freeden, M. (1996) op cit; Koselleck, R. (1985) Futures Past, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press; Freeden, M. 
(2008), ‘Thinking politically and thinking about politics: language, interpretation, and ideology’, in Leopold, 
D. & Stears, M. (eds) Political theory: methods and approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209.  
Also, Hunt, L. (1984) Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, 1984, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
56 Elaborated by Stråth, B. (2013) ‘Ideology and Conceptual History’, in Freeden, M., Sargent, L.T. & 
Stears, M. The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, 2013, Oxford: Oxford University Press 3-19. 
57 Hunt (1984) op cit., 71-73. 
58 Hunt (1984) op cit., 31-32. 
59 Freeden (1996) op cit., 98. 
81 
 
predicts or presumes a fixed path for the future.  What Freeden seeks to pursue is “the role 
of history in ideological analysis”60 as he acknowledges that ideologies and their contents, 
or political concepts, are to a significant extent ‘underwritten’ by history.61 In pursuing the 
diachronic, Freeden shows how history can serve as a backdrop in the process of eliciting 
important meanings in a particular time and place.62 Therefore, historical considerations 
have important implications for thinking adequately about ideas and ideologies, and in this 
regard the work of Quentin Skinner has been influential in joining theory with political 
thought in history.63   In Chapter One I attended, briefly, to new innovations from the 
linguistic turn and the influence of the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Austin in political 
theory. Following some similar interdisciplinary and post-structuralist approaches, Freeden 
argues that conceptual history has “borrowed insights from linguistics, and the end-result is 
the identification of a semantic field in which time and space both confer meaning on 
political language”.64  
 
                                                 
60 Freeden (1996) op cit., 98.  
61 Freeden (1996) op cit., 77.  
62 In doing so Freeden notes the utility of Saussure’s synchronic approach to conceptual interpretation but 
improves it to consider diachronic aspects, 1996, 73. He draws on Wittgenstein to do this—Freeden (1996) 
op cit., 89-91—noting Wittgenstein’s emphasis on families (as in ‘family-resemblance concepts’) as 
diachronic in nature. Cf. Wittgenstein (1958) op cit., section 67, for the origins of this move. 
63 See e.g. Skinner, Q. (1969) ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory, 
8:35.  
For a provocative critique of the Cambridge School and especially (early) Skinner, in what amounts to a plea 
for the rehabilitation of philosophy, see Green, J E. (2015) ‘Political Theory as Both Philosophy and History: 
A Defense Against Methodological Militancy’, Annual Review of Political Science, 425-441.  Green makes a 
good case for the possible importance of a non-historical study of ‘classic texts’; and cf Philp, M. (2008) 
‘Political Theory and History’, in Leopold, D. & Stears, M. eds. Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 128-149.  Whereas Philp’s argument on claims of ‘relativism’ regarding 
Skinner can usefully be compared with, perhaps, a more nuanced defence of Skinner in Palonen, K. (2003) 
Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric, Cambridge: Polity Press, especially the introduction on the 
‘Skinnerian revolution’ for political theory; and, also, a more sympathetic review of Skinner by Ball, T. 
(2007) ‘Professor Skinner’s Vision’, Political Studies Review, 5, 351-364. Another perspective on history 
and theory, which includes discussion on Skinner’s method, can be found in Markell, P. (2015) ‘Unexpected 
Paths’, Theory & Event, 19:1.  
64 Freeden (2003) op cit., 72.  
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Acting in tandem with ideas in history and with sedimented traditions and meanings over 
time is the immediate synchronic dimension.  Freeden discusses the contribution of the 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who advances a synchronic system in language within which 
the components, such as words, derive meaning from “their contingent relationships at a 
particular point in time”.65 This system of meaning relies not just on the association of units 
in a particular formation but also on the consideration of the ‘combinatory possibilities’ of 
words in the text to delineate possible ‘fields of meanings’.  However, Freeden clearly 
departs from Saussure in important ways, as his (Saussure’s) approach is predicated on the 
notion that we can lock or close concepts in their meanings, and also does not consider 
influences that might be external to his linguistic endeavour.  So Saussure’s system is 
characterised by a “relative de-emphasis on diachrony”.66  
 
Freeden is interested in the aspects of our language which connect with the ‘external’ social 
and political world, and this brings us directly to the formation and bounding of ideological 
assemblages.  This requires a move towards the external patterns and interactions of culture 
and history regarding our political concepts and ideologies.  Freeden is expanding the 
horizon of our analysis to include “the actual modes of political thinking, whether expressed 
in the vernacular, the discourses of political élites, or the academic languages of engagé 
political theorists and philosophers”.67 It is Freeden’s morphology of political concepts and 
ideologies which acts to bring all these dimensions together: patterns over time, historical 
tradition with conceptual change or continuity and then abrupt rupture or discontinuity. We 
therefore need Freeden’s morphological approach to deepen our thinking in order to be able 
to dissect ideas in a particular time and place.   
                                                 
65 Freeden (1996) op cit., 49. 
66 Freeden (1996) op cit., 51. 
67 Freeden, M. (2013b) ‘The morphological analysis of ideology’, in Freeden, M., Sargent, L.T., & Stears, 
M. The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 118. 
83 
 
  
A morphological approach to political ideologies  
The overarching consideration of both the synchronic and diachronic dimensions to our 
understanding of concepts and ideologies frames Freeden’s morphological approach to 
political concepts and ideologies.  For example, how exactly are some ideas prioritised or 
preferred over others; what factors go into this ordering; and how might we investigate a 
specific temporal and spatial event or happening?  Freeden provides the fine-grained 
analysis to answer such questions.  The first thing to emphasise is that Freeden’s approach 
to political ideologies regards them as “ideational formations consisting of political 
concepts”.68 Concepts act as a “basic unit of political thought” to help us decode the “sets 
of political ideas circulating in society”, be they the familiar ideological traditions or shifts 
in our ideational landscape. 69  Freeden describes political concepts as making up the 
‘ideological furniture’ in a particular ideological ‘room’, thus providing the contents of 
ideologies.  
  
Freeden, therefore, enables ways of working with essentially contested political concepts, 
using them as important ‘building blocks’ in an analysis of ideologies. Concepts are 
organized by and within specific ideological patterns or traditions, and are ordered to anchor, 
prioritize, advocate, and/or impress upon us certain beliefs over others.  These processes can 
be understood through a central feature in Freeden’s scholarship on ideologies: the notion 
of decontestation. 70  Freeden states that: 
                                                 
68 Freeden (1996) op cit., 48. 
69 Freeden (2003) op cit., 51. 
70 Some good examples of the dynamics of decontestation in motion are with regard to the British Labour 
Party, its record in government, and its evolution: see Finlayson, ‘Third Way Theory’, in Political Quarterly; 
1999, 70:3, 271-279 especially with regard to the idea of and contestation about ‘equality’; and, Bastow, S., 
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In concrete terms, an ideology will link together a particular conception of human 
nature, a particular conception of social structure, of justice, of liberty, of authority, 
etc.  “This is what liberty means, and that is what justice means”, it asserts.71 
 
The process of decontestation moves us from the problem of unending meanings of our 
essentially contested ideas towards a point of stability in attaching words which give us 
meaning in use.  From this we can ascertain the appropriate usage of a word, as a political 
concept, at a given point in time, and determine usage over a period of time — within the 
context of a morphology of political ideologies.  This process shows itself in the real world 
as “struggles over the socially legitimated meanings of political concepts and the sustaining 
arrangements they form”.72 
 
Freeden posits that concepts also obtain enhanced meaning through their positionality in the 
ideational pecking order. He devises a number of concepts to highlight this process and to 
help us make distinctions between different concepts. Freeden provides layers of detail about 
the ways in which a morphology of ideologies “displays core, adjacent, and peripheral 
concepts”.73 In one key explication Freeden gives, the concept of liberty can be considered 
                                                 
Martin, J., and Pels, D. (2002) ‘Introduction: Third Ways in Political Ideology’, Journal of Political 
Ideologies, 7:3, 269-280.  For some provisional thoughts on processes of decontestation in the Syrian and 
Arab revolutionary context see Haugbolle, S. (2012) ‘Reflections on Ideology After the Arab Uprisings’, 
Jadaliyya ezine, published online March 21; then, turning to Arab political intellectuals and their take on the 
revolutionary turn see Kassab, E. (2014) ‘Critics and Rebels: Older Arab Intellectuals Reflect upon the 
Uprisings’, British Journal of Middle East Studies, published online 19 March 2014 - especially in regard to 
shifting sands of ideas and values and how these are being contested now.    
71 Freeden (1996) op cit., 76. 
72 Freeden (1996) op cit., 77. 
73 Freeden (1996) op cit., 77. 
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as a core concept in our understandings of the ideology of liberalism.  Adjacent concepts 
to liberty might help to explicate the central beliefs within this ideological formation, so that 
concepts such as ‘equality’ and ‘democracy’ act to further elaborate what kind of liberty 
pertains to the family of liberalism.  Then, there may be peripheral concepts such as the 
idea of nationalism, which may be relegated through decontestation into the margins.74        
 
Logical and cultural constraints 
The dynamic and potential for change in this conceptual ordering is possible, but it is 
important to note that the variety of possibilities are not endless, as in Gallie’s lament on 
essentially contested concepts.  Rather, Freeden argues that there are a number of possible 
orderings but they all have vitally important internal and relational contexts and constraints.  
Freeden articulates these constraints more explicitly when he discusses the logical and 
cultural constraints, or logical and cultural adjacency, in which concepts are bound by 
ideological distinctions and preferences.  Familiar meanings of the concept of democracy 
may not survive seemingly illogical moves such as restricting voting rights to a small ruling 
elite (as we encountered earlier with Connolly).  For example, it would not be logical to 
have liberty without the notion of non-constraint as a ‘minimum empirical reality’.75  In this 
case Freeden assigns liberty as the “Millite core” concept in the ideology of liberalism.76  
                                                 
74 Freeden (1996) op cit., 77. 
75 Freeden (1996) op cit., 64. 
76 Freeden (1996) op cit., 96, in his chapter ‘Liberalism: The Dominant Ideology’.  See also the way in which 
George Lakoff (2006) Whose Freedom: The Battle over America’s most Important Idea, Picador, 39-62, 73-
74, 243-266 deconstructs the concept of ‘freedom’ in the contemporary north American context, noting both 
the ‘tradition’, or conceptual history of “progressive freedom” in the USA together with the ’live’ and deep 
contestation of the idea and its misappropriation in current usage and how to (re)gain it.  Lakoff’s 
‘progressive freedom’ exemplifies Freeden’s ineliminable dimension of contestation over concepts in 
politics, but, equally, doesn't take this as an invitation to relativism, nor to the abandonment of the idea of 
conceptual contestability. 
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The morphological approach indicates how concepts are ‘mutually defining’, through their 
relative position within an ideological or political tradition.77 For example, adjacent to the 
ineliminable core of liberty resides the importance of the individual, which we find through 
recourse to an established canon of human rights law and discourse in liberal societies.  This 
logical placement of liberty which privileges the individual can be empirically ascertained 
in the political thought — and in the policies — of liberalism and liberal government.  It 
mitigates against anomalous ideological contest or change which might attempt to, for 
example, marginalise the idea of the individual or the value of liberty.  Such contests can of 
course emerge, as we see with current discourse around national security and the consequent 
erosion of individual liberties, but they challenge established tradition and logical 
understandings of what the concept of liberalism consists of.   
 
In the case of cultural constraints, the production of “symbolic and material goods” that 
societies produce serves to “anchor them firmly into the contexts of time and space, and to 
fine-tune the logical interpretations that their conceptual arrangements can carry”.78 Cultural 
constraints might act to compensate for the fact that logic might be blind to moral and other 
considerations.  Freeden gives the example of how a society might respond to the call to 
eradicate poverty. Responses could logically include the eradication of poor people; the 
transfer or economic cleansing of poor communities; or working with the belief that each 
should contribute to society and take from it according to their need – an effort to redistribute 
wealth (which itself could take various forms).  The first two are morally (and therefore 
culturally) repugnant and would not be deemed as civilised acts (though it should be noted 
                                                 
77 Freeden (2003) op cit., 54. 
78 Freeden (2003) op cit., 57-58. 
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that in reality versions of the second are not uncommon).  Freeden also invokes the notion 
of a common sense use of, for example, the concept of poverty.  He gives the example of 
responding to the call to end poverty by redefining the very meaning of the term so that it is 
something which applies only at the point of death.79  This, of course, would be to make 
nonsense of the concept as it goes against all common meanings in use.   
 
As this brief example indicates, Freeden includes a range of factors within the domain of 
cultural constraint, providing a broad canvas on which we might paint the particularities of 
a given society in regard to conceivable cultural constraints.   The very real logical and 
cultural constraints are central to the process of decontestation in a morphological approach 
to the concepts which make up distinctive ideologies and ideational patterns. Such are the 
very real constraints that exist in the concrete world in which particular ideas are organised 
and which might also disregard or dismiss others.   
 
This morphological framework enables some stability of meaning in use and efforts towards 
settling meaning. The conceptual ordering of core and adjacent beliefs and ideas we have 
discussed so far enables an analysis of our established ideological families as well as new 
players.  The idea of new formations and competing ideologies forming is further elucidated 
if we consider Freeden’s ideas about the morphological periphery.   
 
 
 
                                                 
79 Freeden (2003) op cit., 58. 
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Promise at the ideational periphery 
For the purposes of this research in particular, there is much potential in Freeden’s 
conceptual and ideological periphery, there being two nuanced kinds of this: the ‘perimeter’ 
and the ‘margin’.  Each of these appears to delineate a space for the messy business of 
everyday politics and for political change. 80  If we simplify this to consider a general 
periphery, as Freeden later does, 81  we can imagine concepts vying for attention or 
languishing on the very margins of ideological formations.  Freeden notes that the periphery 
in his morphology of ideologies might, for example, house political concepts which are not 
fully fledged: ‘belief challenges’82— such as ‘immigration’. Yet we have seen how such 
ideas can gain pace and how issues of race and nationality can become defining features of 
ideologies at their very core—such as Fascism.  Mobilising the morphological periphery 
illustrates how concepts can take form and become (adjacently, or even at the core) 
important in instances of abrupt change.  For example, Freeden asserts that “cataclysmic 
events can propel marginal concepts into the core, such as happened with the concept of a 
‘market’ after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”   Equally, the concept of ‘violence’ shifted 
from the margins to the core in the rapid development of Fascism, thus illustrating that 
concepts can suddenly gain significance.   
 
Having set out some of the key elements of Freeden’s morphology, we can start to look at 
the ways in which Freeden provides an exposition at a greater level of detail of his 
                                                 
80 Freeden (1996) op cit., 77-81. 
81 Freeden (2003) op cit., 62-3. 
82 Freeden (1996) op cit. 
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morphological approach to ideologies.  In particular his ‘four Ps’ in the composition of 
ideologies.83 
 
The four Ps. 
The ‘four Ps’ give us the composition of Freeden’s morphological approach: in proximity 
to other concepts, in obtaining priority over related concepts, as permeable and amenable 
to overlap and cross pollination between ideological formations and, finally, in placing 
proportionate emphasis on some concepts over others. Freeden is keen to illustrate how his 
theorising on ideologies does not constitute the suggestion of a fixed structure of organizing, 
but, rather, how the processes of decontesting are contingent, allowing fluid formations and 
changes to occur.84  I outline them in brief, below, to advance further our thinking about the 
internal complexity of contestable concepts and the central process of ideological 
decontestation.   
 
The first idea is that of proximity, and Freeden’s point, allied with Connolly’s cluster 
concept thinking, is that concepts cannot be considered or understood in isolation.  We need 
to consider them in their particular contexts in order to see how they can be concretised.  
Therefore students of ideology need to pay attention to the specific ‘idea-environment’ that 
a particular concept shares with other concepts.85  Freeden gives the example of the concept 
of individuality.  How we conceptualise this idea will depend on the other concepts which 
help to clarify it through a relational dynamic in a particular ideological formation.  For 
example, in a given ideology and conception of individuality, are humans conceptualised as 
                                                 
83 Freeden (2003) op cit. 
84 Freeden (2003) op cit., 60-64. 
85 Freeden (2003) op cit., 61. 
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being atomistic and self-sufficient?  Or, alternatively, are individuals conceptualised in a 
particular ideological pattern by means of other concepts which mark individuals as 
completely interdependent, as social animals that need to be part of a community, for 
example.86  In the first atomistic scenario we might find more libertarian ideational patterns 
and in the latter we might find some indications of socialist or communist leanings (and 
there are possible mixtures between these two ideological poles).     
 
Priority refers to the order of the ‘ideological furniture’, the specific ways in which an 
ideology selects and ranks particular political concepts taken from a much more widely 
available ‘pool of ideas’, 87  assigning to some a core position while others are made 
peripheral.  As we have seen, such processes are, inevitably, reflective of “sustained 
empirical, historical usage”.88   But the morphology of ideologies also involves a continual 
process of reordering the conceptual furniture in response to events and happenings in the 
real world.  A core concept in classic Liberalism - such as the example Freeden gives of 
private property - may gradually be pushed to the periphery of the ‘room’ and, perhaps, 
marginalised altogether in a dusty corner.89 This ordering of the concepts in use can also 
work the other way, of course, so that concepts at the periphery gain traction and start to be 
used more centrally. 
 
Linked to this ordering and relational meaning is the notion of permeability.  Freeden 
reminds us that “ideologies are not hermetically sealed: they have porous boundaries and 
                                                 
86 Freeden (2003) op cit., 61. 
87 Freeden (2003) op cit., 61. 
88 Freeden (2003) op cit., 62. 
89 Freeden (2003) op cit., 62. 
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will frequently occupy overlapping space”.90 This alerts us to the fact that concepts are not 
exclusive to a particular ideological tradition or current.  So, we can suppose that ideas of 
modernization and progress might well be desirable concepts across a number of disparate 
ideologies, albeit configured in different ways.  We might find that common ideas relating 
to social justice come to the fore and exist across assumed ideological divides, as has been 
seen at certain times in Egypt between broadly socialist groupings and the Muslim 
Brotherhood,91 although other logical and cultural constraints serve to limit such fluidity. 
 
Finally, proportionality is the tool with which Freeden suggests that the (perhaps 
necessary) simplification, but sometimes oversimplification, of ideologies can be tempered 
by considering the strength with which certain concepts are emphasised over others. Freeden 
gives the example of the way in which libertarians magnify the concept of individual liberty 
to the detriment of other important liberal values, thus distorting the picture.92  
 
Utilising these possible compositions of ideologies we see how concepts are like pieces of 
furniture, preferred and ordered into the core and adjacent or side-lined and forgotten in the 
periphery or margins of a particular ideological formation. Such ‘concrete manifestations’ 
are just settled enough for political analysts to be able to understand and take meaning from 
the nature of the ideas in a particular time and space.93 It is the multiple dimensions and 
possible logical and cultural considerations that ideological ordering might bring about, and 
the very real potential for change in them and introduced by them, which are pertinent to a 
                                                 
90 Freeden (2003) op cit., 64. 
91 See discussion on this in: Browers, M (2009) Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and 
Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4. Freeden (2003) op cit., 64-65. 
92 Freeden (2003) op cit., 64-65. 
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study of concepts which appear and are used in a situation of rapid change such as in 
revolutions.   
 
At the heart of Freeden’s project, and in his later work,94 is a constant emphasis on and 
reference to our ‘concrete’ and ‘empirical’ world, and his plea for theorists to pay more 
attention to the ‘raw material’; to study political thought in the vernacular and to reflect upon 
how these patterns of thinking and acting can be analysed and interpreted by the scholar of 
political theory.95 This points towards the need to reflect on everyday political thought and 
practices, and the ways in which ideas or concepts might start to form a ‘thought-practice’, 
that is, a “recurring pattern of (political) thinking”.96   
 
Important thinking embedded in Freeden’s scholarship about ideas is, perhaps, highlighted 
if we think through the implications of his conception of a ‘concrete, empirical world’ 
throughout his 1996 book, and subsequently in his later work.97 Freeden, is suggesting that 
theory and practice are not two distinctive fields of knowledge, but, rather, is suggesting a 
way to expound on the complex interplay between them.98 This has important value for 
researchers looking at ideas that are produced by divergent actors through their language, 
speech, performance and so on.  In this study one of my central claims is that my approach 
seeks to get closer to the people, the revolutionaries, and to deciphering and interpreting 
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their worlds.  I aim to show this by using Freeden’s work to think about the Syrian 
revolution.  The next section therefore draws together how the theoretical insight and useful 
conceptual tools which both Connolly and Freeden provide can be employed in an analysis 
of dignity in Syria’s revolution.   
 
 
III Theorising elsewhere: Applying Connolly and Freeden to Syria 
 
Before setting out in detail my approach to the conceptualisation of dignity in Syria’s 
revolution, I seek to address the question of applying western theory and ideas to 
other contexts.  It should be recognised that there is a significant debate in the area 
of comparative political theory and thought (CPT) concerning the application of 
Western theories to non-Western contexts. My own approach will be one which 
assumes that the interpretive methodologies I have outlined so far, are relevant to a 
study of human activity and to political happenings, independent of any geographic 
or imagined boundaries. Before specifying in more detail how I will go about this it 
is important to outline the key issues at stake.  The debates about this matter span a 
very broad church of comparative political thought and theory (CPT).  For example, 
Michael Freeden has co-edited a volume on contemporary political thought which 
engages with some of the central debates and problems in existing efforts regarding 
theoretical work in non-western contexts.99 In the introduction Freeden cautioned 
that: 
                                                 
99 Freeden, M. & Vincent, A. (2013a) Comparative Political Thought: Theorizing practices, Oxon: 
Routledge.   
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 We can never arrive at a complete understanding of other societies or even 
our own. What we can though arrive at are certain insights, certain glimpses 
that make sense to us; sometimes they may even make more sense to us than 
to the dominant cultural understanding in the societies that we study.100  
 
Whilst recognising the collective effort within CPT to pay due attention to differing ideas 
and practices of different cultural traditions, Freeden notes the possible risks along the way.  
First appears to be the danger that some established problems in political theory, philosophy, 
and science have inculcated a sense of superiority for the assumed norm and model of the 
West.  However, Freeden notes that contributions to his volume include successful efforts 
to overcome this problem such as the study of ‘multiple modernities’ taking us beyond 
narrow Eurocentric secular rational thought.   
 
A second challenge on the path to ‘theorising elsewhere’ is the need to unsettle assumed 
universalist values and notions and in particular to avoid the assumption of timeless 
ahistorical conceptions of ideas such as politics and justice.  Rising to this challenge, 
contributions in the volume utilise moves from idealism to political realism in political 
theorising.  This move also contains seeds from which to harvest some rich, comparative 
studies on the everyday, vernacular world.  However, this can be counterpoised with another 
obstruction to productive theorising which is the compulsion for normative theorising which 
                                                 
100 Freeden, M. Introduction, in Freeden, M. & Vincent, A.  (2013a) Comparative Political Thought: 
Theorizing practices, Oxon: Routledge, 22.   
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attaches to moralising about, and, more or less, apologising for the ‘Other’.101  This includes 
the theorists who labour to ‘normalise’ Islam and reassure us that it is compatible with 
western liberal democracy, the problem here being, potentially, that theorists reproduce 
Western framing and, more importantly, that it presupposes something questionable: that 
Muslims or Islam have anything to apologise for.  The other end of this obstructing pole in 
CPT is the possible recourse to all kinds of relativism, which is equally damaging.102   I shall 
elaborate on some of these tensions below.   
 
If we are making a claim for the importance of looking at or seeing the ‘political’ in its 
widest and most human (agency/actor) sense (outside formalistic and narrow politics) then 
we cannot assume that, methodologically, such political inquiry stops abruptly and becomes 
irrelevant when we look at other regions in the world.103 It is thus important to foreground 
local contexts and to avoid exceptionalism.  The tendency to essentialise societies and even 
whole regions has been critiqued in the postcolonial critical school of thought that emerged 
from the anti-colonial struggles.104 There is, however, then a danger that this necessary 
critique creates a new problem.  Attempts at correction may take the argument to extremes 
so that we reach a point where western academics have no place or right to study non-
western societies, or where we start to encounter western political thought as a possible 
                                                 
101 For a critique of the field along these lines see Goto-Jones, C. (2013) ‘When is comparative political 
thought (not) comparative?’ In Freeden, M. & Vincent, A. (2013a) op cit., 158-180. 
102 This paragraph has drawn extensively from the introduction by Michael Freeden to his co-edited volume: 
Freeden, M. & Vincent, A. (2013a) op cit., 20-22. 
103 Mamdani, M. (2001) When victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
104 See overview in Rao, R. (2013) Postcolonialism, in Freeden, M., Sargent, L.T., & Stears, M. eds. The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271-289. Also debates on 
decolonizing theory: Baum, B. (2015) ‘Decolonising Critical Theory’, Constellations, 22, 420-34, and a 
response from Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2016) ‘Decolonising Theory from Within or Without? A Reply to 
Baum, Constellations, 23:1, 133-137. For a reparative approach to both Postcolonialism and Marxism see 
Rao, R. (2016) ‘Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism’, Critical Sociology, 1-12.   
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‘westoxication’. 105  Instead, the point might be, drawing on a sympathetic reading of 
Gunnell,106 to be aware that we must not assume a copy-and-paste kind of theoretical model 
or schema, nor begin by assuming that our concepts in use might directly be transposed or, 
worse still, act as the imposed ideal in other contexts.  However, and crucially, this does not 
close off the investigation of diverse social and political landscapes but merely underpins 
the approach I am advancing here, through Freeden and Connolly, that we need to pay 
careful attention to our political concepts as they appear and are organised in specific 
instances, and that we also need to be thoroughly historically—and contextually—minded 
in our inquiries.  
 
Pursued from this direction and in this spirit, comparative theory seems a useful mode of 
approach to making actual comparisons,107 rather than the mere seeking of equivalence 
across intellectual and political discourses in different contexts.  So, for example, von 
Vacano makes a sensible argument that comparative political theory “should involve non-
Western ideas or thinkers, not merely in the application of European ideas in non-European 
contexts.”108  In doing so von Vacano also offers a way to escape the attendant relativism of 
some postmodern lines of thought and to overcome one's own potential cultural prejudices 
and essentialising.109  This is important for my research focus, as for some researchers  
careful attention to specificity has unfortunately led into a retreat into geographic or extreme 
                                                 
105 Freeden and Vincent (2013a) op cit., 9-10. 
106Gunnell, J.G. (2011) Political Theory and Social Science: Cutting Against the Grain, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
107 Compare sections 130-2 in Wittgenstein (1958) op cit. 
108 von Vacano, D. (2015) ‘The Scope of Comparative Political Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science, 
18, 477. Cf. again, along somewhat similar lines, Mamdani, op. cit. 
109 Winch possibly offers a way to think/do this, though the language he used to do so is now out of step with 
postcolonial discourses; see his chapter; ‘Understanding a primitive society’, in Wilson, B. (ed.) (1970) Key 
concepts in the Social Sciences: Rationality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 78-111  
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forms of cultural relativism which, for example, can fetishize differences such as religion, 
ethnicity and so on, and suggest that not all humans could conceivably share similar wants, 
needs and claims, or  to assert that Muslims are not ready for ‘western’ democracy, and so 
on, thereby returning us to the relativist path of ‘Mannheim’s paradox’,110 and the possible 
limits of ‘postmodernists’ such as Rorty.111   
 
CPT, perhaps necessarily, complicates these matters in the course of correcting them, and 
airs a multiplicity of sometimes conflicting and competing visions, as is set out and critiqued 
by von Vacano.112 There are, of course, a number of normative and interpretive approaches 
within CPT.  Normative theorists seek to enter into dialogue, to engage with and/or promote 
equivalence, commonality or the accommodation of western with non-western ideas, or to 
offer correctives to and departures from colonial and Eurocentric errors.  The task of the 
interpreter (where I place myself) is to seek to explicate, to ’understand and decode’, and to 
de-centre different phenomena or different possible units of analysis without ascribing 
‘origin’ and normative judgements which might then enforce prescriptive universalist 
positions in the process.113 However, the attempt at more critical and reflective scholarship 
in response to the problematic of a hegemonic, liberal, normative knowledge production of 
‘elsewhere’, as Bonura cautions, might reproduce some of the problems it seeks to correct. 
                                                 
110 Mannheim attempted to escape the relativism trap, unsuccessfully, which led to Clifford Geertz’s 
characterization of his work on ideology as ‘Mannheim’s paradox’: ie he argued convincingly that Marxism 
cannot be outside of ideology but in doing so could not extricate the positionally of the subject—see 
discussion on this in Freeden (1996) op cit., 26; and, Geertz (1973/2000) op cit., 194. 
111 At least, as Rorty is usually understood: as a postmodern relativist. This interpretation of Rorty may miss 
nuances in his stance which he himself describes as ‘ethnocentric’, and may miss distinctions between, for 
example, stances of superiority and those which merely recognise positionality, however uncomfortable. But 
an exegetical investigation which could settle these matters moves too far away from the main focus of this 
chapter. Rorty himself tackles accusations of relativism in Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, irony, and 
solidarity, specifically Chapter Three, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 44-69.   
112 von Vacano, D. (2015) ‘The Scope of Comparative Political Theory’, The Annual Review of Political 
Science, 18:465-80.   
113 Citing Michael Freeden and Andrew Vincent, in von Vacano, D. ibid, 471. 
98 
 
Through this lens, theorizing elsewhere and in particular about non-western political thought 
merely:       
 
…reaffirms the ‘here’ of contemporary western political theory while rendering the 
substance of non-western political thought indefinite and subject to various kinds of 
‘moral ordering’ amid comparisons with ‘western political thought’.114 
 
In all of these debates within and beyond CPT, some possible and perhaps problematical 
tensions, then, remain.  They cannot be resolved here and that is not my intention.  However, 
they can help to clarify the methodological approach I am seeking to build for a 
conceptualization of the idea of dignity in Syria’s revolution.  My research proceeds along 
a path which seeks to avoid both extreme relativism and Eurocentric errors by attempting to 
give due consideration to context, whilst also questioning any assumed Arab or Syrian 
exceptionalism in thinking about ideas and about the ‘political’.   
 
Freeden partly offers a way out of any seemingly theoretical state of aporia when he posits 
a ‘contingent universalism’.115  In this approach Freeden recognises and analyses different 
ideational patterns over time and across space, but also cautions against fixing ideas or 
patterns in stone, or assuming they can form a final ideological assemblage.116 The necessary 
critique of the mainstream and conventional discipline of political science and theory and 
                                                 
114 Bonura, C. (2013) ‘Theorising Elsewhere: Comparison and Topological Reasoning in Political Theory’, 
Polity, 45:1, 40. 
115 Freeden, M. (2013b) ‘The Morphological Analysis of Ideology’, in Freeden, M. Sargent L.T. & Stears, M 
eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 128. 
116 Freeden (2013b) ibid., 128. 
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the emergence of more radical forms of postcolonial scholarship does not preclude the idea 
that a common way of seeing and thinking about the political can be applied in different 
contexts, even as diverse as Syria and the UK.117 
 
Method and material 
The previous discussion has provided the bridge to my detailed research on Syria and 
underscored the importance of an analysis of ‘ideas from below’ and a specific study of the 
concept of dignity in revolution.  In this final section I set out my method specifically for a 
study of this idea.  This method builds on the detailed methodological framing I have set out 
above.  I will concisely summarise this first and then move on to discuss the actual raw 
materials available in the concrete case of Syria’s revolution, including the selection of 
material and concomitant reflections on method.   
 
I utilise ideas from Connolly to argue for and underpin a research study centred on the 
analysis of the complex and contestable concept of dignity.  I set out to show how dignity is 
contested and contestable and how its internal criteria and its interpretive potential is an 
example of a contested concept.  I then draw on Connolly to argue how the idea of dignity 
becomes political within a revolutionary situation.  I show how dignity has a sedimented 
                                                 
117 This is patently not the same as, for example, the assumed universalism of an American-centric 
knowledge production, as discussed in Schatz, Edward & Maltseva, Elena, (2012) ‘Assumed to be Universal: 
The Leap from Data to Knowledge in the American Political Science Review’, Polity 44, 446-472; and, how 
such critiques contribute to post-colonialism as “an awareness of the ways in which five centuries of modern 
European colonialism continue to shape political ideas and practices, including those concerning the 
production of knowledge”, in Chandra, U. (2013) ‘The Case for a Postcolonial Approach to the Study of 
Politics’, New Political Science, 35:3, 480.  A critical school that emerged directly from the anti-colonial 
struggles is captured in the writings of Fanon, F (2001) The Wretched of the Earth; and Amilcar, C. (1980) 
Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings. 
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meaning anchored in history, but also how it moves through time and how conceptual 
innovation and change might occur in a particular situation.   
 
I rely on Freeden in order to situate and analyse the concept of dignity in all its complexity 
and in its relationship to and with the external world; the morphological approach gives me 
the tools to do this.  I consider dignity in its diachronic and synchronic settings and look at 
how these dynamics interact.  I think about the process of decontestation and how dignity 
relates to and is clarified in relation to other ideas.  I investigate the extent to which dignity, 
as a core concept in the revolution, appears alongside other core and adjacent ideas.   
 
I apply the ideas and theories in the scholarship of Connolly and Freeden to the concrete 
situation of Syria’s revolutionary moment. The next chapter, Chapter Three, is a macro-level 
critical study of Syria’s modern ideational landscape which formed the historical backdrop 
for the rapidly shifting ground and revolution which began in 2011.  I utilise the diachronic 
elements of Freeden’s research approach and draw on the detailed conceptual tools in his 
morphology of political ideologies to consider ideational traditions and ideological 
components of Syria’s dominant ideology. I pick out the core and relational or adjacent 
concepts which structured the dominant Syrian Arab Baʿthist ideology and ruling party.  I 
also consider the ideas which were to be pushed to the margins or periphery as the Baʿth 
party gained power and then, ultimately, was conceded to Asad’s one party state and 
authoritarian rule.    
 
In Chapter Four I extend this ‘historicized' analysis specifically to a treatment of the concept 
of dignity.  In thinking about the history of the concept of dignity and the processes of 
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conceptual change, it is necessary to investigate this internally complex concept and its 
relationship to and with the external world.  I draw on the diachronic aspects of dignity in 
history and I analyse what seems to be the internal structure of the meaning of dignity. I also 
move towards an explicit consideration of the political aspects of the idea of dignity as it 
emerged and functioned at particular historical junctures.  Therefore, I start to draw in the 
synchronic dimension along with a consideration of the broad sweep of ideological 
traditions. The final part of Chapter Four starts to shift us to the synchronic aspects and 
concrete empirical world of the Syrian revolution began in 2011.  Here I introduce the 
beginnings of Syria’s 2011 revolution and the utterances and actions of the revolutionaries 
in it.  
 
In Chapters Five and Six I investigate the political thought and revolutionary practice of two 
distinctive ‘exemplars’ of Syria’s revolutionary moment.  I move to focus more directly on 
the conceptual content of dignity by means of these examples, and on some aspects of 
Freeden’s morphological approach to political concepts and ideologies.  I need to attend to 
the empirical, concrete world of Syria’s revolutionary moment through the utterances, texts 
and practices of its participants, and that is the nature therefore of the two ‘exemplar’ 
chapters. I consider the uses and function of dignity as it is used explicitly, but also as it can 
be inferred implicitly – especially through its relationship with other concepts.   
 
The raw material of revolution 
I now introduce briefly the process of actually selecting the ‘raw material’ from Syria’s 
revolutionary actors that I describe and analyse in detail in Chapters Five and Six.  There is 
a vast wealth of material from the revolution in the form of alternative newspapers, content-
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sharing channels, mediated content available via major Arab news and current affairs 
satellite channels, websites, blogs and much more.  Navigating this burgeoning 
revolutionary culture and production was an important part of my interpretive approach to 
analysing the concept of dignity.  There are many possible approaches to pursue that would 
go beyond a narrow textual analysis and seek to track ideational patterns and ideas in use.  
There are practical constraints in terms of access to people and information.  Given the 
acceleration of the conflict it was not practical for me to travel to Syria without the risk of 
compromising my own and my potential informants’ security and safety.  At the same time, 
though, given the access to material on revolutionary websites and social networking sites 
it was possible to get closer to the ideas as they developed.   
 
Having scoped out and monitored content online and followed various Syrian revolutionary 
Facebook groups, websites, and other social media platforms, I became familiar with the 
material available online and the different kinds of content being made available and by 
whom. In recognising the importance and dynamic nature of political ideologies as 
‘receptacles’ for a variety of ideas, I traced two distinctive ideological currents from within 
Syria’s revolution: that of the progressive liberal trend and the non-extremist Islamist 
current.  These two threads provide us with the broader ideational context for an analysis of 
dignity in revolution.  
  
From this point I selected two prominent ideational exemplars from each of these trends: the 
progressive website al-jumhuriya (The Republic) and the Islamist fighters’ liwa al-tawhid 
(Unity Brigade).  They serve as exemplars simply in the sense that they each offer us 
different takes on a particular set of beliefs and practices which are organised to achieve 
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common and collective revolutionary goals.  These two exemplars enjoyed a high profile 
within the Syrian revolution and they offer contrasting profiles of revolutionary actors: a 
broadly intellectual and activist perspective in contrast to fighters on the frontline.  
Exploring these roles is central to gaining an understanding of what the revolutionary agents 
were doing and why they were doing it. These explorations are focused here through the 
lens of the idea of dignity.  Both these groups have prominently used, referred to and 
promoted the idea of dignity in a number of ways, and offer us pictures of (the idea of) 
dignity in use in a specific revolutionary situation, and show us how this idea emerged and 
played out within differing traditions and trajectories in the revolution.        
 
However, before this detailed examination of specific ideas, we need firstly to stand back 
and to take in the historical, diachronic, formation of Arab ideologies and, in particular, the 
dominant ideological current in modern Syria.  Otherwise, it will not be possible to see from 
where the concept and the call to dignity came from in Syria in 2011.   I suggest that we can 
come to understand the felt force of the concept of dignity if we acknowledge the ways in 
which the Syrian Arab Baʿth project run aground and that, in the era of nation-building, the 
promise of citizenship, freedom, and equality was fundamentally undermined in the service 
of ruling elites and their narrow self-interests and of regime survival.   
 
This necessarily requires a more detailed investigation into the conceptual history and 
political thought of Arab Baʿthism as well as into the formation and aims of the formal Baʿth 
Party, which has dominated the Syrian ideological landscape since the military coup of 1963. 
Attention should also be given to competing and overlapping ideological currents which 
developed in the twentieth century.  This will be the subject of the next chapter.   
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Chapter Three - Arab Ideologies 
The battle for ideas: the rise of the Arab Baʿth Party 
 
Introduction 
The first two chapters of this thesis prepared the ground for an interpretive approach to a 
conceptualisation and analysis of dignity in Syria’s revolution.  In Chapter One I indicated 
the ways in which I seek to move beyond the conventional research questions which 
continue to frame much of our analysis on modern revolutions.  I noted welcome 
developments in the study of revolution which consider agental approaches to important 
social and political events such as revolutions.  In Chapter Two I set out my methodology, 
situated in the study of concepts and political ideologies.  I claimed that ideas are important 
aspects of revolutions, available for our inspection if we broaden investigation beyond 
questions of causation and look at the thought-patterns of revolutionary actors in order to 
uncover the interesting processes that were unfolding and the ideas contained within them.  
  
This chapter acts as an historic ‘bridge’ and vital context for my specific research on dignity 
in Syria’s revolution.  The aim here is to ensure that any consideration of political ideas and 
beliefs is undertaken contextually and with due attention to contemporary Syrian politics, 
the rise of political parties and the forming of modern ideological traditions.  I set out here 
the ideational landscape from which the revolution and the idea of dignity was to emerge.  I 
focus on the emergence of the Arab Baʿth (resurrection) party and outline its founding 
beliefs and its organising concepts (focusing on the Syrian branch and party).  This 
introduces some of the most influential and formative ideas which underpinned the main 
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Arab ideological families emerging and consolidating in the twentieth century. I necessarily, 
therefore, also introduce briefly the competing current of political Islam and I also give 
attention to the republican dimension which is less attended to in the wider scholarship on 
Syria.   
 
Following the scholarship of Freeden, the diachronic aspects I consider enable us to see how 
ideas are important units of analysis for studies of the formation of Syrian Baʿthist ideology. 
This chapter is not a comprehensive history of the period and of the rise of the Arab Baʿth 
Party—that would be a thesis in itself. Rather I focus on the formation of the Arab Baʿth 
movement, emphasising the historic Syrian dimension.  Against this backdrop I introduce 
and analyse the central ideas which informed Arab Baʿthism.  I look at the conceptual 
content of (Syrian) Arab Baʿthism, and, in particular, the core concepts of Arab unity, 
freedom, and socialism. I discuss how we can understand these complex concepts 
themselves as well as in their important relations with each other and with other ideas in 
specific contexts.  I briefly explore and analyse the ways in which the Syrian Arab Ba´th 
Party consolidated its grip and became the ruling party and dominant ideology in 
contemporary Syria.  I also attend to the ideational currents of Islamism and also draw on 
new scholarship to recover some aspects of Arab republicanism.  These sometimes 
competing and sometimes overlapping trends are important to the study of dignity in Syria, 
as we shall see.  
 
In this chapter I argue that we find a fundamental tension between the narrow interests of a 
ruling elite keen to ensure a status quo and that of the ideas which were being produced and 
disseminated with the emergence of new movements and parties across the region.  In 
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pursuing a morphological approach in an analysis of the concepts which went to make up 
emerging ideologies and the formalised Syrian Arab Baʿth Party, I am able to explicate the 
core ideas of Arab unity, freedom and the formulation of a particular Arab socialism.  These 
virtues were what underpinned the historical push for self-determination and citizenship yet 
such ideas were marginalised when the party was formalised (and instrumentalised by rulers) 
in power.     
 
I Historicising the Arab Baʿth Party 
 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century is a formative period for the formation of 
new ideas and modern ideational currents in the Arab region.  There had long existed an 
abstract and broadly conceived cultural and linguistic sense of an Arab nation, or ummah—
albeit contested in practices.  This general sense of being Arab was captured by the idea of 
Arabism which preceded the formal and bounded nation-state and the more politically 
explicit and contentious Arab nationalisms which were to follow.  This Arabism tended to 
exist alongside and in negotiation (rather than conflict) with the entrenched Ottoman system.   
Provincial elites were in positions of influence and power and largely sought ways in which 
to secure their interests and patronage networks.  Such an elite network of notables acted as 
an intermediary between the imperial power base and the local communities.1 However, in 
particular, the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms had had profound effects on subjects in the 
empire.  Issues from tax collection and military conscription to capitulation and ideas about 
                                                 
1 For discussion on the variegated interests of the ‘notables’: Hourani, A. (1968) ‘Ottoman Reform and the 
Politics of Notables’ in Beginnings of Modernisation in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, Polk, W. 
& Chambers, R. eds. Chicago, 41-68.  See P. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of 
Damascus 1860-1920, Cambridge University Press, 1983.  
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citizen equality generated political ferment within which new associations began to emerge.  
Differing ideas of Arabism and Arab nationalism came to reflect a reaction and response to 
the increasingly nationalist turn, with the Young Turks and the emergence of the Committee 
of Union and Progress (CUP) and perceptions of an increasing Turkification.2   
 
Important centres of political agitation for reform emerged and shared common Arabist 
sentiments in Beirut, Cairo and Istanbul, as well as further afield among the exiled Arabs in 
Paris and elsewhere.3 A number of crucial conferences and movements were convened, 
notable among them the First Arab Congress in Paris (1913) which gathered prominent 
figures from the Mashreq and sought more autonomy from centralised rule.4  Also, in Cairo, 
the Hizb al-markaziyya al-idariyya al-͑uthmani (the Ottoman Administration 
Decentralization Party) was founded, and there was al-jamʿiyyat al-ʿarabiyya al-fatat (The 
Young Arab Society) which was founded in Paris in 1911 by young Palestinian, Syrian and 
Lebanese students and became a lasting influence in the consolidation of the idea of an Arab 
nation.5  This group, ‘al-Fatat’, went on to form, in 1919, the pan-Arab hizb al-istiqlal al-
ʿarabi (the Arab Independence Party) which aimed to achieve independence from the French 
and British and to do this by promoting Arab unity.  The membership was dominated by 
Syrians and reached tens of thousands.6   
 
In this context of political agitation the rise of formal and informal (and, sometimes, 
necessarily clandestine) political projects in Ottoman and then in post-Ottoman Syria 
                                                 
2 On all this see the work of Hanioglu, S.M. in Khalidi et al (1991) The Origins of Arab Nationalism, New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
3 Khalidi et al, ibid., 54-55. 
4 Khalidi et al, ibid., 55. 
5 Muslih (1991) 167-185: in Khalidi et al, ibid. 
6 Muslih (1991) 175: in Khalidi et al, ibid. 
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signified a shift towards thinking about projects of self-determination and independence. As 
well as the exiled and students overseas, there were a host of other political actors forming 
new nationalist projects and agendas. The notion of Arab nationalism in an empirical and 
concrete form was first practiced, and manipulated, during the last years of the First World 
War, when the British needed the local Arab communities to join it, ostensibly in the fight 
against Ottoman rule.  In years of negotiations between Sharif al-Husayn ‘ibn Ali, of the 
Hashemite tribe of Mecca, and the British High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry 
McMahon, a British agreement to support Arab aspirations for independence was reached  
based on detailed discussions about which Arab territories would form part of this 
independent territory.  The condition was that the Arabs support the British military in the 
region in fighting the Ottoman forces, and an Arab Revolt against Ottoman Turkish rule 
began in June 1916.   
 
As a reward for allying with the British, Sharif al-Husayn expected the British to honour a 
commitment to the formal establishment and recognition of a completely independent Arab 
constitutional monarchy covering significant Arab territory and centred in Damascus.  
Damascus fell to the British troops led by General Allenby in October 1918 and Sharif 
Husayn expected his agreement with the British to be activated.  However, the competing 
1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between the British and the French undermined the Husayn-
McMahon correspondence because it allocated significant territory to the French at the point 
of victory.   Thus, when the Ottomans surrendered in 1918, the colonial victors active in the 
Mashreq, primarily the British and French, had already decided to divide up the provinces 
based on the earlier arrangements in their 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement.  When the British 
troops formally withdrew from Damascus in 1919 the French swept into the city to unseat 
Amir Faysal and to begin their twenty-six year occupation of modern-day Syria.  In 1920 
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Arab representatives in the Syrian National Congress announced a declaration of 
independence, and Sharif Husayn’s son, Amir Faysal, was declared king in March 1920. 
The French, however, soon put down Faysal’s rule, and with it any illusions of self-rule and 
independence for the Arabs.  Having advanced to victory in the historic battle of Maysalun, 
the French immediately instituted a colonial hold over historic Syria which involved 
parcelling up the territory along sectarian lines and favouring certain sects over others so as 
to divide and rule and protect French interests.7     
 
This early example of Arab national rule was not successful but nevertheless, the Arab nationalist 
cause grew, increasingly amidst regional inter-war colonial rivalries as well as with the 
direct encroachment of imperial powers.8 The different machinations of imperial powers and 
the variegated interventions in the inter-war period, from ‘gunboat diplomacy’, Mandate 
rule and direct occupation, were to shape and be reflected in the local nationalisms. I cannot 
set out all the historical twists and turns in the evolution of these different groupings; 
however I consider them broadly as making up a distinctive ideological ‘family’ based on 
Wilsonian ideals of self-determination and the commonly shared desire for complete 
independence. 
 
The project of Arab nationalism was to become allied with other important political concepts 
which served to clarify what it might be and how its ideas might actually be realised, but it 
was by no means a unitary idea.9 The concept played out differently in different contexts, 
                                                 
7 Khoury, P. S. (1987) Syria and the French Mandate: the politics of Arab nationalism, 1920-1945, London: 
I.B. Taurus & Co. 
8 Chalcraft, J. (2015) op cit., 221-222. 
9 With regard to the wider debates within the literature on the emergence and nature of Arab nationalism see 
the collection edited by R. Khalidi, L. Anderson, M. Muslih and R. S. Simon (1991) The Origins of Arab 
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often drawing on varied strands of socialist and communist thinking, foregrounding an ideal 
of ‘social justice’ understood as the levelling of gross economic and social inequalities.  The 
idea of Arab nationalism resonated in Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, and among exiles in Paris 
and Istanbul, at different points in time.  The common thread in this idea was the shared 
experience of imperial domination and colonial rule, the direct and antagonistic encounter 
with capitalist systems of trade, being subject to Orientalist mentalities, and the experience 
of and rejection of aspects of Western modes of modernity.   
 
It was in this context that educated, elite Arabs organised their Baʿth (resurrection) 
movement and forged the foundations for the Arab Baʿth Party.10 In order to unpick some 
of the critical steps in the rise to formal power of the Syrian Baʿthists it is useful to periodise 
key historical themes in the evolution of the Arab Baʿth Party and formal party politics in 
an independent Syria.  These will be set out below with particular attention to the period 
after Syria gained its full independence, up until Hafez al-Asad took power in 1970 and 
instituted his corrective movement. 
 
 
                                                 
Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press. In particular, for the purposes of this research, the 
chapters by Dawn and alternative arguments by Khalidi, and sections on political activists and thinkers in 
Part 2 on Syria and Iraq.  Also, in the context of Syria see: Khoury, P. (1987) Urban Notables and Arab 
Nationalism: the politics of Damascus 1860-1920, Cambridge University Press, which provides forensic 
detail on the urban upper elites and their interaction and influence under Ottoman rule and beyond.  
Provence, M. (2005) The Great Syrian Revolt: and the rise of Arab nationalism, Austin: University of Texas 
Press, provides a detailed argument for the centrality of the Syrian uprising in the subsequent formation and 
consolidation of Arab (state) nationalism.  Albert Hourani provides a valuable historical record with his 
political essay: Hourani, A. (1946) Syria and Lebanon, Oxford University Press, 96-121.  More recent 
scholarship by Christopher Phillips and Daniel Neep returns to historical events to make more current claims, 
respectively, about the reproduction of pan-Arabism, and, in Neep, violence as a practice of colonial rule (see 
bibliography entries: 2013; 2012).   
10 See Hourani (1946); Khoury (1987); Provence (2005) op cit. 
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Syria: towards independence 
Some Syrian political actors and elites sought to advance ideas about increased local 
autonomy within the confines of French Mandate rule, but the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 
and the years of resistance which followed it made the fervent desire for liberation much 
more explicit and, perhaps, increased the bargaining power of the nationalists with their 
colonial rulers.  A nominal agreement between the Syrian National Bloc, one of the political 
parties in Syria, and the French was negotiated, and culminated in the 1936 Syrian-French 
Treaty.  However, it did not go very far in meeting the demands of some disillusioned 
Syrians, who formed al-Baʿth al-ʿarabi (the Arab Resurrection) in 1940 - founded by Sami 
al-Jundi and Zaki al-Arsuzi - as well as another party called al-Ihya al-ʿarabi, established 
by Michel Aflaq and Saleh al-Din al-Bitar.11 I will expand on this and the political thought 
of its adherents later in this chapter.  
 
Syria finally gained recognition as an independent state when it attained member status at 
the United Nations as the Syrian Republic, in April 1945, and it declared its independence 
formally in 1946.  From 1946 until 1949 Syria enjoyed a parliamentary system of 
government, and three dominant blocs or gatherings of the elite vied for power: the National 
Bloc led by Shukri al-Quwatli, the National Party of Sabri al-Asali, and the larger People’s 
Party of Rushdi al Kikhya and Nazim al-Qudsi.12  These elite political actors had been active 
in the resistance against the French but seemed to place their own economic and political 
interests above realisation of more radical ideas for political and social change. 
 
                                                 
11 Kaylani, N.M. (1972) ‘The Rise of the Syrian Baʿth, 1940-1958: Political Success, Party Failure’, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3:1, January, 3-23. 
12 Kaylani (1972) ibid, 9. 
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The struggle for independence had been influenced by wider events – and especially by 
similar movements for independence in Iraq, the turbulence of post-colonial rule, as well as 
the establishment of a Zionist state in historic Palestine. In particular, the response to events 
in Palestine from the various Arab nationalist and socialist groupings served to pitch 
traditionalists keen on the status quo against those of the more radical pan-Arabist and Arab 
nationalist strains.  The latter lent their support to Arabs fighting the Zionist militias in 
Palestine, and to the Iraqis, for example.  The Palestinian Great Revolt from 1936 to 193913 
and then the 1948 struggle for Palestine were significant in the way that the various political 
groupings were configured and in how the traditionalists were seen to have sold out the 
Palestinian and Arab cause.  This deep contention, and then the increasing foreign intrigue 
in the post war years, laid the groundwork for challenges to power in Syria’s nascent 
independent state, ushering in an era of doing politics by military coup.   
 
In 1949 there was a bloodless coup which ended the government of Shukri al-Quwatli and 
signalled the shift to government by coup.14  Two more coups followed and then, at the end 
of 1949 the parliamentary system was restored, but not for long.  At first one of the 
prominent coup plotters Colonel Adib al-Shishakli preferred to work behind the scenes, but 
after his early attempts at reform (including the distribution of state lands)15 he was to 
become increasingly dictatorial and led a military junta which banned political parties and 
exiled Arab Baʿthists and other dissenters from the Communists and from the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  Democracy was restored in Syria when al-Shishakli was finally ousted from 
                                                 
13 Swedenberg, T. (1993) ‘The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939)’, in Hourani, A., 
Khoury, P., Wilson, M. eds. The Modern Middle East, Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California, 467-503. 
14 Kaylani, ibid, 11-12. 
15 Seale, P. (1988/1995) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley, LA: University of California 
Press, 47. 
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power and fled the country, leading to Syria’s ‘democratic years’ (1954-1958) in which the 
Baʿth Party enjoyed increased popularity and representation in the parliament.16  
 
There were a significant number of competing parties vying for representation and influence, 
from the adherents of a Greater Syria (the SSNP) to the Syrian Communist Party and, 
perhaps inevitably, there was also a level of dysfunction in this particular parliamentary 
system because the multiple opposing stances of these parties made consensus politics 
difficult to conduct. One result of this was that the domestic parties reached out to others in 
the region and beyond to bolster their standing and strengthen their political projects.  This 
included reaching out to the Soviet Union, as the communists did, or looking towards the 
West.  At the end of the 1950s this wrangling came to a head with the union with Gamal 
Abdel Nasser’s Egypt.  This merger lasted from 1958 to 1961. Setting out fully the pros and 
cons of this union would require lengthy analysis but certainly Nasser’s brand of nationalism 
was very much aligned with Syrian ideas. Nevertheless, the Syrian people were to find that 
they lost their autonomy: all political parties were dissolved as part of the merger, and the 
benefits of being aligned with the regional strong man of Egypt were overshadowed by loss 
of control locally.17   
 
Syria’s first decades of independence and intermittent attempts at parliamentary democracy 
had been undermined and weakened by a whole range of competing interests and internal 
internecine conflicts between political groupings.18  Flitting among and across them was the 
                                                 
16 Martin, K. W. (2015) Syria’s Democratic Years: Citizens, Experts, and Media in the 1950s, Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 13. 
17Kienle, E. (1995) ‘Arab Unity Schemes Revisited: Interest, Identity, and Policy in Syria and Egypt’, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27:1, February, 53-71. 
18 See: Khoury, P. (1987) Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945, 
London: I.B. Tauris; Kaylani, op cit. 
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socialist Akram Hawrani, someone who will be discussed in greater depth later in this 
chapter.  Hawrani was an astute political operator with contacts in the Syrian Socialist 
National Party (SSNP) from his early flirtations with the group, and an influential position 
among the rural peasantry.  Crucially he forged deep ties with the colonels in the Syrian 
military.  At the height of Shishakli’s authoritarian rule in 1954 he also instituted a marriage 
of convenience between his Arab Socialist Party and the Arab Baʿthists when they were in 
exile and struggling to retain their significance, by amalgamating the two into the Arab Bath 
Socialist Party.  Some of the important differences between the “three professors” (Aflaq, 
Bitar, and Hawrani) in this merger were to become increasingly difficult to reconcile.19 The 
joining of the ideologues with the likes of Hawrani consolidated a formal political party with 
a wider social base and with representation in the post-Shishakli parliamentary elections of 
1954.  The crisis culminated in the form of the second and third Baʿth Party congresses held 
in Beirut in 1959 and in 1960 in which Aflaq’s initial decision in 1959 to follow Nasser’s 
requirement for Union and dissolve the party was reversed, showing the fissures between 
the differing strands.20 
 
There were a number of developments during the 1960s in independent Syria which had a 
profound influence on the authoritarian Syria familiar to us today (before the 2011 
revolution).  The most significant and much analysed event is the 1963 coup instituted by a 
small and secret military committee, including Hafez al-Asad.21  This coup brought the 
Baʿth Party to power in Syria and continued to illustrate the ways in which civilian party 
                                                 
19 Kaylani, ibid., 22. 
20 Seale, op cit: Asad, 65-66. 
21 Hinnebusch, R. (2001) Syria: Revolution from Above. New York: Routledge; Hinnebusch, R. (2009) 
‘Syria Under the Baʿth: The Political Economy of Populist Authoritarianism.’ In Hinnebusch, Raymond & 
Schmidt Soren. eds., The State and the Political Economy of Reform in Syria, Scotland: University of St 
Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies, 5-24; Seale (1995) Asad, op cit. 
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politics had become enmeshed with army politics and strategy.  Before the coup the party 
was, in any case, undergoing a period of internal contestation about the best way to fulfil its 
founding ideals.  The party was also split about whether or not to continue to support Nasser 
and the Union.  At the heart of this conflict was the struggle between the civilian branch and 
control of the Arab Baʿth Party, and those of the military wing and their influence in the 
party.  Hawrani played both sides but it might also be argued that he opened the door to the 
capture of the party by the Syrian military.22  Equally divisive were the disagreements about 
priorities, with Aflaq seemingly reaching out to the wider Arab nation, conceived as being 
all the newly independent Arab states, against Hawrani’s more domestic brand of 
nationalism and focus on the important land and other reforms required in Syria. 
 
Crucially, for the trajectory of the party, the radical potential in the ideas of the Arab Baʿth 
was dampened and marginalised in the internal struggles for control of the party, especially 
in the face of the dissolution of the union between Egypt and Syria, and splits between 
factions in the army and across the parties, who were divided over support for Nasser and 
his way, or against the excesses of the union.  In 1962, after a four year hiatus, Aflaq 
convened a party congress in Homs.  Significantly he sought to exclude Hawrani, the 
Nasserists, and those who had disobeyed his 1959 pledge to deactivate all Baʿth Party 
politics as had been required under Nasser’s union. The Congress passed a resolution to 
reconstitute the party.  The political manoeuvres at this time were complex but the secret 
military committee was active behind the scenes, with various players, included Aflaq, who 
now had mature plans to institute a military coup which they succeeded in executing in 1963. 
The regional Baʿth Party Congress in September 1963 was the beginning of the end for the 
                                                 
22 As argued in Kaylani, op cit. 23. 
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Arab Baʿthist ideologues Aflaq and Bitar, and they were not elected to vital positions on the 
Baʿth Party Regional Command.23 
 
The other formative event of the 1960s was the 1967 crushing Arab defeat at the hands of 
Israel, in which the Syrian military was involved and for which a defeated Nasser proffered 
his resignation.  This catastrophe, known as the Naksa, can be considered an existential crisis 
for Arab nationalism, its intellectuals, and for Arab citizens who had followed events on the 
radio and had been assured of victory by Nasser.  More Arab land was occupied by Israel, 
serving as a blow to the idea of a unified and strong Arab nation.24  The Arab leaders had 
failed.  A period of profound reflection and criticism then ensued as well as the consideration 
of alternatives, such as that offered by political Islam (which I briefly turn to later in this 
chapter).  Having worked behind the scenes since the coup, Hafez al-Asad seized power in 
1970 in his corrective coup, and the 1970s saw him consolidate his hold over both the army 
and the party, each being principally an instrument through which to legitimise and to sustain 
his rule.25  Aflaq was to live out his days in exile in Iraq, which had also established its own, 
mostly competing, brand of his Arab Baʿth ideas.        
 
The dreams of the idealists behind the idea of Arab Baʿthism were to lose out to the 
realpolitik of the Syrian military and become increasingly marginalised, or mere instruments 
of power, under Asad’s rule.  Nevertheless, as it was the specific ideas and project of the 
Baʿthists which were so influential in the formative years of Arab nationalism and statehood 
                                                 
23 Kaylani, op cit. 
24 Kassir, S. (2006) Being Arab, trans. Hobson, W. London, New York: Verso. 
25 For a nuanced collection of work on liberalisation during the Asad years see: Kienle, E. ed. (1994) 
Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, London: British Academic Press, 
CNMES, SOAS; and, under Bashar al-Asad: Lawson, F. ed. (2009) Demystifying Syria, London: Saqi in 
association with the London Middle East Institute. 
 117 
and which became incorporated in varying ways into the modern nation state of Syria (and 
Iraq), I now focus in detail on the founding structures and ideas of the party in its early 
formation, from a specifically Syrian vantage point. In doing so I recognise that it is not 
possible to consider Syria completely in isolation from vitally important regional 
developments. 
  
II The political thought of the Arab Baʿth Party 
 
In the previous sections I have given a broad brush background to regional developments 
and the rise of the Arab Baʿth movement and party. The formation of the formal Arab Baʿth 
Party starts to flesh out particular practices and beliefs, as we shall see in this analysis of the 
founders of the party.  I start to carry out a morphological analysis of the party and its core 
and adjacent ideas as promoted by leading ideologues. The Ba´th Party started out as a small 
informal network of engaged intellectuals, teachers and other professionals from the newly 
emerging Arab ‘middle classes’, who themselves enjoyed some of the fruits of the earlier 
shift to secular education under the Ottoman rule of the Arab provinces.  The movement 
grew its support through a number of small scale ‘cells’ which operated in secret under 
imperial rule.  Its members, initially in the tens rather than hundreds, worked in the Ottoman 
provinces of present day Syria and, alongside their political and intellectual meetings, also 
carried out practical work to help the poor in rural areas.26   
 
                                                 
26 Batatu, H. (1999) Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Seale, Asad, op cit.  
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We can pursue the thought-practices of the movement by recourse to the ideas of its founders.  The 
commonly acknowledged founder of the Arab Baʿth (resurrection) party, Michel Aflaq, 
introduced earlier, came from a wealthy Maydani27 grain merchant family, with the privilege 
and outlook which the family’s social standing conferred upon him.28  Aflaq read philosophy 
at the Sorbonne and was influenced by the early European nationalist literature, thus imbuing 
the Baʿth project with ideas and an empirical record of how to nurture a modern conception 
of nation infused with national patriotism.29  Aflaq's intellectual and Baʿthist interlocutors 
included Salah al-din al-Bitar, who came from another prominent Damascene grain 
merchant family,30 and, later on, Zaki al-Arsuzi.  There remains some contention around 
who actually came up with the original idea for the Arab Baʿth,31 and there were certainly 
two early competing currents active within historic Syria: Arsuzi’s cultural wing, the Arab 
Ba´th, which was part of a group organising against the Turks in Alexandretta, and Aflaq 
and al-Bitar’s al-ihya al-ʿarabi (Arab Revival) group. The latter took in Arsuzi’s members 
and became the Arab Baʿth Party.32 Arsuzi was born in Lattakia, the coastal city in Syria but 
had moved around, living in cities bordering Turkey, and fled to Damascus when the Turks 
annexed Syrian territory – now known as modern day Turkey’s Hatay province.  
 
                                                 
27 A district of Damascus which was known to be a diverse mix of sect and religions and an important centre 
of grain merchant and other trades, linking with Syria’s southern Hawran region, acting as an important 
network in sustaining the Arab Revolt.  See Batatu (1999); and, Provence (2005), 12-14, op cit., for a 
discussion on the social complexities and the period of the Great Syrian Revolt in the interwar period.  The 
social cleavages between and the political economy nexus of the prominent Syrian families and merchants 
remain important today—see Haddad, B. (2012) Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of 
Authoritarian Resilience, California: Stanford University Press. 
28 Provence, 36; Batatu (1999); op cit. 
29 Discussed in Hourani, A. (1962/1988) Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798-1939, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 356-7; Batatu, (1999) op cit. 
30 Provence, ibid., 152. 
31In the historiography on the Arab Baʿth movement, Arsuzi is treated more sympathetically in the narration 
of the period, which aligns with an account favourable to Hafez al-Asad, but his influence and position is 
moderated in Batatu’s empirical research into this period.  See Seale, Asad, op cit; see also Kaylani (1972) 
op cit., 3. 
32 Batatu (1999) op cit., 135-136. 
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Despite the conflict over claims to the founding name of the party, the three intellectuals 
(Arsuzi, Aflaq, and al-Bitar) came to work together at important periods in order to grow 
the party, and it is perhaps fitting, given the levelling aims of their movement, that they were 
Alawi, Christian, and Sunni respectively.  From these early days a discourse was nurtured 
which championed a number of key ideas and which engaged with some of the fundamental 
problems of the period; foreign rule, imperial power, and the social and political 
fragmentation of the former imperial powers with the attendant upheavals that this caused.   
 
At the core of the Ba´thist ideology that took hold leading up to Syrian independence was 
an idea of Arab unity, conceived of and emphasised at different times as being focused on 
the spiritual, cultural and linguistic commonality, but increasingly as being part of a 
distinctly political project.  The idea of unity was essential to the future common good of 
the Arab territories that had been ruled by imperial and colonial powers. This was connected 
to ideas of independence from colonial rule and the struggle for freedom, which remain 
powerful to the present day in both regional and international contexts. Also central to the 
Arab Baʿth project were the ideals enshrined in Arab variants of socialism.  
 
The Arab Baʿth Party constitution was ratified in Syria by members of the movement on 7 
April, 1947.  It enshrined the core values as disseminated and promoted by the Ba´thist 
activists and ideologues, organised around the principles of “Wahda, Hurriya, Ishtirakiya” 
(Unity, Freedom, Socialism).  I pick out here the Syrian thread from this wider tradition or 
“pool of ideas’ which had deepened amidst a climate of political upheaval and change in the 
Mashreq and beyond.   In doing so I do not suggest that historic Syria alone was the epicentre 
of the birth of modern Arab ideologies or that the intellectuals and writers I discuss were the 
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only, or most influential, producers of the dominant strains of Arab ideologies.  The 
intellectual and political production of ideas historically during the mandate and post 
mandate period included those of the elite and notables along with, and sometimes in 
competition with, the popular politics of the rank and file, the people.  I do not mean to 
privilege certain actors over others but the conventional historiography has tended to 
privilege the elite and the intellectuals.  Nevertheless, such knowledge production from the 
time enables researchers to recover some of the ideas and thinking being reflected, 
promoted, and disseminated, whether in elite salons and committees or on the streets in mass 
protests. I turn now to investigate these founding ideas in more detail. 
 
Arab Unity  
Arab unity was one of the defining ideas which emerged and became consolidated as a core 
concept within Syrian Arab Baʿthism.  The concept of Arab unity is internally complex and 
its meaning is contextually driven, and rather than taking it as a fixed and assumed unit of 
analysis I seek ways to prise it open in order to inspect its contents in more detail.  
This seemingly abstract idea of Arab unity was actually practiced and performed in a number 
of ways which were contingent on a complex of local and specific social, economic, and 
political dynamics.  The concept of unity was based on the idea that there existed a common 
cultural unity expressed through a shared history, language, and traditions.  In this ideal 
formulation, ‘being Arab’ can be defined on a cultural and linguistic level which includes 
Arab Christians, Alawis, and other religions, as well as the various ethnicities—such as the 
Kurds.  This idealistic understanding of Arab unity, indicating a kind of cultural nationalism 
across boundaries of all kinds, was embedded in the earliest iterations of Arabism, as 
espoused by the Ottoman Arab educator and civil servant Sati al-Husri.  For al-Husri, 
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Arabism is the sense of belonging and commonality shared through language and culture.33 
He believes that the national unity of Arabs is the first order priority and, as Cleveland 
narrates, al-Husri argues that: 
 
language is the ultimate criterion for membership in these countries, and anyone 
who speaks Arabic and is located in them is an Arab, irrespective of his religion, 
ethnic background, family history, or official citizenship.34 
 
In this reading of unity al-Husri takes his lead from the rising nationalisms in the Balkans, 
with new movements emerging and with uprisings against empire during the nineteenth 
century.35 He also looks to Germany as a model of how mass education can be put into the 
service of instilling citizen patriotism (wataniyya, in this context). He was particularly 
influenced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation, which al-Husri 
regards as “one of the most important contributions to the ideology of nationalism”.  This 
conception of nationalism as a complete ideology is typical, and later analysts and political 
scientists have produced a vast literature around the topic of nationalism and Arab 
nationalism36.  Of particular interest is the relation between the theory of nationalism and 
the idea of the nation-state; and how these interrelate and, in the case of the newly 
independent Arab states, how they aid in the project of nation-building.37  For example, the 
                                                 
33 Cleveland, W. L. (1971) The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and 
Though of Sati’ Al-Husri, Princeton: Princeton University Press 86-7.  
34 Cleveland, op cit., 118. 
35 On this see Chalcraft (2016) op cit., 91-98. 
36 Some of the most influential theories of nationalism include: Kedourie, E. (1960) Nationalism, London: 
Hutchinson and Co; Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 
Hobsbawm, E. (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.      
37 Ayubi, N. (2009) Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, London: I.B.Tauris. 
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concept of nationalism is often treated as a fully formed political ideology.38 Yet, in this 
chapter I argue that the idea of Arab nationalism, while important, needs to be clarified in 
relation to core concepts which serve, in practice, to organise along social and political lines. 
So I give due attention to the influence of an Arab strain of socialism and ideas of Arab 
unity. If Arab nationalism, conceived of through the promotion of Arab unity which was 
inclusive and which overcame geographic and ethnic boundaries, was the ideal, what kind 
of nation was desired and how was that nation to be organised?  I offer some thoughts on 
this later in the chapter when I look at a distinctive Arab socialism and discuss the concept 
of freedom, the two other defining principles of the Arab Baʿth movement and party.  But 
first I return to interrogate the complexity of Arab unity.   
 
The early adherents of Arab Baʿthism put their faith in the notion of Arab unity as the first 
principle and as fundamental to their project, and they believed that “Arab consciousness” 
would override any other differences that existed in society.    So, of critical importance was 
the notion of Arab unity as a levelling device and as an idea that encouraged an inclusive 
sense of Arabness.  The Marxist historian Hanna Batatu notes how the notion of the Arab 
nation was the “highest form of social relationship”, and that “its followers were enjoined 
to hold it before their particular region, sect, or clan in favour and esteem”.39  This is 
recognised in the constitution, which states that: “The Arabs form one nation. This nation 
has the natural right to live in a single state and to be free to direct its own destiny”. 
 
                                                 
38 Freeden, M. (1998) ‘Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?’ Political Studies, XLVI, 748-765.  See, in the 
Arab context, B. F. (1997) ‘Studying Arab Politics: the end of Ideology or the quest for alternative methods?’ 
Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 6:10, 109-125. 
39 Batatu, (1999) op cit., 133-4. 
 123 
Thus this social, or cultural, sense of being Arab is one of the core ideas which is then 
decontested in light of relational ideas of citizen equality.  Such equality is based on the 
ideals of the Arab nation as set out by the founders of Arab Baʿthism.  In its idealised version 
this equality is one which reaches across to include people of differing tribes, sects and 
religions.  Also, in this conception of the Arab nation, there are no individual nation-states 
but, rather, reference is made to the Arab fatherland as an “indivisible political and economic 
unity”.  Under colonial systems of divide and rule, tribal leaders and local power elites were 
co-opted, and trade took on a sectarian nature.   
 
Ultimately the call for unity acted to reject the arbitrary boundaries set by the colonialists 
and saw the Arab Ummah (nation) made up of regions (aqtar) which were interdependent 
and worked in unity.  Batatu recognised the explicit political sense of the unity project, and 
this discourse spoke to the fragmenting and divisive effect which colonial rule had had on 
territories such as Syria.  The imposition of colonial rule had enforced fixed geographic 
boundaries, divided communities along sect lines, and resulted in the brutal putting down of 
revolts. 40   The idea and absolute necessity of Arab unity was a response to external 
interference and rule, and unity became the primary idea in the political thinking of the Arab 
Baʿthists.  The formalisation of the party at its founding congress, held in Damascus, 
announced “One Arab nation with an eternal mission” and called for a unified Arab state.41  
Later events went on to shape the other Arab Baʿth principles in a number of ways, not least 
of all the goal of obtaining independence 
                                                 
40 On dynamics of fragmentation of power and interests and then division of territory and communities along 
sect lines as introduced during the French colonial mandate see Provence (2005) op cit., Khoury, 23-25 
(1983); Batatu (1999) 134-5, op cit.  
41 In Kienle, E. (1995) ‘Arab Unity Schemes Revisited: Interest, Identity, and Policy in Syria and Egypt’, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27:1, February, 58. 
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Freedom  
What did the Arab Baʿthists mean by ‘freedom’ and how was it conceptualised?  Returning 
to think about the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 is instructive in forming an understanding of 
the foundations of the Arab Baʿth project and its emphasis on ‘freedom’.  After five years 
of French colonial rule this revolt was the articulation of a collective Arab political 
consciousness. In Provence’s study of this revolt he considers it a formative development in 
shaping the ideas and the language of the kind of Arab nationalism which was to come, and 
believes that the uprising was a distinctly Arab response to the challenges of French (and 
British) Mandate rule in the region.42 The Syrian Revolt was against the indirect Lyautey-
style system of political and administrative controls, operated from afar via their 
intermediaries and bolstered by a military presence.  These developments served to sharpen 
the articulation of a more politically explicit Arab nationalist cause which united diverse 
social classes, ethnic groups, and sects in the region.43   Sporadic demonstrations and other 
skirmishes with French forces in the provinces built up to a full blown revolt that started in 
the summer of 1925.  Notably, the revolt was centred in the ‘periphery’, or countryside, 
away from urban centres, and constituted a mass movement which was a “decisive break-
down of the elite-dominated system of the ‘politics of the notables’”.44  Thus, what Provence 
finds is that historical resistance to foreign rule is not merely present among a small elite 
who believed in the Arab nationalist cause.  He argues that otherwise few could explain the 
events leading up to the revolt and:  
                                                 
42 Provence, M. (2005) The Great Syrian Revolt: and the rise of Arab nationalism, Austin: University of 
Texas Press. 
43 Hourani (1946); Batatu, (1999); Chalcraft, (2016), op cit. 
44 Provence (2005) op cit., 13. 
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how such an [assumed] elite ideology of intellectuals and wealthy landowners had 
suddenly burst forth in 1920 to fill the streets of Damascus with ordinary people 
protesting for national rights and an end to European occupation.45 
 
What was present in the earlier Arab Revolt launched in 1916 and in the later and more 
widespread and concerted Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 was an “empirically evident Arab 
nationalism”.46  Taken together with other significant acts of resistance across the Arab 
speaking world, it is easily apparent that the freedom articulated was a freedom explicitly 
from the shackles of foreign rule and control.  Nevertheless, there are some strong 
indications that the freedom desired was not only from foreign domination, but also from 
the stultifying effect of a local ruling elite in the former Ottoman provinces.  The Great 
Syrian Revolt pitted the radical revolutionaries not only against the imposition of colonial 
rule but also against its local agents: the Arab notables who had for so long negotiated a 
status quo with their foreign rulers so as to safeguard their own interests.  The Arab notables 
had thus also become part of the problem, but the sheer force of France’s military might was 
to unite across classes and sects and ethnic groups, and this ‘domestic’ aspect of the demand 
for freedom (and equality) remained unfulfilled and was relegated to being a lesser priority.  
 
We find from a conceptualisation of freedom that it was manifested as a collective freedom, 
one for a people in opposition to colonial rule and subjugation.  It is indicative of the desire 
for self-determination, and, by extension, to notions of self-rule.  Yet because the struggle 
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against colonial rule spread across vast imperial territories and because systems of 
governance and control had been centralised under one power and authority, there is a 
tension in what it might actually mean for the Arab people to be free to govern themselves.  
The negotiations and government of Sharif Husayn in the immediate post-war period had 
sought to define a geographic territory under Arab rule from Damascus.  However, the 
cultural and linguistic sense of being Arab, and the ideal of Arab unity, was always to come 
into adjacency with, and thus qualify freedom in particular ways.   
 
Therefore the idea of freedom can be decontested in relation to the work that the previous 
core idea of unity does in clarifying what kind of freedom it was that the Arabs demanded 
and fought for.  Such freedom based on unity and the equal worth of all Arabs thus indicates 
that the context of this freedom demanded a collective and complete freedom for Arabs 
across all the Arab lands.  This, perhaps, served to militate against the factional, 
individualist, interests of some segments of the community over others.  There were 
fundamental freedoms due to all Arabs.  There still remains the question as to how such 
freedoms were to be formalised and protected and how Arabs were to govern.  The next 
section investigates the importance of Arab socialism in responding to such questions.        
 
Arab Socialism 
The ideas of socialism were manifested in the policies of post-independence Arab 
governments and included land redistribution, nationalisation of economic resources, and 
mass education.47 We can thus see how a particular Arab strain of socialism helped to 
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decontest the ideals of Arab unity and of freedom.  An examination of the concrete political 
systems introduced in the independence era shows us forms of Arab Baʿthism in practice.  
The Arab nation-states became part of the international system of states, yet still retained 
the language and practice of an Arab unity which demanded organisation beyond borders as 
well as within the confines of legal nation-states. So a level of regionalism continued within 
and across the states-system in the Arab region—for example in the way the Baʿth Party 
organised regional meetings and had some level of political autonomy (which was eroded, 
especially under Hafez al-Asad’s rule and with the promulgation of Syria’s new constitution 
in 1973).  
   
The ideas of equality and social levelling were advanced within Syria’s parliamentary 
system of government (notably through the influence of Akram Hawrani whom I introduced 
earlier in this chapter and who I come to in more detail shortly) but, equally importantly, 
also earlier on through local organising under Ottoman and Mandate rule, before the advent 
of the independent state system.48  What Arab Baʿthism did was to blend the ideas of being 
Arab and of Arab unity with the idea of socialism, providing a principled and prioritized 
framework for organising society and implementing these ideas. 
 
The particular brand of socialism central to the Arab Baʿth project was an Arab strain centred 
on a need for social reform and modernisation.  Hourani describes this particular Arab 
socialism, in the Egyptian Nasserist state context, thus: 
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A system halfway between Marxism, which stood for the conflict of classes, and 
capitalism, which meant the primacy of individual interests and the domination of 
the classes which owned the means of production.  In ‘Arab socialism’, the whole of 
society was thought to rally round a government which pursued the interests of all.49 
 
Hourani’s explanation of Arab socialism is not dissimilar to Ayubi’s idea of state-socialism 
or developmentalism which he sees as characteristic of the Arab nation-building period after 
the Second World War and throughout the 1950s and 1960s.50  Ayubi, however, questions 
whether the independent states were in fact truly socialist and suggests, rather, that they were 
etatiste.51  Yet Ayubi’s Gramscian-influenced analysis of Arab socialism seems not to take 
into account the early socialist parties and practices which were present before the 
independent Arab state formations. 
 
Early inceptions of Arab socialism were more grounded in very local and provincial 
concerns.  The first Syrian Arab socialist movement was formed in Hama, historically a 
centre of popular dissent, in 1939, as the Hizb al-Shabab (The Youth Party). Like its Arab 
communist counterpart it did not initially focus on representing the peasants until later on 
when, in 1943, it adopted its slogan of ‘hatu al-Quffah wa-l-kurek Lina’sh al-Agha wa-l-
Bek’ [fetch the basket and the shovel for the burying of the Agha and the Bey].52  Agha and 
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50 Ayubi (2009) op cit., 158-9. 
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Bey here refer to the local notables, reflecting the deep social divide between the elite rulers, 
who regarded themselves as ‘the flower of God’s elect’ and who typically owned large 
swathes of land, and the common people. 53   The struggle was essentially one against 
continuing ‘feudal’ power. 
 
The socialist leader, Akram Hawrani, felt this inequality was the basis of the subsequent 
Arab military catastrophe, or nakba.54  Hawrani believed that the economic and political 
liberation of the peasants was required in order to build unity and fight modern wars against 
foreign and Zionist colonisers.55  Hawrani championed the peasantry, was central in the 
struggle against colonial rule and the Zionist state, pushed for reform when he gained office 
in parliament, achieved resettlement of landless sharecroppers, sought to reform the legal 
protections of tribal systems of power, oversaw the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Law 
of 1958 and built allegiances across diverse sections of Syrian society.  As we saw earlier, 
it was his successes and popularity which led the Baʿthists to seek to merge with his socialist 
movement in order to bolster their own flagging position.    This was a meeting of popular, 
grass roots action with the political idea(l)s of the intellectual ideologues.56 
 
The inter-war period also saw the emergence of the first communist party, which was in 
tension with the socialists and the nationalists.  It sought to recognise the ‘tillers of soil’ and 
forged the first workers’ movement from a nucleus in 1924 to an organised association in 
its later years.57  Its founder was Fuʿad Shimali, a cultivator of peasant origin, but its peasant 
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roots and leadership were to be overshadowed by the more ‘timidly reformist’ leadership of 
Khalid Bakdash58 when it gained formal party status from 1936.59  In his assessment of the 
early Bath period in Syria, Nabil Kaylani argues that whilst Bakdash was well-organized, 
and despite his group continuing to be illegal and suppressed, the central problem was one 
of its ideological commitment.  It did not see Arab nationalism as a desirable end in itself 
but rather relied on a dogmatically Marxist-Leninist approach in order to create the 
conditions for the “successful application of socialism”.60  Others have been critical of the 
communist leader, Bakdash, who was to reassure Syria’s landlords by announcing: 
 
We assure the owners of land that we do not and shall not demand the confiscation 
of their property . . . all we ask is kindness towards the peasant and the alleviation of 
his misery61 
 
I have introduced in brief some of the main organising concepts in a consideration of the 
morphology of the Arab Baʿth ideology.  This is an important historical step as we shall see 
some of these themes repeat and return in Syria’s 2011 revolution.  The Arab Baʿth Party 
and the position of Arab socialism in the Syrian and Arab context has led to an enduring and 
established Leftist tradition in Syria, which connects into Arab and regional groupings 
around Arab Marxist thought of one strain or another.62 In the pre-revolutionary period most 
of Syria’s leading dissidents and opposition figures had spent many years in prison, 
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including Michel Kilo, Hussain al-Odat (who passed away in April 2016), the Syrian 
communist Riad al-Turk63, as well as prominent independent parliamentarians such as Riad 
Seif64 and others.   Syria’s dissenting voices have for decades sought to challenge the 
trajectory of the Syrian state under Asad rule: namely, selective economic reforms absent 
political reforms and freedoms.  When Bashar came to power, a short-lived Damascus 
Spring65 saw attempts by Syrians to participate in and present agendas for reforms, including 
the lifting of Syria’s emergency law, the abolition of Syria’s special security courts, and 
freedom of speech, among other things.  However, hope for democratization under Bashar 
al-Asad did not materialize and his first decade in power was characterized by increasingly 
rampant and unchecked capitalism which served to narrowly benefit a ruling elite and a 
coterie of business and religious leaders and others embedded into the patronage network.66 
 
We will return to these themes in the latter part of this thesis when I investigate the deep 
political contention which took hold from the beginning of Syria’s revolution in 2011. 
However, for the remainder of this chapter I introduce some other ideational currents which 
were forming in the twentieth century in Syria and elsewhere.  This is a vital part of our 
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ideational exploration and helps us to trace the continuity and the breaks with established 
political traditions and ideological families.   
 
The first ideological current I will examine is the rise of political Islam with reference to 
prominent Muslim scholars and reformists around the turn of the twentieth century.  I will 
then briefly reference some though-practices which are discussed in the most recent 
scholarship on revolution and on Syria.  This relates specifically to some ideas on 
republicanism with the emergence of Arab independent republics in the postcolonial age: 
such as that of Syria and Egypt.   
 
III The Islamic Reformers 
 
So far in this chapter I have necessarily foregrounded the political thought of the Arab Baʿth 
Party in historic Syria.  This is the central focus of this chapter, because it was to become 
the sole governing party in Syria.  However, in this section I want to move to a different 
period of time so that I can set out, briefly, some of the core ideas which were forming within 
the, sometimes overlapping and competing, currents of Islamic political thought.   
 
The competing ideas of various strands of Political Islam are important in an understanding 
of beliefs and ideas, particularly when, as we shall see, such ideas are recovered in Syria’s 
revolutionary situation.  The early Islamic thinkers discussed here provide us with some 
aspects of interesting commonality as well as divergence and contrast with the dominant 
ideas and logic of Arab secularism— in the form of Syrian Arab Baʿthist ideas and in 
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Nasserism, for example.  The ideas I set out here become important once more in the 
aftermath of the Arab defeat against Israel, in 1967 and the rise of different strains of 
Islamism as distinctly alternative political projects, but we need to go back further in time 
to capture some of the main ideational threads.    
 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, during the late Ottoman period the effects of the Tanzimat 
reforms were being felt.  Well into colonial rule Egypt was an intellectual hub of activity for 
the region’s most respected and influential Muslim scholars.  Together they can be regarded 
broadly as the ‘Islamist modernisers’ who drew influences from the increasing access to 
western philosophical and political texts as well as frequent travel for learning and study in 
capitals such as Paris.  These scholars, some of whom had fled from oppression under 
Ottoman rule, shared a common vision.  They wanted to preserve and promote Islam (not 
least in the face of the very real zeal of Christian missionaries seemingly attached to a 
concomitant military and diplomatic presence) but in doing so they were also critical and 
self-reflective about where Muslims had gone wrong.  The reformist ideas can be seen in 
the political thought of the Egyptian Rifaʿa Badawi Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi (1801-73) who was 
deeply influenced by French Enlightenment ideas (during his stay in Paris) and was the first 
scholar who “articulated the idea of the Egyptian nation, and tried to explain and justify it 
in terms of Islamic thought”.67  Tahtawi synthesized ideas from many sources, his work 
being in particular influenced by his interest in Montesquieu’s: ‘Considérations sur les 
causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence’, but he retained and remained true 
to Islamic thought in his “appeal to the example of the Prophet and his Companions and his 
conceptions of political authority”.68  Tahtawi was part of the first wave in Islamic thought 
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which sought to reform and reinstate the greatness of Islam from its dark centuries in the 
‘shackles of taqlid’—manifested as an unchanging and literal reading of al-Quran and the 
Sunna.  
 
The long period of darkness significantly included the turning away from early efforts at 
ijtihad (independent reasoning) to a closed era of taqlid, from the tenth century, in which it 
was construed that all questions had been answered and were available directly from the 
sacred sources.  Such literal adherence to the Quran had led to an Islam which was closed 
and static rather than dynamic and responsive to change. In Tantawi’s mind, however, it was 
the Ulama who could truly represent the Egyptian people (rather than rulers installed by 
foreign imperial powers).  The community of Ulama and religious scholars needed to be 
reformed so as to accommodate those educated in the sciences, for example. In the later 
modern period key Muslim scholars advanced such ideas on ways to bring (and revive) 
Islamic thought and practice into accommodation with modernity, while also separating such 
moves from the secular influence, and excesses, of the West. There is some overlap and 
continuity in the common ideas among them and so I set out the most pertinent ideas here. 
 
 
The Islamic Ummah (nation) 
Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) was a political activist and firebrand and he 
promoted a broadly pan-Islamist unity which he felt was required and indeed, urgent in the 
face of European adventures in Egypt and elsewhere.  In Afghani’s conception of Islam the 
emphasis was on action and change, not imitation.  But all his thinking was predicated on 
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his fundamental commitment to the transcendence of God and to reason.69  He was critical 
of leaders in the region who were beholden (economically or otherwise) to foreign influence 
or support, and his brand of politics was deeply anticolonial in nature.  He travelled often 
and widely, sometimes due to forced exile; during his time in Egypt Afghani both played 
for influence with, and agitated against, the Egyptian khedives (Ismail and Tawfiq) and 
wrote about the need to limit the power of leaders.70  In his writings Afghani centred on the 
internal problems of Islam and the effect of European encroachment, although his thinking 
concerned grand narratives for Islam, as a civilisation, and the ways it could engage with 
progress, change and human endeavour,71 and how the ummah could work in solidarity for 
the happiness and welfare of everyone.72   Afghani’s thinking was much influenced by 
Guizot, among others, but was revised in an important way to underpin a return to a true 
Islam and the flourishing of the ummah civilisation (Islamic nation).  Steadfast in his 
religious commitments, Afghani was sure that men could use their minds freely in the 
“certainty that what they discover will not contradict the truths revealed by the prophecy”.73   
 
In his most expansive work, The Refutation of the Materialists,74 Afghani, too, advanced 
arguments to rehabilitate the idea of ijtihad (reasoning), which should be put to new use in 
the modern era to “apply the principles of the Quran anew to the problems of their time”.75   
Afghani was often exiled for his activities; to India and then Paris, where he formed a secret 
society with Muhammad Abduh (1849-19) calling for Islamic unity and reform, and  
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establishing a new journal, al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, (the firmest bond) 76 which had an anti-
British and anti-colonial slant.  Afghani’s disciple, Abduh, continued with his fierce 
anticolonial positions but shifted his writing and efforts towards reforms in the religious and 
education establishment in Egypt, in order to reverse the ‘inner decay’ which had so 
damaged Islam.77  Abduh was at pains to accommodate and synthesise Islam with the 
positive aspects of modernity (scientific knowledge), but in doing so he left the door open 
for a number of interpretations and made himself enemies among both the more conservative 
Muslim scholars, who felt he paved the way to complete secularization, and among some 
Arab nationalists of the time, who were more influenced by secular and socialist thought.78 
The debates about governance and preservation of Islam continued in the interwar period 
and become rather urgent with the abolishment of the Caliphate.            
 
 
The Caliphate  
Rashid Rida (1865-1935) was born in Ottoman Syria and moved to Egypt to pursue his 
religious education where he was tutored by Abduh.  Rida inherited and pursued Abduh’s 
ideas but, it has been argued, sought to articulate them in a more explicitly political direction.  
Key were Rida’s political ideas on how majority Muslim populations should be governed 
and how that related to or departed from rising Arab nationalist conceptions of an Arab state.  
Perhaps Rida’s most important contribution was his treatise on the Caliphate (Al-Khilafah 
aw al-imamat al uzma, 1922-3) which was actually published on the eve of the abolition of 
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the Caliphate by Atatürk in 192579 and advanced his political conceptualisation of a modern 
system of governance. Rida set out ideas on how Islam might be accommodated within a 
modern system of rule.  He felt that there must be a caliphate to provide spiritual (and so 
safeguard ʿibadat, religious worship) and moral authority but that there also needed to be, 
following Abduh, more emphasis on human agency and the need for consultation (ijmaʿ) 
and checks on the ruler in order to avoid any corrupt claims or acting in self-interest.  For 
Rida, too, ijtihad and ijmaʿ were key tools for the Muslim scholars.  This meant letting 
humans interpret those non-divine and nonessential aspects of life and trusting that “the 
community will not agree on an error”.80  Rida’s work was ambiguous in many respects but 
was innovative in its political vision for the governance of an Islamically-guided state which 
would rely on the good judgement and knowledge of the ahl al-hall wa l-ʿaqd (those who 
bind and loose), that is the Ulama, Mujtahid (those qualified to carry out ijtihad) and others 
who could hold leaders to account.   
 
Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), born in rural Egypt into a pious religious family, benefited 
from a religious and secular education and was an activist against British rule from his early 
teens.  Banna’s reformist thinking, influenced by his religious upbringing but more directly 
by his experiences as a teacher in the heart of the foreign occupation in Suez, is significant, 
as he was the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood which was established in 1928.  
The Brothers saw Islam as an all-encompassing system of living, based on the Quran and 
the Sunna, and its efforts were focused on working and preaching at the grass roots, and on 
social activism.  For Banna and his followers, Islam is always applicable; there are no areas 
where Islam is not relevant in the temporal world. Banna was also critical of the Ulama who 
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“saw and observed and heard and did nothing”81 and had become servants to the rulers and 
the government of the day which paid them.  Banna also saw the deep problems caused by 
disunity and pleaded: 
 
Let us cooperate in those things on which we can agree and be lenient in those on 
which we cannot82 
 
In the ideas of these thinkers and Muslim scholars we have found evidence of a particular 
dialogical approach to the fundamental challenges being faced by Muslims keen to protect 
the faith and to also accommodate the march of progress.  There is an activist emphasis here 
of doing and acting in the community.  But the issue of governance of a Muslim majority 
and of the nature of a just state were not resolved in during their lifetime, if at all and their 
ideas go on to influence political Islam in the latter part of the twentieth century.       
 
 
Din wa dawla (religion and state) 
The ideas of Muslim scholar Hassan al-Banna and the Brothers reflected common 
grievances of the time in Egypt and in the wider region: the ways in which elites were 
working with and benefiting from the rise of capitalism, resulting in what Banna believed to 
be a kind of ‘internal imperialism’ leading to: “a dead pacifism, lowly humiliation, and 
acceptance of the status quo”.83  The sense of humiliation conveyed here is important in a 
consideration of the concept of dignity in the Arab context.  I will be returning to discuss 
this at important points in the remainder of this thesis and we will find the concept features 
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heavily in discussions of the humiliation of colonial rule right into the twentieth century.  
Dignity, as we will start to see in this and the following chapter, is the retort to humiliation.   
 
There was widespread opposition in Egypt to the brute force of the occupying foreign power, 
or the al-istiʿmar al-kharji (external imperialism).  There was increasing dissatisfaction with 
the role of political parties in Egypt who served as yet another front for capitalism 
masquerading as democracy in a system of parliament compromised by continuing British 
and royal influence and fuelling a climate of divide-and-rule, and therefore, disunity.84  
Finally, consternation about encroaching westernisation was increasing and the Brothers, 
while critical, recognised the distinction “between Western civilization in its own 
environment and . . . that which was thrown at the East”.85  Banna and the mission of the 
Brothers, as his grandson Tariq Ramadan explains, centred on the need to:  
 
rediscover the living force of their religious teachings, to develop a critical outlook 
and to free themselves from the alienation produced by colonialism86   
     
In the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the ideas of the Islamic reformists 
and modernists discussed above took on a more explicit political form, and in some ways 
were to depart from the ideas of the Abduh and Rida.  In particular the Brothers’ central 
objective was the formation of an Islamic state to take the place of the British, but in the 
ideas of Banna there was a distinct nonviolent and legalist thread which was to remain a 
central plank of the project of the Muslim Brotherhood until the 1960s.87  The focus of the 
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Brothers’ grass roots work was in the social sphere and the literature provided an emphasis 
to issues of social justice which were central to their critique of the existing system.  
However, arguably, Banna keeps his writing at a general level and does not specify or clarify 
in detail how a state based on Islam might actually operate, except, for example, when he 
expresses his opposition to a parliamentary system and desire to promote the need for 
mosques to be the centre of life regarding education and so on.88  Thus, like Rida and others, 
he too leaves a door open for different kinds of interpretation in the future and for the later 
ideas of Sayyid al-Qutb to gain influence and to be interpreted in differing ways. 
 
The three core concepts—Islamic Ummah, Caliphate, state—which I have explicated briefly 
here through the thought and writings of prominent Muslim thinkers have given some 
comparative perspective to my treatment of the Arab Baʿth movement and party.  There are 
similar ideas of unity and issues of governance and justice which are configured by drawing 
in adjacent ideas – such as the nation or the ummah.  This sets up for us the potential for 
tension between these ideas and with the desire to retain a religious tradition in the face of 
external threats, but equally the threats to these core virtues were open to threat from 
domestic rulers, as we shall see.      
 
The discussions we found here were about religion and the state, how to ensure just rule 
which is both in keeping with Islam and which also adheres to the national interest (of the 
people, not its rulers), and the ways in which Islam and the Muslim community could work 
together to preserve the religion, do good work and create a virtuous society.  
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Crucially for the purposes of our research and in setting the scene for the contemporary 
period, it is clear that the overall thrust of the Arab and Muslim discourses are of a deeply 
anti-colonial nature and are thus much engrossed in matters of rule and governance rather 
than the intricacies of individual human rights and how to accommodate such individual 
claims within religion.  For the Muslim majority, in countries beholden to foreign powers 
the threats feel more existential.  In the Islamic context rights and claims were firmly centred 
on notions of home rule and of Arab and Islamic authenticity.  Islam, as practiced for many 
centuries, had allowed time to stand still and was now ill-placed to respond adequately to 
the rapid changes taking place in the world.   We will return to these ideas in Chapter Six 
when we look at an exemplar case of the Islamist fighters in the Syrian revolution, where 
such ideas become salient once more.  In the final section on the multiple currents of Arab 
political thought and ideas I turn to look briefly at the Arab republican trend, drawing on 
more recent scholarship which has started to recover the implications for a focus on the 
citizen rather than the ruling elite. 
     
 
IV The promise of citizenship: from subject to citizen 
 
Some of the newly independent Arab states were to take the title of republics (Tunisia and 
Syria took this title89as did Egypt after its 1952 revolution) in contrast to the royal kingdoms 
of the Gulf, Jordan and Morocco - who gained independence later on) and their direction 
was one of nation-building and consolidating their positions as independent states in the 
global state system. As we saw earlier in the chapter, the newly independent Arab states 
drew on a blend of Arab socialism inculcating ideas of citizenship, and this drew attention 
                                                 
89 Libya was initially a monarchy after independence but after Gaddafi’s successful coup in 1969 he changed 
it first to a republic (al-jumhuriya) and then went on to proclaim Libya an Arab socialist jumahiriya (state 
representing the great masses). 
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to the place and role of the Arab citizen in the new era of independence.  The relationship 
between citizen and Arab state was typified in a social contractual arrangement in which 
citizens would benefit from the social and political policies and reforms of the Arab 
governments, such as redistribution of land, subsidies on essentials such as bread and fuel 
and free and expanding education, in return for which they would play their role in building 
and consolidating the idea and the emergence of an independent Arab state. Much of these 
Arab policies, popularized during Nasser’s rule in Egypt, were attuned to ensuring an 
equalizing effect for the masses who hitherto had been excluded or marginalized under 
successive foreign and monarchical rulers.  The same policies were rolled out in Syria during 
the period of the United Arab Republic.   
 
Reminding ourselves of this serves as useful back ground for when I explore later 
developments and the increasing significance of concepts like dignity in the latest Arab 
revolutions.  While there appears to be no comprehensive or explicit Arab political 
republican ideology, Takriti notes how Nasser propagated principles with:  
 
a classically Jacobin republican understanding of the question of representation, 
believing that in the Egyptian context the will of the people could only be genuinely 
represented by a revolutionary state that works for their interests, and with their 
popular backing90 
 
Takriti asserts that the Nasserist idea of Siyadat al Shaʿb (popular sovereignty) was 
prominent in his speeches and his thinking ,91 and during Nasser’s speech on the adoption 
                                                 
90 Takriti (2013) op cit., 52. 
91 Takriti (2013) op cit., 52. 
 143 
of the 1956 Constitution, republican principles were to the fore: “Citizens: today, popular 
sovereignty prevails, not the sovereignty of the princes or the rulers . . . ”.92  The period 
immediately after Arab independence, at least if we look to Egypt and Syria, showed some 
patterns in the organizing and framing of relations between the people and the state.  Chief 
in framing the ideological emergence of the Arab state and the Arab citizen were ideas of 
civic duty and pride.  As very recent scholarship by Kevin Martin asserts in the context of 
the first decade of Syria’s independence, a revolutionary rhetoric inspired a particular 
conception of Arab citizenship; which surmised that the: 
  
features of the ‘virtuous citizen’ included a specific set of ideological orientations—
non-alignment in the form of Nasser-style ‘positive’ neutrality, ardent 
republicanism, and an accompanying conception of pan-Arab nationalism that was 
pro-Egyptian, anti-Hashemite, resolutely opposed to Zionism and Western 
imperialism, and committed to the struggle against ‘traitors’ within Syrian society.93 
   
Making citizens from former subjects required “the moral and material uplifting of Syria’s 
population through the inculcation of citizenly virtues”.94  Thus the newly formed state 
broadcaster went to great lengths to provide didactic programme content aimed at the masses 
and a broad project of modernity for the Arab state.95 Ideas of citizenship were constructed 
around differing roles which included the ideals of the citizen soldier, the enlightened and 
educated citizen and the morally upstanding citizen.96  It is useful to bear these constructions 
                                                 
92 Takriti (2013) op cit., 53. 
93 Martin, K. M. (2015) Syria’s Democratic Years: Citizens, Experts, and Media in the 1950s, Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 82-83. 
94 Martin (2015) ibid., 2; citing a special issue magazine and article by the Syrian Directorate-General of 
Information in 1953 and reflecting what Martin regards as a common form of discourse of the period, n3.   
95 Cf Abu-Lughod, L. (2004). Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
96 Martin (2015) ibid. 
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in mind and to note the trajectory of Syria’s modern independent state—from that of a state 
which institutes reforms and claims to act in the interests of its citizens, to that of an 
authoritarian state structure under Asad rule. In the words of one who was assassinated by 
the regime: “One cannot  . . . speak of ‘citizens’ in countries where the ruling powers, 
republicans though they may be, see only subjects”.97 
   
So that, as Martin notes, the very idea of citizenship is controlled in an authoritarian system 
in which the “regimes obviously cannot see citizens as autonomous possessions of agency.  
These rulers see, instead, “objects of governmentality””.98  Martin’s recovery of Syria’s all 
too brief democratic years in the 1950s brings us finally to the return of the ‘subject’ and the 
devaluing of the citizen in his relation and position to the state.  As Martin notes, the 
democracy experiments in Syria remind us of “what might have been” and become 
“prospective nostalgia” that “might inform democratic visions of Syria’s future”.99   
 
This section has shown how scholars are starting to consider the rather under analysed idea 
of republicanism as it was present in the Arab nation-state and the post-colonial republics 
specifically.100  There is a significant pointing towards the privileging of the citizen as active 
in nation-building and in political participation.  This section also helpfully points up the 
ways in which the ideal of Arab citizenship fell short in practice.  The grievances of these 
citizens made subjects once more is foreboding of events to come. 
 
                                                 
97 Martin (2015) citing Samir Kassir [Being Arab, 26], ibid., 148. 
98 Martin (2015) citing Chatterjee, 148. 
99 Martin (2015) ibid., 149. 
100 See also Tripp, C. (2015) ‘Battlefields of the Republic: the struggle for public space in Tunisia’, London: 
LSE Middle East Centre, Paper Series: Social Movements and Popular Mobilisation in the Middle East and 
North Africa, 13, 1-21. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to prepare the ground for the analysis that takes place in the 
following chapter, where we will be concerned with a particular idea (dignity) in a specific 
country (Syria) at a time of revolution. This chapter seeks both to describe the vitally 
important historical context and to begin to show the place and dynamic of ideas in use and 
as units of analysis.   
 
I have laid out the historical context of the formation of Syria’s modern and dominant 
political ideology, Arab Baʿthism and, more generally, attempted to show how attention to 
the specifics of the historic political scene, both leading up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
and through the two World Wars, gives some insight into the nature of local and regional 
political contention and the rise of competing ideological currents.  Ideas of Arab 
nationalism gained momentum and were foregrounded in analysing forms of political 
organising and contention in the Arab region (in the period after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire), during the drive towards liberation and independence. The end of one empire and 
domination by others through colonial rule precipitated moves towards putting abstract ideas 
of Arabism into practice, and filling out the content and structures of this imagined 
community.   
 
I explored this relational approach to the founding concepts in order to investigate the 
particular morphology of Syrian Arab Baʿthism, and to look more closely at the principles 
which its founders espoused: the ideas of Arab unity, freedom, and socialism.  In this 
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analysis we are reminded of how the Baʿthist ideals were held hostage in the complex social 
and political context in the immediate post-independence era, and how the ideals of the early 
thinkers were to be tempered and eventually co-opted as instrumental agents in a culture of 
increasingly frequent military coups resulting in the ascendency of Syria’s military to power.  
Since the installation of president Hafez al-Asad in power these ideas have been embedded 
in an official discourse, but not as concrete and empirically evident practices.   
 
In summary, the founding principles of Arab Baʿthism and the ideas which flourished in 
Arabism and Arab nationalist projects were only partly realized with the end of colonial rule.  
Although the formal party was detached and cut adrift from the original project, the ideas of 
equality contained in the particular Arab form of socialism, and the urge for change and 
justice attached to notions of Arab freedom, remain as yet to be achieved.  In the latter part 
of this chapter I gave attention to a competing ideational current in the thought of the Islamist 
reformers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  In the final part of the chapter 
I then turned to draw out some of the republican themes which have been implicit in the 
Arab approach to citizenship and equality.  This gave us the framework for thinking about 
the emergence of the Arab independent republics in the postcolonial period.  What these 
republican and Islamist currents indicated, at least in the modern history of Syria, was that 
there remained a project of liberation as yet unfinished and unattained, even usurped, in as 
much as the very ideals on which the state progressed were held to ransom by more naked 
forms of power and regime survival.   
 
Slogans such as ‘Unity, Freedom, Socialism’ become, in this context, empty of any real 
content and served to bolster an ‘ideological pretender’. As Samir Kasir had remarked, 
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Syrians had become less citizens than subject to arbitrary force, as well as to grossly 
inequitable deprivation. This land of ‘neither bread nor freedom’ was thus ripe for a real 
‘resurrection’ by 2011, when the sparks ignited in Tunisia, then spreading to Egypt, Bahrain 
and Libya, became visible to Syrians. The Baʿth Party had promised Syrians national pride 
and dignity, as we shall see in Chapter Four in my analysis of dignity in the Arab context.  
Yet the gap between the ideals and the practices of the Baʿth Party in power created the 
conditions for and the logic of a revolutionary moment based on the assertion of and the call 
to dignity, in 2011. The project of freedom as a project (as we saw above) of collective 
freedom, of self-determination, still beckoned. 
 
This contemporary historical summary gives vital context to my detailed analysis of the 
concept of dignity, an idea which appears, which is prominent, and which is asserted in a 
number of ways by actors in Syria’s revolution.  As I have indicated, the ideals and spirit of 
the Baʿthist vision is, somewhat ironically and uncomfortably for Syrians who have lived 
with the actual practices of ‘Baʿthist’ rule, a visible element in the re-emergence of the idea 
of ‘dignity’ in the latest revolution.  Dignity has once again characterised the opposition to 
forms of humiliation meted out to Arab subjects by their rulers.  It has also been employed 
once again as part of a language of liberation used by the leaders of newly independent 
states, and now by the revolutionaries in Syria.   
 
With the social and political change that the 2011 Syrian uprisings ushered in, we need to 
consider the (re)entry into the ideological space of old family heirlooms - or renovated 
ideological furniture put to new uses; dusty and neglected but with conceptual form in 
Syria’s political history. In the remainder of this thesis the particular case of Syria, the 
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revolution begun in 2011 and the ideas that flowed in and from it, are the subject of detailed 
analysis and interpretation. Using dignity as my point of entry I consider the political ideas, 
or the ‘ideological furniture’, in Syria, and how it has been thrown into disarray with the 
latest revolution.   
 
We have already seen, in the analysis of the central ideas that formed the Baʿthist manifesto, 
how important it is to understand their historic development in order to see how persistent 
and influential certain conceptions are in civilisations over time, and the idea of dignity in 
Syria is no different. Thus, before I can commence with the contemporary or synchronic 
investigation into the 2011 revolution (in Chapters Five and Six) and the uses of dignity in 
it, I first need to investigate the idea in its western and Arab contexts.  The following chapter 
provides such an analysis: gathering to pursue dignity’s diachronic sweep, and then, of its 
synchrony in Syria’s revolutionary moment. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Continuity and change: traditions and uses of dignity  
in the West and in the Arab world 
 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
As I have set out in the thesis introduction, the concept of dignity (Arabic: karama) was a 
prominent idea in the latest round of Arab revolutions that began in 2010, and it was used 
in the Syrian revolution by activists, citizen journalists and writers who were involved in or 
commentating on events.  The appearance of this idea of karama invites an investigation 
into what was happening and the ways in which this idea was being used.  In Chapter One I 
reflected on the study of revolutions and ideas as a point of reference in pursuit of my 
research into ideas on and in Syria’s revolution.  I began by attending to the influential 
scholarship on modern revolutions and I noted how efforts at producing a generalised 
theoretical model to explicate revolutionary causes and required outcomes had often 
obscured other promising avenues of inquiry.   
 
I then considered ideas and ideologies in modern revolutions.  The most influential literature 
tended to concentrate on ideas only in as much as they might explain the cause of a 
revolution. What all these approaches revealed was a concentration on the state and state 
actors.  As a result, and with very few exceptions, the conventional study of revolution has 
neither given enough attention to the actual people who rise up in revolutions, nor to their 
ideas.  Without suggesting that we discard altogether important structural and socio-
economic explanation for modern revolutions, this thesis has taken a different path in order 
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to get close to the people and their ideas, relying on a non-causal approach to ideas in a time 
of revolution. In thinking about complex ideas as important objects of study in themselves, 
we can investigate the appearance of the concept of dignity in Syria’s revolution, and its 
possible functions and meanings.  
 
To this end I have drawn on an interpretive methodology from within a sub-field of political 
theory which enables me to give due consideration to ideas and concepts, understood as 
important units of analysis in and of themselves.  In the early scholarship of William E. 
Connolly, which I set out in detail in Chapter Two, we found the concepts and tools with 
which to think about ‘dignity’.  Whilst people may seem to share a common sense about the 
worth and meaning of dignity—as we shall see—Connolly’s work on complex and contested 
concepts suggests that we should investigate and reflect on the possibility of conceptual 
revision and change and not assume a timeless and fixed meaning. I also utilise Michael 
Freeden’s scholarship, which I examined in Chapter Two, regarding the study of concepts 
as important units of analysis and as building blocks for the ideational patterns and the 
ideological traditions which shape our world.  In particular I make use of Freeden’s 
elaboration and analysis of the diachronic context and synchronic specificities in which 
ideas are contained and elaborated.  
 
I began, in Chapter Three, with a diachronic analysis of ideological traditions in the Syrian 
context, and set out some of the central ideas and beliefs of prominent ideologues and 
thinkers involved in the Arab Baʿth project and party.  In this way we can cross a wide and 
diverse ideational range: from the core ideas of the Syrian Arab Baʿth Party that I analysed 
in Chapter Three to the historical threads of the concept of dignity, that I consider in this 
chapter.  Layering an analysis of the idea of dignity in Syria’s revolution in this way enables 
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us to look at elements of continuity and change—in the ways that established beliefs and 
ideas may re-emerge and be recast to signify new priorities and to indicate a demand for 
change.  We can explore the extent to which long-standing ideas and beliefs such as ‘unity’ 
and ‘freedom’ might be dusted off and brought back into use again.  
 
The historicised approach I undertake in this chapter is necessarily overlaid with the 
synchronic dimension, which also starts to emerge at points in my analysis here (specific 
events and time periods are given treatment in this chapter, for example, alongside the broad 
sweep of history) and which I engage with extensively in investigating the idea of dignity in 
two ideational exemplars in Chapters Five and Six.  In those final chapters I explore the 
ideational currents which came to the fore at a particular point and place in time - Syria’s 
revolution.  We cannot, however, consider the idea of dignity without recourse to its 
conceptual histories and the ways they trace conceptual changes.   
 
My aim in this chapter is to consider the ways in which the concept of dignity has come to 
“bear the accumulative burdens” of the past but also how we can see the synchronic aspects 
at play in particular instances and in differing conceptual milieu.1  We can start to paint a 
picture of dignity in a western contemporary context and use it as our starting point of 
comparison and departure (as researchers situated in the western academy, not as a 
normative or ideal basis from which to proceed and compare with the ‘Other’) for an analysis 
and interpretation of dignity in a different historical and political context, that of the Arab 
world and of Syria in revolution.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Freeden (1996) op cit., 98. 
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I do not set out to separate and reify these two differing conceptions or to suggest they are 
mutually exclusive.  It is, however, an efficient way to organise and to compare differing 
traditions and trajectories for dignity. In this chapter I show how the contemporary Arab and 
Syrian context for dignity is importantly different to that of the western individualist 
tradition. I set out to show that dignity acts as a powerful analytical lens and signifier of the 
Syrian revolution and, as we will see in my explication of the beginnings of Syria’s 2011 
revolution, how its meaning is, in vitally important ways, context-driven and how it comes 
to be clarified in relation to other core and adjacent ideas.  
 
The chapter is divided into two parts: firstly, the dominant western conception of dignity; 
and, secondly, particular Arab conceptions of dignity. In Part One I set out the three 
commonly found readings and applications which ‘underwrite’ the western conception of 
dignity. These three points of understanding are:  
 
i. Theistic metaphysical notions of human dignity, which consider humans as made in 
the image of God, centred in monotheistic religion; 
ii. Kant’s scholarship, which accommodates a protestant religious tradition and a 
particular rational strand in the Enlightenment, as a foundation for a consideration 
of dignity;  
iii. Cross-disciplinary scholarship, including neo-Kantian influences, which theorises 
dignity in a contemporary setting and accounts for its social and relational aspects. 
 
There are other ideational threads, of course, relating to these themes and to dignity but these 
three are, I argue, the most common and influential.  
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For the first of these threads, in Section One, I examine a broadly Judeo-Christian religious 
conception of dignity to illuminate the metaphysical sense of the idea based on theistic 
tradition and texts.  I examine the core belief that humans were created in God’s image and 
how this metaphysical conception of the human is further fleshed out by linking it with ideas 
such as free will and human reason.  Then I look at the ways in which a broadly conceived 
of Christian tradition has responded to and reacted to secularizing pressures and the age of 
revolutions.    
 
I contrast this, in Section Two, with Kant’s rational argumentation which contains, in 
important overlapping ways, equally foundational conceptions of dignity which are 
organized around Kant’s idea of a rational agent.  In Section Three I update our knowledge 
on dignity by situating a theistic and metaphysical conception of dignity against and in 
dialogue with some recent contributions.  I examine different social and relational 
approaches through Michael Rosen’s historicised analysis and George Kateb’s ‘existential’ 
conception of human dignity.  I argue that this starts to bring us towards productive paths 
for exploring the internal content of the idea and its use and meanings in our social and 
political world. 
 
In Part Two I turn my attention to a detailed investigation of the idea of and 
conceptualisations of karama2 (dignity) in the historical context of the Arab region, and to 
                                                 
2 In modern standard Arabic (MSA) language usage, dignity is commonly denoted by the noun karama and 
in colloquial transliteration may be written as karameh. The idea of dignity, along with associated ideas of 
honour and pride, is prevalent in the Arab language and culture and can be found, for example, in Arabic 
music and poetry as with Umm Kulthoum’s song, al-saun karamiti (‘preserve my dignity’); and, in the poetry 
and customs of the Arab tribes: see Stewart, 1994; Chatty, 2010.  Related concepts might also be used 
interchangeably with karama to denote dignity – such as the Arabic for pride, and honour which might be 
used in differing family, kinship, gendered and socioeconomic contexts.  A good example of such switching 
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a consideration of the dominant religious tradition of Islam.  This diachronic analysis serves 
as both a comparison with the Western conceptions of dignity and as a way of exploring the 
important historical context which avoids making ahistorical assumptions about the meaning 
and use of karama in today’s Syria. This moves us closer, spatially and temporally, to my 
specific research into dignity in Syria’s revolution.   
 
In Section One, we see how in Islam, as in Christianity, the human is elevated in God’s eyes 
and humankind has a special place among God’s creatures.  Second, and in clarifying this 
metaphysical conception, God endowed humans with the unique ability to reason: that is, to 
resort to rational human thinking in the temporal world.  Thus, humans enjoy a dignified 
stature and standing above others of God’s creatures.  Third, in the relationship between 
humankind and God, humans have free will with which to act.  
 
In Section Two I consider how the idea of dignity gained prominence in response to colonial 
and mandate rule, drawing on politicians, writers and thinkers from the colonial and post-
colonial period.   In my analysis of the modern colonial and decolonisation period we will 
see how dignity took on a radical, collective, and liberatory meaning in its appearance and 
uses.  The Arab context thus departs in important ways from a foundational and individuated 
conception of human dignity to advance a more active and collective application of dignity, 
as part of a particular and important strand of political thought-practice.  
 
 
                                                 
between different social uses is the noun ῾irḍ which appears to denote a traditional sense of honour and might 
indicate one’s favourable social standing, an attachment to Arab land or a women’s honour: Stewart, 1994, 
143-4; Abu-Lughod, 1986. Another example is the noun ͑izz (this is sometimes pronounced and transliterated 
as ͑izza in colloquial Syrian Arabic), which can connote honour and strength or pride, as well as dignity, and 
is suggestive of how one is regarded or perceived of in society.  Also, in the Syrian context, the noun nakhwa 
can be used to express a sense of honour and pride, but it can also be a marker of the idea of dignity. 
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In Section Three I bring us up to date with the beginnings of Syria’s revolution in 2011, and 
I indicate the ways in which the notion of karama has been recast and put to use once more 
in a deeply political and contentious context. I conclude by bringing together these main 
trends and suggesting some provisional ways of thinking about the idea of karama as 
signifying a particular liberatory and collective resistance.  
 
To return now to Part One, I begin here with western conceptions of dignity and introduce 
the idea as it has been derived from a broadly Judeo-Christian tradition.3 
 
Part one: western conceptions of dignity 
 
I Religious sources for dignity 
 
Man in God’s image 
In this section I set out a conception of human dignity which is drawn from exegeses of the 
Holy Scripture.  There is an important strand of religious thought and tradition which has 
influenced contemporary conceptions of individual human dignity as innate.4  Across the 
differing Christian denominations the human species is elevated in ‘God’s special favour’ 
and endowed with dignity.  The metaphysical idea of the imago Dei—“the image and 
likeness of the Divine, with which each human being is endowed”—is a source for theistic 
                                                 
3 I am aware that this conflates a very broad family of churches/religious traditions and that a research focus 
on western conceptions of dignity would require tracing the different threads within Christianity, for example 
that of the protestant and the catholic trajectory. However, this chapter is limited to a discussion of some of 
the most influential literature on dignity and it is not possible to provide an exhaustive study of this immense 
canon of scholarship within this research project. 
4 Though one of the debates has been around the extent to which nonbelievers can make the claim to dignity 
if it is God-given.  I follow the logic that if God made humans and preferred them he therefore endowed all 
humans with dignity, regardless of their behaviour in the temporal world.  
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conceptions of human dignity.5  In the Christian tradition the idea of a particular kind of 
human dignity stems from exegeses of the Old Testament.  Humans are blessed with an 
innate sense of dignity because of the way in which they are made in God’s image.  In 
Genesis 1:26 we find: 
 
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, 
and over all the earth and every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.6 
 
This central belief has become embedded across the religious traditions of Christianity (in 
both the protestant and catholic denominations), as well as Islam which I reserve for 
discussion in Part Two of this chapter.  God thus elevated humans above all other animals 
but in doing so held men to high standards — in that all that they might do would reflect on 
God, on his image in them.  Humans are made in the image of God and they must therefore 
strive to be close to and work towards Godly perfection.  To do so, and unlike others of 
God’s creatures (that creepeth upon the earth), humans are equipped with the ability to 
reason and with free will to act.7   
 
 
                                                 
5 Hanvey, J. Dignity, Person and Imago Trinitatis, in McCrudden, C. (2014) Understanding Human Dignity, 
216. 
6 Biblical quotes from: The Holy Bible (1929) Revised Version, The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1. 
7 Although, other prominent religious figures left open the idea of dignity in relation to its non-human 
application: St. Thomas Aquinas suggests, in the definition he offers, in his Commentary on the Sentences 
that: “Dignity signifies something’s goodness on account of itself’: in Waldron, J. (2012) Dignity, Rank, & 
Rights: the Berkeley Tanner Lectures, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 86.   
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In medieval theology we also find there is an important relation between the idea of human 
beings made in God’s image and the notion of God’s gift of free will to men.  One of 
Augustine’s many influential arguments in his explication of religious doctrine was that of 
his religious conception of free will, which he set out in his De libero arbitrio voluntatis.8  
This was an important topic because of his theological and philosophical preoccupation with 
answering the question of why God permitted evil and why men chose to do evil.  When 
humans commit a sin their reasoning is impaired and they fall from grace into sin, as in the 
story of Adam and Eve, which reminds humans of both their imperfectability and of God’s 
perfection in whose image humans are made and through whom they can seek redemption.   
This illustrates well the way that concepts are clarified in relation to other important ideas, 
as in Connolly’s notion of cluster concepts.  Additionally, the relational nature between God 
and people is drawn out from, and then interpreted, in new ways in Augustine’s writing on 
the Trinity.9 Augustine offers a “theological anthropology” in that his extension and analogy 
of God’s Trinity with that of a human trinity (of memory, understanding, and will) “offers 
a highly suggestive account of the human person and our relation to God’s own life”.10   
 
Augustine’s move to conceive of an imago trinitatis paved the way for a conceptualisation 
of rational man within the Christian tradition.11  This is instructive in highlighting how the 
medieval thinkers were grappling with new questions ushered in by the natural sciences and 
man-made law and with the necessity of providing a logic and reason to religious faith.  
These philosophical musings, grounded in metaphysical conceptions of man, show how 
                                                 
8 Benjamin, S. and Hackstaff, L.H. (1964) Third Edition, Augustine: On free Choice of the Will, 
Indianapolis, New York, Kansas: The Bobs-Merrill Co. Inc.  
9 Ayres, L. (2000) ’Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology’, in Dodaro, R. & Lawless, G. eds. Augustine and His 
Critics, London: Routledge. 
10 Hanvey, J. (2013) ’Dignity, Person, and Imago Trinitatis, in McCrudden, C. ed. Understanding Human 
Dignity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 218-9. 
11 Hanvey, ibid., 219. 
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Augustine had started to elucidate the ways in which man has free will and must make the 
right choices for the common good.  In doing so he argued that free will is gifted by God 
but that “it is man alone who decides what he will do”.12  Men exercise their free will by 
recourse to human reason, and this was another dimension to an understanding of the relation 
between God and humans, and indicative of their duties in the temporal world.   
 
Saint Thomas Aquinas advanced Augustine’s ideas and drew from a wide range of 
philosophical texts available—including Aristotle’s work—in order to interrogate free will 
and man’s use of reason.  One of the theological and philosophical puzzles he focuses on is 
the nature of man’s free will.13  Aquinas makes a distinction between essence and existence 
so as to consider the divine and its metaphysical relationship with the human world.14  He 
recognises man as a natural being in search of truth and good, but he seeks to make 
mankind’s capacity for reason and rule consonant with that of God’s will and divine law for 
man on earth. He adheres to some of Augustine’s exegeses of religious scripture, and the 
central tenet that Man comes from God and is made in his image.  He further extends the 
philosophical implications of this principle in a dialogical approach in which he seeks to 
show that human rational thought could be used in the service of a metaphysical and 
religious conception of human free will.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Rist, J.M. (1994) Augustine: ancient thought baptised, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 132. 
13 Hanvey, in McCrudden, (2014) op cit. 220. 
14 See introduction in Clark, M.T ed. (1972) An Aquinas Reader: selections from the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas, New York: Image Books, 7. 
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Human reason 
A third conceptual tool is required, however, for man to choose and decide and therefore to 
act.  In his Summa Theologica, Aquinas explicates the nature of human freedom15 and the 
way in which man’s ability to make choices flows from it.  In doing so he separates out the 
intrinsic and divine known truths from the material, human, world of necessity and choice.16  
Faith in God was the First Truth, and man’s ability to act freely flowed from God, “binding 
together faith and reason”.17 Aquinas writes that, therefore, “Man can will or not will, act or 
not act”; men may will towards good or will toward evil in their exercise of intellectual, and 
moral, choices.18  In the realm of human affairs God’s divine intervention can redeem men 
but cannot necessarily save them from choosing to sin.  
 
From Augustine and Aquinas we find metaphysical conceptions of not only the central first 
principle that man is created in God’s image, but also what that means for human agency 
and free will: the extent to which man’s freedom to act is conceptualized in the Christian 
doctrine and an explication of a theological and philosophical approach which serves to set 
the terms in which reason can proceed with, and not in opposition to, faith.  The debates on 
man’s free will and the extent of it, and for example, the question: “Is man merely God’s 
puppet?”19  This is clarified (and qualified) by the belief that “man is free [liberum] to do 
what he likes, but he is not freed [liberaturm] from sin”.20   
 
                                                 
15 See Summa of Theology, q. 82.a. 4,c and ad.1., cited in Clark, M.T. ed. (1972) An Aquinas Reader: 
selections from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, New York: Image Books, 290-300.  
16 This tension seems to resonate with the much later efforts of the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Islamic modernists - such as Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Rida, whom we met in Chapter Three.   
17 In Clark, ibid, 18-19. 
18 Summa of theology, I-II, q. 13, a.6., cited in Clark, ibid, 293. 
19 See discussion re this in Rist, op cit., 132-133. 
20 In Rist, ibid., citing Augustine in Rebuke and Grace, 13:42, 132. 
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The freedom to act is, therefore, a defining principle, but there is a normative assumption 
that man’s nature is to seek to act for the common good.  The actions of humans are 
contingent on their processes of human reasoning, which Aquinas pursues in great analytical 
and metaphysical detail.   
 
I have introduced in basic form the fundamental beliefs which help to clarify the concept of 
human dignity: man in God’s image; free will, and human reason.  These ideas have 
subsequently formed the basis for a theistic conception of human dignity.   
 
Human agency 
Coming, to a significant extent, from another tradition, an example of the early attempts to 
engage with ideas of dignity was the idealistic, and somewhat eclectic, thesis presented by 
the Italian philosopher Pico della Mirandola (1463 – 1494).21  Dignity started to attract more 
careful and concerted attention as part of a “turn towards humanity”22 exhibited in the Italian 
Renaissance but found in common (secularising) cause elsewhere. Pico’s thesis is an attempt 
to develop an early modern humanism aimed at marrying (rather than rejecting) Christian 
religion with concerns for rational human thinking amidst the cultural flourishing of this era. 
Pico’s oration, posthumously entitled ‘The Dignity of Man’,23 captures his ideas and the 
spirit of the time. He starts by pondering questions as to the position of, and the wonder of, 
man and the source of his happiness.   When God had created earth, narrated Pico, this 
‘Artisan’ desired that there would be someone to ‘wonder at its greatness’ and ‘love its 
                                                 
21 Wallis, C. G., et al (1965/1998, translation), Pico della Mirandola on the Dignity of Man, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing.  
22 Steenbakkers, P. (2014) Human dignity in Renaissance humanism, in Duwell, M, Braarvig, J., 
Brownsword, R. & Mieth, D, The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: interdisciplinary perspectives, 
86. 
23Wallis, C.G. et al (1965/1998) ibid. 
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beauty’, and so God created man in the form of Adam.  With no archetype in which to mould 
man, God said to his creation, Adam:  
 
In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose hands I have placed thee, thou art 
confined by no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself. I have placed 
thee at the centre of the world, that from there thou mayest more conveniently look 
around and see whatsoever is in the world.  Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither 
mortal nor immortal have We made thee.  Thou, like a judge appointed for being 
honourable, art the molder and maker of thyself; thou mayst sculpt thy self into 
whatever shape thou dost prefer.  Thou canst grow downward into the lower natures 
which are brutes.  Thou canst again grow upward from thy soul’s reason into the 
higher natures which are divine. 
 
Central to Pico’s controversial (for its time) thesis is how to consider the ways in which man 
might honour this God-given virtue of dignity, so that humans do not abuse the “liberality 
of the Father”24 in causing harm to themselves instead of moving toward salvation.25 He 
deliberates on the ways in which man should “compete with the angels in dignity and glory”, 
and responds to his own questions with: “where we have willed it, we shall be not at all 
below them”.   
 
In pursuing ways to live in dignity, and to reach up to the very heights of God, Pico, 
importantly, turns to the notion of human agency and concepts of charity, intelligence, and 
(human) judgement.26 In Pico, as well as elsewhere, we can see the ideational architecture 
                                                 
24 Wallis, C.G. et al (1965/1998) ibid., 7 
25 Here Pico is referencing the Psalms, 48:21 (King James version, Psalms 49:20) cited by translator, in On 
the Dignity of Man. 
26 Wallis, C.G. et al (1965/1998) ibid., 7 
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for the coming secularising influence on religion and the turn to reason, thus developing 
notions of what human dignity might consist of and how it should be treated.   
 
In summary, the monotheistic conception of dignity is one which is special to and inherent 
in humans as it is ordained by God unto man.  It is the foundational sense in which we might 
consider the notion of dignity emerging from a western Christian conception, a view which 
has taken on important universal meanings.  Having navigated a path which sets out a 
religious conception of dignity, I also indicated the differing ways in which key Christian 
traditions sought to engage with and adjust to the Renaissance. In a religious conception of 
dignity the idea must be understood on a metaphysical level. 
 
Continuing with the western tradition, I now trace the conceptual history and usages of 
human dignity through the writings of Immanuel Kant.   
 
 
II Kant, practical reason, and dignity 
 
 
Immanuel Kant’s writing has deeply influenced contemporary understandings of dignity; 
not least in the human rights discourse espoused by western liberal thinkers and democracy 
theorists, as well as jurisprudence on matters of human dignity as promulgated through 
international law and nation-state constitutions.27  Therefore it is important to recognise 
Kant’s influence on dignity because it has been so great and it shows some important 
continuity with the foundational conception of dignity we just saw.  For Kant, humans have 
                                                 
27Waldron, (2012); McCrudden, (2014) op cit. 
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intrinsic dignity in virtue of being rational and free – in that they are able to make (morally 
guided) decisions and to act based on a Kantian notion of ‘practical reason’.  Thus humans 
are beyond price as their worth is derived from their being not merely instruments or a means 
to some end, but from being an end in themselves.  For Kant, man’s ability for practical 
reason is the organizing and core idea around which all else flows – thus, it is claimed, 
providing the opening for non-theistic treatments of dignity.28  
 
Kant’s use of, and exposition of, dignity is scattered somewhat through his extensive 
writing, and some have noted how there is some variation in his treatment of the concept.29  
It is not possible to fully explicate Kant’s ideas on dignity30 here as it relies on his expansive 
foundational ideas, and this would take us away from our central purpose of advancing 
towards a conceptualisation of dignity in an Arab and Syrian context.  However, I draw out 
some of the important threads from the canon of Kant’s work in relation to dignity.   
 
There are some fundamental principles and claims which underpin Kant’s conception of 
dignity. A founding principle for Kant’s conception of dignity is that it has an intrinsic value, 
beyond price, which is vested in the human being on account of his worth as not merely a 
means, but as an end unto himself: 
 
                                                 
28 However, Kant’s practical reason stems from the protestant context in which he was writing and to which 
he adhered. That is certainly what Nietzsche supposed in his assessment of Kant’s work:  in Hollingdale, R. 
J. trans. (1990) The Anti–Christ(ian), Penguin Books. 
29See discussion in Bayefsky, R. (2013) ‘Dignity, Honour, and Human Rights: Kant’s Perspective’, Political 
Theory, 4:6, 813-4. 
30 On this effort see Sensen, O. (2011) Kant on Human Dignity, Kantstudien-Erganzungshelle, 166, De 
Gruyter, especially Part II, 141-213.  Sensen pursues a novel non-foundational approach to Kant’s 
conception of dignity which utilises the idea of Kant’s Copernican revolution in moral philosophy.   
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In the kingdom of ends, everything has either a price or a dignity.  What has a price 
can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; what, on the other hand, is raised 
above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity.31  
 
Rational beings are above price because of their inherent worth. In recognising the 
privileged place of humans, rational human actors must bear a responsibility and inner moral 
duty.  Kant stated that: 
 
Every man has Conscience, and finds himself inspected by an inward censor, by 
whom he is threatened and kept in awe (reverence mingled with dread); and this 
power watching over the law is nothing, arbitrarily (optionally) adopted by himself, 
but is interwoven with his substance.  It follows him like his shadow, however he 
may try to flee from it.32 
 
So, Kant’s ‘inalienable dignity’ differs, in some way, from an innate religious conception of 
dignity, in that man possesses an internal ‘moral law’ and so moral guidance comes from 
within, from human beings, who were created by God and endowed with reason by Him.   
Those duties flow from human reasoning and decision-making.   Thus, man has to value 
himself and, in doing so, be in “respect of the dignity of our humanity”. 
 
Kant offered us a second sense of dignity, based around the intrinsic value of the human as 
a rational being with free will who is his own law-maker and must act morally and correctly. 
Pursuing a conception of dignity from Kant’s philosophical oeuvre provides us with an 
                                                 
31Kant, I. (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed./trans. Gregor, M. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 42-43. 
32 Kant. I. (1886) Chapter Three: Of the Duty owed by Man to Himself as his own Judge, The Metaphysics of 
Ethics, 3rd ed., Calderwood, H. trans., Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 254. 
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example of the way in which dignity has come to be regarded as not just something which 
is innate and inalienable, but which is qualified, in that men must fulfil their duties and act 
in a morally correct manner in order to maintain it, thus subsequently providing the 
groundwork for a universal legal and moral operationalising of the concept of dignity which 
has, as we shall see in the next section, manifested itself in a normative and individualist 
human rights discourse.  
 
This is a vital point to take from our analysis of Kant’s scholarship.  This internal moral law, 
in following Kant, is held by man; that is, by the individual, and is acted upon by making 
individual choices, thus providing the basis for a conception of dignity which is 
individualising.  We will contrast this with the modern Arab colonial context: in Part Two 
we see how a collective conception of dignity emerged, but next I will look more at 
contemporary thinking about dignity. 
 
 
III Dignity in the social world 
 
 
In this section I will pinpoint some productive approaches to the concept of dignity which, 
in some important ways, seek to recognise the social world and a more public and relational 
aspect of dignity.  In doing so it is necessary to problematise the idea, although this does not 
mean giving in to the weight of dignity’s critics.  The most vocal criticisms have been in 
regard to ethical matters.  But also, importantly for the trajectory that dignity starts to take 
us in regarding this thesis, there is potential in arguing that conventional study of dignity 
has problematically linked it with a dominant liberal and western democratic discourse, and 
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a false one at that (given the vast inequalities in our liberal societies).33 These unsettling 
ideas about dignity become important in this research study as it usefully interrupts and 
challenges the dominant foundational claim to dignity which I have spent time analysing so 
far and which I want to move away from to see how else we can understand the concept of 
dignity as it is being used.    
 
To begin with, an important juncture in the contemporary conception of human dignity is 
the ushering in of the post Second World War peace settlement, which provided the 
foundations on which political and legal frameworks and protections were drawn up to 
protect humans from the excesses of war, and to guarantee the respect of human rights in 
the nation-state system. For example, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights 
(1948) and, at a national level, the German Grundgesetz (Basic Law, 1949) placed the 
concept of human dignity in primary place as a grounding for the protection of individual 
human rights which would flow from it.   Protecting and respecting dignity serves as the 
basis on which to codify, enact and protect equal human rights in human-made law and 
doctrines. Contemporary philosophical, legal and moral commitments to the sanctity of 
human dignity can be found in the field of international law and political philosophy, which 
                                                 
33Dignity indeed has its critics: the most cited critics appear to be Ruth Macklin who wrote an editorial in the 
British Medical Journal claiming that dignity is useless.  She also conflates, wrongly, autonomy with dignity 
as she claims them as interchangeable.  Then Stephen Pinker who has said that we are “using dignity to 
condemn anything that gives someone the creeps”, in his account of ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’, cited in 
Waldron, 2012, op cit., 42, n.55.  Not surprisingly, both of these rebukes come from the natural sciences and, 
specifically, the field of stem cell research against which the Catholic Church has used claims of human 
dignity to condemn this scientific development and its ethical implications—discussed in Waldron (2012) op 
cit. 42.  Michael Rosen singles out Schopenhauer’s critique of the expression ‘dignity of man’ as “the 
shibboleth of all the perplexed and empty-headed moralists”, thus rejecting the idea as a mere façade with no 
actual moral substance (2012, op cit., 1-2).  Nietzsche takes this much further in his critique of the emptiness 
of the  slogan ‘dignity of labour’—this, in my reading, reflects some of the later radical critiques we will 
encounter in Fanon regarding individualist conceptions of human dignity (see chapter: The Greek State, in 
Ansell, K. & Large, D. eds. (2006) The Nietzsche Reader, Blackwell, 88-94.   
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dominates the scholarship on and informs our common understandings of dignity in the 
West. 
 
However, rather than discuss this canon of scholarship and the normative ideas on dignity 
which remain close to Kantian conceptions of the concept, I want to explore some alternative 
paths of inquiry from different disciplines.  One of the more interesting international law 
perspective resides in Bayefsky’s approach to dignity and honour.34  She seeks to excavate 
Kant’s treatment of honour, which she claims has been neglected in a consideration of the 
concept of dignity.35  In doing so she reintroduces an important sense of being in the social 
world and of a relational aspect of dignity which is clarified in adjacency with traditional 
codes of honour.  This moves us beyond an individuated sense of dignity and towards ways 
dignity might be understood in the social world.  Her argument is suggestive of the notion 
that honour be used as a tool to imbue a collective social responsibility based on doing the 
right thing and acting with honour and dignity.  Her argument seeks to find ways to hold 
state leaders to account and to curb human rights abuses. 36    
 
Michael Rosen’s useful compact study on the history of dignity attempts to get at this social 
and relational aspect of dignity from another angle.  Rosen argues that we should not see 
dignity as only a timeless intrinsic value.  This falls short of providing a full understanding 
of the range of uses and meanings of dignity.  In particular Rosen’s interrogation of the ways 
in which we self-reflect, relate to and respect each other illuminates the multi-dimensional 
and social aspects of dignity—as reflexive, reaffirming, responsive, and so on. Rosen thus 
provides an analysis of dignity which recognises that the concept does not and need not 
                                                 
34 Bayefsky, R. (2013) op cit. 
35 Bayefsky (2013) ibid., 812. 
36 See also: Krause, S. (1999) ‘The Politics of Distinction and Disobedience: Honor and the Defense of 
Liberty in Montesquieu’, Polity, 31:3 (Spring), 469-499. 
 168 
require a foundational basis on which to appear and be acted upon in practice.  In decoupling 
dignity from a foundational ‘human rights’ discourse, Rosen considers the difference 
between ‘respect’ and ‘dignity’ and suggests that: 
 
Instead of respecting dignity by respecting a set of fundamental rights, dignity 
requires respectfulness.  Taken in this way, the right to have one’s dignity respected 
is one particular right - albeit a very important one - rather than something that acts 
as the foundation of rights in general. 
 
Rosen here appears to be pointing towards looking at the way in which dignity appears as a 
practice—in our everyday lives and relations with each other.  This helps Rosen to answer 
one of the fundamental and difficult puzzles he pursues in his book: why do we feel it 
important to treat the dead with dignity?37  Rosen begins to answer this puzzle by suggesting 
that it is not only because humans are ends in themselves that they have a duty to place value 
on humankind but, moreover, that we hold this value in high regard without needing to rely 
on a timeless or abstract conception of an objective dignity.38  It is telling in how Rosen 
asserts that if a human was the last person on earth alongside one other who died, then the 
last surviving human would most likely take care to bury the deceased, or otherwise carry 
out some kind of ritual to mark the death, with respect, of another fellow human being.39  
Acting with dignity and as an upright member of society, for Rosen, requires no 
metaphysical basis or argument based on the utility of moral concepts such as dignity.40  
                                                 
37 Rosen, op cit., 10, 138. 
38 It is interesting to point out that Rosen’s question represents a rather secularised thinking on death.  A 
theistic response to his question would need to respond on a metaphysical level that considered that humans 
come from God, belong to God and return to Him.  But that is the point of such contemporary theorists- to 
move beyond religion.  See also George Kateb later in this section.   
39 Rosen, op cit., 138. 
40 Rosen, op cit., 143; 156. 
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Rosen goes along with some of Kant’s notions of duty but he appears to be attempting to 
unsettle and interrupt any fixed ideas or narrowly legal and philosophical conceptions of 
human dignity.        
 
In a contrasting approach George Kateb offers an ‘existential’ conception of dignity.  He too 
moves in a direction which takes us away from universalising norms, but has a particular 
project in mind to promote the need for an urgent human ‘stewardship’ of the natural world 
and all its species.  In his monograph Human Dignity Kateb boldly advances a defence of 
dignity which purposely puts aside any recourse to theistic claims and justifications for a 
conception of dignity based on the intrinsic worth of humans.41  Nevertheless, Kateb’s 
conception claims that humans have unique traits that elevate them from the rest of the 
natural world.   
 
The human intellect is something that Kateb celebrates, and free and moral agency are 
central to his thesis on humans and their special place in the order of things.42  Kateb 
explicates a particular human trait of human thought and consciousness43 articulated in 
speech through complex language systems unique to humans.44 Interestingly, given his 
secular claim, Kateb notes: “That God spoke the world into existence is a parable on the 
transformative power of human language”.45 As a result of this elevation, the human species 
has a duty in the ‘stewardship’ of nature.  It seems that a tension emerges regarding the level 
to which Kateb sees dignity ‘as if’ it is foundational and then the extent to which he is 
                                                 
41 Kateb, G. (2011) Human Dignity, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.  Kateb’s is a resolutely 
secular defence of and conception of human dignity though.  Similar arguments are, however, made from 
within political theology:  Moltmann, J. (1984/2007) On Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics, 
trans. Meeks, D. M, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 26-29.  
42 Kateb, ibid., 132-136. 
43 Kateb, ibid., 134-5. 
44 Kateb, ibid., 136-145. 
45 Kateb, ibid., 142. 
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arguing his secular and secularising human stewardship because of  our natural world.  I 
cannot resolve this here but Kateb is useful because of his unsettling treatment of the idea 
in use and because he also seeks to problematise it and work on it as a theoretical and moral 
puzzle. 
 
The scholars I have briefly discussed here seem to share the idea that human dignity is an 
important concept with normative consequences for human conduct and individual human 
rights.  The focus, echoing ideas and exegeses of Kant’s scholarship, is on rights and 
responsibilities, even when metaphysical and foundational claims are being contested.  Thus 
dignity might appear to be settled and stabilised to a large extent in these legal and 
philosophical moorings to which human rights are tied.   
 
However, we also found indications that the meaning of dignity has necessarily been 
clarified in relation to the external world, in human relations in the social, political and 
public sphere.  Virtues such as respect for one another and equality for all have been core in 
decontesting the notion of dignity.  In this respect perhaps Rosen offers ways to conceive of 
a more dynamic and moving concept of dignity.  This is important as it is a challenge to the 
legalistic human rights and philosophical moorings which suggest that the idea has a 
timeless essence, whereas the social and relational aspect of dignity suggests that it is more 
dynamic, contingent and shifts in differing contexts.  From Rosen’s conceptual history 
treatment of dignity emerges the potential for a more intersubjective and contingent 
consideration of dignity which helps us to move between different contexts rather than to 
try and carry across and enforce any one unitary conception of dignity.   
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These debates start to open up to recognise certain levels of contestation regarding the idea 
of dignity in the ways that it appears and is used in our social and political world.  In doing 
so, a certain level of unsettling, and of opening up the concept to investigate its internal 
contents, and ordering, is required.  I have suggested that some of the scholarship relating 
to dignity tends to box in the idea—in legal and normative frameworks.  It is thus productive 
to also consider, to the extent that we have the space here, other conceptions of dignity.   
 
I draw this section to a close by examining ideas of dignity at the very extremes of human 
existence.  Tzvetan Todorov offers us the clearest and starkest picture of a dignity in 
practice, and (indirectly) for survival.  In his exploration of moral life in the Nazi 
concentration camps Todorov drew on survivor accounts and interpreted survivors’ ideas of 
dignity as: 
 
The capacity of the individual to remain a subject with a will; that fact, by itself, is 
 enough to ensure membership of the human race.46 
 
For Todorov the virtue of dignity is inextricably linked to notions of freedom and the 
autonomy of humans to act.  Thus, he suggests, there were instances of prisoners able to 
remain ‘morally intact’ of their own will and through their individual and collective 
practices, maintaining their dignity in a multitude of ways in the absence of the rule of law, 
institutional justice and so on.  In suggesting this everyday virtue of (and resistance in) 
dignity, Todorov is showing how the camps sought to destroy the autonomy of the individual 
altogether.  He asks: 
                                                 
46Todorov, T. (1991/2000) Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps, trans. Denner, A & 
Pollack, A. London: Phoenix, Orion Books Ltd.  
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What happens if society not only refuses to recognise your dignity but actually 
declares you not worthy of life, as Nazi Germany did to the Jews?47 
 
From accounts of holocaust survivors, Todorov narrates how dignity was guarded, fought 
for and retained in the most extreme conditions and in the complete absence of any kind of 
‘rights’ regime for its prisoners.  For Jean Amery during his time in Auschwitz, it was the 
physicality of his resort to violence to defend his dignity which brought him to regard the 
notion as “a form of social recognition”,48  and in which he appeared to consider it as 
interchangeable with the concept of honour which, as Todorov points out, can be bestowed 
through social codes in a way that dignity cannot, although Todorov extends his argument 
to point out that, unlike honour, dignity can be experienced by the isolated individual.49   
 
Human dignity is taken for granted and has an ineliminable innateness.  But, it becomes 
something that we as individuals struggle for, in relation to the world and situation around 
us.   We cannot understand dignity just as an innate kernel in the human being.  We have to 
look at the social context for the other, relational, virtues which clarify it.  For example, 
consider the way in which Bruno Bettleheim’s account of moral life in the camp shows the 
relational aspect of dignity at work in “man’s internal ability to regulate his own life”.50  
Thus it was that extreme acts of autonomy—whether by choosing to kill oneself rather than 
face the gas chambers or by fighting for one’s preservation and position in the camps—
characterised individual, and sometimes collective, responses in the most extreme situations.  
 
                                                 
47 Todorov, ibid., 60. 
48 Todorov, ibid. 59-60. 
49 Todorov, ibid., 60. 
50 Todorov, ibid., 61. 
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Todorov shows for us, by taking us to the extremes of what humans do, how context can 
shift meanings in use for important and complex ideas like dignity.  Such kinds of extremes 
came to be a reality for Syrians too as the revolution turned to conflict and humanitarian 
disaster. 
 
In this section alternative avenues for thinking about dignity were briefly analysed so as to 
highlight some of the strands of thinking on dignity which started to point us to the ways in 
which dignity is used in our social world and how it becomes a kind of practice—of self and 
mutual respect and of survival. Rosen and others offer a promise of a relational and social 
investigation into dignity and this comes directly to bear on conceptions of this idea in the 
Arab contemporary and revolutionary context, as we shall see shortly.  I now move to Part 
Two of this chapter in order to investigate Arab conceptions of the idea of dignity. 
 
 
 
 
Part two: Arab conceptions of dignity 
 
I Islam and conceptions of dignity  
 
There is no explicit mention of the precise noun, karama, (as it is commonly used and 
translated today) in the Quran (nor an explicit mention of a ‘human dignity’),51 although 
                                                 
51 I am grateful to Dr Omar Imady, email correspondence, 2015, for pointing this out thus reinforcing the 
need to check with source texts in order to understand the ways in which the idea has then been interpreted 
(sometimes, seemingly, overly so in a way that has suggested that karama itself is present in the sacred texts) 
in the modern context.   
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other verbal derivatives are used from the same Arabic root letters for karama, such as 
karram (translated as: to honour). However, treatments of the idea of human dignity in Islam 
rely on and go back to the classical conceptions of the human and of man’s place in Islam 
and relation to God.52 The idea of human dignity is interpreted with reference to and in 
exegeses of the sacred texts of the Quran and the Sunna, as these represent the “bedrock of 
Islamic belief”. 53  The Sunna collectively refers to the chain of evidence and recorded 
instances of prophetic traditions, which are made up of the sayings and doings of the Prophet 
Muhammed during his lifetime.   
 
We necessarily start, then, with the religious sources for Islam at its very beginnings: the 
messages from God which were transmitted orally through the Prophet Muhammad.  Later 
on we have the consolidation of the sayings and doings of the Prophet (Sunna) and the 
received messages from God as they are gathered, authenticated through a chain of authority 
(isnad) and finally written down and recorded (al-Quran).  Subsequent understandings of 
human dignity have been derived from a consideration of important precepts and relational 
concepts which I will focus on here: Man in the image of God; human reason, and free will.  
I set out here the foundational ideas through which the concept of dignity has then been 
interpreted and articulated by Islamic scholars.     
 
 
 
                                                 
52 So, generally speaking, the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence (maḏhab) in Sunni Islam, including 
the Shafi’i as it has traditionally been followed by sections of the Sunni population in Syria as well as many 
other Arab countries.  The other three main schools of influence in the Muslim majority countries are Hanafi, 
Maliki and Hanbali: Esposito, J. 1991. Islam: the straight path, Oxford: Oxford University Press 85.    
53 These sacred texts form part of the canon of Islam and its differing strands and schools, as discussed in 
Ramadan, T. 2012. The Arab Awakening: Islam and the new Middle East, London: Allen Lane, Penguin 
Books, 73-74; see also, Esposito, J. (1991) Islam: the straight path, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 80-83; 
also, discussion on the concept of Sunna and origins in Rahman, F. (1996/2002) Islam, 2nd edn., Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 44-49.    
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Man in God’s image 
As with the Christian tradition and its treatment of dignity, which we set out earlier, the idea 
of dignity in the Islamic world has become intertwined with the privileged place of humans 
in God’s creation and their duties to submit (the meaning of Islam) to God.  Conceptualising 
human dignity requires thinking about the way in which Islam conceives of human animals.  
In particular there is an emphasis on the first man—Adam.  In the Quran Adam is seen as 
God’s representative on earth, as His khalifa (vicegerent), made in God’s image.54 Adam is 
referred to in the Quranic tradition as Abu-al-Bashar55 (father of humanity) and is mentioned 
in several of the Quranic verses.56  The coming into being of Adam serves as the starting 
point for “the unfolding of humanity”.57  The scholar of Islam, Mohammed Kamali, refers 
us to the Quranic source for a conception of the dignity of man in the Sura: Children of 
Israel, (17:70), which declares: 
 
We have bestowed dignity [karram] on the progeny of Adam . . . and conferred on 
them special favours, above a great part of Our creation. 
   
Here Kamali has rendered the derived verb karram as ‘dignity’ but elsewhere it is translated 
as ‘honour’. 58  In an Islamic conception of humankind, it is God who bestows human virtues 
                                                 
54 Nettler, R. (2003) Sufi Metaphysics and Quranic Prophets: Ibn Arabi’s thought and methods in the Fusus 
al-Hikam, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 17-8, who is writing here in relation to particularities of 
Ibn Arabi’s exegesis of the Quran but which nevertheless utilises the Quran which is a source for all 
Muslims; also, Abou El-Fadl, K. ( 2004) in Cohen, J. & Chasman, D. Islam and the Challenges of 
Democracy, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,  6-7.   
55 Nettler, ibid, 18. 
56 See 2:31, 3:33, 3:59, 7:11, 7:19, 20:115, I use the Marmaduke Pickthall translation of the Quran, published 
by Everyman, 1909/1992.  
57 Nettler, (2003) op cit., 17. 
58 My italics: Kamali, M. H. (2002) The Dignity of Man: An Islamic Perspective, Cambridge: The Islamic 
Texts Society, 1, translates the Arabic karram (the derived verb form of the word which would mean noble 
or honour as per the Hans Weir dictionary) as dignity (karama).  This reflects the ambiguity and the 
retrospective translation of such ideas; meaning is contingent on context and many Arab nouns can have 
multiple meanings-so that they form a family of concepts.  Notably Kamali specifically translates the Arabic 
noun used in the Quran, ird, as honour.  So he is making a consistent distinction (as set out in his glossary of 
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such as honour, which are “. . . not earned by meritorious conduct; it is an expression of 
God’s favour and grace” towards humans.59 In this sense, an Islamic conception of human 
virtues such as dignity and honour appear similar to the Christian foundational stance on 
human dignity which we discussed earlier.  The relationship between man and God that is 
stipulated in the Quran is one of submitting to and serving God on earth: “the most honoured 
of you in the sight of God is the most righteous or God fearing of you”.60 Humans are 
required to submit to God, their creator.61 As we saw in the Christian tradition earlier, in 
Islam humans have certain duties and obligations which relate to the ways in which they are 
the very image of God on earth.  Therefore humans must strive to keep to the straight path 
of Islam and to live as God would like.  As a minimum, believers must adhere to ibadat – 
that is, the duty to worship, and other rituals which are obligatory in their submission to 
God.  We can draw closer to an Islamic conception of dignity by considering two further 
core and relational concepts that are discussed centrally in consideration of dignity: human 
reason and free will. 
 
Human Reason (ʿaql) 
It is the metaphysical considerations and debates (and sometimes very practical matters) 
about the best ways of keeping to a straight Islamic path which have led to the codification 
of God’s law through a system of Islamic jurisprudence from the earliest period of Islam.  
Hence we have the weight of God’s law, the Shari’a, which is the gathering of rulings and 
legal codification regarding and drawing on that which is in the Quran and the Hadith.  Since 
                                                 
key terms), 33.  In the Pickworth translation the phrase is rendered as: ‘we have honoured’ and the Surah 
itself is translated as ‘the children of Israel’ in reference to the Israelites.   
59 Kamali, ibid., 1 
60 Sura 49:13, cited in Esposito, J. 1981 op cit., 28-9.  
61 There is debate in the literature as to whether this includes for Muslims only or all of mankind.  This 
depends on the kind of interpretation but it can be read with a charitable interpretation as being inclusive of 
all of mankind, the children of Adam.  Although central to a religious conception is a generalisation of 
submitting to God (Allah) and being religious, something which can apply to all the monotheistic traditions 
and thus, potentially, exclude those outside of it.   
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the time of the Prophet Muhammed we find the early codification and explication of God’s 
commands and the development of an Islamic jurisprudence which results in the necessity 
for consulting the sacred sources in all matters of discussion and contention.  A central 
thread in the pre-modern and modern debates about Islam has been the importance and place 
of human reason.   
 
Kamali notes how Ibn Abbas, the Companion of the Prophet Muhammad, commented that 
“God most high has honoured mankind by endowing him with the faculty of reason”.62 Man 
is expected to be an upright and honourable custodian on earth and to act as the gatekeeper 
of justice in the temporal world.63 If we want to think about human reason and its relation 
to, and use within Islam, we need to attend to the conceptual tools of human reason in early 
Islam, and the way in which the application of these tools has changed over time.  In order 
to figure out questions of fiqh (Islamic law) scholars relied on ijtihad, the principle of the 
use of independent human reasoning to come to informed legal decisions regarding the 
sacred Quran and the Sunna, and on  ijmaʿ ʿ (consensus building). 
 
These tools for reasoning within the faith have been used in markedly different ways across 
time and by differing schools of thought.  Some scholars deemed that only the positions of 
consensus explicitly reached during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammed were valid and 
authentic, whereas the Islamist modernists wanted to expand this and put ijmaʿ ʿ to much 
wider use for new challenges and questions in the present, too.  Likewise the usages of 
ijtihad in the early and pre-modern eras were limited to a narrow legal context rather than 
the suggested individual level and widened application desired by the Islamic modernists 
                                                 
62Kamali, ibid., 1.  
63 Kamali,op cit., 30-31; Abou El-Fadl, (2004) op cit., introduction; and, Esposito (1981) op cit., 71-73 for a 
discussion on medieval Islamic theology and the Mu’tazila school of thought on human agency and freedom 
in comparison with the Hanbali school which was more dominant.   
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we met in Chapter Three.  The debates around Islamic jurisprudence are complex and cannot 
really be generalised as we find, of course, internal contention among and between the main 
religious schools and scholars.  But, for our purposes, we need to be aware that Islamic 
scholars and reformers were seeking ways to expand the notion, and application of 
independent and individual human reason (ʿaql) in modern Islamic jurisprudence. The 
gatekeepers of this were a community of Islamic scholars consisting of the Ulama and those 
religious scholars were respected as an authority on Islam within the wider community on 
account of their schooling in, and knowledge of, Islamic scripture.   
 
Islamic scholars face new challenges in the modern period, when matters relating to the 
advances and pace of change present them with constant new challenges that did not exist 
in pre-modern times.  For example, in the field of medical advances, there is contention 
about the extent to which it is medically permissible to try to save a foetus in cases where 
the mother has died while carrying the baby.  This is because to interfere with the human 
form by cutting open her body raises fundamental questions on the innate dignity, invested 
by God, in the human body.64 Those Islamic jurists who are less open to innovations using 
ijtihad are unlikely to agree to something which would seem to go against the word of God 
(Quran) or the sayings and doings of the Prophet.  In this case the pertinent text states that: 
‘breaking the bone of the dead is like breaking one when he is alive’.65 Advances in medical 
science arguably make such decisions easier when there is less chance of major disruptive 
surgery on the corpse.   
 
 
                                                 
64 See this discussion in Kamali, op cit. 
65 Kamali, op cit., 86-87. 
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Such debates in medical ethics relating to religious practices echo the ethical dilemmas we 
alluded to earlier in relation to the Christian tradition and advances in science which have 
raised ethical issues around abortion, assisted suicide and bioethics.66 They also indicate the 
ways in which the divine law and the codes interact with or are in tension with the human, 
temporal world and the need for an accommodation of Islam with the modern world.  Within 
this metaphysical parameter of action is the question of the extent of human free will in 
Islam.   
 
 
Free Will 
Related to the idea of human reason is the question of the extent to which man is free to 
reason and to act autonomously.  This extends into the realm of power and the extent to 
which man must defer to God’s will.  Kamali indicates how the “dignity of man is 
manifested, perhaps more than anything else, in his freedom of conscience, moral autonomy 
and judgement”.67 Human freedom is conceived of, in an important way, through man’s 
choice to come to religion, inferred from the Quranic verse al-Baqarah, 2:256: There shall 
be no compulsion in religion.68 Kamali shows verses in the Quran which support the idea 
that God can only warn and guide but he cannot stop humans from going astray.  Kamali 
also indicates the moral basis on which men should act, so that if they see evil they should 
speak out, according to the Quranic principle of hisbah which provides for the moral 
                                                 
66 Sherine Hamdy gives a detailed ethnographic treatment to the issue of organ transplants and the medical 
profession in relation to Egypt and Islamic law:  Hamdy, S. 2012. Our bodies belong to God: organ 
transplants, Islam and the struggle for human dignity in Egypt, Berkeley/LA: University of California Press. 
67 Kamali, ibid, 39. ; Kamali cites as evidence: Muhammad Raja Mutajalli, al-Hurriyat wa’l-Huquq fi’l-Islam 
Rabitat al-alam al-islami bi-Makkah al-Mukarrahmah, Dar al-Sahafah wa’l-Nashr, 1407/1987, 23. 
68 In Kamali, ibid., 39.  This Quranic phrase was used by Syrian activists in the Northern parts of Syria in 
response to the increasing extremism (and threats to secular Syrians in the revolution) and sectarian nature of 
the conflict; posters and murals on buildings can be found with the phrase in Arabic.   
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autonomy of humans.  This Kamali takes to indicate the ‘liberty of conscience’, albeit, and 
as we saw in the classic Christian teachings, within a metaphysical and theistic framework.69  
This freedom to speak out extends to the necessary righteous conduct of speaking out against 
tyranny, as in the Hadith: 
 
When you see my community afraid of addressing a tyrant with: ‘O tyrant’, then it 
is not worth belonging to it anymore. 
   
Stemming from discussions on issues of free will, we can think about the source(s) of 
authority and the level of autonomy from divine and temporal rule (however construed) that 
individuals enjoy, so that in a broadly Islamic setting, human action would be constrained 
by God’s laws through the codified system in Shari’a; man is always subordinate to God 
and must submit to him.  Then, within these confines, humans have some space to act 
autonomously through man-made law, secular and human-made laws and with recourse to 
constitutions and so on.   
 
Above, I have briefly outlined the three core principles which relate to discussions on Islam 
and human dignity: that is, the uniqueness of humans in God’s image, human reason, and 
free will.  So far these look similar to the core ideas we saw in Christian conceptions of 
dignity in Part One.  But we also need to consider the debate about the place of Islam within 
a modern nation state system, as this continues to exercise contemporary scholars of Islam 
and also those within the realm of political Islam.  The focus has been on questions about 
the extent to which temporal rulers and governments can claim and maintain their 
legitimacy, and the extent to which they must be obeyed. Operating within the confines of 
                                                 
69 Kamali, ibid., 40-41. 
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an Islamic conception of dignity as being dependent on and subordinate to God’s generosity, 
the scholar Khalid Abou al-Fadl asserts that the human social and political sphere stands 
distinct from (but in important ways, subservient to) the divine, through a reading and 
interpretation of the Quran and Hadith.70  For him here are three central tenets relating to 
the human social and political sphere in the Quran.71  These are: i) pursuing justice through 
social cooperation and mutual assistance; ii) establishing a non-autocratic, consultative  
(ijmaʿ) method of governance, and iii) instituting mercy and compassion in social 
interactions.  
 
In this reading, Islam provides the foundations for a democratic system which ensures equal 
rights of speech, association and suffrage for all and “offers the greatest potential for 
promoting justice and protecting human dignity”.72 Abou El-Fadl thus offers an agental 
exegesis of the sacred texts: “God’s sovereignty provides no escape from the burdens of 
human agency”.73 If God gave humans the unique ability among all his creatures to reason, 
then one reading is that how could God then deny free will?  In the temporal world, Islamic 
law constrains men’s actions so as to act within the ‘natural law’, codified and sanctioned 
in Shariʿa, or Islamic, law as upheld by Islamic jurists and Ulama. 
 
In this section I have drawn on sacred Islamic sources in order to understand conceptions of 
the human in Islam and the way in which a metaphysical understanding of man and his 
relation to God has informed subsequent exegeses on human dignity in Islam.  I have briefly 
noted that contemporary writing on Islam has tended to focus on Islam and human rights – 
                                                 
70 Abou al-Fadl (2004) ibid., 4-6. 
71 Abou al-Fadl (2004) ibid., 4-6. 
72 Abou El-Fadl, (2004), op cit., 4-6; he cites Quranic verses as follows:  6:12, 6:54, 21:107, 27:77, 29:51, 
45:20.     
73 Abou El-Fadl, (2004) op cit., 9. 
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is Islam compatible with human rights? Can Islam recognise and incorporate democracy? 
And so on.  However, I have not entered into these discussions in detail as they would then 
risk taking us away from the aim of this research, which is to look at a particular 
revolutionary situation in the contemporary period.  Also, as I discussed in Chapter Two, in 
relating the debates in Contemporary Political Theory (CPT), there are some problems with 
taking a western conception of democracy and then seeking to shoehorn Islam into it to 
‘prove’ that the two traditions are compatible and that Islam can be moderate and that 
Muslims are, in fact, just like ‘us’.  This account does not give due attention to difference—
such as religious sensibilities and pious Muslims living in a secular, western, state.  
 
Another more productive approach would be one which sought to look at new ideational 
patterns or prominent ideas within the traditions and then to build a contextualised picture 
of the beliefs and ideas and what might be similar and what might be different.  In any case, 
we need now to consider, more directly, the political context for dignity in the twentieth 
century. This next section needs to be read whilst bearing in mind the historical context I set 
out in Chapter Three.  In particular we can recall the core ideas which resonated among the 
ideologues, writers, and also among the people and public which sought to create a society 
based on the ideas of unity, freedom, and socialism.  We saw how these ideas were clarified 
in relation to the notion of equality and how an imagined community was articulated in its 
watan and ummah formations—suggesting some tension between but also some 
commonality in ideas of the nation, the Arab people and Islamic civilisation.   
 
We saw that, by the 1960s and up to the presidency of Hafez al-Asad the performance of the 
Baʿth party in power was neutered by the need to sustain power and legitimacy.  We can 
trace this period of time, below, and look at the idea of dignity in the colonial and post-
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colonial era where the idea of dignity abounded and came into close contact with a 
continuing, and postcolonial, ethos of resistance and liberation.  
 
 
II Dignity in resistance: colonial rule  
 
 
So far, in Part Two, we have looked at the ways in which the idea of dignity has come to be 
conceptualised and understood, drawing on Islamic sacred sources.  I now turn to consider 
the idea of dignity in the twentieth century colonial and independence period in order to 
provide the context for an analysis of dignity in Syria’s 2011 revolution.  I move on here to 
give detailed consideration to the colonial period, as this picks up some of the historical 
threads, and conceptual linkages, in Chapter Three, and pursues some of the central ideas 
that I introduced there. I tap into the dominant political discourses of the anti-colonial 
revolutionary struggles through the thought and practices of leading revolutionary actors 
and leaders in the colonial and postcolonial eras.  This historical setting helps us in situating 
the current assertions of dignity in the Arab revolutions since 2010.74  
 
Utterances of dignity in the Arab, and Syrian, context stretch far and wide in time, place, 
and thus, in meaning.  There are important levels of complexity which range across issues 
                                                 
74 Pappé, I. (2011) ‘Reframing the Israel/Palestine Conflict’, Interview by Frank Barat, 6 March, 2011, 
uploaded on YouTube on 4 August 2011; Chomsky, N. (2013), ‘Violence and Dignity: Reflections on the 
Middle East’, The Edward W. Said Lecture, Friends House, London, 18 March. Tripp (2013), op cit., 2; 
Gerges, F. (2013) Interview for: ‘The Making of the Modern Arab World’, Episode 2, BBC Radio 4 
documentary series, presented by Tarek Osman and first broadcast in December, 2013; Gerges, F. (ed.) 
(2014) The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; Willis, M. J. (2016) ‘Revolt for Dignity: Tunisia’s Revolution and Civil Resistance’, in Roberts, A., 
Willis, M., McCarthy, R. & Garten Ash, T. eds. Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and 
Disasters, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49-50. 
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of class and gender and thus play out in different ways.75 Within the scope of this research 
I introduce a conceptual framework within which these social and political dimension might 
be productively explored.  The idea was, for example, manifested on the airwaves of Arab 
nationalist radio Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) during the era of Nasserism, replete with 
a language and politics of dignity, and also in the liberation struggle for Palestine.76 In the 
immediate period of decolonisation the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was one of 
the most influential leaders and earned respect for standing up to British colonial rule in 
Egypt when he nationalised the Suez Canal.  In examining Nasser’s speeches we find that 
the concept of dignity was one that he strikingly made use of.  During his visit to Damascus 
in February 1958, Gamal Abdel Nasser addressed the Syrian National Assembly to 
announce the new experiment in Arab unity between Egypt and Syria, called the United 
Arab Republic (1958-1961).  This speech is important in the way that it captures a rich 
discourse spoken whilst the legacy of colonial and monarchical rule was still fresh in the 
minds of the newly independent Arab states and people:    
 
We are living in the dawn of independence, we are living in the dawn of freedom, 
and the dawn of pride and dignity, the dawn of strength, and we are living in the 
dawn of hope in building a happy society. . . . For each dawn we saw a familiar long 
night . . . long nights stretched for hundreds of years in a constant struggle with the 
darkness of colonialism, tyranny, injustices and weaknesses . . .77 
 
                                                 
75 There are some useful analyses which can be considered in the Syrian context too; for example, discussion 
in Singerman, D. (2013) ‘Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the Egyptian Uprising’, Journal of Middle East 
Women’s Studies, 9:3, Duke University Press, 1-27. 
76 Gerges (2013) ibid; Chomsky (2013) ibid; Rogan, E. (2009) The Arabs: A History, London: Penguin 
Books Limited, 305; Wynn, W. (1959) Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity, Arlington Books. 
77 Nasser, A. (1958) ‘Speech to the Syrian national Assembly on the founding of the United Arab Republic 
between Syria and Egypt’, 5 February, available online at Nasser.org/speeches, Arabic (my translation; the 
audio is also available to listen to). 
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The speech is redolent of the beginnings of Arab independence and of the promise of a 
fulfilled Arab dignity.  Ideas such as dignity and freedom were to the fore – against different 
kinds of enemies.  Nasser reminded the Syrians of the pain of injustice and weakness – in 
the face of foreign power and control.  Then, during the crisis of relations between Egypt 
and Syria under this union Nasser can be found again appealing to the idea of dignity to seek 
to promote the common project and to urge for Arab unity in the face of threats to the Union: 
 
I ask all popular forces who still abide by the UAR and by Arab Unity to understand 
now that national unity within the Syrian homeland is the prime consideration.  
Syria’s strength is strength for the Arab nation and Syria’s dignity is dignity for the 
Arab future.  Syria’s national unity is a pillar of Arab Unity . . . May God help 
beloved Syria, guide its footsteps and bless its people.  This UAR will remain to 
support every Arab struggle, every Arab right and every Arab aspiration.78 
 
These extracts from speeches by Nasser illustrate his articulation of an Arab dignity, one 
that is distinctly illuminated by the urgency of Arab unity to maintain independence in the 
face of foreign interference in the region and the instability which had resulted.  Here we 
find direct resonances with the kinds of ideas that I have analysed within the Syrian context 
in Chapter Three.  In particular, the principles of the Arab Baʿth Party, with its core concern 
for unity, is carried over in Nasser’s language and reflects the language and politics of the 
time.79 This unity is an immediate and active political call, and it is in close ideational 
adjacency with the virtue of a dignified Syrian people and a dignity for Arabs.  This 
connects, in important ways, the flourishing of dignity with the necessity to protect Arab 
                                                 
78 In R. Hrair Dekmejian. (1971) Egypt under Nasir: a study in political dynamics, 1st Ed. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, n.27 
79 Although I also noted some political contention between competing Arab groups such as the communists, 
Nasserists, and nationalists in their differing conceptions. 
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unity, and land, and to support Arab aspirations.  The dignity is a kind of dignity in continued 
resistance and we find it wherever we find injustice, humiliation, and the need to struggle 
for liberation.  Dignity is most present in the absence of its conceptual relations of freedom 
and of a unified and people.      
 
For some, liberation was yet to come.  So it is that dignity has associations with the liberation 
of Arab land and people, and this politics of resistance and liberation was to continue in the 
discourses of the ‘Third World’ struggle.  These anti-colonial beliefs were also reflected by 
one of Africa’s most prominent nationalist leaders of the revolutionary vanguard, an 
ideologue, the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah, who captured the political mood during 
a speech to the African Freedom Fighters conference in Accra on June 4, 1962: 
  
We have achieved some measure of success in this struggle for human freedom and 
dignity, but we still have a great task ahead.  We can only know the extent of our 
task and our own strength when we have examined and ascertained that of the enemy 
[imperialism].80 
 
Land, bread, and, above all, dignity        
This continuing struggle was in recognition of the fact that patterns of neo-colonialism were 
being reproduced by the newly independent African countries, in the shape of a westernised, 
political elite, a subject which Frantz Fanon wrote about extensively in his seminal book 
The Wretched of the Earth.  Fanon is searing in his critique of the turn to party and elite 
national politics, and of a craving for political power: 
 
                                                 
80 Obeng, S. (1997) Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, Volume 3, Accra: Afram Publications Ltd.  
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The entire action of these nationalist political parties during the colonial period is 
action of the electoral type: a string of philosophico-political dissertations on the 
themes of the rights of peoples to self-determination, the rights of man to freedom 
from hunger and human dignity, and the unceasing affirmation of the principle: ‘One 
man, one vote.’  The national political parties never lay stress upon the necessity of 
a trial of armed strength, for the good reason that their objective is not the radical 
overthrowing of the system.  Pacifists and legalists, they are in fact partisans of order, 
the new order  . . .81 
 
Fanon too offers us a radical and critically-minded conceptualisation of the idea of dignity.82  
In his discussions on ‘white man’s values’ he rails against the Christian religion as it is 
experienced by the natives living under colonial rule.  Fanon tells us that: 
 
The Church in the colonies is the white people’s Church, the foreigners Church. She 
does not call the native to God’s ways but to the ways of the white man, of the master, 
of the oppressor. 
 
The Church reinforces the two worlds of the coloniser and the colonised, the brutality and 
gross inequality of which Fanon drew out in his writings.  The natives are excluded from 
white values as well as from the material resources appropriated by the masters.  Not 
surprisingly, then, Fanon rejects ‘white’ man’s dignity too:   
     
                                                 
81 Fanon, F. (1961/1963) The Wretched of the Earth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 46. 
82 The following critique by Fanon has echoes of Nietzsche’s discussion on dignity and labour, op cit; 
although Fanon can be read here as inverting and offering a much more radical idea of dignity, having 
rejected the standard western fare. 
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For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first 
and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity.  
But this dignity has nothing to do with the dignity of the human individual: for that 
human individual has never heard tell of it.83  
 
The struggle for bread and dignity and Fanon’s suggestion that there are different kinds of 
dignity points to his preoccupation, in Wretched of the Earth, with the marginalised 
periphery: the peasant or slave as colonial subject to the urban, bourgeois colonial master.  
This unequal relationship was based on the domination of, and assumed superiority of the 
foreign master or the local ‘colonialist bourgeoisie’84 who were placed above the slave or 
the peasant in terms of worth.  In this Fanonian conception of dignity we can find some 
indications of a dignity which questions, and ultimately rejects, the taken-for-granted innate 
dignity of the individual.  In the struggle for liberation from colonial rule the assertion of 
dignity is an outright and fundamental rejection of the assumed “triumph of the human 
individual”.   
 
Here we have, once again as we saw it too through Nasser’s speeches, this necessary link 
between the struggle for a collective freedom which must be fought for and which cannot 
merely be handed down by the colonial powers or in a legal document which recognises 
individual human rights.   
 
 
                                                 
83 Fanon, ibid., 34. 
84 Fanon, ibid., 37. 
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In the Western context the idea of dignity is part of a system of legal protections and 
proclamations in international law which commit to respecting and protecting the inalienable 
human dignity which resides in the individual, endowed by God or as inalienable in human 
law.  Whereas, in the colonial setting it became apparent that not all humans are considered 
to have equal dignity, so that the idea of equal human dignity is not, in practice, attained 
through the institutions and legal structures of power but is, in fact, in danger of being eroded 
by them.  The response and assertions are from a collective, a people, who assert the struggle 
for dignity and freedom as a collective response to colonial rule.   
 
We find a necessarily a radical conception of dignity as it resides where there is injustice 
and humiliation.  Therefore dignity is not passive, at all, in the Arab colonial context, but 
active and actively guarded.  The people are demanding radical changes and such change 
cannot be brought about by the very institutions which are dominating and exploiting them.  
The struggle moves outside and across (newly independent) state boundaries and outside of 
the hegemonic power to reside in the people; the shared ideas also come from the people not 
from official discourses which are rejected.      
 
In this section I have introduced some ways in which the concept of dignity was manifested 
in the particular context of peoples struggling to shake off colonial rule and to counter 
imperialist power in the decolonisation era.  During this time of upheaval and change we 
found some indications that Arab and African ideologues, leaders, and thinkers were relying 
on the idea of dignity which appeared, and was clarified, along with other concepts such as 
independence, freedom, and unity.  I have shown how a distinctly radical conception of 
dignity had emerged in the colonial and Arab context, and one which was intimately linked 
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with resistance and the need to struggle for liberation from colonial, but then also from neo-
colonial rule.            
 
As I outlined earlier in this thesis, once again, and in new and interesting ways, dignity has 
emerged as an important idea in the latest Arab revolutions, from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen 
and Syria.85   In the next section I begin to introduce the specific Syrian case and the 
revolution which started in March 2011.   
 
 
III Beginnings: Syria in the Arab revolutions, 2011 
 
 
Previously I have discussed the ways in which the idea of dignity was manifested during the 
colonial era and how certain ideologues and political leaders and thinkers responded to, and 
resisted, foreign control.  It is notable that ideas of freedom and dignity were a central plank 
in anti-colonial discourse, which travelled across national borders.  This historical 
background appears to have important resonances with the current and latest Arab 
revolutions and, specifically, the 2011 Syrian revolution which is the focus of my research. 
 
The latest Arab revolutions represented a turn to resistance against the domestic tyranny of 
resilient authoritarian states.  Syria’s uprising was, in important ways, spurred on by wider 
regional revolutions and the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak in which we also 
                                                 
85 Saleh, Y. H. (2011) ‘Thawrat al-karama’, al-hiwar mutamadden, available online at www.ahewar.org, 
accessed October, 2015; Tripp (2013) op cit; Pearlman, W. (2013) ‘Emotions and the Microfoundations of 
the Arab Revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, 11:2, 387-409; Gerges (2014) op cit; Schielke (2015) Egypt 
in the Future Tense: Hope, Frustration, and Ambivalence before and after 2011, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press; Willis (2016) op cit..  
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saw the idea of dignity emerge.86  The collective and popular sense in the manifestations of 
the latest of the Arab revolutions in the Middle East is captured simply and explicitly in the 
chant which dominated all the revolutions from Tunisia to Yemen: “The People Want  . . . 
”87  Or, as Chalcraft explains in his analysis of the ways in which Egypt’s January uprising 
and hegemonic contestation followed in hot pursuit of the Tunisian one: “it was simply the 
power of an idea that was appropriated across borders, and power-holders largely looked 
on”.88   Charles Tripp notes, in the case of Syria in 2011, that the utterance of dignity served 
to highlight “some of the key features of a politics of resistance in action” in which Syrians 
have sought to ‘rupture’ the existing systems of power.89 Syrians talked about their ‘dignity 
revolution’, they issued daily and weekly human rights reports (lists of those killed, 
imprisoned or disappeared) disseminated under the name of their ‘dignity revolution’.   
 
Syria’s dignity revolution formed part of what Ilan Pappé describes as a new phase for Arabs 
in “the assertion of self-dignity”.90 In doing so Pappé is reminding us that the freedoms hard 
fought for against colonial rule have yet to be fully gained.  But in this phase it was clearly 
domestic tyranny, or the dictators at home, who were the enemy of the people.  In the case 
of Syria, sites of protest simultaneously emerged in the capital Damascus and in the southern 
city of Dar‘a, then Banyas and other towns during February and March, 2011, respectively.  
Initially these were not connected actions but reflected local grievances, and were in some 
                                                 
86 See Willis, M. J. (2016) ‘Revolt for Dignity: Tunisia’s Revolution and Civil Resistance’, in Roberts, A., 
Willis, M., McCarthy, R. & Garten Ash, T. eds. Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and 
Disasters, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
87 Achcar, Gilbert (2013) The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising, London: Saqi 
Books;  Chalcraft, J. (2016) Popular Politics in the Making of the Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
88 Chalcraft (2016) ibid., 168. 
89 Tripp (2013) op cit., 2. 
90 Traboulsi, F. (2012) ‘Syrian Revolutionaries owe no one an Apology’, Interview by Mohammed al-Attar, 
available online at www.boell.de., accessed September, 2015; Pappé, I. (2011) ‘Reframing the 
Israel/Palestine Conflict’, Interview by Frank Barat, 6 March, 2011, uploaded on YouTube on 4 August 
2011. 
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cases acts of support in response to developments in Libya and other revolutions.91  In Dar‘a 
the March protests were in response to the local security agency detaining some children on 
6 March, 2011, the oldest, aged 15, having scrawled graffiti on the school walls saying ‘The 
people want the downfall of the regime’.92 The children were held by the local authorities 
without any information given out or access to them.  The anger about the detaining and 
torture of children, and the subsequent response of the local authorities to the 
demonstrations, is captured in the folk song called Ya Hayf (Oh Shame!) by a well-known 
Syrian singer, Samih Shouqair.93 Tribal leaders and family relatives in Dar‘a responded to 
the arrest of the children by sending a delegation to meet with the local authorities to have 
meetings with the regional security general Atef Najib to obtain their release.94  An enduring 
narrative of this period recalls how the family representatives, who were wearing traditional 
Arab head dress (the keffiyya and aqal) following local custom, removed their head bands 
or their black aqals and rested them on the table to be taken back after resolving the situation.  
The Syrian official is said to have responded by throwing the traditional head bands into the 
                                                 
91 Yazbek, S. (2012) A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution, London: Haus Publishing 
Limited; International Crisis Group (2011) ‘Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V1): The 
Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide’, Middle East/North Africa Report, 108, July 6, 2011; Ismail, S. 
(2011) ‘The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation’, in Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 
11:3, 538-549. 
92Though revolutionary actors had been discussing the revolutions in Tunisian and elsewhere and daring to 
think about what they or their friends might do. This feeling of being influenced and inspired by events in 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is mentioned explicitly by prominent Syrian activists who were forced to flee: 
Samar Yazbek, Suheir Attasi, and Rima Flihan; in their recollections of the beginning of the revolution, in a 
TV documentary recorded and directed by Nada Abdelsamad (Abdelsamad is a journalist based in Lebanon; 
information is gathered from my private copy of the documentary which is called ‘nuun’ (the letter n in 
Arabic; it represents ‘nissaa’ (Arabic for women).  Filming took place on locations in Jordan and France 
during 2013. It has never been broadcast.    
932011 Shouqair is an exiled Syrian Druze from the Golan.  The song is dedicated to the children of Dar’a 
and asks: who kills their children with live bullets?  The song has over 1.5 million views on YouTube (see 
bibliography for information).  It is discussed in the michcafe blog available at michcafe.blogspot.co.uk, 
entitled ‘Syria protest ode on YouTube’. I am grateful to Muzna for introducing me to this singer.   
94 International Crisis Group, op cit., Macleod, H. (2011) ‘Inside Deraa , al-Jazeera online, 19April, 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth, accessed February 2016. 
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rubbish bin.  Further, a common narrative told by Syrians is that the official is said to have 
offered to impregnate their wives to replace their children.95 
 
So, in response, in the first weeks of the uprising the idea of dignity was invoked, with the 
naming of the square outside the al-Omari mosque in Dar‘a as ‘Dignity square’ on Friday 
18th March 2011.  On this day, public protests had come under fire and the first martyrs of 
the revolution fell. Over time, Syrians posted the pictures of martyrs on the buildings around 
the square, as the numbers of dead grew at the hands of the security forces and army. In 
subsequent funerals and demonstrations Syrians were shot, beaten and taken by security 
forces.  These beginnings, in particular in Dar‘a, are very central to an investigation of the 
ways in which the idea of dignity took hold.  The emotion of sheer anger, a natural and 
human response by parents and family to a child being detained by the authorities, is further 
deepened by the breach of social conventions which are meant to respect one’s standing as 
an individual: facing his family and community or tribe.  Customs thrown aside and 
insinuations of impotence show in sharp relief the nature of the gulf between that of the 
Syrian people in this neglected province and that of the security and authority figures.  There 
is a demand for karama at the individual, family and local community levels. So it is in this 
very ordinary human sense that dignity enters into the uprising in Syria: a sense of karama 
that is, perhaps, felt as innate as it honours the value of all human beings.   
 
Dar‘a became a particularly important site of protest because it was where significant 
numbers of Syrians first publicly gathered and aired their grievances against the government.  
Also, it is the site of the first martyrs of the revolution as security forces opened fire on 
                                                 
95 This is one of the most widespread narratives that emerged from the beginning of the revolution, Syrians 
sympathetic to the revolution will give similar accounts of this chain of events.  Still, it is set out here in 
summary as a useful insight from this period in relation to dignity and honour.   
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demonstrators.  Thus a cyclical process was set in train: demonstrations, state violence and 
deaths of civilians, public funerals at which the government forces would open fire on 
mourners and then more and bigger demonstrations, more funerals and so on.  Syrians posted 
the pictures of martyrs on the buildings around the al-Omari Mosque and the main square 
outside the mosque, as the numbers of dead grew at the hands of the security forces and 
army. The demonstrations, killings and funerals were not just in Dar‘a, but spread quickly 
to other towns which came out to demonstrate in sympathy with the residents of Dar‘a.  So, 
the uprising quickly began to take on a collective nature.   
 
By the autumn of 2011 there was a major campaign which indicates the performative 
function in the invocations of dignity – as a mobilisation tool, as a cause and value to fight 
for and hold to, and as a plea against ongoing repression. The beginnings of the revolution 
were ‘mediated’ by local activists, citizen journalists and the demonstrators who uploaded 
user-generated content, or the raw material, from the protests.96   This was well-captured in 
a documentary produced with support from the various local tansiqiyat (local coordinating 
committees and groups), unions, media networks, and journalists operating in the Hawran 
region. The narrator of the documentary told us that “the beginning was 18th March and 
[this] first Friday was called the Friday of Dignity”, with gatherings in the square in the 
southern city of  Dar‘a after Friday prayers.  Utilising one of the few sites of legal gathering 
allowed in Syria, the mosques, Syrians could gather to demonstrate straight after the midday 
prayers.97  In this documentary we also heard the voice of an old Syrian man explaining 
                                                 
96 Harkin, J. et al (2012) ‘Deciphering User-Generated Content in Transitional Societies: A Syria Coverage 
Case Study’, available at https://innovation.internews.org/research/deciphering-user-generated-content-
transitional-societies-syria-coverage-case-study 
97 Pierret, T. (2012) ‘The Role of the Mosque in the Syrian Revolution’, Near East Quarterly, March 20; 
Pierret, T. (2013) Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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what happened: “. . .  we called for dignity and freedom, no-one said anything about toppling 
the regime until they started shooting at us”.98   
 
The early demands of the demonstrators were for justice, the lifting of Syria’s long 
emergency law, and for other reforms.  This reflected, in a way, the conservative nature of 
the society in the southern region of Syria.  But it was soon to reconnect with its history of 
revolution and revolt.  The determination of the Syrian government to quell the uprising at 
any cost created the conditions for a national revolution.  Once this was in train, we found   
how words flowed in the most variegated speech-acts of Syrians to express themselves, to 
speak out, campaign, publish, and to demonstrate in public alleys, streets, and squares.  Now 
I discuss the Syrian idrab al-karama (dignity strikes) campaign as an example of one of the 
ways in which dignity was to develop and manifest itself in the first year of Syria’s 
revolution. 
 
 
Idrab al-karama (dignity strikes) 
The dignity strikes which took place from December 2011 onwards were the culmination of 
efforts by Syrians to organise acts of civil disobedience inside Syria under the watchful eye 
of local informants and security forces.  The mobilisation of dignity strikes throughout 
autumn 2011 and into 2012 were promoted by prominent Syrian activists such as Ayman al-
Aswad and Fadwa Suleiman 99  and by the tansiqiyat.  These strikes were in no way 
comparable in scale with the organised-labour strikes and protests which were well-
                                                 
98 FreeSyrianTranslator, 2012 
99 See: Soliman, F. (2011) ‘A call to strike’, uploaded online December 11, YouTube channel 
‘FadwaSoliman’, accessed September 2015. 
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established by the time of Egypt’s 2011 revolution.100  However, in the context of Syria and 
given the pre-revolutionary scale of repression compared to countries like Egypt, the strikes 
are significant.  Such small-scale initiatives calling for general strikes eventuated in a 
national campaigns for idrab al-karama (dignity strikes) and also for idrab al-‘izz (strikes 
of pride).101  Syrians were mobilised as part of a collective effort towards civil disobedience 
against the Syrian government and state apparatus.  The dignity strikes campaign resulted 
in general and targeted strikes in Syrian towns and cities and rural areas throughout 
December, 2011, and into 2012. Despite the high levels of repression, the breadth of and 
collective nature of these actions can be seen from material published and uploaded on 
YouTube and on the Facebook and Twitter feeds mostly by tansiqiyat activists but also by 
others: for example, the Syrian group ayam al-hurriya (freedom days) and the idrab al-
karama (dignity strikes) Facebook page and Twitter account.102  They consisted of a series 
of strikes focused on different sectors: education, commercial traders and so on.  In the 
activist material, available in online archives, we can find early examples of revolutionary 
communications. On December 7, 2011 activists posted a flyer on Facebook which included 
the following information: 
 
Dignity Strike: begins at dawn, Sunday 11th December: 
Until the withdrawal of the army from the cities, And until the release of the 
prisoners  
Look, you are important  . . . support your homeland and your strike 
 
                                                 
100 Beinin, J. & Vairel, F. (2011) Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and 
North Africa, California: Stanford University Press 
101On Egypt see Beinin & Vairel (2011) ibid. 
102 See twitter.com/karamahStrike/media; forfreedom YouTube channel; freedomdays YouTube channel, for 
example, last accessed December 2015.    
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The idea of Syrians being ‘important’ and active is a theme which can be found in the flyers 
and can be read as an argument for the agency of the citizen against that of the state and its 
apparatus of control. The flyers appeal to Syrians in the colloquial language, seeking to 
mobilise citizens and to persuade them that they are not alone and should not be afraid.  On 
the first day of the dignity strike, Sunday 11 December, 2011, there were over 40 video clips 
from around Syria uploaded by Syrian activists and the tansiqiyat. The clips uploaded onto 
YouTube accounts from across Syria in one day, Sunday 11 December 2011, were from: 
‘Izaz in Aleppo, Debassiyeh, Qayseer, Zabadani, Jibleh, Idlib, Jobar, Daraya, Bustan Bashar 
in Aleppo and Sweida, among other villages and towns. It is hard to find video footage, and 
perhaps none exists, that lasts longer than 30-40 seconds.  This is because it was very 
difficult to openly ‘film’ events in public with the heavy presence of security and with the 
culture of informing which remains pervasive in Syrian society.  Activists posted video clips 
which showed shops with their shutters down and of short and sometimes shaky footage 
(because it was taken covertly to avoid arrest) of Syrian security officials forcibly opening 
the shutters.   
 
I have briefly established the place of dignity strikes in the performative milieu of Syria’s 
revolutionary resistance.  We have seen how these strikes were carried out at multiple sites 
as acts of civil disobedience.  A highly visible strand in the revolution around these dignity 
strikes was a progressive, liberal current which was present in the early part of the 
revolution.  These revolutionary practices continued to gain pace, with the securing of 
districts in liberated towns and villages in Syria in which Syrians started to organise their 
own affairs, including local councils, rubbish collection, burial of martyrs, human rights 
activism, distribution of food and local services.  But the activists faced tanks and missiles 
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as well as incursions by Syrian soldiers and the various security branches directed by 
president Asad’s brother.  The level of repression built the case, among revolutionaries, for 
the arming of the struggle and for the militarist strands to emerge from within the revolution.   
 
Having set out examples of a ‘dignity in resistance’ at the beginning of the uprising in Syria, 
I want to explore how it continues to develop and manifest itself in the revolution. In the 
final two chapters I will set out in detail two differing ideational exemplars from Syria’s 
revolution:  that of a ‘progressive’, republican, and intellectual-activist current, in the ideas 
and writings published on the al-jumhuriya (The Republic) website, and then a different 
perspective from an armed Syrian brigade of fighters: the case of the liwa al-tawhid (Unity 
Brigade).  Before we come to these two exemplars, in the following and final section of this 
chapter, I start to draw together some of the ideas and conceptions of dignity that I have set 
out in this chapter, and I offer some provisional thoughts on the political dimensions and 
implications of the concept of dignity, both in the Western and Arab contexts and across 
them both.   
 
 
IV Conclusion: dignity as praxis 
 
 
Central to our understanding of dignity in the West is the domination of a conception of 
human dignity clarified in relation to the individual in society and a protection of individual 
human rights, both within a state system and in the transnational realm, beyond borders.  
Thus the western tradition of human dignity is dominated by a rationalist conception of 
humans which relies on a broadly Kantian understanding of our world.  Dignity as an idea 
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and an ideal is constitutive of a broader human rights regime and judicial system of 
protection based on the notion of it as intrinsic and universal.  In this way it has been 
generalised and universalised, as we see in the United Nations Declaration on Human 
Rights, so that all humans are beyond price.  
 
In codifying the concept of dignity in legal and philosophical foundations the danger has 
been that we have closed off any consideration that the idea might be importantly contingent 
and contested, and therefore maintained in different ways, because of its complexity.  
Scholars have started to address this complexity, as we saw earlier in this chapter.   More 
specifically for my research, the emergence of dignity and its operationalising on a number 
of levels in the Arab and Syrian revolution presents new puzzles in our understanding of 
what it is that Syrians were doing when they made ‘dignity’ so central an idea in their 
revolutionary project.  
 
In the later scholarship I introduced, in the modern western and Arab contexts, I started to 
show how dignity might be decontested in differing political contexts; that is, beyond one 
which foregrounds the metaphysical, timeless ‘rational dignity’ and legalistic arguments I 
have considered here.  Dignity in the Arab world is, of course, appraisive too: in all our 
common human understandings.  But the political context shifts the ideational context in 
which dignity can be achieved and maintained.  This is especially important to think about 
in the context of authoritarian and non-democratic contexts as well as those of revolutionary 
situations.   
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We have seen indications that dignity cannot be understood in complete isolation.  In 
practice it is an organising idea and an idea which can also have an illocutionary force.  The 
way dignity is felt is dependent on the ideas it gathers in.  In this way, dignity is decontested 
in relation to related concepts we find in use alongside it.  In the Arab case we saw how a 
tradition of resistance had emerged and that ideas such as equality and freedom decontested 
dignity in ways which signified its (and their) complete absence.  Human dignity, it seems, 
has the potential to gather a vital political meaning and force when it is under attack.  We 
might consider how an ineliminable aspect of dignity, that is, its innate quality unique to 
humans, is maintained, in practice, in differing historical and in (hostile) political 
environments. 
 
The potentiality of dignity as a practice is, perhaps, rendered most starkly in the earlier 
discussion of Todorov’s writing on the Nazi concentration camps.  Todorov’s dignity, as an 
everyday virtue, is an example of retaining and protecting dignity in the most extreme of 
circumstances. Whereas Christianity might condemn suicide as playing God, in the Nazi 
concentration camps it can be read as an act of human free will – to choose the moment for 
the taking of one’s own life rather than leave it to the Nazi machinery.  But, as well as radical 
acts such as suicide it is also the small and everyday things by which people can honour 
themselves.   
 
This is close to Rosen’s ideas about self-respect and about acting with dignity.  But I mean 
to extend this self into its relational and social space—as Rosen also does when we think 
about how we treat others and respect each other.  So it is that we see this relational and 
social dignity emerge within the context of colonial and liberation struggles and in the face 
of humiliations from dominant imperial powers.  
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Therefore ‘context’ serves to change the meaning and the uses of complex concepts such as 
dignity.  In an extreme context such as in the concentration camps the idea manifests in our 
social and political world in a different way.  There are a number of reasons for this; prime 
among these we should give careful attention to the concrete empirical differences between 
western and Arab political trajectories and, in particular, the distinctive colonial context and 
period of decolonisation. Most distinctly, we saw how dignity was appropriated and asserted 
within a collective struggle and resistance against colonial and foreign rule.  The virtue of 
(Arab) unity was central to a decontestation of dignity in this context—because it spoke to 
a community, to a people.  This political and collective dignity is given its most radical 
articulation in the ideas of Fanon. 
 
Therefore, there are important contrasts in a consideration of the western and the Arab 
conceptions of dignity.  Although, as I summarised above, there is a basic and shared 
common sense of dignity—as intrinsic to humans—there is also an important way in which 
dignity is internally and externally contested in our social and political world.  This is 
because I have been comparing a liberal democratic framework with that of a modern 
liberation struggle against occupation and foreign rule.  In the former, the logic of the 
individual, as autonomous actor free to make choices, is privileged.  In the latter, the struggle 
for freedom is, necessarily, a collective one which has imbued and embedded a deep logic 
of resistance.  Inculcating practices of resistance requires a commitment to organising and 
to struggle in a shared social and political arena, or theatre.  In this context there is little 
space, and perhaps no desire, for the individual, but rather for the growing of a collective 
struggle for dignity, freedom and equality.      
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This collective logic of resistance is brought out in the case of Syria and its 2011 revolution.  
The instances and uses of dignity in the Syrian revolution have important political 
dimensions and constituted the forming of a dynamic and fast-developing new revolutionary 
practice and culture.   The idea of dignity, as we saw, was expressed at a basic level of 
common humanity, by Syrian families and a community outraged by the treatment of their 
children by the Syrian government and its local representatives.  Then, we investigated some 
of the uses of and the force of dignity which developed in the revolutionary moment.  The 
concept was used to motivate and build support among Syrians, as well as to express the 
reasons for the uprising in reaction to the brutal and violent put-down of dissent, something 
which has not been seen on such a scale since the 1980s in Syria (but, crucially, in this 
instance such ‘events’ unfolded during a widespread Arab uprising in the region).     
 
Dignity’s emergence signalled the ways in which Syrians had not gained their full citizen 
hood or freedom; how the social contract between the people and the Arab state was never 
fulfilled.   For Syrians the revolutionary utterances of dignity appear in a ‘live’ political 
context and attach to practices of and the performance of ‘resistance’.103 There emerged a 
new peoples resistance and bitter contestation of established political traditions and ideas, 
and of the very terms of Syrian, and Arab, political discourse.   
 
In the final two chapters I undertake a detailed analysis of the concept of dignity in Syria’s 
revolution with recourse to two dominant ideational exemplars: the case of the Syrian 
revolutionary website al-jumhuriya; and the Syrian armed brigade: liwa al-tawhid. 
                                                 
103 Tripp (2013) op cit., 2. 
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Chapter Five 
Ideational Exemplar: al-jumhuriya (The Republic) Website 
 
Introduction  
In Chapter One I set out approaches to the study of modern revolutions in social and political 
science.  I argued that the focus on establishing fixed definitions and causal links, and of 
dictating required revolutionary outcomes, obscured important processes and developments 
which happen from the very beginning of revolutions, regardless of their eventual outcomes.  
I also showed how the treatment of ideologies had often been confined to establishing the 
extent to which ideas are a causal factor in revolutions or not.  In Chapter Two I proposed 
an alternative line of inquiry, drawing on the work of political theorists of political discourse, 
attuned to conceptual contestation and change, and to the dynamic and changeable world of 
political ideologies.  In that chapter I argued that it is important to reconfigure our 
understanding of ideologies and, by extension, the ideas or concepts which they prioritise.  
In particular, I argued that ideas are important as units of analysis in themselves.  In times 
of flux it is vital that we consider how existing and familiar ideas might be refashioned 
and/or if new ideas might gather pace and emerge from an ideational and political periphery.   
 
My aim in this thesis is to think ‘dignity’ in this way: to understand how it is embedded in 
and shaped by the political and social contexts in which it is used, and thus to analyse and 
assess its meaning and function beyond its mere positioning as a word in a sentence.  This 
is an important methodological distinction which I elaborated on in Chapter Two.  The focus 
of my research is on an ideational ‘infrastructure’.  Drawing on Freeden’s concept of 
204 
ideological morphology I have set out to examine how dignity is embedded in a particular 
revolutionary period of time in Syria.  In Chapter Three, I examined the ideologies of anti-
colonialism and of Ba’athism that provide the key historical background for understanding 
the events of 2011 and beyond.  In Chapter Four I gave a macro-level, diachronic analysis 
of dignity and of the extent to which the idea has been stable over time.  I also started to 
indicate the ways in which the synchronic immediate and concrete instances of dignity 
interplay with a sedimented tradition of dignity in the slow burn of history, with specific 
reference to the Syrian Revolution that began in 2011. 
 
Having examined religious sources in the western and the Arab context, I illustrated the 
extent to which dignity had become a virtue that was felt by many to be innate to all humans. 
In religious conceptions, both Christian and Islamic, dignity was God-given, in that God had 
elevated humans above all other creatures.  This metaphysical conception of dignity has 
been of great politico-historical significance and there is continuity between it and 
contemporary conceptualisations. I then explicated two broad traditions within which 
dignity has been encompassed, in both the western and Arab contexts, showing that the idea 
is far from unitary. The first of these was a western and liberal concept of dignity which has 
become embedded in democratic societies, in legal frameworks, and in a human rights 
discourse which emerged after the Second World War.  Such notions of dignity have become 
enshrined in international and national legal codes and declarations, such as the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights. I noted how this conception is evidenced in many of 
our current understandings of dignity, and how the idea that dignity is innate in all humans 
can be regarded as an ineliminable criterion of dignity. In this tradition I found that the 
concept of dignity was intimately attached to notions of individual freedom, and further 
clarified by the idea of an equal dignity.  The ideas of equality and freedom helped to 
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decontest the idea of dignity, showing us the extent to which it had become dependent on, 
and privileged, individual human rights. 
 
I then contrasted the western context with that of the colonial and Arab context and showed 
how the struggle for independence produced a different kind of conception and other uses 
of dignity.  In the conditions of colonial rule we found that in its usage the concept of dignity 
performed specific functions and exhibited different meanings.  This anti-colonial concept 
of dignity was clarified in opposition to foreign and imperial rule and humiliating policies 
and control over colonial subjects.  This was an important feature of dignity in the material 
I drew on from the colonial period, and during the long and difficult process of 
decolonisation and self-determination.  I indicated, drawing on the utterances and speech-
acts from this period, that the dignity appealed to by the anti-colonialists was one which had 
an important public and collective force to it.  It moved away from our familiar conceptions 
of a legally derived and based individual dignity, to one of a collective — people’s — dignity 
which has new resonances through the struggle for the self-determination of a people, for 
the liberation of land from foreign control and for political freedoms and full and active 
citizenship.  
 
In the Arab context the idea of dignity was found to be adjacent to other important concepts 
such as freedom, justice and equality.  Although these ideas echoed the concepts adjacent to 
and in relation to dignity in the western context, there were, nevertheless, important 
distinctions to be made regarding the dynamic development and use of dignity, its functions 
and the ways in which it constituted a ‘politics of resistance’.  This tradition of Arab 
resistance, situated in the anti-colonial struggles for liberation, is – as we will see – a vital 
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part of the context against which I will analyse Syria’s revolution, its revolutionary 
discourses and practices and the place and functions of dignity within it.  This time, as I 
mentioned in my analysis in Chapter Four, the important difference is that this latest 
revolution was not against foreign and colonial rule but against domestic tyranny and 
illegitimate rule.   
 
As I first set out in Chapter Two in discussion of my ‘Method and Material’ for an 
interpretive analysis, I chose to focus my detailed examination on two different but 
important ideational exemplars from within Syria’s revolution. I narrowed down my 
analysis in order to gain some insight from within the discourse and practices of two 
differing, sometimes competing ideational currents.  The ideas contained in the exemplar 
cases do, importantly, permeate across assumed divides.  Both, however, offer us different 
conceptions of, and performances of, a ‘dignity in resistance’.  In adducing both these 
ideational exemplars I seek to highlight the way in which dignity can be clarified: from 
writings, speech-acts and the practices of Syria’s revolutionary actors.  I take into 
consideration the positionality and function of these actors—selecting material from the 
intellectual, the activist-writer, the media activist and, in the next chapter, the armed fighter.  
Importantly, my approach across these exemplars applies Freeden’s morphological analysis, 
attending in particular to the adjacent or associated ideas we find along with the appearance 
of dignity, ushered in from the ideational periphery, which help to decontest its meaning.   
 
For the first exemplar I have chosen the revolutionary website al-jumhuriya because the 
content on the website at once represents, reflects, and critically analyses the different 
aspects of Syria’s “thawrat al-karama” (dignity revolution).  This website is an important 
207 
exemplar of a liberal, progressive trend which has, over a number of decades, and during 
the latest revolution, been marginalised in the politics of Syria.  This is because of the severe 
repression exacted on any political trend (for change or reform) which might threaten one 
party rule and the leadership of the Asad family.  Since the latest revolution of 2011, 
progressive activists, artists and intellectuals have been targeted and incarcerated by the 
Syrian government.1    
 
In preparing and selecting published material from the website I conducted a provisional 
survey of the articles that were posted online during 2012 and 2013.  This period of time is 
my focus, so that we can concentrate on reflecting on the ideas in the formative years of the 
revolution and so that I can narrow down the themes and challenges to a manageable degree 
for this thesis.  My research aim was to get a deeper sense of the conceptual positioning of 
the idea of karama.  I therefore mainly concerned myself with drawing out some key 
concepts and themes which were embedded into the revolutionary discourse and practices. 
From my extensive reading and monitoring of material posted on the website during this 
time period I have then selected three articles which form the basis of my analysis in this 
chapter.  
 
Drawing on and working across the three selected articles, the general information on the 
website and other material I utilise for an analysis of al-jumhuriya, I argue that the website 
and its collective of revolutionary actors and commentators serves as a receptacle for, and 
as a producer and disseminator of, major ‘belief challenges’ — from within the revolution, 
                                                 
1 See Halasa, M, Omareen, Z. & Mahfoud, F. (2014) Syria Speaks: Art and Culture from the Frontline, 
London: Saqi Books. 
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to the Syrian government and state.  The idea of dignity is constitutive of a partially novel 
revolutionary practice, a collective project the contours and contents of which are being 
refined in the everyday utterances and actions of the people.  The ‘ideas from below’, as I 
will show, cluster around the virtue of a Syrian dignity and can be clarified in relation to 
other revolutionary ideas flowing in the demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience and so 
on.  I turn to start to look at these ideas now.  I conduct my analysis using these articles so 
as to trace the conscious and unconscious2 ways in which dignity appears in the writings and 
content published on the al-jumhuriya website.  I now introduce the website, the thought-
practices of one of its key founders (Saleh), and then move on to analysis in detail the three 
articles I have selected. 
  
                                                 
2 I draw on this from Freeden (2003) op cit. 
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I The al-jumhuriya website  
 
The al-jumhuriya (The Republic) website sits within a—broadly defined—liberal and 
progressive ideological current.  As its name infers, it speaks to a republican potential (as 
yet unfulfilled, as we saw in Chapter Three) and urges a practical and ‘civic republicanism’ 
based on a people-centred notion of sovereignty.3 I investigate the ideas attached to this 
website through recourse to the political thought and activities of one of its most prominent 
founders: the dissident intellectual Yassin al-Haj Saleh (Saleh).  This historical 
backgrounding of a republican revolutionary current through the political thought of one of 
its most prominent thinkers, is important, as it provides context and understanding when we 
move on to investigate selected writings from this website.  This then clears the way for my 
analysis of material published on the website, the details of which I discuss further below.  
 
The website was launched in 2012 in recognition of the first anniversary of the ‘Thawrat al-
Karama’ (dignity revolution).4 It was established by a group of Syrian writers, bloggers and 
researchers, who were volunteers working for the website and based inside and outside 
Syria.  No published information about the founders existed until articles and analysis started 
emerging (in English) sometime after the website was established.  As I have mentioned, 
most prominent among its founders was the Syrian dissident and former political prisoner 
Yassin al-Haj Saleh.  Saleh is from an older generation of Syrian dissidents who gained 
                                                 
3 See Nabulsi, K. (2013) ‘The ‘Treasure’ of Revolution: a tradition of thought and practice’; ASEN Lecture, 
Nationalism and Revolution, Plenary 1, http://www.lse.ac.uk/ASEN, accessed December 2016.   
4 Though there is some internal disagreement among supporters of Syria’s revolution as to which day the 
revolution ‘started’.   
210 
prominence because of his political writing and long periods of time spent in Syrian prisons.  
Also involved was a younger generation of writers such as Yassin Swehat5 and Karam 
Nachar.6  Swehat and Nachar adhere to a broadly conceived Arab leftist tradition.  Nachar 
is a Syrian exile and lecturer at a university in Turkey and Swehat is a Syrian blogger who 
resides in Spain.  There were a number of Syrian writers who began to contribute to the 
website in the first few years and some of these writers used pseudonyms—especially if they 
were very active in the revolution inside Syria.   
 
In its first years the website provided a rich source of material and a useful point of access 
to the revolutionary ideas and practices in the revolution.  The website published material in 
a number of genres: short commentary; long-form analysis; reportage; human rights 
information; activist discussions; witness accounts from within the revolution.  The material 
ranged from sharp polemic to analysis which was more reflective and attempted a critical 
distance (albeit from a position of support for the revolution and its aims).  For example, in 
the first year the website published articles about the ideological aspects of the Syrian 
government army, sectarian massacres, rape as a means of humiliation (by Syrian security 
forces) and the implications of the revolution for Palestine and the Palestinian refugees in 
Syria.  Throughout 2013 the site included analysis on the Egyptian revolution, the Islamist 
extremist current in the revolution (i.e. groups like jabhat al-nusra, and the rise of ISIS), 
issues of Arab unity, critiques of both Islamism and secularism, and coverage of fighting in 
local regions, as well as the challenges for civil and humanitarian work in conflict, the effect 
on schooling and so on.  In the second year, the website also included extensive dialogues 
                                                 
5 In Arabic I would transliterate this name as Suweiha, but I use Yassin’s own transliteration into English: 
Swehat – as it appears on his personal Facebook account. 
6 See profile of Yassin Swehat on muftah.org: ‘It’s as if there is only Islam’, (no date), available at 
http://muftah.org/its-as-if-there-is-only-islam-exiled-writer-yassin-swehat-fights-for-syrian-thought/#.VzYK-
stIjcs 
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with Syrian and Arab intellectuals and academics, such as Sadiq al-Azm, Burhan Ghalioun, 
Ziad Majid, and Hosam Itani.        
 
One of the stated aims of the website was to create a space for intellectual production in 
order to contribute to the building of a new Syria.  The outlook was, in spring 2012, 
optimistic, in light of developments elsewhere where leaders had relinquished power.  The 
website’s min nahnu (Who are we) section—as it was when it was launched—published 
information about its aims.7  A central aim was stated as offering “support for the dignity 
revolution” in Syria.  The contributions were to advance an “intellectual revolution in 
thinking” and to look at the “related issues and problems” of Syria and the Syrian revolution.  
The group aspired to contribute to the building of a new “pluralist, democratic, Syria”.   
 
There was no explicit mention on the website as to why this intellectual project was called 
al-jumhuriya, and there is no explicit explication of republican ideas.  However, I include 
discussion of this, below, in Saleh’s analysis—given that the name of the website was his.8 
In the next section I introduce Saleh as an exemplar of a key progressive current and indeed 
as a creator of a Syrian ideological current. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The website was reorganized in 2014 and a new ‘about us’ section was published.  
8 Swehat, K (2015) ‘It’s as if there is only Islam: Exiled writer Yassin Swehat fights for Syrian Thought’, 
published online: www.muftah.org, December, 17, accessed December 2016. 
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II Yassin al-Haj Saleh: the conscience of the revolution 
 
Saleh is significant in my analysis because of his high profile as a long time dissident among 
the Arab and Syrian intelligentsia and, in particular, the Arab progressive and Leftist current 
which had long been agitating for political reform in Syria, Lebanon and beyond.  I highlight 
Saleh not as an individual thinker or actor but as a way in which to sketch a more detailed 
picture of this significant current.  Such a point of entry helps us to navigate through the 
selected publications on the al-jumhuriya website, which tend to offer highly historicised 
and deeply analytical accounts of Syria’s revolution and require detailed knowledge of 
Syria’s contemporary history and its social and political structures.  Also noteworthy, is that 
Saleh was actively participating in the revolution in the first years from the suburbs of 
Damascus before eventually fleeing north to his home town in Raqqa and then to Turkey.  
Saleh thus represents not a distant commentator on the revolution but a writer and 
intellectual who is very much a revolutionary too.  This somewhat breaches common notions 
of, and attempts to pigeon hole, who is an intellectual, an activist, or an external 
commentator or onlooker.  Saleh might be seen as a contemporary example of a Gramscian 
‘organic intellectual’; his multiple ‘hats’ are indeed reminiscent of Gramsci’s own. 
 
Yassin al-Haj Saleh was born in 1961 in a village near what is now the Islamic State’s de 
facto capital al-Raqqa, a northern city by the Euphrates River in Syria.  Saleh was educated 
at Aleppo University and joined the Aleppo branch of the Syrian Communist Party-Political 
Bureau (SCP-PB) whilst at university there.  The SCP-PB was later to oppose Hafez al-
Asad’s dictatorial rule over Syria, notably his crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
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1970s, and his policies relating to the Lebanese civil war.  For his political positions Saleh 
spent sixteen years (1980 to 1996) in Syrian prisons, sharing crowded cells with members 
of the Syrian Muslim Brothers as well as other political prisoners.9 
 
Saleh became part of an established Arab communist tradition in his early life.  The Syrian 
communist branch he joined was a breakaway from the earlier-formed Syrian Communist 
Party which was dominated by Khalid Bakdash, who I discussed in Chapter Three.  After 
his release from prison in the 1990s Saleh was to move away from what he considered to be 
the more dogmatic communist ideology, in advocating for a democratic system for Syria.  
This, for Saleh, was a turn away from ideology towards a humanist outlook centred on 
critique and action for change.10 In my reading of his work, what this turn away from 
ideology meant was a particular rejection of party and formal politics and representation in 
formal bodies or aligning with established ideological traditions.11   
 
Saleh is known for his published works on sensitive (taboo) but important questions of 
Syrian society, including critiques of both the official Syrian secularism and of political 
Islam.12  When the Syrian revolution started these existing questions became urgent (and 
activated in new ways), and exposed the pre-existing and underlying problems in Syrian 
society under Asad’s authoritarian rule.  Saleh became active in the nascent Syrian civil 
society grouping inside the country and was a signatory to the Damascus Declaration, 2005 
                                                 
9  Saleh also wrote a book about his prison years: Saleh, Y. (2012) B-il-khalas ya shabaab: 16 aman fi al-
sujun al-suriyyah ’Salvation oh youths: 16 years in Syria’s prisons’, Beirut: Dar al-Saqi. 
10 As explicated in Massouh, F. (2015) ‘Searching for Salvation: Yassin al-Haj Saleh and the Writing of 
Modern Syria’, Unpublished thesis, School of Social and Political Science, University of Melbourne. 
11 This seems to cohere with Massouh’s analysis on Saleh, ibid. 
12 His sole authored book publications are listed here: http://www.yassinhs.com/books/; a detailed 
bibliography of Saleh’s work has been prepared in Massouh (2015) op cit.    
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which, drawn up by Syrian intellectuals, artists, journalists and political actors, called for 
fundamental political reforms in Syria. As we will see there remains a Marxist influence in 
Saleh’s writing, but one which is balanced by the central importance he began to place on 
working in a cultural sphere of intellectual and knowledge production towards social and 
political change in Syria.  A functioning Syrian democracy would finally bring about some 
of the demands Syrian dissidents and activists had long struggled for.    
 
In the latest round of Arab revolutions which swept across the region, starting with Tunisia 
in 2010, Saleh quickly became a prominent figure, regarded as the conscience of the 
revolution.  His elevated position was because of the active intellectual role he had carved 
out through his writing and analysis of Syria during the decades since he had been released 
from prison.  His popularity might also very likely be in part due to his legitimacy as a 
dissident who had spent years in Syria’s prisons, and possibly also because he was, 
somewhat unusually, not one of the Damascus elite clique but hailed from one of Syria’s 
forgotten and neglected provinces.13   
 
Also noteworthy is that Saleh had remained in Syria throughout the first years of the 
revolution, seeking to remain close to his fellow Syrians and to the revolution, and was thus 
regarded as a ‘revolutionary intellectual’ and ‘participant-chronicler’.14  He was eventually 
forced to flee to Turkey to relative safety, in 2013; shortly afterwards, his wife and three 
other prominent Syrian human rights colleagues were kidnapped by Islamists in the 
                                                 
13 For recent analysis of Saleh and his life and thought see Massouh, F. (2015) op cit.  Massouh draws on 
email and Skype communications with Saleh to paint a picture of the intellectual in the revolutionary 
moment. 
14 These are Massouh’s formulations: the first draws on conceptions of the intellectual by Laroui; 22; 25, 
ibid. 
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Damascus suburb of Douma.  At the time of writing they are still missing and have become 
known as the “Douma 4”.   
 
In an analysis of Yassin Haj Saleh, by Syrian philosopher and writer Odai al-Zoubi15 and 
co-authored with Hosam al-Din Mohamed, we can also find reference to explicit discussion 
on conceptions of ideologies and the role of the intellectual.16  Interestingly, Zoubi describes 
Saleh’s thinking as against fixed ideology and foundational understandings and for an 
approach which flows from moral stances and the place of the intellectual in discussing and 
debating such notions.  Zoubi’s analysis of Saleh’s contribution suggests a critical turn away 
from the Arab leftist Marxist tradition and from assuming the validity of any essentialising 
and foundational claims in understanding and analysing Syria.  This turn may be partly 
traceable to the disillusionment with explicit and explicitly-political ideologies; for which I 
traced some key reasons in Chapter Three. Saleh’s work is best done, according to Zoubi, 
by focusing on the ‘microcosmic’ world of Syrians and by being close to it, rather than 
promoting theories or foundational claims which may or may not be applicable to the Syrian 
case.   
 
Through this analysis we can start to see the ways in which Saleh conceptualises ideology 
and how he has been interpreted.  Saleh appears to avoid the essentialist and dogmatic 
                                                 
15 Zoubi is one of the co-founders and writers of al-jumhuriya and has become one of the main editors of the 
online website.   
16In Zoubi, O. & al-Din Mohammed, H.  (2013) ‘waʿy al-thawra: fakkar Yassin Haj Saleh namuthijan’ (The 
conscience of the revolution: the thought of Yassin al-Haj Saleh as an exemplar), introduction entitled 
‘asalat al-thawra’ (‘Questions of the revolution’), Awraq magazine, Issue 3, published online, Middlesex: 
Syrian Writers Association, available at  http://syrianwa.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/awraq3.pdf 
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problems with ideology by relying on a cultural understanding of ideologies (he is certainly 
influenced in this by the work of Gramsci) in as much as he is committed to operating in a 
cultural sphere in which intellectuals such as he can critique and act on ideas counter to the 
hegemonic power structures.  More recently, in the period of 2012 to 2013 which I focus on 
here, Saleh has stressed the importance of the cultural sphere as a site of struggle against the 
“extreme political poverty” of a Syria in the shadow of totalitarian rule and dictatorship.17 
This follows an established tradition of cultural production from within the confines of 
Syria’s authoritarian structures, across cinema, theatre and literature18  
 
This cultural production has only intensified and was, ironically, ‘set free’ at the start of 
Syria’s uprising and in the face of brutal repression.19  For Saleh, it now seems as if the 
production and dissemination of ‘ideas’ and values takes place in a cultural sphere and not 
what he might consider as a political, ideological one. Although Saleh, and analysts 
disseminating his ideas, such as Zoubi, might be keen to reject ideology altogether—because 
of the limits of classical Marxist configurations and the pejorative association of the term 
ideology due to their lived experience of Syrian Baʿthist rule— Saleh’s thought and ideas 
might also be recast and interpreted (drawing on the theoretical frames I outlined in Chapter 
Two) as a move towards a distinctly alternative political imaginary which also creates 
possibilities for new ideological formations and for the reconceptualization of the political 
as it has hitherto been understood.    
                                                 
17 Saleh, Y. H. (2015) ‘Syria interview: Culture is part of the Struggle’, interview by Scott Lucas, EA 
Worldview, published online December 27; see also: Haugbolle, S. (2015) Our Miserable Country. 
18Wedeen, L. (1999) Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, 
Chicago: University of Chicago; Wedeen, L. (2013) ‘Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from Syria’, 
Critical Inquiry, 39, 841-873, Chicago: University of Chicago. 
19Harkin, J. (2013) ‘Is it possible to understand the Syrian revolution through the prism of social media?’ 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 9:2, London: Communication and Media Research 
Institute, University of Westminster, 93-112. 
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We can explore through Saleh’s writing whether his articulation and development of an idea 
of ‘republic’ might be suggestive of alternative thinking about ideas and beliefs which might, 
at least in Saleh’s conception, form a kind of republican practice, as opposed to a thick and 
well-defined political ideological project. To help us in gaining insight into the thinking 
behind al-jumhuriya as a project I draw on Saleh’s reflections on the very idea of republic.20 
In an article published on the Arabic online site kalamon in 2011, called ‘From the Kingdom 
of Asad to the Third Republic – Statehood and Participation’, Saleh reminds us of the origins 
of the modern Syrian state as the Syrian Republic (later Syrian Arab Republic).  The idea of 
the Arab republic was an alternative to, or rejection of, the monarchical systems such as 
those of Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.  Saleh notes how: 
 
The Syrian Republic contained no republicans when it first came into being; that is 
to say, no intellectual or political school of thought centred around principles of 
active citizenship, the rule of the people, freedom and equality, and strong opposition 
to inherited titles and privileges and the arbitrary exercise of power.21 
 
So, although we do not find a fully articulated conception of al-jumhuriya on the website, 
Saleh does, in his kalamon article, set out what he thinks a republic should be comprised of.  
We find reference to some normative frameworks for conceptions of a republic.  For 
example, Saleh argues that “power exercised by the people should not be inherited” and goes 
                                                 
20 Saleh, Y. (2011) ’From the Kingdom of Assad to the Third Republic – Statehood and Participation’ 
kalamon, 4, autumn, Beirut: Dar al-Saqi. 
21 Saleh, ibid. 
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on to say that the existence of a “master of the nation” essentially “abolishes the republic in 
one fell swoop”, and therefore, too “all equality between its inhabitants”. With the 
replacement of Hafez with his son, Saleh opined that this was another fatal blow to the idea 
of ‘republic’. 
 
Of vital importance in any analysis of Syrian ideologies is Saleh’s exposition of a distinctive 
and exclusionary ideology which was consolidated under the rule of Bashar al-Asad.  Saleh 
labels it a peculiar form of ‘modernist ideology’ and discusses how: 
 
The ideologues of modernism have an essentialising view of Arab societies in which 
[it is assumed that] Islam is the main, if not the only, determinant of people’s 
behaviour.  It is the well spring of all backwardness, stagnation and despotism.   . . .  
‘Homo islamicus’ is a different breed to other men; whatever he might claim about 
himself, he is fanatical, violent, backward and irrational, all qualities that stem in 
turn from his religious beliefs. 
 
From Saleh we receive a stinging critique of the secular claims that Syria is a tolerant and 
diverse society or, in official parlance, ‘a mosaic’; claims which have come to make up an 
established part of the official, state, Syrian discourse.  Bashar’s Syria effectively 
‘institutionalises’ ties of personal allegiance and a culture of political appointments and 
privilege and divides society along sectarian lines.  According to Saleh, the rule of Asad, 
through a complex system of nepotism, “undermined the epistemological credibility of 
concepts like ‘the people’, ‘the citizen’ and ‘equality’” and created instead “mutually 
antagonistic identities”.  Instead of a collective Syrian people, Syria had a powerful ruling 
clique which was to regard Syrian society as: 
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A patchwork of different social groups—tribes, religions, sects and 
neighbourhoods—and not as a people. . . . Ba’athists received preferential treatment 
in education, employment and positions overseas, while those related or affiliated to 
the party members also obtained privileges, most notably appointments on 
diplomatic missions. 
 
Saleh claims that the regime and its planners thus focused on “religion, ethnicity and 
sectarian affiliations, with scant regard for republican categories such as state, citizenship 
and community”.22  What has resulted, according to Saleh, is a new “feudal regime” in which 
“class-based and political privileges” are “bequeathed to a narrow segment of the population 
and … are concealed behind a religious and sectarian heterodoxy that makes them 
defensible”.  As a result, Asad’s Syria has been underwritten and “sheltered from criticism” 
based on these patronage networks of privilege and access.  In countering this picture, Saleh 
puts forward a future alternative, writing as he is in 2011, as being centred on the recasting 
of the very ‘idea’ of Syria: 
 
Syria is the true foundation of citizenship, freedoms, and rights.  Pan-Arabism can 
function as a cultural and strategic support while Islam provides an over-arching 
cultural and value system.  Syria must not stand in tension with pan-Arabism and 
Islam; in our view the proper relationship will be one of inclusive dominance: Syria 
outranks them, and assimilates them.    
                                                 
22 Arabic terms used are al-dawl, al-muwataneen, and al-shaʿb. 
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However, Saleh’s ire is not reserved only for the secular rulers: 
The reality is that neither ‘Islam’ nor ‘Islamic man’ exist; instead we have attempts 
to define Islamism carried out by both Islamist ideologues and their secularist foes, 
whose relationship with secularism mirrors that of Islamists to Islam: one of blind 
faith and fetishization.  
We will encounter more of Saleh’s ideas about Islam and Islamism in the article by him that 
I analyse later on in this chapter.  But, more broadly, I have sketched out some of the ways 
in which the early revolutionary moment in Syria provided a new testing ground for 
alternatives in the strange space created in the revolutionary interregnum.23 In bringing 
together the ideational threads I have traced out above, through Saleh’s own analysis on the 
very idea of ‘republic’ and through recourse to the statements and information about the 
aims of the website published on their ‘about us’ page, we find that three central ideas 
emerge.   
 
Ideological assemblages 
In Saleh’s conceptualisation of republic we saw a particular assemblage which drew together 
ideas from established ideological traditions and attempted to reintroduce certain virtues 
centrally into a configuration of a Syrian republic.  Saleh shows how the idea of the people, 
as popular sovereignty, was a core concept, in close adjacency to the central concept of 
republic.  This exhibits some normative ideas about classic republicanism but Saleh is 
working in the very concrete conditions of revolution: he is seeking to both critique and 
                                                 
23 Haugbolle, S. (2015) ‘Moving through the Interregnum: Yassin al-Haj Saleh in the Syrian revolution’, 
Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 8, 13-36. 
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expose the defunct republic, and also to usher in a new assemblage which is closer to reality 
and to the Syrian people.   Saleh is foregrounding people-led rule rather than a populist 
authoritarian ruler and he is both reflecting actual on-the-ground actions and contemplating 
the implications of this present revolutionary moment. In doing so he is reflecting upon the 
ways in which Syria has been polarised into two extremes: that of Islamism and Secularism.   
 
The republic offers an alternative to the status quo, but there are indications that Saleh is not 
suggesting abandonment of any particular forms of life, but is seeking to suture the wounds 
inflicted by polarising positions and claims.  This requires the recovery of another core 
concept, in Saleh’s analysis, and thinking about a new republicanism for Syria: that of 
equality.  The Baʿth version of the ideal of equal citizenship and the levelling of social and 
economic inequality is a completely failed project in Syria, at least for the majority outside 
the formal patronage networks.  So Saleh refashions ideas of equality and, in doing so, 
reminds us of how much the Syrian state and government machinery has strayed from the 
founding principles of Arab Baʿthism, and from the socialist ideals of equality in particular.  
We find an ideological ‘pretender’24 in the form of secular rule failing to uphold its founding 
virtues and instead meet the sectarian way in which the ruling elite and the executive powers 
have governed Syria.   
 
In this context Saleh’s reimagining encompasses a recasting of the very idea of ‘Syria’.  His 
critique of the ruler and the state opens up to the need for differing levels or kinds of 
                                                 
24 See Freeden on Liberal Pretenders, chapter seven (1996) op cit., 276-314; in the case of Libertarianism and 
discerning such pretenders in an analysis of the concepts, or contents, of an ideology: in this case 
conceptions of and the morphological placement of ideas of state and of private property and economic 
beliefs were regarded as sitting outside of the liberalism ideological family. 
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freedom, which he does not expand on beyond mention of a conception of Syria in which 
the people are assimilated and in which inclusiveness dominates.  We can garner from his 
analysis that he is concerned with a return to the idea of a kind of unity which is based on 
Syrian-ness and which works towards inclusivity, respecting all Syrians and not 
essentialising or demonising religious Muslims.  This Syrian republic is one which puts a 
stop to the endless antagonisms between communities and which is a real collective and 
bottom up, people-led project.  Saleh is, as I have indicated, writing these ideas in the first 
years of the revolution, but he is no romantic; already he is wary of unleashing the multiple-
headed monsters of forms of extremism.   
 
To discuss these ideas further I now move to investigate more deeply the material from the 
al-jumhuriya website.  
 
Introduction to the three selected articles 
In the remainder of this chapter I analyse in detail three selected articles from the al-
jumhuriya website; the full information for these articles is listed in the Appendix.  The first 
article which I examine below is an al-jumhuriya editorial published on line in March 2012, 
at the launch of the new website project.  This contains an analysis of the first year of the 
Syrian revolution, from the perspective of the Syrians simultaneously active in the 
revolution and writing about it. It gives us a good introduction to the emergence of new 
revolutionary ideas and to new practices that were starting to take shape.  The article shows 
how the thawrat al-karama (dignity revolution) started to recast the very idea of a ‘Syrian 
people’ and contest the limiting discourse of the official government discourse and its claim 
to represent and reflect the Syrian people.  This contestation recalls Connolly’s ideas on the 
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way in which commonly perceived and widely used concepts can become deeply political.  
The concept of dignity can be further clarified in proximity to a distinctive ‘dignified Syrian 
people’.  The ideas ‘Syria’ and ‘the people’ helps to decontest the meaning of dignity in this 
revolutionary moment.  
 
The second al-jumhuriya article I draw from is a much shorter analysis and critique of an 
official Syrian state discourse of resistance. The previous hegemony of this was challenged 
with the emergence of a new revolutionary resistance countering the claims of the Syrian 
government to be leading an axis of resistance in the region.  This commentary adds an 
important dimension to our understanding of dignity in that it considers a vital moral (and 
universalising) dimension to a decontestation of dignity as a demand for all peoples who rise 
up against tyranny.  In this framing, dignity takes on and gathers meaning as something 
which is or ought to be universal to all humans and, in a political context, the struggle for 
dignity should not end at or be confined by geographic borders.  Dignity is clarified in 
adjacency to resistance.  The struggle for dignity and freedom is a moral imperative and a 
core aspect of a leftist politics of resistance.  
 
The third selection from al-jumhuriya is a very lengthy and in-depth analysis of Syrian 
society with a focus on the socio-economic divides in the country which have created ‘two 
worlds’ and which have led to large segments of Syria’s Sunni population feeling 
‘estranged’.  The emphasis of the analysis is on injustices and the responses to them from 
those Syrian communities excluded by a ruling elite, its state apparatus and its patronage 
networks.  The dignity we find among this community echoes many of the aspects of the 
concept we have met so far in this thesis.  It can be conceived of as a dignity clarified through 
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social relations and positions, ideals of justice, and respectful treatment.  It is also a dignity 
signifying deep political contestation (of the status quo) and an activation of particular 
conceptions of citizenship and, in particular, carrying a new Syrian (Sunni) consciousness.  
 
 
III First article: al-shaʿb al-suri al-karim [the dignified Syrian people] 
 
Here I draw out some of the key ideational threads from a long form editorial published to 
coincide with the launch of this website on the first anniversary of the Syrian revolution.  
The editorial was entitled: ‘An analytical survey of the first year of the Syrian revolution: 
“Asad and no one else”, against “The people want the fall of the regime”’, published online 
on 30 March, 2012. 25   This report on the status of the revolution discussed key 
developments, highlighted some of the internal problems and challenges faced by the Syrian 
revolutionaries and suggested some ways forward.  It is an important article as it shows how 
the concept of dignity was retrieved from the ideational margins and the way in which it 
developed and took on political significance in the first year of the revolution.  This occurred 
with and through the mobilisation of a new Syrian revolutionary subject position which 
ushered in a popular politics from below.     
 
To begin with, a central claim in the al-jumhuriya editorial is that karama (dignity) is a core 
idea and overarching priority in the latest revolutionary project:   
 
                                                 
25 Refer to the Appendix for full information about this first source article and all subsequent articles. 
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The principle of karama occupied an important position in all of the Arab revolutions 
and in the Syrian context it meant that the Syrians are al-shaʿb al-suri al-karim [the 
dignified Syrian people] who will not be insulted [humiliated] and treated with violence 
and with contempt, which is what they had become used to from the regime.26 
 
The sense of a visceral human dignity is present here. The idea appears embedded in the 
social world, and pivotal to it.  Here we can acknowledge a settled, universal dimension of 
human dignity, in this context.  However, we need to know more about what this dignity 
meant for the Syrian people when it was acted upon at this particular time.  The people were 
demanding to be treated decently by those in power, a demand we saw in Chapter Four made 
by the families of the children who were incarcerated by the local authorities in the southern 
city of Dar‘a.   These people are conceived of, in the editorial, as being a ‘dignified Syrian 
people’; a people who reject the humiliations visited upon them by the authorities. Thus the 
dignity is appealed to and is acted on, or performed, through the Syrian demonstrations, in 
direct opposition to the humiliations being visited on the people by the state: 
 
On February 17 [2011] the first of the Syrian revolutionary slogans was coined: al-shaʿb 
al-suri ma biyanzil! [The Syrian people will not be humiliated].  This was following a 
policeman attacking a young man in al-hareeqa, a commercial area of Damascus.27 
 
 
                                                 
26 Editorial, 28 March 2012. 
27 This has obvious echoes with Tunisia and the case of Mohamed el-Bouazizi.  Certainly Tunisia’s 
revolution also held the idea of dignity as central to its struggle- see Willis (2016) op cit.  
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So it is the Syrian people, as a collective, who move to voice this rejection: in the alleys, 
streets and squares of Syria. ‘The Syrian people will not be humiliated’ was the first slogan 
of the emerging revolution: a powerful demand in support of the important role assigned to 
dignity in the present thesis. We find, adding to ideas of an innate and universal notion of 
dignity, the development here of a collective conception of the people, played out in the 
public demonstrations and in the challenging of representatives of authority.  The Syrian 
people launched spontaneous (and as the demonstrators and revolutionaries quickly found 
out, dangerous) public acts of defiance in the face of such disrespect for the Syrian people.     
 
In doing so the demonstrators contested the very legitimacy of the government and the 
authorities.  The popular nature of the first demonstrations and uprising are recorded in the 
editorial which also describes the security response to other actions in Damascus in the first 
part of 2011: 
 
In the middle of March tens of people demonstrated for a short while in the same 
area of Damascus [al-hareeqa], and the next day a sit-in was held by tens of people 
in front of the building of the ministry of the interior  . . .  around forty of them were 
arrested and humiliated by the special security apparatus, the air force branch.  This 
is the branch that would be at the forefront of terrorising civilians throughout the 
coming Syrian revolution.   
 
Two days later, the editorial narrates, a sit-in took place at the Omari mosque in the city of 
Dar’a and then in Homs, on the 25th March, where, the editors state, over 3,000 people 
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gathered at the clock tower square ensuring that the people’s response quickly took on a 
national character.  The editorial goes on to note this: 
 
This was an unprecedented number in Baʿthist Syria . . . .This suggests that a spirit 
of opposition had existed, buried in Syrian society, that the traditional opposition had 
never managed to make use of to build its movement, and indeed, when new, popular 
opposition emerged the traditional opposition had hardly any impact on it.28 
 
The concept of dignity can be decontested, or clarified, here, specifically in relation to a new 
mobilised opposition.  The people started to organise and to air their grievances, which gave 
a clear message to the government that it was no longer, if ever, acceptable for authorities 
and officials to humiliate the Syrian people.  Through this action the Syrian demonstrators 
and revolutionary agents had not lost their dignity but were acting on a dignity in resistance.  
This editorial indicates how the social contract long assumed between a state and its people 
had been undermined and then, in the actions of the state against its people in Damascus and 
in Dar’a and elsewhere, broken.  The state could no longer assume, or claim, that it spoke 
for the people.  As the editorial notes, in a media interview in the Wall Street Journal in 
February 2011, Asad asserted boldly that the revolution would not come to Syria because 
the positions of the Syrian government are in “close proximity to the beliefs of the Syrian 
people”.  Yet, since the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia, the writers question this confidence; Syrian 
security forces had been more visible and active than usual in the streets of Damascus, 
                                                 
28 References to the traditional opposition likely relate to an established older generation of intellectuals and 
dissidents such as Michel Kilo, although it is difficult to generalize this point without giving detailed context 
and space here to the domestic opposition in Syria.   
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suggesting that the government actually knew that Syrians too could rise up, as did their 
Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts.  The Syrian writers noted:  
 
The slogan [The Syrian people will not be humiliated] carried two important 
messages: the first was that there was such a thing as the Syrian people, and those 
protesting the attack of the young man immediately based their protest on this entity 
[the Syrian people], which previously only the regime had spoken on behalf of, and 
usually as the Syrian Arab people.29  The second message was that this people would 
not accept humiliation.  It also implied that the source of the humiliation of the Syrian 
people was the regime.30  
 
This clarifies the concept of dignity in the Syrian uprising through making focal the aligned 
concept of the Syrian people.  The people rejected the established order based on coercive, 
violent, and centralised power, and radiated instead, a bottom-up people’s sovereignty—
thus countering and turning the power dynamic upside down.  The revolutionary nature of 
the demonstrations served to stress the idea of dignity as being revolutionary praxis 
involving the organising and articulating of new ‘belief challenges’ to the Syrian 
government. Thus recalling here our consideration of the morphology of ideologies in 
Chapter Two with Freeden’s notion of ideas which move in from the periphery.  
 
                                                 
29 Here, the editorial implies that the Revolution was achieving an anti-sectarianism never attained by 
Baʿthism. This is a vital point, in that the cross-sect nature and non-sectarianism of the Revolution is a key 
underpinning for the bold claim that it was the Syrian people, including Alawis and non-Islamic religious 
minorities, who opposed the corrupt and ultra-authoritarian Government. I expand on this point below, in 
discussing the Revolution’s deliberate self-positioning as deeply non-sectarian. 
30 My italics. 
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The al-jumhuriya report also discussed the ways in which the government responded to these 
mobilisations of widespread and peaceful protests and gatherings across Syria. The state 
tried to stop this counter-hegemonic dynamic by completely shutting down all kinds of 
dissent and any vague threats of dissent: 
 
The intellectual class31 in Syria was weakened in two ways.  The first was that many 
of the most progressive minds in the country were detained, killed, sent into hiding 
or forced to migrate.  These were the people who had the most influence on the 
revolution in terms of progressive, democratic and nationalist thinking.  They 
included Hadi al-Jundi from Homs, Ma’an al-Awdat from Dar‘a, Ghiath Mattar from 
Daraya as well as people who are now in prison such as Yahiya Shourbaji from 
Daraya and Mohammed Arab from Aleppo and others.  The other way that this class 
was weakened was that the psychological and physical violence over the months 
meant that most Syrians reacted with anger and emotion rather than rational thinking.  
It is difficult to remain rational when facing an irrational regime.   
 
Here the editorial is at pains to highlight the progressive voices in the Syrian revolution, 
mentioning the names of prominent activists who became known for organising and 
participating in nonviolent acts—through demonstrations and other measures of civil 
disobedience.32  The other way in which the Syrian government sought to quell the dignity 
                                                 
31 The Arabic used is al-tabqa al’aqlaniya, indicating revolutionary actors who were progressive and rational 
(rather than traditional and closed minded), perhaps reflecting the positionality of the editorial writers for this 
report. 
32 For example Ghiath Mattar is now the subject of a documentary on Syria called Little Gandhi; discussed 
on this blog: https://en.qantara.de/content/syrian-civil-war-the-end-of-a-dream 
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revolution was through instilling fear for a sectarian-fuelled war and through claiming that 
the revolutionaries were all salafi extremists.  The al-jumhuriya editorial details how it was 
the government spokesperson Bouthaina Shabaan who, just weeks into the protests, first 
played on the fears of the people that there might be a fitna taʿfiya (sectarian conflict),33 at 
a time when Syrian demonstrators were saying “wahid, wahid, wahid, the Syrian people are 
one”. The editorial mentions that in the Syrian town of Baniyas the demonstrators responded 
to government claims and retorted with: “Not Salafiyya, nor terrorists, our revolution is a 
people’s revolution!”  Official attempts to undermine the revolution by sowing seeds of fear 
and sectarian conflict were countered by the actions and practices happening on the streets. 
The challenge was immense though, as the report recounts how: 
 
Syrians, with the rest of the world as their witness, have experienced scenes bringing 
together brutality, hostility and sectarianism, such as the events in the village of 
Bayda near Banyas, and the shelling of the minarets of mosques in Homs and in Deir 
Ezzour, and other famous examples, such as forcing a soldier to testify that “there is 
no God but Bashar [al-Asad]” and “there is no God but Maher [Asad’s brother and 
head of security]”.  The aim here was to send a message that the regime was willing 
to kill (and indeed it killed some of those targeted in these events), and to humiliate 
and undermine the values and symbols of Syrian Muslims.  In fact, it was an attack 
on all Syrians, because when these limits have been reached, nobody is safe unless 
they accept this absolute slavery. 
 
                                                 
33 On which see Ismail, S. (2009) ‘Changing Social Structure, Shifting Alliances and Authoritarianism in 
Syria’, in Lawson, F. H. Demystifying Syria, London: Saqi books; and, Ismail, S. (2011) ‘The Syrian 
Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation’, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 11:3, 538-549.  
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These pro-Asad slogans mock the Quranic shahadah (bearing witness): the recitation of 
‘There is no God but God’ (or, put more idiomatically: there is only one God) is one of the 
five pillars of Islam and a core part of the Islamic rituals of worship.  The editorial reminds 
us that there was a new collective of Syrian people who were not motivated by belonging to 
a particular sect, but only organised in unity against “absolute slavery”.  The Syrian writers 
were at pains to show the ways in which the revolution was one which had an inclusive 
conception of the Syrian people; whereas the government was willing to institute a security 
policy to crush dissent and moreover to activate and instrumentalise sect.   
 
I have drawn on this editorial so as to begin to understand the place of dignity in the first 
year of the revolution.  We saw dignity’s emergence in responding to humiliations exacted 
on the people by the state through its police and security forces.  I noted how the idea of 
dignity, in this particular setting, quickly took on a very public nature and exhibited a 
growing collective sense. This quest for (Syrian) dignity is in close conceptual proximity to 
the (diachronic) conception of resistance for dignity (and freedom) as we saw already in 
Chapter Four. Such a compulsion to collective action was present in the history of 
anticolonial resistance to all kinds of oppression, in the writing and speeches of Fanon, 
Nasser and Nkrumah.  The articulation and rising consciousness of a ‘dignified Syrian 
people’ showed how revolutionaries were seeking to extricate themselves from being 
beholden to an official discourse and politics which claimed to speak for the people but did 
not.  When we have the concept of dignity adjacent to the idea of a Syrian people and to that 
of citizen action we can see an important political dimension emerging regarding (the idea 
of) dignity in the revolution. The appearance and assertion of dignity conveyed, in this early 
stage of the uprising, an assertion of a ‘dignified Syrian people’. It was also the beginnings 
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of a battle between the state and the people for ownership of the terms of political discourse.  
This ‘politics of language’ is the subject of the next article.      
 
IV Second article: The battle between state and people 
 
The idea of resistance, which I have started to illustrate above, in the first year of Syria’s 
revolution, continued to gain pace and is most interestingly analysed by the Syrian activist 
and blogger Yassin al-Swehat in a much shorter article entitled: ‘How the Left ‘Resistance’ 
failed Syria’, which was published online on the al-jumhuriya website on the 12 April, 
2012.34  This article serves as a valuable point of entry to considering the important moral 
dimension of the idea of dignity in the context of a revolutionary struggle aimed at achieving 
dignity and freedom.  As Swehat is of a younger generation of Syrians, and is a blogger and 
journalist active in and reporting on the revolution, it is useful to pursue his line of thought.  
Through this article I can expand on the relation between the idea of dignity and that of 
resistance.  I pursue this through Swehat’s conception of a (leftist) resistance.     
 
Swehat’s article is a polemic against the Arab Leftist intellectuals and commentators in the 
Arab region regarding their scepticism at the outset of the Syrian intifada.  He saw their 
positions — in particular, their unwillingness to enter the fray against Asadism — as flawed 
on account of their “insistence to remain outside of history”.  This criticism is interesting as 
Swehat is clearly suggesting a historicised approach to thinking about the leftist tradition 
and about revolutionary action.  He does this in order to claim that the leftist stances 
                                                 
34 Refer to Appendix for full bibliographical information on this and the other two source articles. 
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regarding the Syrian revolution were historically, and morally, untenable. That is, if one 
takes resistance to oppressors to be one of the core virtues of the Left.  Thus Swehat makes 
some connections for us to a diachronic tradition of resistance—as we discussed in Chapters 
Three and four—which suggest that resistance against oppression is actually an ineliminable 
component of the Arab leftist and progressive ideological family.     
 
This opens into a consideration of the logical and cultural context which might justify, and 
impel, Arab Leftist thinkers and activists to rise up, or to support in solidarity the people or 
the masses who resist.  In this context Swehat focuses on a particular strand of the Left in 
the Arab region which had long entered into political and strategic alignments with 
Hizbollah and other forces of resistance against the Zionist enemy.  Swehat notes how the 
first of the latest wave of Arab revolutions did not pose any ideological dilemmas for them 
in their support for the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, for example.  However, as Swehat 
explains: 
 
The test did not come until the 15th March with the intifada against the system of 
‘resistance’ [the Syrian government] the trusted ally of Hizbollah.  The left resistance 
was surprised and did not expect the Syrian intifada.  It found that it was forced to 
take a position [vis-a-vis] the regime and it could not defend its position in the moral 
language of the left and it could not take a stand against the [Syrian government] 
‘resistance’ because it is an ally of Hizbollah alone among many other Arab 
countries.  Faced with this dilemma most of the left decided to (exceptions exist, 
fortunately) take the middle road politically [and were] morally elusive and heavy 
with ironic language. 
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The test of Syria’s revolution represents a significant ideological contestation which can be 
seen in the ways in which the idea of resistance, in this particular context, became one which 
was deeply contested within and across a sedimented ideological family and grouping.  The 
competing claims were and are made through recourse to a language of politics within which 
this contestation is played out and continues to play out, creating an historical split, and 
polarisation, between different strands of the Arab left.  Here the ideological furniture within 
a progressive tradition has been thrown into disarray and political actors and activists are 
keen to align with the resistance; but who now is the resistance?  This contestation, Swehat 
goes on to argue, must be settled through recourse to the moral arguments which underpin 
the tradition of the Left resistance in the Arab world.  According to Swehat’s analysis, taking 
the “moral stance [al-mawqif al-akhlaqi] is central to any politics of the left” but he laments 
that there was no such firm support, as while the Left could not: 
 
deny the Syrian people [the right] to rise up against the system of tyranny: the 
economic, political, cultural, and moral impoverishment of the political system of 
the government, [but] it must be acknowledged that there was also a conspiracy 
against the [Syrian] government, from afar.  
 
This ‘moral dilemma’ is mediated, by Swehat, with recourse to what he conceives to be at 
the very core of the Arab leftist tradition in the region. Swehat argues that supporting 
resistance against tyranny is a principal organising idea for the (Arab) Left without which 
they cannot claim to be a part of it.  He laments how: 
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Dignity and freedom are deemed worthy for some and refused for others, to make 
[such] principles fixed in some places and to avoid [zigzagging] them in other places.  
Geo-politics, it seems, is a test of the slogans and the raised fists, not only for the 
Arab left . . . but in Latin America in particular and the world in general. 
 
Here dignity and freedom are the principal values of the people, not merely symbols, and 
thus form a central project for the Left resistance.  Swehat condemns the response by 
sections of the Leftist political current for being: 
 
morally elusive [ambiguous] in their writing…; while they recognised the socio-
economic grievances of the demonstrators, they also cautioned that the ‘fingerprints’ 
of imperial powers seemed present – powers that sought to undermine the Syrian 
state as a leader in the resistance against the Zionists and American Imperialists.   
 
So, as Swehat asserts, sections of the Arab left became the doubters and the sceptics as to 
the authenticity of Syria’s intifada.  I have drawn out these threads from Swehat’s analysis 
because they offer insight into both the ideological and conceptual levels.  Swehat’s analysis 
illuminates how the concept of resistance has changed over time.  The tradition of resistance, 
long seen as a vital adjacent concept in the arsenal of the Baʿth party and Syrian state, is 
now, suddenly, deeply contested, thus unsettling assumed ideological traditions.  The second 
important thing illuminated here is that, through the concept of resistance, we can trace 
linkages to the ideas of freedom and dignity which are foregrounded by Swehat and by the 
Syrian revolutionaries, as we have seen elsewhere.  The revolution is a dignity revolution 
and those supporting it and acting in it are responding to and contesting the excesses of 
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power.  For Saleh this holds universally, and across all revolutions which make a claim for 
and strive for dignity and freedom in the face of tyranny.   
 
We find in this article a return to the kind of discourse present in the anti-colonial movement, 
with the struggle for dignity and freedom and the delineation of a tradition of resistance 
which has become part of a leftist tradition and that was, historically, aimed, as we saw in 
Chapter Four, at colonial or imperial powers.  The language of resistance resonates across 
time and space but plays out in different contexts.  The concept of dignity is decontested in 
relation to a ‘moral notion’ about when to resist and to what ends.  Thus resistance is 
intimately linked to dignity and freedom in the Arab context.  It is inconceivable that a 
government intent on crushing dissent can be deemed to be acting for the resistance and in 
pursuit of dignity and freedom for its people.  
 
Now the people’s resistance has turned against domestic tyranny at home instead of enemies 
next door. This rapidly shifting landscape in Syria has created an ideological dissonance.  
The position of a vocal Arab Left is that the Syrian people had needed to have a foreign 
enemy in order for any intifada to fit into rigid ideological patterns and norms.  The 2011 
people’s resistance against the government of Bashar al-Asad represented a new era and 
unchartered ideational territory.  It is through a pursuit of the idea of dignity and its 
emergence and attachment to the ideal of freedom and to the tradition and practice of 
resistance that this ideological blind spot has been illuminated. The consequent contestation 
and dislocation is reflected the world over among seemingly progressive Leftist groupings.  
As Swehat describes it: 
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The Syrian intifada has reached a point of no return and we have plunged into it, 
insisting on continuing until the end, and it was against the Fascist dictatorship of 
the regime and against any local or regional forces which wanted to deprive us of 
our rights to build a state of dignity, equality, and freedom.  There are many 
difficulties and the road is long.  It may succeed, it may fail.  Either way, it will miss 
the comrades who I believed, a year ago, would align their slogans with our slogans 
and put their faith in the rights, freedoms and dignities of the people before any other 
reason, and would be next to us and with us.  I was mistaken. 
 
In short, Swehat shows how fixed leftist notions of resistance were unsettled by new 
assertions of popular resistance against a government which had long based its own 
legitimacy on claims to be leading resistance against foreign interference and imperial 
power.  In analysing Swehat’s ideas through the prism of the concept of dignity we have 
started to see the deep level of contestation between the state and the people from the very 
beginning of Syria’s revolution—as soon as Syrians themselves resisted power and 
coercion.  The emergence of dignity in the revolutionary discourse, as we see it here and 
elsewhere across this chapter, helps to clarify a new kind of resistance in Syria: a people’s 
resistance, rather than merely a Government-sponsored ‘resistance’.  Dignity is clarified in 
relation to this idea of resistance which gives form to the idea of dignity in the revolution. 
The Syrian revolutionaries have a moral argument which underpins their actions and justifies 
their resistance.  This makes assertions by the Syrian government that they are the chief 
resistance a false claim to dignity on behalf of its people.  The demonstrations and civic 
action by Syrians in the name of their dignity and freedom exposed the illegitimacy of the 
Syrian government and leadership and forced a recasting of the very idea of resistance. 
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V Third Article: activating citizenship 
 
In this section I discuss some of the most pertinent ideational threads from a very long form 
analytical article written by Yassin al-Haj Saleh: ‘Those left over: the Syrian Sunni and 
politics’, which was published online on 18th October, 2012.35  Saleh’s writing is dense, 
sometimes opaque and bitingly critical in his determined efforts to reflect on how things 
came to be as they are in Syria, and on what they might rather be.  In particular this analysis 
illuminates for us the ways in which the logic of dignity emerges in the revolution to signify 
the need for the repair of a marginalised, numerically significant, segment of Syrian society.  
This reparative dignity is largely unconsciously rendered in Saleh’s writing: historically, 
politically, and in a social and cultural framework of analysis. It is from his multi-faceted 
intellectual oeuvre that I draw out the full power of the idea of dignity in the revolution. 
 
The title of the article is a reference to a segment of Sunni society in Syria which is ‘left 
over’, or marginalised by the social policies and strategies employed in sustaining power 
during the period of Hafez al-Asad’s presidency; as well as that of economic liberalisation 
– in particular as accelerated under Bashar al-Asad.36  Saleh’s analysis takes us to the heart 
of the grave social, political, and economic injustices visited on this segment of Syrian 
society over the decades, and especially since the new constitution of 1973, which finally 
put paid to any pretences of an autonomous political Baʿth party and confirmed the all-
encompassing power of the president.  In noting the social complexities during this period, 
Saleh indicated how the rise of favouritism in the years of Hafez al-Asad’s rule stripped 
                                                 
35 Refer to Appendix for full bibliographical information on this source article. 
36 See Kienle, op cit. 
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communities of formal state and universal party support and increasingly encouraged a 
reliance on: 
 
networks of favouritism made up of senior influential people, officers, religious men, 
the authorities, rich people, tribal sheikhs  . . . and these networks gathered together 
as points of cohesion and nodes which strengthened their web and provided solid 
foundations [of support].  These networks were made up of Alawi officers and 
leaders, archbishops, businessmen, Druze thinkers and party officials, and Shiite 
businessmen and men of religion, in particular.  These social and religious groupings 
were formed in such a way that almost none of them are excluded from wasta [an 
intermediary in the network who can help someone access government sector 
resources, jobs and so on] or deprived of influential connections which allow access 
to [party and state] bureaucrats to support his interests. 
 
These networks of patronage and privilege, whilst also co-opting significant elite Sunni 
businessmen and religious leaders or sheikhs, 37  for example, nevertheless excluded 
significant segments of Syrian Sunni society—in particular, poor Sunni communities, 
religiously pious and conservative Muslims, and those regarded as sympathetic to political 
Islam or, specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood, membership of which was illegal in Syria 
and punishable by death (and so a disparate grouping of Sunnis).  Saleh sought to analyse 
these segments and, in doing so, exposed the wide gap between those who were attached to 
and benefiting from the system and those who were not. Saleh captured well the extent of 
alienation, or what he describes as a deep level of “ightirab” [estrangement] between the 
                                                 
37 See Haddad, op cit; Pierret (2012) op cit. 
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different social strata in Syria. Saleh adheres, to some extent, to a Marxist analysis which 
gives due attention to social class, although the perimeters of those social cleavages have 
been complicated and blurred somewhat since earlier social class-based analyses. 38  In 
particular, one should note the emergence of a new social class, a new ‘labour’ bourgeoisie 
(typically, cutting across: urban, commercial, industrial sectors).   
 
Saleh introduces the Syrian shami.  Saleh is referring to the term as used to indicate those 
who have deep historical and commercial links to the capital, loosely, a middle class 
bourgeoisie which cuts across religious cleavages: it includes a distinctive middle class 
urban Sunni bourgeoisie as well as, for example, a significant Christian commercial 
segment. He contrasts the shami with the shawi, a reference to the poor, rural Syrian 
labourer, from the neglected provinces such as Raqqa, Hawran, Deir Azzour; they are 
numerically typically Sunni but they can also be from the lowest social strata of Alawis39, 
or other minority sects and ethnicities.  Saleh paints a picture of “two worlds” — a picture 
which is also evocative of some of Fanon’s anti-colonial writing, discussed in Chapter Four. 
Saleh related the way in which Syrian society had been polarised before the revolution of 
2011: 
 
There is nothing in common, for example, between the rural labourer, the shawi, who 
works in construction or who gathers with his friends in the squares in Damascus 
                                                 
38 Batatu (1999) op cit.  
39 Of course neglected and marginalised rural Alawi and other minority peasantry benefited in the 1960s 
from the levelling effect of the Baʿth Party in power and then also from Hafez al-Asad’s populist policies 
which favoured such communities for recruitment in secure state jobs, the army and the security forces.  So 
in referring to the rural and provincial communities it is literally about what is left after such social mobility 
and privileging is complete; following Batatu this (still) included an elite class too - such as in Derʿa and 
elsewhere, but the rampant poverty, neglect and prolonged droughts in the provinces and villages of Syria 
resulted in urban migration to Damascus and other centres to search for work. 
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waiting to be hired for work and [. . .] and…the scions of the authentic Damascene 
[families], the shami, commercial trading families.  Indeed, the typical Damascene 
stance of the middle classes is still one of hostility to the rural Syrians, regardless of 
whether they are Sunni or not.  . . . [t]he commercial middle classes in particular 
speak of their utter contempt for the outsiders, who are not Shami, who ruin their 
city, especially the rural Syrians. 
 
This portrayal of the “two worlds” of the Shawi and the Shami shows, for Saleh, how the 
middle class urban Syrians have little to nothing in common with the poor, rural and 
marginalised Sunnis who are condemned as ‘outsiders’.  Having set this context, Saleh 
explores the ways in which Syrian society has been fragmented so that issues of Syrian 
identity have become confused or contested by differing groups and communities.  Saleh 
exposes the sectarian and corrupt policies of the ‘Asadi system’ of rule.  As we saw earlier 
in this chapter, the official state discourse which was reinforced through policy and through 
the language of its representatives and agents in the executive and in government had 
inculcated the idea of Asad’s Syria as a modernist state which accommodated and protected 
a diverse ‘mosaic’ of ethnicities and religions.  Yet the ruling elite cliques actually served to 
malign the conservative and provincial Sunni Muslims and their traditions and culture, 
especially those in the provinces who were looked down upon.   
 
What Saleh gets around to arguing, many pages into his exegesis of the history of Islam as 
it relates to modern day Syria, is that “the issue of sect is a question of policy and power and 
not a question of religion or religious doctrines”.  It is Asad’s policies which have created a 
distinctly politicised and disgruntled Sunni subjectivity.  Saleh is at pains to illustrate the 
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ordinary, everyday nature of religion as a lived experience and not as a label with political 
or extremist connotations.  Saleh talks about his own upbringing in Raqqa: “. . . in my 
childhood I heard from my father that we followed a school of thought in Islam but I did not 
hear from him that we are ‘Sunni’”.  The use of the concept of Sunni as a social marker and 
identity was simply not present in Syria, historically.  In reflecting on Islam and Syrian 
society Saleh goes on to note that: 
 
the foundations of Islam were not shaken until the nineteenth century with the 
beginning of a Muslim consciousness in the face of distant global [imperial and 
colonial] control and dominance in the world.  Until today this [historical] reality did 
not reconcile Islamic consciousness and did not find what caused the self-rupture 
and what the intellectual solution is. 
 
It was the encounter with modernity which necessitated, among some Muslim intellectuals, 
a push for change or reform—Saleh references Afghani, who we met in Chapter Three.  This 
intellectual production was aimed at finding ways to enable reforms in Islam whilst 
simultaneously protecting a metaphysical commitment to Islam.  Whilst he recognises the 
diversity of the Syrian Sunnis who range from pious to atheist with diverse lots in between, 
Saleh’s analysis goes on to interrogate the way in which a specific Syrian Sunni 
consciousness was activated, especially since the 1960s in Syria, set against an increasingly 
extreme version of Baʿthist secularism.  According to Saleh, there emerged a narrative of 
Sunni injustice which served as the ‘gelling agent’ for a new grouping and consciousness 
which was slowly emerging under the unsettling policies of Baʿthist Syria, but was fully 
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‘activated’ under Hafez al-Asad’s rule.  Saleh refers to the events in Hama in 1982 in Syria 
as a pivotal point in history resulting in ‘piercing the dignity’ of the Sunni community:     
 
in the Baʿthist era and in the era of Hafez especially, there began to emerge a 
narrative of Sunni injustice in reaction to the Asad system which discriminates in 
employment, in the army and security and in the media especially, against the Sunni; 
and, regarding the conservative Sunni groups, the system deliberately corrupts the 
morals of the population (sexual morals in particular) and the system oppresses 
Muslims (=Sunni) . . . the focus is particularly on what happened to the Islamists 
who were tortured and the denying of the massacres, especially in the city of Hama 
in 1982, and before that the massacre in Tadmor [Palmyra] and its prison. 
 
I have attempted here to weave a path through Saleh’s nuanced and deep thinking on the 
condition of, and new consciousness of particular Sunni communities in Syria.  I have sought 
to illuminate the places where a deep injury was felt by this community, described by Saleh 
as a piercing of the dignity of Sunni communities in Syria.  I have picked out the ways in 
which Saleh attempted to demystify Syria’s power structures so as to show that the 
subsequent revolution did not start due to sectarian divides but that, instead, under President 
Hafez al-Asad resources and opportunities started to be based on privileging the Alawi sect 
and co-opting key social and political actors so as to ensure his longevity and hold onto 
power.  This resulted in a complete estrangement, which was felt by a large number of 
Syria’s population, especially the rural poor and neglected provincial populations, the 
majority of whom were Sunni, but also an urban and provincial political Sunni elite who 
were sympathetic to the banned Muslim Brotherhood.  We see how the piercing of dignity 
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goes very deep and is historically situated in the machinations of Baʿth party and presidential 
policies over the decades.  Saleh also gives a sense that this community of Sunnis felt the 
injury to their dignity because they were outsiders to the dominant ruling ideology and 
discourse - that of a modernist, secular state against which a conservative tradition of Islam 
and Sunni culture and morals were anathema.     
 
In Saleh’s political thought we can find a resolutely socially-situated conception of dignity: 
one which resides and takes hold, or is activated in reaction to slights against a particular 
segment of society.  We can find in the socio-economic inequalities in Syrian society the 
emergence of an increasing consciousness of these Syrians who came to be considered as 
outsiders and who were excluded from official networks of privilege and support.  Saleh 
indicates how the treatment of pious, religious Sunnis in the neglected provinces and also in 
the cities, and the ‘events’ of Hama and the massacre of 1982 contributed to the ‘piercing’ 
of Sunni dignity.   
 
Through this article we can see a process of decontestation in the way the concept of dignity 
appears and is used in relation to adjacent notions of injustice and of estrangement.  These 
grievances reflect the flaws in governance and in the social and economic policies of the 
Syrian government and leadership.  But, significantly, the lack of justice for the segment of 
society delineated by Saleh goes beyond economic considerations to relate the deep nature 
of the injustices visited on the Sunni communities.  Their political and religious freedoms 
have been fundamentally constrained and their religious sensibilities have become alien to 
the grand narratives of the Syrian state which has promoted the ‘modernist’ ideology 
discussed earlier in this Chapter (and in Chapter Three).  In essence the state had long 
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demonised those conservative and pious Sunni Muslim communities which had not been 
bought into or co-opted in some way into the Asadi patronage network.  The Asad leadership 
had already set in train an official discourse of a war on terror and a security discourse which 
worked to demonise Sunni Islam (as it did in the 1980s against the Muslim Brothers).   
 
Saleh’s article, together with the other two offerings analysed above, has helped us to work 
out some synchronic conceptions and inflections of dignity within the revolution moment.  
The strands which have been drawn out so far begin to help us understand more about why 
the idea of dignity came to be so potent, and indeed, why it moved in from the ideational 
periphery to be ascribed to and represent the revolution itself.  It was, after all, these Syrian 
Sunni outsiders who were to go on to play a pivotal role in the revolution, especially in the 
armed wings of the revolution. 
 
VI Conclusion: situating dignity in Syria’s revolutionary moment 
 
In this chapter we began our immersion into a broadly-conceived Syrian, and Arab, leftist 
and progressive tradition (in the revolution) with an introduction to the Syrian website al-
jumhuriya and its most prominent founder Yassin al-Haj Saleh, before then turning to 
analyses of material from the al-jumhuriya website.  The launch of the al-jumhuriya project 
one year into the revolution gave space for Syrians to start to imagine alternatives to 
inherited, authoritarian rule.   
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We found Syrian writers, thinkers, and activists producing a new language of politics; 
imagining, recasting or rejecting the existing terms of political discourse which had 
dominated an authoritarian Syria until the outbreak of demonstrations across the country in 
2011.  What might a future Syria look like and what might being Syrian be?  To have these 
conversations Syrians needed to expand beyond a limited and, sometimes, dogmatic political 
discourse; they needed to emerge outside the dark tunnel of authoritarian rule. 
 
In reflecting on my research question I sought to show what kinds of conceptions, 
understandings and uses of dignity were we seeing through the speech-acts and the writings 
on the al-jumhuriya website.  Firstly, Yassin Saleh’s ‘thought-edifices’40 of modern Syria 
and of an Asadi ‘modernist’ ideology helped us to see inside the ‘black box’41 of Syria’s 
dominant political ideology: Arab Baʿthism.  What Saleh shows us is the extent to which 
the core ideas of the Syrian Arab Baʿth movement and party—the tripartite Baʿthist 
principles of unity, freedom, and socialism—were not only appropriated, to add a veneer of 
legitimacy to the Asad ‘dynasty’ in power, but were in fact severely undermined by recourse 
to a ‘modernist’ ideology which claimed to be a champion of economic progress, secularism 
and a bastion of a ‘mosaic’ plurality.  
 
When we understand the problems inherent in the ruling ideology and (more importantly) 
the gaps and hypocrisies which existed in practice we start to build an ideational picture and 
to see where ideals floundered and how dignity then rapidly emerged from the neglected 
margin and moved to the centre. The idea of dignity as a core principle, as a call to action, 
                                                 
40 Freeden (1996) 144. 
41 I refer here to Freeden’s term in analysis of political ideologies; but, equally, this relates back to Saleh’s 
earlier work and his critique of the system in Saleh, Y.H. (2010) ‘Suriya min al-zil: dakhil al-sunduq al-
aswad' [Syria from the Shadows: Inside the Black Box], Alexandria: Jidar for Culture and Publishing—cited 
in Massouh, F. (2015) op cit., 55,59.  
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and as a revolutionary idea and mobiliser, emerged from and illuminated the gap between 
that of the ideological precepts and traditions in post-independence Syria and the actual 
official practices.   We can, I believe, now identify three core clarifying strands of conceptual 
thinking in relation to the core concept of dignity. These are summarised below. 
 
Syria was experienced as ‘two worlds’, where the ‘Shami’ and ‘Shawi’ had nothing in 
common and where the concept of equality was all but absent.  The core idea of equality 
which had been so central a tenet and so closely related to the struggle for the ideas of 
freedom and dignity (recall for instance the quotation from Nasser on which I dwelt in 
Chapter Four), had completely disappeared from the Syrian system of government.  With 
the idea of equality pushed to the margins, other core concepts which had been importantly 
proximate to equality, such as the idea of unity, were also put under a direct threat of 
marginalisation. The project of Arab Baʿthism had bound equality, unity, and socialism 
together; without that binding, the Asad leadership did not enjoy any real legitimacy among 
its people, as we came to see in the Syrian uprising of 2011.42   
 
In 2011 we found the demand for recognition of a dignified Syrian people.  The notion of 
a new revolutionary subject emerged: that of the Syrian people (not any sect or subgroup) 
who gathered first to demand decency and dignity from, then to contest, and then to outright 
reject a system of rule which they had found to be unjust and unequal.  The very idea of 
Syria and what it constituted, ideationally, as well as the notion of being, or becoming, 
‘Syrian’ was being challenged and deconstructed and reconstituted in the writings of Saleh 
                                                 
42 It should be noted that the concept of Socialism given its particular Arab gloss—as I discussed in Chapter 
Three—works across the assumed ideological divides of Arab Baʿthism/Secularism and of Islamism.  This 
can be seen to an extent in Egypt before its revolution changed the dynamics between the Left and the 
Brothers, but also a distinctly Arab socialism captures some of the core concepts of political Islam relating to 
social justice, for example.  See, for example, Tripp, C. (2006) Islam and the Moral Economy: the Challenge 
of Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter Three, 46-76. 
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as well as being articulated in the streets and in the squares in Syria.  We saw this in the 
chants of the demonstrators who refused humiliation, asserted that they were a unified 
people, and demanded dignity and freedom.   
  
The third core idea is that of resistance which helped to further clarify the concept of dignity 
in a revolutionary situation.  Swehat clarifies the concept of resistance as necessarily based 
on a moral commitment and on solidarity for and with those acting against tyranny.  In doing 
so, Swehat reflects the way in which a radical notion of resistance enters into adjacency with 
the virtue of dignity, and thus offers ways for us to conceive of dignity through a truly radical 
and leftist commitment to resistance.  
 
Amidst this unsettling of the political and social order it would nevertheless, I hold, be a 
mistake to consider the emergence of the idea of dignity as operating outside the ideological 
world we inhabit.  Rather, the force of dignity signifies a level of deep ideological 
contestation of an ideology betrayed, and an unrequited social contract between the people 
and the state.43 The project of al-jumhuriya signals the interrogation of the ideological 
claims and assumed legitimacy of the Syrian government and executive power, and it 
reminds Syrians of the republican ideals implicit in the independent nation state but which 
were never actualised.44  In the analyses of the concept of dignity as a central principle in 
the revolution we can shed light on an emerging civic Syrian republicanism in the first years 
of Syria’s revolution.  At least implicit in this Syrian Republican thinking is a focus on 
                                                 
43 On the idea of the social contract see: ‘Towards a National Social Contract in Syria: Issued 14 April 2001’ 
by the Constituent Board of the Committees for the Revival of Civil Society in Syria, a document made public 
and signed by prominent Syrian intellectuals and oppositional figures, including Michel Kilo, continuing a 
long struggle in Syria to nurture a civil society outside of government and party control. 
44 Syria’s constitution was promulgated in 1950 and revised under Hafez al-Asad’s corrective movement and 
brought into being in 1973.  Article 12 states, for example, that “The state is in the service of the people”, in 
George, A. (2003) Neither Bread nor Freedom, Zed, 2. 
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practices and doing or acting in newly created free or liberated public spaces and towns.). 
Equally, the ideas propounded by the al-jumhuriya contributors adhere to a series of moral 
and political arguments for a new Syria, based on the equal value of the Syrian citizen and 
the centrality of the people in the social and political ordering and governance of the country. 
It rejects outright corrupt and unaccountable government as well as hereditary rule.  The 
idea of al-jumhuriya itself promotes an alternative ‘third way’ which weaves a path between 
the binary assumptions of an either/or ‘choice’ between Islamism and Secularism.  The al-
jumhuriya project problematizes both these traditions.      
 
In the next and final chapter I give consideration to the second exemplar which is situated 
in a distinctive but, again, variegated ideational current: that of Islamism and political Islam.  
The liwa al-tawhid (Unity Brigade) is understood, for my research purposes, through the 
exemplary activity of its most prominent brigade leader, Abdel Qader Saleh (Abdel Qader).  
I examine the force of his speech-acts and the ideas flowing through the political discourse 
which has built up around the armed fighters, through mediated material online and through 
his interviews and interviews about him. 
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Chapter Six  
Ideational Exemplar Two: Syria’s revolutionary fighters  
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Five I investigated the meanings and uses of dignity in Syria’s revolution through 
an examination of the material published on the revolutionary website al-jumhuriyeh (The 
Republic).  In the first of the two ‘exemplary’ currents in the revolution, I sought to highlight 
the beliefs and ideas which were prioritised and advocated by ‘progressive’ revolutionary 
intellectuals, writers, and activists.  In pursuing the threads of dignity through the thought-
practices of these actors in the revolution, I started to examine the ways in which dignity was 
articulated, tracing a particular conceptualisation of a dignified Syrian people together with 
other core concepts such as freedom, and in adjacency with concepts such as equality.  I looked 
at how these concepts flowed from and attached to the idea of dignity, thus decontesting it in a 
particular time and place.   
 
We saw how the revolutionary discourse which developed through the activities and actions of 
Syrian revolutionary actors centred on the idea of nonviolent struggle and civil disobedience.  
For example, the al-jumhuriya editorial had highlighted how democracy activists had been 
tortured, imprisoned or, as with Ghaith Mattar, killed.  We also saw how, in the first year of 
the revolution, a plurality of views emerged about how best to pursue and maintain the 
revolution in the face of a full military and security response to the dissent across the country.  
In Chapter Four I noted how the way was opened up to the proliferation of fighting groups.  
Principally these were made up of Syrian army defectors and civilians, principally the al-jeish 
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al-hurr (the Syrian Free Army), some elements of which increasingly took on an Islamist tone 
as the revolution moved fully into an armed conflict against the state army, the security forces, 
and its supporters. 
   
In this chapter I shift the focus to analysing a particular exemplary case from among the 
numerous fighting brigades in Syria.  This is in contrast to the previous chapter, where we 
examined the intellectual writers and activists in the revolution.  In contrasting different 
ideational currents within the revolution we can consider the shared aspects of dignity which 
are held in common across ideological currents in the Syrian revolution, and where they 
diverge.  This is important as it allows us to see how a shared idea such as dignity can function 
in different ways.  
 
I have selected one of the most well-known northern Syrian fighting groups, liwa al-tawhid, 
for my second exemplary study.  This regional brigade is considered here as an exemplar 
because of its vital significance as a fighting force in northern Syria; crucially it was one of the 
first and main rebel groups to take and hold territory in what became regarded as the Battle of 
Aleppo which raged in 2012 (and beyond).  Another important consideration regarding this 
brigade is that they were, early on, considered to be a moderate Islamist voice and force which 
was closer to the Syrian revolutionary aims and principles than some of the other fighting 
groups.1  
 
                                                 
1 See report: Syzbala, V. (2013) ‘A power move by Syria’s rebel forces’, blog report for the Institute for the 
Study of War, 22 November. 
 252 
As I will discuss, liwa al-tawhid gained a high public and media profile because of one of its 
highly respected regional commanders who was killed in November 2013: Mujahid Abdel 
Qader al-Saleh (Abdel Qader).2  Abdel Qader, as a vocal representative of a major military 
group in Northern Syria, can help us to gauge the context for the emergence of the idea of 
dignity in armed struggle.  
 
A detailed analysis of the utterances and practices of the liwa al-tawhid military group is vitally 
important if we want to obtain a more rounded and nuanced picture of the revolutionary actors 
during the first two years of the revolution—and not just the liberal trend we encountered in 
Chapter Five.  There are constraints, however, on access to relevant source material, especially 
given that the group were, to all intents and purposes, fragmented and co-opted into other 
fighting blocs after the death of Abdel Qader in November 2013. 3   Information and 
communications by and about the group and about Abdel Qader were posted on social 
networking sites such as Facebook and YouTube, and Abdel Qader himself had a twitter 
account.4  Some of these accounts have changed or are no longer active or accessible.   
 
 
                                                 
2 See: BBC News (2013) Top Syrian Rebel Commander Dies”, BBC News report online, 18 November, 2013, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24984365; Lund, A. (2013) ‘The death of Abdul-
qader Saleh‘ Syriacomment blog published online, 17 November, 2013, available at: http://www.joshualan-
dis.com/blog/death-abdelqader-saleh/?print=true 
3 It is important to be aware of military and political shifts regarding the brigade.  I am here focused on the pe-
riod 2012 to 2013 and up to and around Abdel Qader Saleh’s death.  The liwa brigade has joined other groups, 
split, and been subsumed into larger fighting forces since this time.  So, we cannot look at social media activity 
by the group today to discern what was happening in 2013.  
4However what appears to be the official YouTube channel for the brigade in these first years is still available 
online: https://www.youtube.com/user/leuaalTawhid1/videos?flow=grid&view=0&sort=da.  The channel was 
established in October 2012.  The last video posted is dated as two years ago (so in 2014).  See below re Abdel 
Qader’s twitter account.    
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I conducted online searches for the brigade and for Abdel Qader and watched video material 
posted by the group or by its supporters or other revolutionary groups.  I also reviewed 
interviews of Abdel Qader and analysis about him and the brigades as broadcast by major Arab 
news channels and made available online, on official and nonofficial content-sharing channels, 
after the broadcast.  Much of the raw material I viewed consisted of short videos of battle 
ground footage, shelling, and other military activity as well as videos and images of civilians 
dead in the conflict.5  On Abdel Qader’s official twitter feed (which is no longer accessible) I 
found tweets about military battles, meetings with other prominent brigade leaders in the 
region, links to communiques issued by the brigade, and retweets of announcements of 
appointments to the local Shura council (presumably in Aleppo city), as well as announcements 
about martyrs killed and words of support to other parts of Syria, such as Homs and the district 
of Muadimiya in the Damascus suburbs (areas which would have been under heavy military 
attack during this period).6     
 
From my review of the available material relating to the brigade and to Abdel Qader I have 
selected four video sources (VS 1-4) for detailed analysis.  I focused in detail on the period 
from early 2012 and throughout 2013, as this is when the revolution was militarised and when 
liwa al-tawhid was consolidated into a significant fighting force.7 The videos I have selected 
provide more detailed insight than some of the raw footage of battles and casualties might tell 
us about the political thought and practices of the armed wing of the revolution.  The video 
                                                 
5 Sites referred to included YouTube channels set up by media groups and individual activists in the area, as 
well as the official YouTube channels for al-Jazeera Arabic, Orient TV, al-Arabiya.  See my selective list of in-
ternet sources in the bibliography. 
6 I was able to download the tweets from this official site which was registered as @abdulkadr_Saleh on Twit-
ter.   
7 The arming of the revolution was, of course, happening alongside militarisation of pro-Asad militias, also from 
2012 and before.  See a recent analysis by al-Tamimi, A. J. (2016) ‘Syrian Hizbollah militias of Nubl and Za-
hara’, SyrianComment blog, 15 August, available online at: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/syrian-hezbol-
lah-militias-nubl-zahara/. 
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sources also address somewhat differing audiences, as we shall see.  I now turn to elaborate on 
the selected material.    
 
The first video source (VS1) is an informal interview with Abdel Qader which was aired in 
July 2013 on the pro-revolutionary satellite channel Orient TV.  This is a rare take on Abdel 
Qader as the family man rather than the fighter, and during the interview he talks about life 
before the revolution and he emphasises the desire for a “life of honour and dignity”.  Abdel 
Qader opines that a return to dignity must include a return to ‘our religion’ and ‘our country’ 
and that Syrians want to be ‘free’. 
 
In the second video source (VS2) the pace changes, with Abdel Qader being interviewed for a 
flagship current affairs programme aired by the Arabic language satellite channel al-Arabiya.  
This is a more combative interview focused on the big political questions around governance 
in the liberated areas of Syria.  It offers us another piece of the ideational puzzle in pursuing 
the thought and practices of Syria’s rebel groups and ties in to ideas emerging across the other 
video sources in this chapter.  How might Syrians be free and under what social and political 
system will they live?  These political questions help us to understand more about the kind of 
dignified life which Abdel Qader alluded to in the first video.  What he is advocating, if we 
consider the wider terrain in which these ideas emerged, is, not surprisingly, a better 
accommodation with Islamic religion and traditions and a more just state; a reparation of Syrian 
‘pierced dignity’, perhaps.   
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The third video source (VS3) is very different again, as here we see another side to Abdel 
Qader as he is motivating his battalion on the frontline, among fighters who have more in 
common with the Shawi we met in Chapter Five than the political and media elites who he was 
addressing in the first two interviews.  He refers to an important traditional notion of honour 
which I introduced in Chapter Four (in holding and freeing Muslim land), relating to the idea 
of dignity he mentions elsewhere.  The focus here is on the importance of continuing the armed 
jihad, and this provides us with some linkages in thinking across the Syrian revolution as a 
whole, in comparison and contrast to other forms of resistance we have already considered 
previously.  In this material I trace (what Freeden might term) an ‘unconscious’ appeal to 
dignity in relation to honour and in relation to metaphysical commitments to ‘aid God’ and to 
protect Muslim land and Islamic religion.   
 
As I have indicated, the reported ‘martyrdom’ of Abdel Qader was a key moment in the Syrian 
revolution.  I selected video source four (VS4) in order to hear reflections and analysis from 
media activists and political analysts about Abdel Qader’s death, his role in the revolution, the 
fate of his battalion and the fight against the state—now that he has gone.  There is an appeal 
to Abdel Qader’s akhlaq (morals) and qiyam (values) which are highlighted as being 
representative of not just an individual but the collective struggle and revolutionary spirit.  The 
ideas of the revolution are discussed and summed up by one interviewee as being based on 
freedom and dignity in being able to choose the shape of the country and how politics should 
be done.  Along this path is the way to ‘live a dignified life’.             
 
 
 256 
I also supplement the selected video material with other secondary material; in particular, 
analysis by scholars and policy experts who have followed the rapidly shifting terrain of these 
fighting groups since their inception.8 These analysts have a very specific research agenda and 
set of questions which focus on the military and geopolitical aspects of the brigades rather than 
the ways in which ideas and beliefs might appear and be crafted and acted upon in revolution.  
However, the depth of their empirical investigations and tracking of the fighting groups 
provides a supplementary resource of secondary material with which to layer my analysis here.   
 
I Liwa al-tawhid  
 
Throughout the summer of protests in 2011 there emerged, locally and through the 
representatives of the newly established formal opposition of the Syrian National Council 
(SNC), internal debate and disagreement among Syrians about whether or not to take up arms.  
During this period Syrians who had either defected from the army ranks or taken up arms as 
citizens had a sole purpose of protecting the civil disobedience activity and the demonstrations 
in their home towns or villages—representing a novel application of nonviolent struggle as one 
which is necessarily protected by local armed Syrians.   
 
Syrian army defectors set up a revolutionary military command in Istanbul as a way of 
coordinating and directing the increasingly organised revolutionary brigades and emerging 
army defectors and armed fighters.9  Hundreds of local brigades were formed and then joined 
                                                 
8 For academic treatments see: Lefévre, R. (2013) Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, London: 
C. Hurst & Co., Ltd; Pierret, (2012); (2013), op cit. 
9 Tripp (2013) op cit. 57. 
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by foreign fighters from Iraq and elsewhere.  The brigades carried diverging and crisscrossing 
ideological stances—from broadly secular and nationalist to conservative Sunni and Islamist—
and they all vied for outside funding and support from governments and individual donors.  
Liwa al-tawhid was regarded by some as a ‘moderate’ Islamist brigade which gained 
prominence around July 2012 as a newly merged umbrella group gathering local units fighting 
the government forces in northern Syria.10   
 
Liwa al-tawhid is usually translated as the Unity Brigade; however, it is important to note that 
as well as meaning ‘unity’ the concept of tawhid in classical Islam refers specifically to the 
oneness or unity of God, from which all else flows, pointing to the monotheistic nature of 
Islam.  Some commentators of the Syrian fighting brigades have noted the Islamic nature of 
and symbolism in naming brigades and the use of ‘unity’ in the naming of brigades is present 
across the warring parties. This concept of unity, which we met in Chapters Three, Four, and 
Five, is shared across ideological and battle divides.  The names used commemorate events 
and famous battles in Syria’s long history and reference the names of heroes (e.g. against the 
Crusaders) and martyrs, monuments, local mosques, and so on. Therefore, pro-Syrian 
government Lebanese, Iranian, Iraqi and other groups fighting for Bashar al-Asad use very 
similar symbolism – Islamic, Secular, and Christian; as do the Kurdish fighters.11  In modern 
usage tawhid is commonly used to refer to unifying, and the brigade did serve this purpose in 
the Syrian revolution, bringing together disparate local fighting groups.  
 
                                                 
10 For example, it was not placed on any international designated terrorist lists: Stanford University (2016) 
‘Mapping Militant Organisations: Liwa al-tawhid’, narrative summary, published online at http://web.stand-
ford.edu/group/mappingmilitants.  
11 This is discussed by Yassin-Kassab, R. & Al-Shami, L. (2016) in Burning Country: Syrians in revolution and 
war, London: Pluto Press.  There are also countless blogs on these topics on the SyriaComment blog and on 
aymnennnjawad.org blog by A.J. Tamimi. 
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Syrian citizens took up arms to protect their villages in Northern Syria: such as Marea, Anadan 
and Aazaz.  By 2013 the brigade claimed to number around 12,000 fighters and their most 
celebrated military operation was the first Battle of Aleppo, which began in July, 2012, and 
went on through 2013, during which the Syrian rebel fighters were hemmed in but gained and 
held liberated territory from the Syrian government.  The battalion was to obtain funding, 
especially from sympathetic Gulf countries – from the outset this is likely to have included 
Qatar, France12 and Turkey as well as private funders.  However, in holding the liberated 
territory and in governing and working with hundreds of other brigades there were, 
increasingly, reports of internal disputes between the different Islamist groups and the more 
extremist elements.   
 
Patterns of corruption persisted and a war economy emerged which was based on narrow 
interests and profit extraction (sometimes for weapons but sometimes for personal gain).  It 
became increasingly common for rival brigades to kidnap members of rich families, or others, 
for financial gain, to commandeer property, factories and equipment for self-aggrandisement 
and personal profit, and there were also reports of human rights abuses against the government 
and militia prisoners of war (execution without trial, for example).13     
 
 
                                                 
12 Chulov, M. (2012) ‘France funding Syrian rebels in new push to oust Assad’, The Guardian online, 7 Decem-
ber, 2012. 
13 See for example the interview of Abdel Qader by al-Jazeera Arabic anchor Taysir Allouni, published on the 
official YouTube channel for al-Jazeera Arabic, for the Meeting Today programme, on 16 June 2013.  Taysir 
presses Abdel Qader on corruption within the brigade ranks and thus rankles him:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_xXU9YaRLc 
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The brigade is considered Islamist in nature and is commonly assumed to be linked to the 
Muslim Brotherhood current.14 But when Abdel Qader was a leading regional commander he 
also took pains to keep good relations with all the fighting groups, including the Salafi-
influenced fighters and the al-Qaeda affiliated group, Jubhat al-Nusra (the Victory Front) who 
were Islamists of a different stripe.  The brigade gained a reputation for their military operations 
and, when under Abdel Qader’s direct command,15  for ethical (moderate) conduct in the 
revolution.  The brigade mostly worked under a general Syrian Free Army banner and Abdel 
Qader represented the northern Syria fighters within the Free Army command structures.  I 
now consider Abdel Qader in more detail so as to contextualize him as an exemplar of the 
armed revolutionary struggle.  
 
II Mujahid Abdel Qader al-Saleh     
 
Mujahid Abdel Qader al-Saleh was a young and wealthy grain trader from the village of Marea 
in Northern Syria.  Before the revolution he was known for his pious religious nature and for 
proselytising for Islam, at home and abroad.  It seems the case16 that Abdel Qader was active 
in a religious movement claiming to be fundamentally apolitical called the Juma‘a al-Tablighi 
(Group of Preachers), which emerged from India in the 1920s, and which has a presence in 
                                                 
14 The situation was very fluid, with rebel brigades following the money for weapons as well as negotiating dif-
fering ideological positions; see Syzbala, V. (2013) ‘A power move by Syria’s rebel forces’, a blog report for 
the Institute of the Study of War, 22 November, available at: http://iswresearch.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/a-
power-move-by-syria-rebel-forces.html.  Abdel Qader Saleh was publicly interviewed on his political stances, 
during military operations, by the local Aleppo Media Centre: ‘exclusive interview with Abdel Qader Saleh’, 
posted on the YouTube channel ‘tujama’ al-shabab murek al-ahrar’ [The Youth Group of Murek for Liberation 
– a provincial village in Hama, Syria], available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eviYiTRnrnk 
15 Abdel Qader was not the most senior commander.  He was deputy to the co-founder of liwa al-tawhid: Abdel 
Aziz Salameh, or Hajji Anadan, who went on to form the military coalition called the al-jabha al-shamiyya (The 
Levantine Front) in December 2014.   
16 I gained this information having asked Syrians based in the UK.  To protect their privacy I do not name my 
sources. 
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Pakistan, with adherents across East Asia and among Muslim populations worldwide. 17 There 
is a vague reference made by a prominent Syrian activist paying tribute to Abdel Qader, to his 
travelling and preaching before the revolution (VS4).   
 
As we will see, Abdel Qader claimed that he was not political; that he was not a politician but 
that he did undertake jihad for the cause of the revolution and the Islamic ummah (nation).  
However, what this chapter reveals is the extent to which, and the way in which, Abdel Qader 
was to become political, exhibiting a more explicit political Islam bent.18 Islamist ideas did 
take hold and were instrumentalised on the front lines to encourage and sustain the armed jihad, 
or struggle, for a life of honour and dignity.  I focus here on the speech acts and practices of 
these Syrian fighters and build a picture of the ideals they ascribe to and how dignity is central 
to their ideational vision of a future Syria. 
 
 
                                                 
17 This fundamentalist religious movement is a transnational project to proselytize for Islam, but claims no polit-
ical agenda,  It is difficult to find scholarly treatments of the beliefs and practices of the group in Pakistan out-
side of the literature on security and terror studies, but see Ali, A. (2006) ‘Tabligh Jama’at and Hizbul Tahrir: 
Divergent Paths to Convergent Goals, Education to Counter Extremism’, Dialogue & Alliance, Newsletter, 
20:2, Interreligious Federation for World Peace, available at: http://www.irfwp.org/files/20-2co-
tent.pdf#page=51.  On the Pakistan dimension in Syria’s conflict see: Sherazi, Z.S. and Mohsin, S. (2013) ‘Paki-
stan Taliban arrive in Syria, and more are to come, CNN told’, CNN, 24 July, 2013; Mohsin, S. and Sterling, J. 
(2013) ‘Syrian opposition questions Taliban rebel role’, CNN, 18 July, cited by Siddique, A. M. (2015) ‘Drones 
Do Not Contribute to Counterinsurgency, An Analysis of the Strategic Value and Humanitarian Impact of US 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, Islamabad Papers, 25, Institute of Strategic Studies. 
18 I use this term reluctantly here and do not want to get diverted to the vast debates on the term, its use, and 
meaning.  I have sympathy with a memo prepared as a result of scholarly debate regarding the problematic na-
ture of the concept; see Philbrick Yadav, P. (2016) ‘Rethinking Relationality: Abductive Reasoning, Action Re-
search, and Islamist Politics’, prepared for the Evolving Methodologies in the Study of Islamist Politics Work-
shop, 29 January, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS).  Generally I use the concept of Islamism 
and political Islam to refer to an ideational current which seeks to order society based on and prioritising Islamic 
precepts.  However this leaves lots of space for very divergent practices and implementation.  For the specific 
Syria context and overview of the Islamists see: Pierret, T. (2012a) ‘Syria: Old-Timers and Newcomers’, in 
Wright, R. ed. The Islamists are coming: Who They Really Are, Herndon, VA: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, 71-80. 
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On the 17 November, 2013 news spread quickly on social networking sites such as Facebook 
that the revered revolutionary fighter Abdel Qader had died from his injuries inflicted during a 
Syrian government strike on a liberated zone in the northern city of Aleppo.  Abdel Qader was 
killed in a targeted aerial attack during a meeting with other military leaders in Northern 
Aleppo.  Abdel Qader was aged 33 and left behind a widow and five children. Over the 
following days those involved in or researching Syria’s revolution found our news feeds 
flooded with pictures of a smiling Abdel Qader, as mediated by the brigade’s supporters as 
well as Syrian activists generally, on online social networking sites set up by the various 
revolutionary groups. The day after his martyrdom the Syrian government pounded his home 
town, Marea, with aerial and artillery bombardments.  After Abdel Qader’s death the brigade 
was to eventually leave the Free Army stable and merge under the banner of the jaish al-Islam 
(the Army of Islam).19 
 
The very striking thing in all the commemorations of his death was the extent to which Syrians 
sympathetic to the revolution lamented and expressed sorrow in hearing about his death.  
Twenty-something Syrian media activists and artists who might usually post avant-garde art 
and photography by their Syrian compatriots, or pictures of revolutionary cultural festivals in 
Idlib and al-Raqqa,20 often juxtaposed with ubiquitous images of Syrians mangled and killed 
under the bombs, were now posting images of a smiling bearded man pictured on Syria’s front 
line and affectionately known as Hajji Marea.21 Most striking was that this outpouring of grief 
                                                 
19 Lund (2013) op cit. 
20 The Syrian Media collective ‘The Street’ organised a number of revolution festivals in northern Syria, for  
example: see content posted on their channel: YouTube channel: muwassasat al-shara‘a al-‘ilaam (The Street 
Media, Incorporated), accessed September 2015. 
21 Hajji (Syrian dialect; masculine) being a term of respect for one who is older and/or has completed the Haj 
(pilgrimage) to Mecca or is very religious/respected in the community; and, Marea being his home town in 
North Syria and the site of active uprising and fighting against the Syrian government. But, as Abdel Qader 
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was stark in the way in which it seemed to bridge across assumed ideological, sect, and ethnic 
divisions.  Facebook status updates, content sharing and commemoration came from 
revolutionary supporters who were Kurdish, Druze, Sunni, Christian, and Alawi on the days in 
which I monitored Facebook.22  The response to Abdel Qader’s death and his iconic status in 
the revolution signifies why he serves well as an exemplar of Syria’s armed revolution in 2012 
and 2013.  We will bear this strange meeting of Syrian-ness in mind and return to reflect on 
this in the concluding part of this chapter, having outlined a particular thread of the Islamist 
current in Syria’s armed struggle with the government.  
 
Abdel Qader worked to resolve local disputes around self-government of the liberated areas, 
resource control and access among the fighting groups.  Abdel Qader cooperated with and 
recognised the newly formed Aleppo Sharia court which operated in the liberated city.  He also 
represented the positions of the armed rebels and Islamists in the formal Syrian opposition 
(Syrian National Council; this became the Coalition and underwent further name changes and 
restructuring), and will have had some form of cooperation with Western government 
representatives, even if it was through the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul.  These 
factors make Abdel Qader, and his command of the brigade, helpfully exemplify this current, 
and provide a rich source from which to access the Islamist tendency of the revolutionary 
fighters and to explore the idea of dignity through this martyr and his brigade. 
 
                                                 
Saleh explains (in VS1) the name ‘Hajji + hometown’ was used as a common pseudonym for Syrian revolution-
aries needing anonymity.  
22 I monitored social networking sites and the accounts of Syrian revolutionary groups and individuals for the 
days following Abdel Qader Saleh’s death.  Most activity was happening across Facebook pages and through 
the sharing of YouTube material, comments or status updates by activists, reflections on why Abdel Qader 
Saleh was so loved: his ethics, his good nature, lamentations about the prospects for the battalion and for 
Aleppo after his demise, and dedications through texts about and images of Abdel Qader Saleh.  See my se-
lected internet sources in bibliography.      
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I now turn to explore in detail the ideas on the battlefield and I do this by discussing each of 
the video sources I have selected in turn and by giving details about the selection and 
importance of the material as well as analysing it in relation to the idea of dignity.    
 
III Video source one (VS1): a life of honour and dignity23 
 
Here I present and analyse the first video recording: a television interview with the liwa al-
tawhid regional commander, Abdel Qader.  The interview took place in Aleppo during the holy 
month of Ramadan on 15 July, 2013 and was published online on the official Orient News 
YouTube channel.24  The Orient YouTube channel is managed by the pro-revolutionary Orient 
satellite television channel with headquarters in the United Arab Emirates.  The channel’s 
footprint, or reach, includes Syria and large parts of the Middle East.  This interview segment, 
just ten minutes long, was aired during an Orient TV flagship programme Huna Suriya (Here 
is Syria)25 and was billed as ‘a private and exclusive interview with Commander Abdel Qader 
talking about the human aspects of his life’.  This interview helps us to get a sense of the man 
and his ideas and it provides us with a slightly less-guarded insight into Abdel Qader’s 
thoughts. Abdel Qader’s utterances are significant as they provide an important piece of the 
ideational puzzle we are seeking to put together.  In particular, we can explore, through the 
                                                 
23  I am thankful to Muzna for translating some of this video interview with me. I withhold her full name for her 
privacy (see my acknowledgments page).  All the material is selected and analysed solely by me. The material 
from this video is mostly in summary or paraphrased form based on Abdel Qader’s answers to questions posed 
by the Orient TV presenter.  The register he uses is conversational Arabic and he speaks in his Syrian dialect 
(some Arabic speakers switch to a more formal media Arabic, but it is becoming a bit more common for inter-
viewees to speak in their dialect on major news channels). 
24 Refer to Appendix One for full bibliographical information about this video and subsequent video sources. 
25 More idiomatically, in English: ‘This is Syria’.   
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idiom of a Syrian fighter, what kind of “life of honour and dignity” fighters like Abdel Qader 
might aspire to and how he conceptualised the notion of being free.   
 
Abdel Qader was interviewed in situ by an Orient correspondent based in Aleppo and they 
were linked via satellite to the Orient’s studio presenter in Amman, Jordan.  In this interview, 
over two years after the start of Syria’s uprising, the presenter asked Abdel Qader to focus on 
his personal life, before the revolution, and now.  The Orient presenter and the correspondent 
with him in Aleppo were very friendly towards Abdel Qader and this VS is therefore very 
different from the more combative current affairs format.  In this relatively unguarded 
Ramadan interview Abdel Qader contrasted the days before the uprising with living in the 
present revolutionary situation.  Abdel Qader is first asked where his family are and how often 
he sees them.  Then, he is asked by the interviewer: “What about your smile, it never leaves 
you, even in difficult situations, in battle?”  Abdel Qader responded: 
 
I don’t know how to answer.  It is the nature of the human. . . Whatever God has written 
is going to happen to you . . .  Your smile to your brother is considered an act of charity 
[this is a reference to a Hadith]. . . You should always greet your brothers with a smile 
and God will reward you for that.  This is just my nature.  I don’t know how to speak 
much, my education was simple; I am a simple man. . . 
 
Continuing to elicit information about Abdel Qader the person, the interviewer then asked him: 
“How much do you miss the days of Ramadan before . . . your family, breakfast together . . .?”  
Abdel Qader replied: 
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Let me be honest, the days that we lived as a family were good days, but we weren’t 
comfortable and were living in an unjust situation of oppression. The life we want to 
return to is a life of honour and dignity.26  We don’t want to go back to being slaves to 
Bashar and his supporters and his regime.  
 
Abdel Qader is placing central importance on the ideas of honour and dignity,27 in talking about 
a possible future Syria.  The central aim of the fighters is the struggle for the repair of their 
honour and dignity.  The appearance of dignity here is allied by him with ideas of obtaining a 
just situation for Syrians: specifically, with escaping slavery.   
 
This presents us with a useful insight into his motivations and seems to echo some of the 
material we have looked at in the previous chapter.  The pervasive sense of injustice and not 
feeling comfortable or at home in their own country is something which points to an unfulfilled 
life for conservative and pious Sunni Muslims in Syria; not unlike the shawi and the ‘Sunni’s 
left behind’ whom we met in the previous chapter.   
 
                                                 
26 He uses both karama and ‘izz; I have discussed this elsewhere in the thesis: in Chapter Four.  The noun ‘izz 
can also mean pride but I have translated it as honour, because of the context here.  There is a possible connec-
tion with the nuance of its use in rural and more traditional communities where the word is used along with 
karama or on its own.   
27 In Arabic the use of nouns together for emphasis is called taradof.  This means to add a word which comple-
ments the other or which acts as a synonym.  When this device is over-used, and becomes too much, it is re-
ferred to in Arabic in the pejorative: itn’ab.  I am grateful to Bissane el-Cheikh, a Lebanese writer and journal-
ist, for clarifying the terminology for me, via a Facebook exchange on 20 June 2016.  I was aware of taradof as 
a literary device and in my research specifically the complementary noun used with dignity: pride or honour, is 
sometimes dropped altogether in translations into English.   
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Abdel Qader’s utterances can be considered within a broader Islamist milieu.  Although Abdel 
Qader and his family lived well they were not ‘comfortable’.  This resonates with the writings 
of the Islamist thinkers and modernists we met in Chapter Three, and it reflects a desire to go 
back to a purer way of living as a Muslim and submitting to God.  Abdel Qader is articulating 
a general sense of the absence of the good life, from his perspective. Further on in the interview 
we are given some more information about what priorities might be in an ideal society and for 
a comfortable life.  Abdel Qader goes on to explain that: 
 
If someone is imprisoned and is provided with all the luxuries he wants he will not be 
happy because he will be humiliated.  Now we break our fast on the simplest food of 
onion and bread [on the front lines in Aleppo] and even if we only break our fast on 
that [food] we are happy and satisfied and free as we are fighting for what we believe 
in. 
 
It is striking that he talks here of freedom, in a situation of some privation and danger. We find 
reference, in the above quotation, to a state of being free which comes from within the 
revolution, for the fighters on the front line as they break their fast in the holy month of 
Ramadan. The picture emerging appears to be one of a simple life in which Syrians have a 
level of freedom which allows them to comfortably practice an everyday Islam.  The idea of 
freedom is one that we encountered in the previous chapter in considering the new kinds of 
‘activation’ of Syrian citizens and a new consciousness.  In both exemplary currents there is an 
idea of being free for the first time, despite the violent put-down of their demonstrations and 
the dangers of undertaking acts of civil disobedience as well as taking up arms.   
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Just as we have seen elsewhere, notions of being free are related to an end to humiliations by 
the state.  Abdel Qader is fighting to achieve an end to the ‘injustice’ and ‘oppression’ meted 
out by Bashar and by the system which sustains him in power.  He presents the situation on the 
front line as necessary and as a way to be free from slavery (again we have seen this phrase 
already, in Chapter Five).   
 
In these quotes from Abdel Qader the idea of being free is one which flows from living a 
dignified life fulfilled by pursuing what one believes in.  Being free, for Abdel Qader, is 
certainly not about materiality; it is nothing to do with, for example, freedom to choose which 
consumer goods to buy.  Rather, he conceptualises freedom in the nonmaterial, and in a theistic 
sense. Returning to the video interview (VS1) Abdel Qader seeks to convince viewers watching 
the programme that: 
 
No matter how much we sacrifice now, it is worth it to return to the country we want 
and we don’t want to go back to being the slaves of Bashar and his supporters or the 
regime. No matter how much we sacrifice now it is worth it because we can return to 
our religion. 
 
Abdel Qader places this sacrifice, and duty, on the shoulders of the Syrian people who need to 
struggle against the regime.  Later on in the interview Abdel Qader states that it is according 
to God’s will that the fighters will remain, together, with ‘love and compassion’, defiant on the 
front line.  Abdel Qader, it seems clear, was reinforcing the case for continuing the armed 
struggle so that Syrians could truly be free.  Within this dialogue, however, there is a distinctive 
thread which shows itself and sets this exemplar fighter apart from his intellectual, progressive 
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(secular) compatriots whom we met in the previous chapter.  Here we can see it enunciated by 
Abdel Qader in his describing liberation as a path to a ‘return to religion’.   
 
There is a general sense throughout the interview that Abdel Qader is genuinely reflecting his 
conservative, pious religious position and suggesting that his community will return to dignity 
and honour when they are free to return to their religion. This desire for a return to religion 
reaffirms the analysis — of the seeming wound felt by a segment of Syrian Sunnis as a result 
of the injustices inflicted by the regime — which I discussed in the previous chapter.  In 
particular I picked out there a reference the Syrian intellectual Yassin Haj Saleh made to a 
perceived ‘piercing of dignity’, as inflicted on the Syrian Sunni Muslim community by Hafez 
al-Asad and the regime, with the discriminatory policies of the Syrian government and state 
and then the massacre of the Sunni community in Hama in the early 1980s.  Implicit in this 
video (VS1) is the sense of injustice felt by a Syrian Sunni majority whose conservative, pious 
religious traditions were deemed as primitive and as counter to the state’s interests and a threat 
to its hegemony.   
         
So, in calling for an end to a system of oppression and slavery it seems apparent that Abdel 
Qader is seeking to represent and reflect a Sunni Muslim consciousness to itself.  He is on the 
one hand an esteemed brigade leader, but on the other hand he is of the people and, as he 
describes himself, ‘simple’ (or humble).  It seems appropriate to ascribe Abdel Qader’s beliefs, 
those worth fighting for, to a religious sensibility.  His beliefs, or his ethical stances, flow from 
God’s will, as we will see elsewhere in this chapter (VS3).  As we discussed in Chapter Four, 
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it is God who bestows dignity and enables freedom28 to humans on earth, so that they might 
act as He wills, and it is thus a duty of believers to struggle for their God-ordained dignity when 
it is taken away.  
 
However, there are important and direct political implications in his speech-acts.  Having 
advanced some of the implicit theistic aspects of Abdel Qader’s utterances, we can also 
investigate the important political dimensions to the revolutionary ideas which he reflects and 
inflects.  Abdel Qader inevitably strays from his personal life to talk about what he describes 
as the ‘criminal regime’ of Asad, and to comment on military developments, such as 
Hezbollah’s advance onto ‘our land’ to ‘enjoy Ramadan’ and to destroy the town of al-Qusayr.   
Even though he might not use this language, an idea of an alternative political ordering of 
society and its resources is present.  When asked what his message to viewers was during this 
holy month, Abdel Qader responded that he wanted to convey a Ramadan Mubarak (happy 
Ramadan) to: 
 
the Islamic ummah.  I send my greeting to all the Syrian people without any exclusion 
with all its variety and they are all our family.  We will all be relieved when we get rid 
of this criminal regime which has enslaved us.   
 
                                                 
28 Here the first, opening, verse of the Quran, specifically Sayyid Qutb’s exegesis of it is very instructive for me 
in conceiving of this notion of freedom: one which transcends the present and man’s “earthly desires” so as to 
aspire to a “moral and intellectual freedom” which takes into account man’s future: judgement day, and so en-
courages an Islamic belief based on a “well balanced and conscientious humanity and not an egotistic, self-seek-
ing one”, in al-Fatihah (The Opening), Qutb, S. fi dhilal al-Quran (In the shade of the Quran) Surah 1, trans. 
Adil Salahi.  This can be compared with conceptions of freedom set out by the Sudanese Muslim intellectual, 
Taha, M.M. (2000) in Cooper, J; Nettler, R. & Mahmoud, M. Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Re-
spond, IB Tauris, 109-111.     
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Then, in this same interview Abdel Qader notably attempts to show concern for those Syrians 
in “areas controlled by the regime” (who are sometimes considered to be mostly loyal to the 
regime).  In response to the interviewer’s last question asking Abdel Qader if the rebels will 
help to aid the delivery of food and other supplies to a government-held village, he replies 
“God willing we will stand by the people until they receive what they need”.  
 
This is an attempt at negotiating the political context he is in, with an assertion of a commitment 
to an all-inclusive Syria, which includes the government strongholds.  Abdel Qader has 
attempted in this dialogue to present a narrative which seeks to marry the notion of an Islamic 
nation with that of a Syrian nation which is for all the Syrian people. Abdel Qader sought to 
show a face of Syrian unity, between an imagined and expansive Islamic ummah and that of a 
bounded but contested Syrian nation which he claims to recognise, including those Syrians in 
Asad loyalist areas. But an alternative life and project is not fully articulated, here or elsewhere. 
 
It is, perhaps, an awkward attempt because it hopes also to appeal to the increasingly diverging 
Islamist brigades whom Abdel Qader was trying to keep unified in the military struggle against 
Asad in Northern Syria.  It is cautious because Abdel Qader is aware of the need to gain and 
sustain approval from Western powers (mainly the USA) who, indirectly, put pressure on or 
fully open or close the various taps which supply the limited arms and resources to the brigades.  
Abdel Qader finishes the interview by saying how he and the fighters will stand by the Syrian 
people who are all one family until they get what they need.  
 
In this first video we have heard personal reflections from Abdel Qader during the holy month 
of Ramadan.  His locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech-acts here — that is, 
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through his statements about himself and about the revolutionary cause, his promises, and his 
attempts to mobilise the fighters and others — help us to envisage the context and the wider 
meaning of the idea of dignity (and adjacent ideas) as it is being used in the idiom of a Syrian 
armed fighter and commander.  We’ve seen here how the idea of dignity was clarified in 
relation to notions of honour and how these were closely correlated with and reflective of a 
community ill at ease with, or uncomfortable with, the life they lived before the revolution.  
Adjacent to these core ideas we have found the desire for both a metaphysical and a political 
righteous, just and free existence.   
 
There is another crucial (and, again, related) concept which we have seen present in this video: 
that of religion, and a return to a religious way of life.  Abdel Qader alludes to a humble life 
lived in piety, in contrast to Bashar and his regime; this is the alternative future which is tested 
and performed through and in the revolutionary moment for these fighters and believers.  
Despite the surface-level attention to and performance of religiousity, there is a vital move 
towards the political which Abdel Qader has made—both in taking up arms and in seeking to 
reach out way beyond his religious ‘constituency’.  It was the emergence of the idea of dignity 
which served both as a clear ideational marker for the absence of justice and as an assertion of 
the needs for it, a demand for its return.   
 
This constitutes a deep contestation of the Syrian polity and the government.  The details had 
not been thought through, so the potential problematic aspects, as well as the positive potential, 
of the highlighting of this ideational and political gap are immediate.  The struggle for the 
ideational ground and dominance in the revolution had been, in some ways, neglected in the 
taking of physical ground.   Those who were contesting the dominant ideas of the ruler more 
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deliberately and systematically were the writers and intellectuals we met in the previous 
chapter.  But evidently it is not the case that the two currents—leftist progressive and Islamist—
were on the same ideational page.  I continue to explore these central ideas in the following 
videos.   
 
IV Video source two: becoming political29 
 
In this section I examine video source two (VS2), a television interview with Abdel Qader 
conducted by the presenter Hassan Muawad for a current affairs programme called nuqtat 
hiwar (Talking Point), on the Arab news and current affairs channel, al-Arabiya.30   This 
exchange is important as the discussion provides us with some insight into how fighters like 
Abdel Qader conceive of themselves and opens up the important political dimensions of this 
revolutionary current and the ideas, centred on a core demand for dignity, flowing in it.  This 
video aids in pursuing the ways in which dignity is decontested relationally, and this is pursued 
with reference to the conservatism of the Syrian Islamist fighters.  It enables us to investigate 
other adjacent and core concepts which help to clarify dignity.  
 
In context of this thesis it is vital here to continue to explore the move to the political that 
Syrian citizens such as Abdel Qader made when they first marched and then took up arms for 
change.  We need to know what kinds of ideas came to the fore in the armed wing of the 
                                                 
29 I am grateful to Abu Nina for translating this television interview in full for me.  If  key concepts are being  
used I refer to the original Arabic in brackets.  See my acknowledgement page re translations.    
30 Refer to Appendix One for full bibliographical information about this video and subsequent video sources. 
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revolution, what was changing and becoming more central, and how dignity might relate to 
these other ideas. 
 
Before analysing the raw material it is worth noting that the al-Arabiya31 channel has had a 
broadly pro-Syrian revolutionary editorial line and benefits from private investment from 
members of the Saudi royal family.32 The segment was billed as ‘an exclusive interview with 
Abdel Qader, leader of liwa al-tawhid in the Syrian Free Army’, and it was broadcast and then 
uploaded onto the revolutionary YouTube channel Syria4Allnews on 20 April, 2013.  The 
interview lasted for just over twenty minutes and mainly focused on military strategy, relations 
between the different Islamist groups and issues around human rights in the liberated areas of 
Syria.  There are a number of pertinent conceptual questions which emerge and these are 
important for my investigation, albeit sometimes incidental to the main thrust of the interview.    
 
Muawad introduces the interview as a discussion about the rebels and the jihadi fighters in 
Syria, relations between the groups and whether the jihadists have taken over the revolution, 
as well as whether or not these fighters in Syria are protecting human rights in the liberated 
areas in which they operate.  This dialogue between the presenter, Muawad, and Abdel Qader 
gives us a sense of the emerging ideas among the Islamist brigades: 
 
                                                 
31 The channel is owned by MBC and funded by Saudi Arabia.  See Sakr, N. (2007) Arab Television Today. 
London: I.B. Tauris. 
32 Though the channel has only elevated certain aspects of it.  For example, it is argued that channels such as al-
Arabiya gave too much prominence to the armed, Islamist, and jihadi fighters.  The politics and editorial deci-
sion-making processes behind al-Arabiya are complex and not the subject of this thesis, but suffice to say the 
channel is offering a particular world view of the Arab revolutions and is in direct competition with al-Jazeera 
Arabic in Qatar (which also provided sympathetic coverage of most of the Arab revolutions, but especially fo-
cused on Syria, after the first few months of 2011).  
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Muawad: Mr Abdel Qader, you said that you agree with al-nusra [jabhat al-nusra 
(Victory Front); al-Qaeda-affiliated brigade in Syria] about military 
affairs, but you disagree with them politically.  How do you disagree 
with them and on what? 
Abdel Qader: To begin with, I am not a politician.  I don’t have any political 
experience. 
Muawad: But you [have] said you disagree with them politically.  What is the 
difference? 
Abdel Qader: Maybe we do not agree on their [jabhat al-nusra’s] vision for the future, 
but the important thing is that we, Nusra, and other groups are in 
[military] agreement.  Our main goal is to bring the regime down.  Once 
the regime has fallen the political vision will be decided by politicians.  
For now, we are just military fighters and that is it. 
 
Abdel Qader is claiming to operate outside the political realm.  This is a noteworthy conception 
of the political realm in the Syrian revolutionary context and one which was common among 
the revolutionary progressive current I examined in the previous chapter.   Its roots arguably 
go back in part to the loss of faith in politics consequent upon the failure of the legatees of the 
anti-colonial struggle, and especially the profound failure of Baʿthism (that we explored in 
Chapter 3). Here Abdel Qader is speaking about and setting himself outside a formal political 
realm where formal politicians represent positions, make decisions, and set out policy and 
governance issues.   
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How does this claim relate to Abdel Qader’s earlier discussion of the struggle for a return to a 
life of dignity and honour?  As in the previous video, these discussions point to fundamental 
issues of justice, and therefore, of governance.  As we discussed in Chapter Four, the liberated 
areas were places for alternative systems of governing, through the local councils and civil 
society organisations which sprang up when the government pulled out.  For the Syrian fighters 
the immediate goal and focus was to topple the Syrian leader and this was the path to honour 
and dignity.  The political work was for the formal opposition negotiators in Istanbul and 
elsewhere; the decisions would be at the level of the opposition leadership and the Syrian 
people.  There is a natural demarcation of roles within the revolution, as we might expect, but 
the fighters are the ones on the front line and it is they who are running the liberated areas of 
Syria.  The formal opposition is notably, and problematically, absent in Syria during this period 
and beyond.  Abdel Qader is pressed further on the possible political distinctions between the 
Islamist groups operating in Syria: 
 
Muawad: Am I accurate in this quote from something you have said once, which 
is “the aim is to apply justice and the Islamic sharia”.  This means that 
you have something in common with Nusra, is that right? 
Abdel Qader: Yes, probably.  We want a just state, an Islamic state, which is elected 
and which represents all the rights and considers the rights of minorities.  
This is what we aim for.  However, we won’t force, neither us nor 
nobody else will force the shape and the structure of the state in the 
future.  The people are the ones who will decide the destiny of this state, 
and the structure of this new state. 
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The return to dignity and honour is, it seems, adjacent with an idea of a just state of an Islamic 
nature. In this case the kind of just system alluded to is one abiding by Islamic principles which 
need to be respected and brought more centrally into the Syrian polity.  In this way Syrian 
Sunni Muslims in the neglected provinces and now at the battle front lines, can live a dignified 
life.  This imperative for a just state is, of course, a rejection of the Asadist government and 
state system in its entirety.  Dignity appeared in the revolution and was asserted by the fighters 
because they had felt the injustice of the Syrian state response to the demonstrations and the 
national uprising.  Abdel Qader explained this in the interview in response to a question about 
whether he had used a rifle before the revolution, and if things all happened by chance when 
the revolution started: 
 
I can’t say by chance, but I have never held a rifle or used one apart from when I was 
in the army.  Before the revolution I used to work as a trader.  I was a food trader.  We 
started demonstrating peacefully for seven months, but when we had had enough and 
after he [the Syrian president] started killing people randomly, including women and 
children, we were forced to use weapons.  This is why we started using weapons.  
Before that we didn’t. 
  
There is a clear narrative and justification, in Abdel Qader’s mind, as to the taking up of arms, 
not as being inevitable but as a necessity given the actual context of government violence.  
There is an indication of the sense of injustice felt by the demonstrators and by the communities 
who bore the brunt of the government’s security and military response in order to quell the 
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dissent. The quest for justice is thus a core value within the Syrian armed revolution.  The 
question this poses is what kind of just polity might the fighters’ desire?    
 
As I noted in watching the previous video, pious or practicing Muslims such as Abdel Qader 
wanted to feel comfortable in their homeland and in the practice of their faith.  The place and 
form of Islam in the everyday and in relation to the political realm is being recast in real time 
by the fighters — but the revolution, as a receptacle for all kinds of ideas, cannot act to 
constrain or distinguish or prefer some such ideas over others.  The political implications of 
Abdel Qader’s desire for a state based on the principles of Islamic law are in potential conflict 
with his assertions that a future Syria will be inclusive and respect minorities (or those who do 
not want Sharia law expanded in a future Syrian state).33 
 
Within this, and across these potentially competing logics, we can position the concept of 
dignity as signalling ways of living in a just state, allied with notions of justice and following 
the religious sensibility of the Syrian fighters, but how exactly might the Syrian people return 
to dignity without an urgent consideration of such political issues that the revolution has opened 
up?  I think we should hear Abdel Qader is deliberately being somewhat ambiguous on the 
matter. The vagueness reflects the difficulty of his ‘positionality': he is aware that diverse 
Islamist brigades may be watching him; he is not politically experienced; he does not want to 
come over, himself, as being a politician. He portrays his role in the revolution as that of a 
fighter undertaking armed jihad—this is what he is trying to maintain and project.  
                                                 
33 Some aspects of Islamic law are already implemented in Syria as is the case with other Muslim majority 
countries, in particular around family and marriage, for example.  There is thus much ambiguity and lots of 
wiggle room for varying conceptions of a state which recognises Islamic law. 
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However, Abdel Qader is pushed to the political and, as he conceives of it, he does not want to 
go there.  Muawad’s questioning concentrates Abdel Qader’s attention on some of the 
challenges which have emerged in the Islamist-controlled liberated areas of Syria, and in 
particular the targeted surface-to-surface bombing of civilian areas and suicide bombings, as 
well as rumours of summary executions and massacres.  Abdel Qader concedes that: 
 
There have been individual mistakes.  This is a revolution.  Some people misbehave, 
and someone might kill another person.  We don’t deny this.   
 
For all Abdel Qader’s claims of being just a military man, or a fighter, he reflects some of the 
wider political dimensions and issues being discussed ahead of the assumed fall of Asad (the 
deadly default assumption of all revolutionaries at this time).  He sought to instil a 
revolutionary culture of hope. He drove home the idea that there were fundamental problems 
in Syrian society, as we have seen so far, in that there was a significant breach between the 
state and its social contract with its people.  In his responses Abdel Qader is, rather reluctantly, 
hinting at a reimagining of Syria in which the role of, and relations between, the people and 
the state changes and in which the role of Islam is deepened on the social and political levels.  
Abdel Qader’s shift to the political, recast here as revolutionary action outside formal politics, 
is his response to the above-mentioned breach; it is not an inevitable move, nor does it manifest 
a compulsion in Islam for armed jihad as an end in itself; at least not in a society which properly 
accommodates and respects the believers.   
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In pursuing the thread of dignity and investigating its connections in the revolutionary 
discourse of the Syrian fighters, we have found an Islamist bent which demands that dignity, 
as belonging to a community of Syrians and an Islamic Ummah, be restored.  This restoration 
rests on a conception of a just and Islamic state.  This is nothing short of a declaration and 
demand for a completely reconfigured Syrian polity and system of governance.  Although this 
is not often rendered explicit, we can garner from these video dialogues that dignity had gained 
centre ground among the ideas of Islamist and Syrian Sunni fighters because of the Islamic 
logic within which it was being conceived, and the promise for a more religiously-attuned state 
and society in a post-Asad future.   
 
V Video source three: armed resistance through jihad (struggle)34 
 
For the third video source (VS3) I analyse footage which circulated after Abdel Qader’s 
martyrdom.  The video is entitled:  ‘The last appearance of the martyr Abdel Qader al-Abdel 
Qader (Hajji Marea) on the 80 battalion Front (in Aleppo region)’.35  It was uploaded onto a 
YouTube channel called ‘Thaer36 al-Shamali’ (the northern revolutionary) and is an amateur 
recording, likely to have been made by a local media activist or supporter of the brigade.  As I 
mentioned earlier, this footage of one of the last recorded moments of Abdel Qader was shared 
extensively by Syrian media activists and others on Social Networking Sites (SNS) in the 
                                                 
34 I am grateful to Abu Nina for translating this video material which contained much material which is unfamil-
iar to me, including many quotes from and references to Islamic texts such as the Quran and the Hadith.  See my 
acknowledgements page. 
35 Refer to Appendix One for full bibliographical information about this video source and others for this analy-
sis. 
36 This would be properly transliterated at al-thaʿir but I use the name here as it appears on the YouTube chan-
nel.  
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aftermath of his death.37  It thus clearly resonated with a broader revolutionary spirit and 
captures what has been perceived of as being the best among the revolutionary fighters.  In this 
section I draw extensively from this video footage, which lasts less than eight minutes, as it is 
important raw material which captures Abdel Qader with the rebel fighters he commanded.  
This gives us some insight into the ideas he adhered to and the language of mobilisation and 
the revolutionary discourse which developed among the fighters on a front line against the 
Syrian government.   
 
I start here by setting out some of the visual imagery, and audio from the video, of Abdel Qader 
rallying troops from the 80th battalion on the front line. The video begins with a close range 
shot of a group of around 8-10 fighters who have been engaged in conversation before the 
filming started.  All of them are wearing various forms of military clothing and they are seated 
on the ground surrounding Abdel Qader as he speaks to them.  There are a few guns in view.  
We can hear very clearly loud exchanges of gunfire nearby.  The footage constantly reminds 
us where Abdel Qader is – the sporadic gun fire in the near distance, the rebel fighter who 
strolls, from off-camera, into the group to join the discussion and is urged by Abdel Qader to 
return to his lookout.  Abdel Qader praises the men, using a number of religious invocations, 
for undertaking armed jihad.  Abdel Qader begins by making a joke that his brothers cannot 
sleep unless there is the sound of gunfire.  These men are on one of the major front lines in 
what has now become known in Syrian revolutionary historiography as ‘The Battle for 
Aleppo’.  Abdel Qader asks:  
                                                 
37 As I mentioned in the introduction, I monitored a number of SNS after the announcement of Abdel Qader’s 
death took over my own Facebook newsfeed and thus became a significant moment in the revolution.  Re the 
myriad SNS relating to the revolution see: Harkin, Juliette et al (2012)’Deciphering User-Generated Content in 
Transitional Societies: A Syria Coverage Case Study’, Commissioned Report by the Center for Global Commu-
nication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Washington DC:  
Internews Center for Innovation and Learning, Internews Network. 
 281 
 
How can we aid God? I always repeat this question.  I aid God by following his 
instructions.  The highest level in Islam is jihad for God, and you are muraabit 
[a person who travels to spread Islam] for God.  You’re defending the honour 
of Muslims, our religion, land, our honour.  You should know how big your 
reward is. 
  
He uses this to forcefully remind the fighters that jihad is the most important duty in Islam.  
Although we do not find in this video an explicit mention of dignity, we find a correlative word 
is employed, the word for honour (῾irḍ).  This is a core idea in the Islamist revolutionary 
discourse and among more traditional communities with an attachment to the land and to social 
bonds.  As we saw in Chapter Four, honour can be associated with Arab tribal tradition 
generally and resonates among pious, conservative, Muslims.  This sense of honour was one 
we also met when we looked at the analysis about the beginning of Syria’s revolution in Dar’a, 
in Chapter Four. We have then seen this idea of honour used in association with dignity, as in 
the first video (VS1).  These (dignity, not humiliation, an escape from slavery, honour, pride, 
respect and self-respect) form part of a cluster of similar concepts which relate to and are 
clarified in relation to each other.  Here we can find an idea of honour which is associated with 
protecting communities and land.  It is expressed in the idiom of a Syrian commander and pious 
Muslim who has taken up armed jihad.   
 
Appeals to honour and dignity are used both to mobilise fighters and to make moral and 
metaphysical claims and arguments about the rightness of armed struggle and about man’s duty 
to God.  The appeal to religious duty is one which I have discussed in Chapter Four.  If dignity 
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is endowed to Man by God then it is a duty for Men to fight to retain that God-given dignity 
and to protect their honour in the temporal world.  In the Islamist revolutionary discourse ideas 
of duty and fighting are intimately linked to, and dependent on, a foundational, theistic world 
view.  Pursuing the concept of dignity and recognising it as a core value in the revolution 
shows, in this instance, the development of a revolutionary culture and practices which draw 
strength from Islamic precepts.   
 
Equally, Abdel Qader indicates that what we are seeing here is a particular and local form of 
revolutionary resistance against an oppressor, which takes on an Islamist hue in the language 
of jihad.  What the men are actually doing is fighting together against a dictator.  This raises 
questions as to whether we might consider armed jihad, in this context, to be a means to a 
temporal end as well as a metaphysical imperative.  This has important implications, too, for 
thinking about the political aspects of and the ideational context for this collective 
revolutionary practice which privileges armed struggle.  Abdel Qader speaks of us forcibly 
defending our religion, our land, our honour. He explains that the Prophet Mohammed told his 
followers that it was not possible to equal armed Jihad and that those who do not go into battle 
must pray and fast during the day until the mujtahid is back from fighting. Abdel Qader draws 
on a Quranic verse to emphasize his argument:  
 
O ye who believe! If ye will aid [the cause of] God, He will aid you, and plant 
your feet firmly.38  
 
                                                 
38 Sura Muhammed, 7, the Quran. 
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Abdel Qader relates these religious invocations and scripture to the immediate battle situation 
that the men are in.  He offers the men his reading of religious texts.  His stature is one of an 
accomplished and charismatic orator.  Abdel Qader explains to his troops:  
 
A man said to God’s Prophet, “I would like to stay at home, in Marea or in Tell Rifaʿa 
(towns in Syria) and I don’t want to do jihad but will do other things equal to fighting 
on the [battle] Front at the airport or the Area 80 Front, or the Front in Aleppo”.  The 
Prophet said, “There is no such thing. There is nothing equal to jihad”.  When pushed, 
the Prophet said, “Even if you fast you cannot equal jihad”. 
 
Abdel Qader is seeking to build the morale of his troops by drawing on the Quran and Hadith 
and by crafting a careful language which appeals to an everyday Muslim sensibility. He is 
mobilizing the troops and doing so with constant appeals to Islamic scripture.  He reminds the 
men again about their reward – as much as 700,000 hosanna (hosanna being a record kept of 
good deeds to be accounted for on judgement day) and more.  He reminds the fighters to pray 
and to strive for istighfar (forgiveness from God).  Then he moves quickly to the specificities 
of their own reality, on the battleground:  
 
if you don’t have weapons our morale won’t be high.  In the past, we used to celebrate 
when we managed to get an RPG weapon.  Brothers, may God bless you, do not rely 
on your weapons, rely on God.   
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The men all chime in with: la allah illa allah (There is only one God).  Then Abdel Qader 
moves on to talk about the Companions of the Prophet and relates to the men stories of local 
battles faced by the Muslim community of Medina in early Islam.  The Battle of Badr is used 
by Abdel Qader to illustrate how men can obtain victory “even when they are few in number” 
(Quran, Sura al-Umran, 124).  Abdel Qader urges his compatriots to ask for help from God, 
as the Prophet did in the Battle of Badr, which resulted in a thousand angels coming to fight 
with him (Quran, Sura al-Atfal, 12).  Abdel Qader reminds his men how the Medina Muslims 
exclaimed ya Allah! (Oh, God!); “As we say in demonstrations in Syria: ya Allah we only have 
you to rely on”.  He goes on to remind the fighters that they are fighting for a nation (Islamic 
Ummah) and for a whole people (Sunni) and that even though Russia and Iran are supporting 
President Asad victory is not about numbers and advanced tools.  Who supports us? Abdel 
Qader answers his own question: “nobody but God” and that “the whole nation [Islamic or 
Arab world] let us down”.   
 
Recourse to Islamic battles provides some respite from the concrete, immediate and severe 
difficulties the fighters are facing.  It reminds the fighters of their duties to God which, if we 
link them with the speech-acts examined elsewhere in this chapter, include the protection of 
the gifts of dignity, and of freedom, which God has bestowed and enabled for Man.  This is 
reinforced in Abdel Qader’s message to keep up with the struggle.  He urges the fighters on 
with: “Let us just rely on God, just like we did when we captured Aleppo with little weapons 
and men”.  Abdel Qader finishes by urging the men to pray, to do their duty, to do their guard 
shifts and to not sleep if there are no guards at night. He warns them to avoid gathering and 
be prepared for clashes at any time.  He urges them to report to operations and keep their 
military phones with them. 
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As well as a traditional notion of honour, related to the protection of Muslim land and of 
dignity, there is, very clearly, the idea of armed jihad, undertaken by these fighters, as a 
particular kind of resistance which resonates with historic instances of struggles against 
oppression in the Islamic and Arab world.  So we find that Abdel Qader is committed to Islamic 
precepts and their instrumentalisation in mobilising and sustaining an armed resistance to the 
state.  Abdel Qader and his men want to make a free Syria, for the ummah, for the Syrian watan, 
perhaps, and feel that their religion compels them onto this path.   
 
There is a tension.  Are the fighters merely aiding God as an end in itself, or do they themselves 
have agency and a worldly goal?  It seems that both these threads exist side by side and it is 
difficult to unpick them in the weave of a revolution and a war in which resources and men are 
critical to holding ground.  Here the temporal world, the concrete instance of war and fighting 
on a front line against a dictator, has become increasingly intertwined with the metaphysical 
notion of fighting to retain dignity in God’s name and as a duty to God.   The latter has become 
the best perlocutionary means to the former; but it is clear from Abdel Qader’s speech-acts that 
it would be a mistake to analyse his religiosity here as merely an instrument in service of the 
struggle.  It appears natural, unfeigned, impassioned.  This is perhaps why he was regarded as 
an effective leader. 
 
The logic of armed jihad is a core belief for these fighters who have inculcated this Islamic 
idiom in armed revolution.  It is intricately linked to the ideas of honour and dignity.  The 
armed struggle is one with which to strive to retain human dignity which has been eroded by 
the state.  The state, and Syria itself, is thus one of the most deeply contested concepts in this 
revolution and emerges through the thought practices of the fighters across the videos in this 
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chapter.  In this particular dialogue we saw how the state is notably and necessarily absent.  
The fighters have bypassed the state, which no longer serves or represents them, and their 
appeal is directly to God and their loyalty is directly to God and, in the struggle for honour and 
dignity, directly to the Syrian people and the Muslim ummah.   
 
The aim of this analysis has been to point to the main ideational currents flowing through the 
Islamist current in the revolution, as represented by what was regarded by many as the 
exemplary actions and practices of one of its most revered commanders and most effective 
battalions.  In the next video I examine some of the reactions and analysis following the 
martyrdom of Abdel Qader.  This final video will help us to get closer still to the ideas flowing 
in this armed struggle and how they have been reproduced and disseminated as well as 
inculcated among Syrian activists and supporters of the revolution.       
 
VI Video source four (VS4): ethics and values in the revolution39 
 
The fourth video I select for analysis is: ‘A special segment on the martyrdom of the 
commander Abdel Qader’, produced and aired on the Syrian revolutionary television channel, 
Orient News, on the 18 November 2013, one day after Abdel Qader’s death was confirmed.40  
The programme lasts nearly fifty minutes and begins with a news bulletin on events in Syria, 
followed by a video montage with images and footage of Abdel Qader; it then moves on to a 
discussion involving guests via Skype in Syria and a studio guest with the Orient presenter in 
                                                 
39 I am grateful to Muzna for summarising this interview and for discussing the content with me in order to clar-
ify some of the themes.  The translations here are sometimes paraphrased or in summary form.   
40 For full bibliographic information about this video source refer to Appendix One. 
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the studio in Amman, Jordan.  The programme segment I focus on is the analysis and 
commentary by the guests.   
 
The segment is informative for our purposes because it provides us with perspectives from 
Syrians who were involved in the revolution, knew and admired Abdel Qader and who worked 
to cover the activities of, or were familiar with the brigade and its military operations.  The 
interviews are particularly noteworthy as the Syrian commentators start to provide a moral 
picture of Abdel Qader: they focus on what they describe as his ethics (akhlaq) and values 
(qiyami).  The video is very insightful as it illustrates the ways in which Syrian media activists 
worked with the fighters and the brigades and so returns us to the discussion in the previous 
chapter, and earlier in this one, regarding a common Syrian-ness and unity of purpose, albeit 
articulated and acted on through different forms of resistance.   
 
I begin here with a quote from one of the studio guests, Islam Abu Shakeer, a writer and 
journalist, who sums up the values, or principles, which Abdel Qader represented and struggled 
for and which, more importantly, reflected the wider revolutionary spirit and summed up its 
aims: 
 
There are two principles here.  Freedom and dignity.  Freedom to choose the shape of 
the country and the shape of political life in the county and how politics is done in line 
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with your desire and wishes and nothing that is forced from the outside.  And dignity 
also, in ensuring there is everything to live a dignified life.41 
 
Once more we find dignity appearing with the notion of freedom as an essential component of 
life; people must be free to organise and to be active citizens in Syria.  As we have seen in the 
previous chapter(s), dignity is frequently close by when demands of freedom are being made 
by Syrians.  Dignity relates not just to being free to determine together the “shape of the 
country”; freedom (as opposed to ‘slavery’) is part of the whole of a dignified life.  The kind 
of life aspired to is that of a ‘normal’ one for the Syrian people. The implication from the 
commentary in this video is suggestive of a desire for ordinary Syrians to have more agency; 
for the pious, humble Syrians to be recognised, over prominent figures or personalities and 
politicians who claim to represent the Syrian people and for everyday religion, and Islam 
specifically, to be honoured.  
 
The ideas of dignity and freedom serve to frame this television debate; we can compare Abu 
Shakeer’s thinking with that of Abu Fares, another of the guests on the programme. Abu Fares 
was present in the hospital in Turkey when Abdel Qader died and for this programme he is 
being interviewed via Skype from Aleppo, Syria.  As a prominent media activist42 Abu Fares 
accompanied the fighters and reported on events from Aleppo.  His work is typical of, and part 
of, a well-established network of citizen journalists’ media centres established in Aleppo and 
across Syria in the first months of the revolution.  Abu Fares is emotional in his eulogising of 
Abdel Qader when asked about Abdel Qader the human being, he says: 
                                                 
41 The audio of the last sentence of this quote from the video interview is not clear so I have paraphrased this, 
with help from Muzna (see my acknowledgements page).   
42 He is introduced as a nashaat ‘ilaami by the Orient presenter. 
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He chose to raise arms when he saw the injustices of the Asad regime against the people. 
[H]e taught us many lessons.  He was like an intellectual school for us and his 
ideological teaching should be spread around Syria.43 
 
These striking words, suggesting a role for Abdel Qader almost parallel to that which we saw 
Saleh occupying in the previous chapter, came a day after Abdel Qader’s death and will have 
been broadcast via satellite on the Orient channel to audiences in Syria and across the Arab 
region as well as shared online.  The mood is one of high emotion in these conversations about 
Abdel Qader.  As someone who worked closely with the fighters to capture the battles and life 
in Aleppo for a wider audience, Abu Fares was keen to point out Abdel Qader’s exemplary 
role in the revolution.  He was looked up to and was like a muʿallim (teacher) for those in the 
revolution.   
 
Alongside Abu Fares’s heartfelt dedication to al-batl (the hero), Abu Shakeer reflects, too, on 
Abdel Qader the man, but is also at pains to emphasise that: 
 
The revolution has introduced to us leaders like Yasser Aboud, Yusef al-Jader44 and 
Abdel Qader . . . now they are gone, unfortunately, but that does not mean that their 
values do not remain.  The people who we will discover will follow the same ethical 
path of Syrian patriotism (wataniya), as exemplified by Abdel Qader. 
                                                 
43 These comments are made during a Skype call and the audio is not very clear.  
44 Al-Jader was a tank commander who defected from the Syrian army when he was instructed to fire on demon-
strators in a village in Lattakia.  His story is related by Yassin-Kassab, R. & al-Shami, L. 2016. op cit., 98-99.  
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Abu Shakeer goes on in the interview to elaborate and reflect further on Abdel Qader and what 
he stood for in the revolution.  In doing so he remarks how it is people like Abdel Qader who 
the Syrian government fears the most, more so than the extremists, because he was a real 
national leader dedicated to al-mashruʿa al-watani (the national project).  Through his analysis 
Abu Shakeer presents the revolution as a national project for Syria.  We can and to some extent 
should contrast this with the language used by some activists and by Abdel Qader himself 
elsewhere in this chapter – in which there is some ambiguity in the switch between using Syrian 
nation (watan) and the ummah (which could be taken to mean an Arabic nation or an Islamic 
nation when there is no qualifying adjective with it).   
 
There is also some tension during the discussion, in particular from Abu Shakeer, about not 
placing undue focus on Abdel Qader as an individual.  The guests on the programme constantly 
moderated the tone of the presenter, who was intent on lionising Abdel Qader as unique or 
exceptional. Abu Shakeer attended to this issue at other times during the interview: 
 
As Syria gave birth to Abdel Qader it too gave birth to people like him who are still 
working.  I just want to highlight an important point.  If we look at the reaction to his 
death we can see that everyone is sad for his death, not only as a man, as many did not 
know him personally; we are mourning the values of what he represented as a leader.  
This sense of values which other people claim have been diluted [in the revolution].  
This is not true.  What proves that the spirit of the revolution and the value and path of 
the revolution is still the right path is the case of this collective sadness about Abdel 
Qader and people like him who have died. . . Syrians are still Syrians and still believe 
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in their nation and there are thousands of leaders who could step up and be like Abdel 
Qader.45   
 
These comments reflect an important dimension and an historical tradition of Arab unity and 
perhaps of socialism in which socialist ideas of a collective, of an Arab people, of a Syrian 
watan or ummah, are privileged over those which give undue focus to the individual in society.  
This dimension is found in both the progressive and the Islamist currents I deal with in this 
research study.  Abu Shakeer is at pains to emphasise the collective nature of the struggle and 
the potential of the Syrian people to keep on representing the values and beliefs of the 
revolution.    His remarks are in this sense very hopeful, and part of an ongoing shared political 
project. 
 
Then the presenter brings in another guest who is also a media activist, Abu Hassan.  During 
the interview he relates how Abdel Qader was known by Syrians and by the whole Islamic 
world or nation, and he remarks, along somewhat similar lines to Abu Shakeer, that there will 
be many others like him to continue the ummah islamiyyah project [of liberation].  This sense 
of Abdel Qader as part of a shared, living project that is not confined to a short temporal 
duration is an important aspect of what emerges from these interviews. The guests each refer, 
through their various contributions during the interview, to the values and ethics that they felt 
Abdel Qader represented.  Abu Hassan describes how Abdel Qader was humble, of the people, 
and ate, prayed, and fought with the soldiers.   His struggle goes on, without him, with and 
through them. 
                                                 
45 This is paraphrased from the original video interview with the help of Muzna; see my acknowledgments page. 
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Abu Shakeer suggests that maybe Abdel Qader was disappointed with the formal Syrian 
opposition, the politicians in Istanbul, because they were not close to the people in Syria (the 
formal opposition has its base in Turkey).  Abu Shakeer remarks that Abdel Qader was a good 
character and says that he did not have any political agenda; he wanted only to embrace the 
national cause and his reputation was not tarnished, the implication being that some others’ 
have been.   
 
Abu Hassan mentions how leaders like Abdel Qader are just “normal Syrian citizens” and that 
Abdel Qader was normal [he was not a vain leader] and this is why he was loved before the 
revolution for the same qualities.   This sense of a ‘normal’ Syrian is also something which the 
studio guest Abu Shakeer suggests distinguished Abdel Qader from the extremists: 
 
Abdel Qader and people like him enjoy a natural kind of religiousness.  It is common 
between all of us.  This is the nature of Syrian society: Christians and Muslims are 
religious, we cannot escape the fact . . . we are religious but it is natural and normal and 
one [sect] does not cancel the other out [prefer].  They perceive of and honour the rights 
of others . . . this is the path of Abdel Qader and what he advocated.   
 
Abu Shakeer was here attempting to present a Syrian perspective and to delineate a distinctive 
Syrian people who are ordinary, and have a natural religious nature.  In doing so he was 
highlighting that Syrians (can and do) honour one another and respect difference across the 
religious groups in Syria.  There is a suggestion of a necessary dynamic of mutuality and of 
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respect, which, as we found in Chapter Four, importantly works with the concept of dignity 
and, inter-relationally, connects one with other humans and with the external world.  Abu 
Shakeer uses this explanation to distinguish the Syrian fighters from what he refers to as the 
more extremist fighters, particularly, he argues, those who are foreign fighters and have an 
extreme discourse and a pre-formed project of the shape of Syria and how it ‘must’ look after 
Asad falls.  Abu Shakeer emphasises that Abdel Qader left such decisions to the Syrians and 
how this chimed with “the values of the Syrian people”.   
 
The values and ethics of the Syrian revolution, in its culture and practices, cohere here 
especially around the core principles of dignity and freedom.  In this video discussion about 
Abdel Qader we have found it stated that Syrians were struggling for a dignity which could be 
honoured by freedom, in a political system which enabled active citizen participation. The 
analysis and commentary about Abdel Qader provide the contours of a Syrian popular 
sovereignty which I discussed in the previous chapter.  As well as the attention paid to the 
normal religious character of many Syrians, there is also mention of the ‘national project’ and 
of the liberation of Syria from Asad’s rule.  There is an attempt by the activists to set Abdel 
Qader apart from the more extremist Islamists and the banditry which has come to characterise 
the revolution in some parts of the liberated areas in Syria.  The values of Syrians are presented 
as being that of a nation who yearn for an inclusive Syria which, as Abu Shakeer claimed, “. . 
. honour the rights of others  . . .”  Still, even within this exchange of views on Abdel Qader 
the man, and on his politics and his religious nature, there is a tension and perhaps a 
contradiction which echoes the balancing act that Abdel Qader tried so precariously to perform 
when he was alive – to assuage his different publics and the variegated revolutionary actors 
inside Syria while avoiding fanning any sectarian discourses.   
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With some of the Aleppo media activists the idea of the Islamic ummah still holds sway as we 
find in their eulogising of Abdel Qader.  This is possibly because the ideas underpinning the 
revolution are held in common. There is a unity of purpose among the fighters, the media 
activists, and the ‘progressive’ intellectuals (whom we met in the previous chapter), about 
revolutionary ends.  There is also though, as we have started to unpick in this chapter, internal 
disagreement about the best means and about the encroachment of the Islamists across the 
revolutionary landscape. 
 
This tension is perhaps indicated in a more prescient voice from a member of the Orient 
audience who writes a message on the official Facebook page, which is read out by the 
presenter during the programme, about Abdel Qader’s death: “After the death of Abdel Qader 
a part of Syrian dignity went with him”.  The Battle of Aleppo was to be lost to both the Syrian 
government and to the nihilistic forces of ISIS.  Thus, the Syrian fighters had not managed, 
either through Abdel Qader’s brigade or in the ever-increasing new military formations, to 
return the Syrian people to dignity and to free them.   
 
VII Conclusion 
 
As I had indicated in the introduction, the ‘raw material’ for an analysis of this brigade was 
relatively scarce compared to the rich publication of the thought-practices of the first exemplar 
study and progressive trend in the revolution.  However, and for both of the exemplar cases, I 
had wanted to give space to and try to allow the ideas in the utterances and speech-acts to 
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breathe and speak for themselves, to some extent.  Hence why I choose to try to go deeply into 
just two revolutionary currents and not to gather multiple sources which might also reflect 
similar ideational patterns in the revolution.  
 
There is, of course, the attendant concern not to over-analyse and to revert to a textual analysis 
of a particular dialogue or article.  I have tried to synthesise and to embed the ideas we found 
in these two exemplars within the wider political context: not just that of revolution but also to 
reflect the Syrian and local cultural and logical constraints and issues where this is possible.  It 
is thus important to reiterate that I have not set out here to analysis words in a text or to conduct 
a discourse analysis (though this has its uses and there is some overlap with my method).  
Rather I have been analysing and interpreting a wider context and web of meaning: that is the 
ideas, patterns, and the broader ideational implications for the thought-practices as situated by 
these revolutionary agents. 
 
These two differing currents in Syria’s revolution gave me a valuable point of access for my 
investigation and interpretation of the idea of karama.  Using the idea of karama as an entry 
point seems to have provided a vision of these two trends which exhibit strikingly similar 
thoughts and ideas.  There is the common project of Syria, the assertion of and demand for a 
dignified Syrian life, and the attendant ideational features of such a life, including that of a 
being free and living in a just State and adhering to principle of equality for all.  This is the 
ideal sense of the revolutionary dignity when we trace the idea and pick out its relational 
concepts and see what it resides in close adjacency with.   
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However, as Connolly already alerted us to, such concepts of dignity are bound to contain an 
internal complexity and to take on differing hues depending on differing contexts and 
interactions in the social world.  Although we have been able to follow the threads of dignity 
and see the ways in which it has been decontested, there are layers of political implications 
which would require further inquiry.  So, for example, we have seen in many examples now 
that the idea of freedom helps to clarify what dignity is for the Syrian revolutionaries.  We were 
alerted to the ways in which the humiliations and injustices of Asadism had breached basic 
civil norms and torn at the very social fabric of Syrian society.  But what kind of freedom might 
be envisaged and how might a just society be ordered?  The contestation is at this level: the 
way that Islamic precepts and religious sensibilities are dealt with; the kinds of social and 
familial freedoms that the progressive liberals will guard and retain, and the manner of 
authority and nature of the polity vis-a-vis these social constraints and priorities.   
 
However, the aim of these two final chapters has been to start to pick out and pursue the thread 
of dignity and to see where it takes us.  In my examination of dignity explored through Syria’s 
armed and Islamist fighters there was situated an explicit commitment and justification for 
armed jihad: a resistance against tyranny and the desire for a happy life lived in dignity.  This 
dignified life was one in which, for these pious Muslims at least, they were free and respected 
rather than vilified within a modernist state project.  But this seemingly religious and traditional 
sense of dignity and honour also contains clear political implications for these fighters and for 
Syria; despite Abdel Qader’s protestations to the contrary.  There is, perhaps, nothing more 
political than taking up arms to effect a change in society.   
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But the problem starting to assert itself here, in an investigation of the dignity of the fighters, 
is that the distinctions made between the religious and the political have become blurred.  Partly 
this is because there is, of course, a political dimension in religion practiced in a secularising 
society, but importantly because the appeal to Allah permeates the discourse of the fighters—
in the speech-acts of Abdel Qader, in the revolutionary culture among the fighters and in the 
ways in which religious belief comes to the fore and becomes the only thing the men feel they 
can rely on.  In the shifting sands of war the social and political context of dignity is constantly 
on the move—the more violence and extreme the conditions the further the assertion of dignity 
and the fight for it moves into a metaphysical realm.  It is only here, perhaps, that the fighters 
can safeguard the brotherly, Syrian, dignity which they first took up arms to fight for.       
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Conclusion 
 
 
In my conclusion I aim to draw out the main themes from my findings and to briefly 
speculate on the wider implications of and future possibilities for my research.  This thesis 
set out to address my main research question: what were the uses and meanings of the 
concept of dignity in Syria’s revolution?  
 
I achieved this by situating an investigation of karama within its diachronic—historical—
and ideational context.  I analysed the idea of dignity as it emerged in two differing 
revolutionary currents and I showed how dignity was decontested in relation to other 
priorities and virtues in the thought-practices of Syria’s revolutionary agents. The potency 
of the idea of karama weaved a wider web and structure of meaning which was clarified in 
relation to resistance and the struggle for freedom and equality.  Dignity’s release from its 
ideational margins was a harbinger of the imminent and urgent resistance forming to protest 
the state’s long indifference as to the “absences, erasures, demands and lacunae” building 
up in the Syrian polity and society.1  Dignity signified the history that could have been and 
was articulated, and then activated, as a virtue held dear by the Syrian people in Syria’s 2011 
revolution. 
    
Syrian revolutionaries were both interrupting historical convention, assumed inherent in the 
‘burden of history’, and also refashioning ideas from it.  This attempt in the “making and 
remaking of the past, the making and remaking of the future”2 inaugurated the deep political 
                                                 
1 Cited in Norton (2010), op cit. Drawing on Spivak, G. (1988) ’Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in C. Nelson & 
Grossberg, L. eds. Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Champaign IL: University of Illinois Press. 
2 Norton (2010) op cit., 340. 
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excavations Syrians have undertaken in their revolution. They pursued an alternative 
history-in-the-making which was necessarily non-linear—the messy, non-sequential 
processes within which conceptual change (and in this context, political change) takes place 
and which, in ideal form, would free them from the clutches of authoritarian power.3  The 
imagined future would usher in a new ethos and civic republican logic (in any number of 
possible secular and/or Islamist variants) in which the Syrian people are centre and sovereign 
and thus reject, as illegitimate, the state in its current repressive structure and functions.  The 
speedy entrance of karama, from Syria’s ideological margins, constituted a form of 
revolutionary rupture and praxis, evident from the first demonstrations and actions of 
Syrians in 2011.    
 
To explore the function of dignity, in the revolutionary interregnum, in service of this 
imagined future, I reviewed the most influential contributions in the literatures which dealt 
with theories of revolution and with ideas, and ideology, in revolutions.  I found that there 
had been some productive developments in the study of revolution, which gave voice to 
people in revolutions and sought to factor them into their analyses.  However, I concluded 
that there remained an influential underlying epistemological commitment to the definition-
causation-outcomes nexus on revolutions that have occurred in history.  The Syrian 
revolution provided new opportunities for researchers to investigate modern revolutions.  
Importantly, once again, people and their ideas were on the move and within this moment 
dignity gathered pace.   
 
                                                 
3 See Zoubi, O. (2016) ‘The legend of the flood: beginning and end of the revolution’, published online: 
alhumhuriyeh.net, May 12.   
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How might researchers engage with and analyse these significant political and ideational 
moves, with Syrians at the centre and claiming their ‘dignity revolution’?  In Chapter Two 
I pursued productive avenues for a research methodology within a sub-field of interpretive 
political theory concerned with the critical study of political ideologies and contested 
concepts.  I showed how this sub-field gives serious attention to ‘ideas in the wild’, in the 
beliefs, utterances and speech-acts of people in the everyday and beyond the realm of or in 
contention with state-centric, narrowly-conceived ‘formal’ politics.  Due importance is 
placed on meaning as, to a significant degree, contingent; and, on a particular concept’s 
historic and political situatedness.  So rather than seek to pin down a unitary definition of 
dignity I instead clarified the idea in its usages and functions; and, relationally with other 
organising ideas.  In short I did not seek to offer a fixed or unitary definition of dignity but 
‘thought’ dignity through an interpretive analysis and as constituting a complex structure of 
meaning-in-use.  
 
This research thus opens out to possible future avenues of exploration, not least in tracing 
some of the complex and interweaving threads of dignity in use, of its related ideas and how 
they play out in differing contexts.  This could productively include analysis of the social 
(class, tribe) and the gendered implications for dignity.    
 
Research findings 
In this thesis I have shown and argued that the idea of karama was central in and to the 
revolutionary ethos in Syria.  Having analysed the western tradition of dignity I found that 
its foundational and highly individual conceptions of dignity are, in some important ways, 
starkly different to the colonial and revolutionary context we examined.  In the colonies 
dignity was articulated in a radically ‘Fanonian’ way which rejected colonial rule. The felt 
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alienation by the colonised peoples, and the response of a dignity in resistance, is 
transported to and recast in a different frame in Syria in 2011: tyranny at home, rather than 
from foreign lands.  
 
My investigation into dignity was conducted in a ‘live’ revolution (and ensuing conflict). In 
my exemplar studies I showed how dignity appeared in the revolution as a fundamental 
‘belief challenge’ to the Syrian state and to tyranny (as in history).  The concept emerged 
from an ideational periphery from where it had been long neglected and pushed to the 
margins—an historical promise in the colonial struggle deemed as won.   
 
In the Syrian revolution dignity signified that the ideas struggled for and desired by the 
people remained to be achieved.  There was a vast ideational lacuna between the idea(l)s 
held by the Syrian people and the state which humiliated them.  The gulf between the 
ideational claims of the Syrian state Ba’thism—for unity, freedom, socialism—and parallel 
unfulfilled liberatory and collective desires of the people created space for new political 
imaginaries to emerge when the Arab revolutions started to bear fruit.   
 
The appearance of dignity, in the beginnings of the revolution, sheds light on a new 
emerging Syrian revolutionary subject: that of a dignified Syrian people. In particular the 
dignity revolution asserts its own logic of resistance and the virtue of resisting resides, in 
the Syrian villages, towns, and cities, with the people active and participating in it. The idea 
of dignity exemplifies a deep sense of estrangement felt by a majority of Syrians who were 
treated as outsiders by the state and authorities. Dignity represented the urge for change and 
for an end to tyranny. Within this frame, the force of and trajectory of dignity is clarified.     
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The path towards this Syrian dignity requires a complete recasting of society and a 
recognition of the equal dignity of all of Syria's citizens.  In particular, the revolution 
reflected the grievances of the Shawi, marginalised and humiliated by the authorities.  One 
conception of the Syrian people is based on the revolutionary idea that that the Islamic and 
Muslim Ummah should be respected and that pious and religious Muslims in Syria should 
feel free. Somewhat similarly, Syrian revolutionaries wrote about and spoke of the urge to 
be free from slavery under Bashar al-Asad and to feel and be free.  A dignified Syrian life, 
then, is one lived in freedom.  
 
Closely tied to the desire for a free and equal society was the idea of and importance of 
Syrian unity in the ways it was articulated and felt in common by Syrians participating in 
the revolution. These ideas were at the very core of the the Arab Baʿth movement in its 
formative years.  With good reason.  As we saw, in the unequal society and policies under 
Asad rule divisions undermined the beliefs which Syrians adhered to: not least of all the 
very idea of ‘Syria’ and being Syrian.  Unity seems impossible for now under polarising 
conditions of war, but will remain and be reconfigured in the future.  The writings of Syrian 
intellectuals has shown its potential but the divisive frontline have increasingly absented it 
too.   
 
Today as Syria, with its war economy, and deeply polarised and traumatised publics, lurches 
further towards even more extreme and chauvinistic forms of secularism4 and goes as far as 
inviting fascistic tendencies into its ideological parlour, the importance of greater attention 
to the complexities of and the range of ideas which go to make up our ideological world 
                                                 
4 For an example of which see the Syrian-directed and government supported film: intithar al khareef 
(Waiting for the Fall) directed by Rehab Ayoub (2014). 
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takes on new and increasing urgency.  This means, drawing from Freeden, considering the 
whole spectrum of ideas in their ideological patterns—the appraisive ones we hope and 
strive for as well as the ones which we doubt or which repulse us.  Crucial to this endeavour 
is to recover the black box of ideological pretenders and to really attempt to open it and to 
‘see’ its contents; what is actually happening so that the lessons we draw and the things we 
learn are based on actual real ideas in use and not on the artistry of embedded and assumed 
patterns of discourse, official or otherwise.           
 
The two exemplar studies I showcased are both concerned with pursuing ideas and practices 
in unity of cause for the revolution.  As already mentioned, their ideas cohered in significant 
ways: the revolution for dignity and to gain a dignified life obtained through a just system 
made up of the Syrian ummah or watan.  An imaginary in which all Syrians enjoy freedoms 
and are treated equally and with respect. But, both currents had the potential to move towards 
the extremes and to prioritise ideas which polarised or estranged the other.    
 
Further avenues of inquiry 
Future directions and research on Syria must necessarily overcome the snap reaction to 
dismiss politics and the political realm based on the failure of or rather the decimation of the 
ideals of the Arab Baʿth project in Syria.  It is commonplace to dismiss the defunct ideology 
of the Syrian Baʿth party in power under Asad.  It is axiomatic.  But, as he remains in ‘power’ 
we must ask more questions about Asad’s ruling ideology, organised and closely gathering 
particular configurations of ‘modernism’, ‘secularism’, and ‘security’ underpinned by and 
enacted with adjacent mechanisms such as violence, fear, and coerced consent.  As we have 
seen in the analysis of intellectuals like Saleh, there is no place for the actual ‘practice’ of 
the ‘mosaic’ in this Asadism.  The exclusionary nature of the ideology is clarified in relation 
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to the necessity to privilege and to practice the violent control of a people. Thus what is in 
place in these remnants of Syria is a forced and long lost legitimacy.     
  
The ideological furniture of Baʿthism, worn and long misused, together with its established 
‘logical’ placement of resistance, is radically and irrevocably unseated.  The uprising 
immediately, and necessarily, tears at the very ideological fabric of Asadism and begins to 
sever the ideational threads of the established order.  The implication of this for the ruling 
elite became immediately clear: as dangerous to the desired status quo and a threat to the 
foundations of Asad’s ‘modernist’ and ‘secular’ rule.  The revolution was impatient to sweep 
out the old, perhaps repairing and recycling that which was desirable but never functioned 
properly; such as ideas of unity and of being Syrian.  Aside from the obvious, and 
anomalous, encroachment of ISIS in Syria’s failed state conditions: what kind of Asadism 
will we see in the future, with or without Bashar at the helm?   
 
Equally, a morphological analysis of ideologies would be a useful tool for analysis of the 
forming or consolidating ideas in the conflict, for example the Syrian Kurdish project in the 
north of Syria, the tribes and brigades in the south of Syria, and the formal oppositions 
formed in the revolution, in exile and in Syria.  The so-called loyalist areas controlled by the 
government and army are not immune to this tide of change.  A new culture of demonstrating 
when wrongs are done has already taken hold.  What kinds of beliefs have taken hold in 
these areas and might we still find common purpose in a possible socially and geographically 
cohesive future.  In other words, what has happened to the concept of ‘Syria’ and to what 
extent might it hold and transform?  The detailed and complex micro-politics of these 
localised developments have been outside the scope of this study but my research approach 
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provides productive ways in which to seek to get closer to ideas in times of flux, rather than 
wait for expected outcomes so as to pick at the historical artefacts.  
 
Finally, this study only begins the process of learning more about Syrian political thought 
and disseminating ideas and practices from the texts and utterances of Syrian (informal) 
political agents.  My necessarily partial and provisional exploration of the Syrian revolution 
through the lens of the idea of dignity has enabled us to actually see the important 
revolutionary processes and actions—instances which, I have argued in this thesis, would 
be absented in much conventional study of revolutions.  Syria’s 2011 revolution must have 
its place among the modern revolutions, despite the devastating curtailment of it and the all-
out war which ensued.        
  
306 
 
 
Bibliography  
 
Abisaab, R. J.  (2016) ‘Peasant Uprisings in Astarabad: the Siyāh Pūshān [wearers of 
black], the Sayyids, and the Safavid State’, Iranian Studies, 49:3, 471-492 
Abou El-Fadl, K. (2004) in Cohen, J. & Chasman, D. Islam and the Challenges of 
Democracy, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
Abu Lughod, L. (1986) Veiled Sentiments: Honour and poetry in a Bedouin society. 
Berkeley: University of California Press 
Abu-Lughod, L. (2004) Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Achcar, G. (2013) The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising, London: 
Saqi Books 
Althusser, L. (1971/2008) Chapter One: ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
(notes towards an investigation)’, On Ideology, London, New York: Verso 
Amilcar, C. (1980) Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writing 
Ansell, K. & Large, D. eds. (2006) The Nietzsche Reader, Oxford: Blackwell 
Arendt, H. (1963/2006 reprint) On Revolution, London: Penguin Classics 
Armbrust, W. (2012) ‘The Revolution Against Neoliberalism’, in Haddad, Bassam, et al 
eds. The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?  London: Pluto Press   
Armbrust, W. (1996) Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Arthur, C.J. (1974) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart 
Austin, J.L. (1979) ‘Performative Utterances’, Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 233-252 
Aya, R. (1979) ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective 
Violence’, Theory and Society, 8:1, 39-99 
Ayres, L. (2000) ’Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology’, in Dodaro, R. & Lawless, G. (eds) 
Augustine and His Critics, London: Routledge 
Ayubi, N. (2009) Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, 
London: I.B.Tauris  
  
307 
 
Azikiwe, A (2016) Stokely Carmichael, ‘Black Power and the age of political oppression’, 
in The Spirit of Biko: Struggles for Black dignity continue’, 16 June, Pambazuka News, 
790, published online at pambazuko.org, accessed October 2016 
al-Azmeh, A. (1996)  Islams and Modernities, 2nd edn., London: Verso 
Ball, T. (2007) ‘Professor Skinner’s Vision’, Political Studies Review, 5, 351 
Bastow, S., Martin, J., and Pels, D. (2002) ‘Introduction: Third Ways in Political 
Ideology’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 7:3, 269-280  
Batatu, H. (1999) Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and 
Their Politics, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
Baum, B. (2015) ‘Decolonising Critical Theory’, Constellations, 22, 420-34 
Bayat, A. (2010) Life as Politics: how ordinary people change the Middle East, California: 
Stanford University Press 
Bayefsky, R. (2013) ‘Dignity, Honour, and Human Rights: Kant’s Perspective’, Political 
Theory, 4:6, 809-837 
BBC News (2013) ‘Top Syrian Rebel Commander Dies”, BBC News report online, 18 
November, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24984365, 
accessed December 2016 
Beinin, J. (2001) Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Beinin, J. & Vairel, F. (2011) Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the 
Middle East and North Africa, California: Stanford University Press 
Bell, D. (1962) The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, 
New York: Free Press 
Benjamin, S. and Hackstaff, L.H. (1964) Third Edition, Augustine: On free Choice of the 
Will, Indianapolis, New York, Kansas: The Bobs-Merrill Co. Inc 
Bonura, C. (2013) ‘Theorising Elsewhere: Comparison and Topological Reasoning in 
Political Theory’, Polity, 45:1 
Browers, M. (2009) Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and 
Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Browers, M. (2016) ‘Arab Political Thought after 2011 (Lines of Inquiry for a Research 
Agenda)’, 24 January, published online at www.thedisorderofthings.com 
Cameron, D. (2006) ‘Ideology and Language’, Journal of Political Ideologies, June, 11:2, 
141- 152 
  
308 
 
Chalcraft, J. & Noonan, Y. eds. (2007) Counterhegemony in the colony and postcolony, 
Hants: Palgrave Macmillan 
Chalcraft, J. (2016) Popular Politics in the Making of the Middle East, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Chambers, S. A. & Carver, T. eds. (2008) William E. Connolly: Democracy, Pluralism, 
and Political Theory, London: Routledge 
Chandra, U. (2013) ‘The Case for a Postcolonial Approach to the Study of Politics’, New 
Political Science, 35:3, 480 
Chatty, D. (2010) ‘The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal 
Authority and Control’, The Middle East Journal, 64:1, 29-49 
Chomsky, N. (2013), ‘Violence and Dignity: Reflections on the Middle East’, The Edward 
W. Said Lecture, Friends House, London, 18 March. 
Chulov, M. (2012) ‘France funding Syrian rebels in new push to oust Assad’, The 
Guardian online, 7 December, 2012 
Ciccariello-Maher, G. (2016) ‘Decolonising Theory from Within or Without? A Reply to 
Baum, Constellations, 23:1, 133-137 
Clark, M.T. (ed.) (1972) An Aquinas Reader: selections from the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas, New York: Image Books 
Cleveland, W. L. (1971) The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in 
the Life and Though of Sati’ Al-Husri, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Cole, J. (1999) Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural 
Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi Movement, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press 
Connolly, W.E. (1967/2008) Political Science and Ideology, New Brunswick: Aldine 
Transaction 
Connolly, W. E. (1996) ‘Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming’, Culture, 
Medicine and Psychiatry, 20 
Connolly, W. E. (1993) The Terms of Political Discourse, third edition, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers 
Cooper, J. et al (2000) Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond, London: I. B. 
Tauris & Co. Limited 
Crystall, J. (2004) ‘Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World’, World 
Politics, 46:2: 262-289 
  
309 
 
Davis, J. (1969) ‘The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some 
Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion’, in Violence in America, Graham, Graham, 
Hugh & Gurr, Ted, eds., New York: Signet Books, 671-709 
Eastwood, J. (2008) ‘The role of ideas in Weber’s theory of interests’, Critical Review: A 
Journal of Politics and Society, 17,1-2, 89-100  
Eisenstein, E. (1986) ‘On revolution and the printed word’, in Porter, Roy & Teich, 
Mikuláš, eds., Revolution in History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Enayat, H. (1982) Modern Islamic Political Thought, MacMillan Press Limited 
Esposito, J. ed. (1983) Voice of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Esposito, J. (1991) Islam: the straight path, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Fairclough, N. (1989) Language and Power, New York: Longman Inc.   
Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press  
Fairclough, N. (1994) Critical Discourse Analysis, London: Longman 
Fanon, F. (1961/1963) The Wretched of the Earth, Middlesex: Penguin Books 
Feierabend, I., Feierabend, R. & Nesvold, B. (1969) ‘Social Change and Political 
Violence: Cross National Patterns’, in Violence in America, Graham, Hugh & Gurr, Ted 
Robert, eds., New York: Signet Books, 606-668 
Finlayson, A. (1999) ‘Third Way Theory’, in Political Quarterly, 70:3, 271-279  
Finlayson, A. & Valentine, J. (2002) Politics and Post-structuralism: An Introduction, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
Finlayson, A. (2007) ‘From Beliefs to Arguments: Interpretive Methodology and 
Rhetorical Political Analysis,’ Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9:4, 545-
563 
Finlayson, A. ed. (2010) Democracy and Pluralism: The Political Thought of William E 
Connolly, London: Routledge  
Finlayson, A. (2012) ‘Rhetoric and the Political Theory of Ideologies’, Political Studies, 
60, 751-767 
Foran, J. (1993) ‘Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?’ 
Sociological Theory, 11:1, March, 1-20 
 
Foran, J. ed. (1997) Theorising Revolutions, London: Routledge 
Foran, J. (2005) Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
  
310 
 
Franzen, J. (2011) Red Star over Iraq: Iraqi Communism before Saddam, London: Hurst & 
Company 
Fraser, N. (2009) Scales of Justice: reimaging political space in a globalizing world, 
Columbia: Columbia University Press 
Frazer, E. (2008) ‘The boundaries of Politics’, in Leopold, D. & Stears, M. (2008) 
Political theory: methods and approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Freeden, M. (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Freeden, M. (2003) Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Freeden, M. ed. (2007) The Meaning of Ideology: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives, 
Oxford: Routledge 
Freeden, M. (2008) ‘Thinking Politically and thinking about Politics: language, 
interpretation, and ideology’, in Leopold, D. & Stears, M. eds., Political Theory: methods 
and approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Freeden, M. (2013) The Political Theory of Political Thinking: The Anatomy of a Practice, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Freeden, M. & Vincent, A. (2013a) Comparative Political Thought: Theorizing practices, 
Oxon: Routledge 
Freeden, M. (2013b) ‘The morphological analysis of ideology’, in Freeden, M., Sargent, 
L.T., & Stears, M. The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Freeden, M. (2014) ‘Editorial: the ‘political turn’ in political theory’, Journal of Political 
Ideologies, 19, 1 Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, New York: 
Avon 
Geertz, C. (1973) See Chapter Eight: ’Ideology as a Cultural System’, in The 
Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 193-233 
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
Gelvin, J. (1998) Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of 
Empire Berkeley: University of California Press 
George, A. (2003) Syria: Neither Bread Nor Freedom. London: Zed Books 
Gerges, F. (2013) Interview for: ‘The Making of the Modern Arab World’, Episode 2, 
BBC Radio 4 documentary series, presented by Tarek Osman and first broadcast in 
December, 2013 
Gerges, F. ed. (2014) The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
  
311 
 
Geuss, R. (2008) Philosophy and Real Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press  
Goldstone, J. (1980) ‘Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation’, World Politics, 32:3, 
425-453 
Goldstone, J. (1982) ‘The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions’, Annual 
Review of Sociology, 8, 187-207 
Goldstone, J. (2010) ‘From Structure to Agency to Process: The Evolution of Charles 
Tilly’s Theories as Reflected in his Analysis of Contentious Politics’, The American 
Sociologist, 2010, 41:4, 358-367  
Goodwin, J. & Jasper, J.M. (1999) ‘Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural 
Bias of Political Process Theory’, Sociological Forum, 14, 27-54 
Goodwin, J. & Skocpol, T. (1994) ‘Explaining Revolutions in the contemporary Third 
World’, in Skocpol, Theda (1994) Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Goto-Jones, C. (2013) ‘When is comparative political thought (not) comparative?’ In 
Freeden, M. & Vincent, A. (2013) Comparative Political Thought: theorizing practices, 
Oxon: Routledge, 158-180 
Green, J E. (2015) ‘Political Theory as Both Philosophy and History: A Defense Against 
Methodological Militancy’, Annual Review of Political Science, 425-441 
Gunnell, J.G. (2011) Political Theory and Social Science: Cutting Against the Grain, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Gurr, T. R. (1970) Why Men Rebel, Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
Haddad, B. (2012) Business Networks in Syria: the political economy of authoritarian 
resilience, California: Stanford University Press 
Haddad, B. (2013) ‘Syria’s Third Gruelling Summer: what should one write about?’ 
Available at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12488/syria’s-third-grueling-
summer_what-should-one-writ Jadaliyya online, June 29, accessed 24 January, 2014 
Halasa, M, Omareen, Z. & Mahfoud, F. (2014) Syria Speaks: Art and Culture from the 
Frontline, London: Saqi Books 
Hamdy, S. 2012. Our bodies belong to God: organ transplants, Islam and the struggle for 
human dignity in Egypt, Berkeley/LA: University of California Press 
Hanieh, A. (2013) Lineages of Revolt: issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle 
East, Chicago: Haymarket Books 
  
312 
 
Hanioglu, S.M. (1991) ‘The Young Turks and the Arabs Before the Revolution of 1908, in 
R. Khalidi, L. Anderson, M. Muslih and R. S. Simon in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, 
New York: Columbia University Press 
Hanvey, J. (2014) ‘Dignity, Person and Imago Trinitatis’, in McCrudden, C. ed. 
Understanding Human Dignity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209-229 
Harkin, J. et al (2012)’Deciphering User-Generated Content in Transitional Societies: A 
Syria Coverage Case Study’, Commissioned Report by the Center for Global 
Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of 
Pennsylvania, Washington DC: Internews Center for Innovation and Learning, Internews 
Network. available at https://innovation.internews.org/research/deciphering-user-
generated-content-transitional-societies-syria-coverage-case-study, accessed December, 
2016 
Harkin, J. (2013) ’Is it possible to understand the Syrian revolution through the prism of 
social media?’ Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 9:2, London: 
Communication and Media Research Institute, University of Westminster, 93-112 
Harkin, J. & Read, R. (2016) ‘Review of Michael Temelini’s Wittgenstein and the Study 
of Politics’, The Review of Politics, 78:2, 329-331 
Haugbolle, S. (2012) ‘Reflections on Ideology after the Arab Uprisings’, March 21, 
available at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4764/reflections-on-ideology-after-the-
arab-uprisings, accessed January 2014 
Haugbolle, S. (2015) ‘Moving through the Interregnum: Yassin al-Haj Saleh in the Syrian 
revolution’, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, 8, 13-36  
Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 205-6 
Hay, C. (2009) ‘King Canute and the “Problem” of Structure and Agency: On Times, 
Tides and Heresthetics’, Political Studies, 57:2, 260-279 
Hazeeresingh, S. & Nabulsi, K. (2008) ‘Using archival sources to theorize about politics’, 
in Political Theory: methods and approaches, Leopold, D. & Stears, M. (eds) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press  
Heydemann, S. & Leenders, R. eds. (2013) Middle East Authoritarianisms: governance, 
contestation, and Regime resilience in Syria and Iran, California: Stanford University 
Press 
Hinnebusch, R. (2001) Syria: Revolution from Above. New York: Routledge 
Hinnebusch, R. (2009) ‘Syria Under the Baʿth: The Political Economy of Populist 
Authoritarianism.’ In Hinnebusch, Raymond & Schmidt Soren. eds., The State and the 
  
313 
 
Political Economy of Reform in Syria, Scotland: University of St Andrews Centre for 
Syrian Studies, 5-24. 
Hinnebusch, R. (2009) “Syria Under the Baʿth: The Political Economy of Populist 
Authoritarianism.” In Hinnebusch, Raymond & Schmidt Soren. eds., The State and the 
Political Economy of Reform in Syria, Scotland: University of St Andrews Centre for 
Syrian Studies, 5-24 
 
Hoare, Q & Nowell Smith, G. eds (1971/1986 reprint) Selections from Prison the 
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, London: Lawrence & Wishart 
Hobsbawm, E. (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Hollingdale, R. J. trans. (1990) The Anti–Christ(ian), Penguin Books, Introduction by 
Michael Tanner 
Holy Bible, The (1929) Revised Version, The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hourani, A. (1946) Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, London: Oxford University 
Press 
Hourani, A. (1968) ‘Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables’ in Beginnings of 
Modernisation in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, Polk, W. & Chambers, R. eds. 
Chicago, 41-68 
Hourani, A. (1983, reprint) Arabic thought in the liberal age 1798-1939, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Hourani, A. (1991/2005) A History of the Arab Peoples, London: Faber & Faber  
Howarth, D. (2005) ‘Applying Discourse Theory: the Method of Articulation’, in 
Howarth, David & Torfing, Jacob, Discourse Theory in European Politics: identity, Policy 
and Governance, Hants & New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Howarth, D. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) ‘Introducing discourse theory and political 
analysis’, 1-23, in Howarth, D., Norval, A. & Stavrakakis, Y. eds (2000) Discourse theory 
and political analysis: identities, hegemonies and social change, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 
Howarth, D., Norval, A. & Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: identities, hegemonies and social change, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 
R. Hrair Dekmejian. (1971) Egypt under Nasir: a study in political dynamics, 1st edn. 
Albany: State University of New York Press 
  
314 
 
Hroub, K. (2010) Political Islam: context versus ideology, London: Middle East Institute, 
The School of Oriental and African Studies  
Hudson, M. (2012) ‘Awakening, Cataclysm, or Just a Series of Events? Reflections on the 
Current Wave of Protest in the Arab World’, in Haddad, Bassam, et al (eds.) The Dawn of 
the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?  London: Pluto Press   
Hunt, L. (1984) Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, Berkeley & Los 
Angeles: University of California Press 
Hunt, L. (2014) ‘Louis XVI Wasn’t Killed by Ideas: This is what happens if you ignore the 
role of politics in intellectual history’, Book Review published online, New Republic, 28 
June 
International Crisis Group (2011) ‘Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East 
(V1): The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide’, Middle East/North Africa Report, 
International Crisis Group, 108, July 6, 2011 
Ismail, S. (2010) ‘Changing Social Structure, Shifting Alliances and Authoritarianism in 
Syria’, in Lawson, Fred, ed. (2009) Demystifying Syria, London: Saqi in association with 
the London Middle East Institute, 13-28 
Ismail, S. (2011) ‘The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation’, in Studies 
in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 11:3, 538-549 
Israel, J. (2014) Revolutionary Ideas: An intellectual history of the French Revolution from 
The Rights of Man to Robespierre, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press  
Jackson, B. & Stears, M. (2012) Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in Honour of Michael 
Freeden; Oxford: Oxford University Press 
al-Jazeera Arabic (2013) Taysir Allouni interview with Abdel Qader Saleh, Meeting Today 
programme, on 16 June, published online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_xXU9YaRLc, accessed December, 2016 
Joffe, G. (2011) ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa: origins and prospects’, The Journal of 
North Africa Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, December, 507-532 
Kamali, M. H. (2002) The Dignity of Man: An Islamic Perspective, Cambridge: The 
Islamic Texts Society 
Kant, I. (1886) The Metaphysics of Ethics, third edition, translated by Semple, J. W., 
Edinburgh: T & T Clark  
Kant, I. (1998) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed./trans. Gregor, M. New 
York: Cambridge University Press 
Kasseb, E. S. (2010) Contemporary Arab thought: cultural critique in comparative 
perspective, New York: Columbia University Press 
  
315 
 
Kasseb, E. S. (2012) ‘The Arab Quest for Freedom and Dignity: Have Arab Thinkers Been 
Part of It?’ Middle East Topics & Arguments, Vol. 1, available at http://meta-
journal.net/article/view/1038 , accessed January 2014 
Kassir, S. (2006) Being Arab, trans. Hobson, W. London, New York: Verso 
Kateb, G. (2011) Human Dignity, Massachusetts: The Belknap of Harvard University 
Press 
al-Kawakibi, A. (c1889) The Nature of Tyranny (trans.), Cairo: unknown publisher 
Kaylani, N.M. (1972) ‘The Rise of the Syrian Baʿth, 1940-1958: Political Success, Party 
Failure’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3:1, January, 3-23 
Keddie, N. (1981) Roots of Revolution: An interpretive History of Modern Iran, New 
Haven: Yale University Press 
Keddie, N. (1982) ‘Comments on Skocpol’, Theory and Society, 11:3, May, 285-292 
Kedourie, E. (1960) Nationalism, London: Hutchinson and Co. 
Khalidi, R., Anderson, L., Muslih, M. and Simon, R. S. (1991) The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press 
Khalidi, R. (2012) ‘Preliminary Historical Observations on the Arab Revolutions of 2011’, 
in Haddad, Bassam, et al (eds.) The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order?, 
London: Pluto Press   
Khoury, P. (1983) Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 
1860-1920, Cambridge University Press 
Khoury, P. (1987) Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-
1945, London: I.B. Tauris 
Kienle, E. ed. (1994) Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold 
Peace, London: British Academic Press, CNMES, SOAS 
Kienle, E. (1995) ‘Arab Unity Schemes Revisited: Interest, Identity, and Policy in Syria 
and Egypt’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27:1, February, 53-71 
Koselleck, R. (1985) Futures Past, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 
Kovesi, J. (1967) Moral Notions, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Krause, S. (1999) ‘The Politics of Distinction and Disobedience: Honor and the Defense of 
Liberty in Montesquieu’, Polity, 31:3 (Spring), 469-499 
Kumar, K. (1989) Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
  
316 
 
Laclau, E. (no date) ‘Philosophical Roots of Discourse Theory’, Archived Papers, Centre 
for Theoretical Studies: University of Essex 
Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985/2014) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Polity, second edition. London, New York: Verso 
Lakoff, G. (2006) Whose Freedom: The Battle over America’s most Important Idea, 
Picador  
Laroui, A. (1967) L’ideologie arabe contemporaine, Paris: Maspero 
Laroui, A. (1874) La Crise des intellectuels arabes: traditionalisme ou historicisme?, 
Paris: Maspero 
Lawson, F. (1981) ‘Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt, 1820-1824, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 13, 131-153 
Lawson, F. ed. (2009) Demystifying Syria, London: Saqi in association with the London 
Middle East Institute 
Lawson, G. (2011) ‘Halliday’s Revenge: revolutions and International Relations’, 
International Affairs, 87, 5, 1067-1085 
Lawson, G. (2012) ‘After the Arab Spring: power shift in the Middle East? The Arab 
uprisings: revolution or protests?’ in Kitchen, Nicholas, eds., LSE Ideas, London:  London 
School of Economics and Political Science  
Lawson, G. (2004) Negotiated revolutions: the Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile, 
Aldershot: Ashgate 
Lefebvre, G. (1962) The French Revolution From its Origins to 1793, London: Routledge 
Lefévre, R. (2013) Ashes of Hama: The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, London: C. Hurst & 
Co., Limited 
Leith, J.(2001) ‘History of Revolutions’, in Smelser, Neil & Baltes, Paul, Eds., 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences, vol. 20, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier 
Leopold, D. (2013) ‘Marxism and Ideology: From Marx to Althusser’, in Freeden, 
Michael, Sargent Lyman Tower & Stears Marc (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Lesch, D. (2015) Lecture: ‘The Slow Fix: The CDI-Trinity Syria Initiative’, 3rd Biannual 
Conference of the Centre for Syrian Studies, University of St. Andrews, 1-3 July 2015 
Lund, A. (2013) ‘The death of Abdulqader Saleh’ Syriacomment blog published online, 17 
November, 2013, available at: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/death-abdelqader-
saleh/?print=true 
  
317 
 
Lund, A. (2013) ‘Islamist Groups Declare Opposition to National Coalition and US 
Strategy’, published on syriaComment, September 24, 2013.  Available at:  
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/major-rebel-factions-drop-exiles-go-full-islamist/, 
accessed September 2015 
Lyotard, J.F. (1979) La Condition postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir. Paris: Éditions de 
Minuit 
MacIntyre, A. (1973) ‘Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution’, Comparative Politics, 
Special Issue on Revolution and Social Change, April, 5:3, 321-342 
Macleod, H. (2011) ‘Inside Deraa’, published online, 19 April, on 
www.aljazeera.com/indepth, accessed February 2016 
Makdisi, U. (2000) The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in 
Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon, Berkeley & California: University of California 
Press, Limited 
Mamdani, M. (2001) When victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda. New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
Markell, P. (2015) ‘Unexpected Paths’, Theory & Event, 19:1  
Markoff, J. (2001) ‘Sociology of Revolutions’, in Smelser, Neil & Baltes, Paul, Eds., 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences, vol. 20, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier 
Marlin, D. (2005) “The State of the Musalsal: Arab Television Drama and Comedy and the 
Politics of the Satellite Era.” Transnational Broadcasting Studies, 1:2 
Martin, J. (2005) ‘Ideology and antagonism in modern Italy’: Poststructuralist Reflections, 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8:2, 145-160 
Martin, K. M. (2015) Syria’s Democratic Years: Citizens, Experts, and Media in the 
1950s, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 
Massouh, F. (2015) ‘Searching for Salvation: Yassin al-Haj Saleh and the Writing of 
Modern Syria’, unpublished dissertation, School of Social and Political Science, 
University of Melbourne. 
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S & Tilly, C. (2001) Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
McCrudden, C. ed. (2014) Understanding Human Dignity, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Mitchell, R. (1969) The Society of the Muslim Brothers, London: Oxford University Press 
  
318 
 
Mohsin, S. and Sterling, J. (2013) ‘Syrian opposition questions Taliban rebel role’, CNN, 
18 July, cited by Siddique, A. M. (2015) ‘Drones Do Not Contribute to 
Counterinsurgency, An Analysis of the Strategic Value and Humanitarian Impact of US 
Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, Islamabad Papers, 25, Institute of Strategic Studies 
Moltmann, J. (2007) On Human Dignity: political theology and ethics, translated by 
Meeks, Douglas, Minneapolis: Fortress Press 
Mouffe, C and Laclau, E. (1999) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, second edition. Verso: London & New York 
Muslih, M. (1991) ‘The Rise of Local Nationalism in the Arab East’, in R. Khalidi, L. 
Anderson, M. Muslih and R. S. Simon, The Origins of Arab Nationalism, New York: 
Columbia University Press 
Nasser, A. (1958) ‘Speech to the Syrian national Assembly on the founding of the United 
Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt’, 5 February, available online at 
Nasser.org/speeches, Arabic 
Neep, D. (2012) Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State 
Formation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Nettler, R., Mahmoud, M & Cooper, J. (2000) Islam and Modernity: Modern Intellectuals 
Respond, London: I.B. Tauris 
Nettler, R. (2003) Sufi Metaphysics and Quranic Prophets: Ibn Arabi’s thought and 
methods in the Fusus al-Hikam, Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society 
Norton, A. (2010) ‘Politics against History: Temporal Distortion in the Study of Politics’, 
Political Studies, Vol.58, 340-353 
Norval, A. (2013) ‘Poststructuralist conceptions of ideology’, in Freeden, M., Sargent, L. 
T. & Stears, M. (eds) (2013) The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, 155-174 
Obeng, S. 1997 Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, Volume 3, Accra: Afram 
Publications Limited 
Palonen, K. (2003) Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Pappé, I. (2011) ‘Reframing the Israel/Palestine Conflict’, Interview by Frank Barat, 6 
March, 2011, uploaded on YouTube on 4 August 2011  
Parsa, M. (2000) States, Ideologies, & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Parsa, M. (2011) ‘Ideology and Political Action in the Iranian Revolution’, Comparative 
Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, 31:1, Duke University Press 
  
319 
 
Pearlman, W. (2013) ‘Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Revolutions’, 
Perspectives on Politics, 11:2, 387-409   
Perthes, V. (1994) “Stages of Economic and Political Liberalization.” In Kienle, E. ed., 
Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace. London: British 
Academic Press, 44-71.  
Perthes, V. ed. (2004) Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner  
Perthes, V. (2004a) “Syria: Difficult Inheritance.” In Perthes, Volkner ed. Arab Elites: 
Negotiating the Politics of Change. Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 87-114  
Philbrick Yadav, P. (2016) ‘Rethinking Relationality: Abductive Reasoning, Action 
Research, and Islamist Politics’, prepared for the Evolving Methodologies in the Study of 
Islamist Politics Workshop, 29 January, Project on Middle East Political Science 
(POMEPS) 
Phillips, C. (2013) Everyday Arab Identity: The Daily Reproduction of the Arab World, 
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge 
Philp, M. (2008) ‘Political Theory and History’, in Leopold, D. & Stears, M. Political 
Theory: Methods and Approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 128-149 
Pickthall, M. (1992) The Koran, London: David Campbell Publishers Limited 
Pierret, T. (2012) ‘The Role of the Mosque in the Syrian Revolution’, Near East 
Quarterly, March 20 
Pierret, T. (2012a) ‘Syria: Old-Timers and Newcomers’, in Wright, R. ed. The Islamists 
are coming: Who They Really Are, Herndon, VA: Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars, 71-80 
Pierret, T. (2013) Religion and State in Syria: The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Pleasants, N. (1997) ‘Free to act otherwise? A Wittgensteinian deconstruction of the 
concept of agency in contemporary social and political theory’, History of the Human 
Sciences 10:4, 1–28 
Pleasants, N. (2009) ‘Structure, Agency and Ontological Confusion: A Response to Hay’, 
Political Studies, 57, 885-891 
Polk, W. R. and Chambers, R. L. eds., Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, 
Chicago, 1968, pp. 41-68 
Posusney, P. M. and Angrist, P. M. (2005) Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes 
and Resistance. Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
  
320 
 
Pratt, N. (2007) Democracy & Authoritarianism in the Arab World, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
Provence, M. (2005) The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism, Austin: 
University of Texas 
Qutb, S. (2001) Milestones, trans., New Delhi: Islamic Book Services 
Qutb, S.  fi dhilal al-Quran (In the shade of the Quran) Surah 1, trans. Adil Salahi   
Quran, The. (1992) trans. Pickthall, M.  London: David Campbell Publishers Limited 
Rahman, F. (1996/2000) Islam, 2nd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Rajchman, J. & West, C. eds. (1985) Post-Analytic Philosophy, New York: Columbia 
University Press 
Ramadan, T. (2013) The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East, London: 
Penguin Books Limited  
Rao, R. (2013) Postcolonialism, in Freeden, M., Sargent, L.T., & Stears, M. (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 271-289.  
Rao, R. (2016) ‘Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism’, 
Critical Sociology, 1-12  
Rist, J.M. (1994) Augustine: ancient thought baptised, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Rogan, E. (2009) The Arabs: A History, London: Penguin Books Limited 
Rorty, R.M. (ed.) (1967/1992), The Linguistic Turn: essays in philosophical method, with 
two retrospective essays, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Rosen, M. (2012) Dignity: its history and meaning, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press 
Rudé, G. (1959) The Crowd in the French Revolution, London: Oxford University Press 
Sabry, T. (2010) Cultural Encounters in the Arab World: On Media, The Modern and The 
Everyday, London: I.B. Tauris & Co., Limited 
Sakr, N. (2007) Arab Television Today. London: I.B. Tauris 
Salamandra, C. (2014) ‘Reflections on not writing about the Syrian Conflict’,  available at 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/16290/reflections-on-not-writing-about-the-syrian-
confli?fb_action_ids=10153805934430315&fb_action_types=og.recommends&fb_source
=aggregation&fb_aggregation_id=288381481237582, accessed 23 February, 2014 
  
321 
 
Saleh, Y. H. (2011) ‘Thawrat al-karama’, al-hiwar mutamadden, available online at 
www.ahewar.org, accessed October, 2015 
Saleh, Y. H. (2011) ’From the Kingdom of Assad to the Third Republic – Statehood and 
Participation’ kalamon, 4, autumn, Beirut: Dar al-Saqi  
Saleh, Y. H. (2015) ‘Syria interview: Culture is part of the Struggle’, interview by Scott 
Lucas, EA Worldview, published online December 27  
Salloukh, B. F. (1997) ‘Studying Arab Politics: the end of Ideology or the quest for 
alternative methods?’ Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 6:10, 109-125 
Schatz, Edward & Maltseva, Elena, (2012) ‘Assumed to be Universal: The Leap from Data 
to Knowledge in the American Political Science Review’, Polity 44, 446-472 
Scheman, N. (1996) ‘Forms of life: Mapping the rough ground’, in Sluga, H. D. & Stern, 
D. G., The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 383-410 
Schielke, S. (2015) Egypt in the Future Tense: Hope, Frustration, and Ambivalence before 
and after 2011, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Scott, J. C. (1976) The Moral Economy of the Peasant: rebellion and subsistence in South 
East Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press 
Seale, P. & McConville, M. (1968) French Revolution 1968, Hammondsworth: Penguin 
Seale, P. (1988/1995) Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley, LA: University of 
California Press 
Selbin, E. (2010) Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: the power of story, London: Zed 
Books 
Sensen, O. (2011) Kant on Human Dignity, Kantstudien-Erganzungshelle, 166, De 
Gruyter, GmbH 
Sewell, W. (1994) ‘Ideologies and Revolutions’, in Skocpol, Theda (ed.) Social 
Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169-198 
Shehabi, O. (2014) ‘Bahrain’s Fate’, available at 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/01/bahrains-fate/, accessed 16 January 2014  
Sherazi, Z.S. and Mohsin, S. (2013) ‘Pakistan Taliban arrive in Syria, and more are to 
come, CNN told’, CNN, published online 24 July  
Singerman, D. (2013) ‘Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the Egyptian Uprising’, Journal of 
Middle East Women’s Studies, 9:3, Duke University Press 
Skinner, Q. (1969) ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and 
Theory, 8:35 
  
322 
 
Skinner, Q (2002) Visions of Politics: Volume 1: Regarding Method, Cambridge 
University Press  
Skocpol, T. (1979) State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia and China, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press 
Skocpol, T. (1994) Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Sluga, H. D. & Stern, D. G., The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 383-410   
Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. & Mohammadi, A. (1994) Small Media, Big Revolution: 
Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 
Stahler-Sholk, R (2001) ‘History of Revolutions’, in Smelser, Neil & Baltes, Paul, Eds., 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social & Behavioural Sciences, vol. 20, Amsterdam: 
Elsevier 
Stanford University (2016) ‘Mapping Militant Organisations: Liwa al-Tawhid’, narrative 
summary, published online: Stanford University, at 
http://web.standford.edu/group/mappingmilitants, accessed December, 2016 
Steenbakkers, P. (2014) Human dignity in Renaissance humanism, in Duwell, M, 
Braarvig, J., Brownsword, R. & Mieth, D, The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: 
interdisciplinary perspectives, 85-94  
Stewart, F. H. (1994) Honor, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Stråth, B. (2013) ‘Ideology and Conceptual History’, in Freeden, M. & Stears, M. eds. The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Swedenberg, T. (1993) The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-
1939), in Hourani, A., Khoury, P., Wilson, M. eds. The Modern Middle East, Berkley and 
Los Angeles: University of California, 467-503 
Syzbala, V. (2013) ‘A power move by Syria’s rebel forces’, blog report for the Institute for 
the Study of War, 22 November 
Taha, M.M. (2000) in Cooper, J; Nettler, R. & Mahmoud, M. Islam and Modernity: 
Muslim Intellectuals Respond, IB Tauris 
Takriti, A. R. (2013) Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans and Empires in Oman, 
1965-1976, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
al-Tamimi, A. J. (2013) ‘Jihad in Syria’, published on his personal blog, March, 2013, 
available at: http://www.aymennjawad.org/13097/jihad-in-syria, accessed September, 
2015 
  
323 
 
al-Tamimi, A. J. (2016) ‘Syrian Hizbollah militias of Nubl and Zahara’, SyrianComment 
blog, 15 August, available online at: http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/syrian-hezbollah-
militias-nubl-zahara/, accessed December, 2016 
Taylor, C. (1992) ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Multiculturalism and “The Politics of 
Recognition, An Essay by Charles Taylor”, Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, pp. 25-73 
Temelini, M. (2015) Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press 
Thomassen, B. (2014) ‘Liminal Politics: Towards an Anthropology of Political 
Revolutions’, in Thomassen, B.  Liminality and The Modern: Living through the in 
between, Surrey: Ashgate, 191- 213 
Thompson, E. (2000) Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and 
Gender in French Syria and Lebanon, New York: Columbia University Press 
Tilly, C. (1995) European Revolutions, 1492-1992, Oxford: Blackwell 
Tilly, C. & Tarrow, S. (2007) Contentious Politics, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers   
Todorov, T. (1991/2000) Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps, 
trans. Denner, A & Pollack, A. London: Phoenix, Orion Books Limited  
Torfing, J. (2005) ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges’, in 
Howarth, D. & Torfing, J. eds. Discourse Theory in European Politics: identity, Policy 
and Governance, Hants & New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Traboulsi, F. (2012) ‘Syrian Revolutionaries owe no one an Apology’, Interview by 
Mohammed al-Attar, available online at www.boell.de, accessed September, 2015 
Travis, C. (2001) Unshadowed thought, Cambridge MA: Harvard 
Tripp, C. (2006) Islam and the Moral Economy: the Challenge of Capitalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press  
Tripp, C. (2013) The Power and the People: paths of resistance in the Middle East, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Tripp, C. (2013a) ‘Performing the Public: Theatres of Power in the Middle East’, 
Constellations, 20:2, 203-216 
Tripp, C. (2015) ‘Battlefields of the Republic: the struggle for public space in Tunisia’, 
London: LSE Middle East Centre, Paper Series: Social Movements and Popular 
Mobilisation in the Middle East and North Africa, 13, 1-21 
Tucker, R., ed. (1978) The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, London & New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company  
  
324 
 
van Dijk, T. A. (1998/2000) Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (reprint), London, 
California, New Dehli: Sage 
von Vacano, D. (2015) ‘The Scope of Comparative Political Theory’, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 18, 477 
Waldron, J. (2012) Dignity, Rank, & Rights: the Berkeley Tanner Lectures, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Wallis, C. G., et al (1965/1998, translation), Pico della Mirandola on the Dignity of Man, 
Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Wedeen, L. (1999) Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in 
Contemporary Syria, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Wedeen, L. (2013) ‘Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes from Syria’, Critical 
Inquiry, 39, pp. 841-873, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Wedeen, L. (2014) Interview with Online Editor, Jadaliyya, January 29th, available at 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/16239/new-texts-out-now_lisa-wedeen-ideology-
and-humor-i accessed January 2014  
Wieland, C. et al (2013) ‘The Syrian Uprising: Dynamics of an Insurgency’, St Andrews: 
St Andrews Papers on Contemporary Syria, University of St Andrews Centre for Syria 
Studies  
Wieland, C. (2013) A Decade of Lost Chances: Repression and Revolution from Damascus 
to the Arab Spring, Seattle: Cune Press 
Willis, M. J. (2016) ‘Revolt for Dignity: Tunisia’s Revolution and Civil Resistance’, in 
Roberts, A., Willis, M., McCarthy, R. & Garten Ash, T. (eds) Civil Resistance in the Arab 
Spring: Triumphs and Disasters, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Winch, P. (1958/1977) The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Winch, P. (1970) ’Understanding a primitive society’, in Wilson, B. ed. Key concepts in 
the Social Sciences: Rationality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 78-111 
Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations, I, 3rd edn., trans. Anscombe, G. E. 
M., New York: Macmillan Publishing Co 
Wolf, E. (1975) ‘Peasants and Political Mobilization’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 17:4, 385-38 
Wynn, W. (1959) Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity, Arlington Books 
Yassin-Kassab, R. & Al-Shami, L. (2016) Burning Country: Syrians in revolution and 
war, London: Pluto Press 
  
325 
 
Yazbek, S. (2012) A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution, London: 
Haus Publishing Limited 
Zimmermann, E. (1983) Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and 
Research, Massachusetts: Schenkman 
Zoubi, O. & al-Din Mohammed, H. (2013) ‘waʿy al-thawra: fakkar Yassin al-Haj Saleh 
namuthijan’ (The conscience of the revolution: the thought of Yassin Haj Saleh as an 
exemplar), introduction entitled ‘asalat al-thawra’ (‘Questions of the revolution’), Awraq 
magazine, Middlesex: Syrian Writers Association, available at  http://syrianwa.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/awraq3.pdf 
Zoubi, O. (2016) ‘The legend of the flood: beginning and end of the revolution’, published 
online aljumhuriya.net, available at http://aljumhuriya.net/en/syrian-revolution/the-legend-
of-the-flood-the-beginning-and-end-of-the-revolution, May 12 
  
  
326 
 
 
Selected online sources and links 
Aswad, A. (2011) Activist Aymen Aswad calls for Dignity Strike, uploaded on Facebook 
group ‘idrab al-karama’, December 13, accessed September 2015. 
Forfreedom, (2011) idrab al-karama, published online at YouTube channel ‘forfreedom’, 
December 6, 2011, accessed September 2015. 
freeSyrianTranslator (2012) Dignity Revolution, English subtitles provided at YouTube 
channel ‘freeSyrianTranslator’, published June, 16, 2012, accessed September 2015.  
al-Jazeera Arabic (2011) ‘Beyond the News: idrab al-karama’, uploaded December 11, 
YouTube channel ‘al-Jazeera Arabic’, accessed September 2015. 
al-Jazeera Net (2011) ‘Electronic Demonstrations and the Dignity Strikes in Syria’, 
published online December11, accessed September 2015.  
Sameh, Shouqair. (2011) Ya Hayf (oh Shame!), revolutionary song, available via the 
YouTube channel for the ‘local coordinating group for the town of Yabrud’, published 
March 29, 2011, accessed September 2015.  
Shehadeh, Basel (2013) ‘Streets of Freedom’, produced by The Street collective and 
supported by Kayani, published online, April, 2013.  See YouTube channel at ‘Kayani 
Web TV’, accessed September 2015. 
Soliman, Fadwa (2011) ‘A call to strike’, uploaded online December 11, 2011, YouTube 
channel ‘FadwaSoliman’, accessed September 2015. 
Street Media and Development, The (2013), ‘Jarablus Horizons’of Freedom (ifaq al-
hurriya), documentary short, published online March 2013; on their YouTube channel: 
muwassasat al-sharaʿa al-ʿilaam (The Street Media, Incorporated), accessed September 
2015. 
 
Arabic Language and Translation Reference Books: 
Baker, Mona (1992/2003) In Other Words: a course book on translation, London:  
Routledge  
Cowan, J Milton (1994) The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, Fourth 
Edition, New York: Spoken Language Services, Inc, Ithaca 
Stowasser, Karl & Ani, Moukhtar, Eds. (2004) A Dictionary of Syrian Arabic, English-
Arabic, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press 
  
  
327 
 
Appendix 
 
Arabic Source Material: Ideational Exemplars 
 
Chapter Five:  al-jumhuriya website 
 
Article One 
al-jumhuriya (2012) ‘An analytical survey of the first year of the Syrian revolution: “Asad 
and no one else”, against “The people want the fall of the regime”’, 30 March, published 
as an editorial (Arabic), http://therepublicgs.net/16878, accessed December, 2016.  
 
Article Two 
Swehat, Y. (2012) ‘How the Left resistance failed Syria’, published online, al-jumhuriya, 
12 April, http://therepublicgs.net/152, accessed December, 2016. 
 
Article Three 
Saleh, Y. H. (2012) ‘Those who are left behind: the Syrian Sunnis and politics’, 18 
October, published online, al-jumhuriya, http://therepublicgs.net/237, accessed December 
2016 
 
Chapter Six: liwa al-tawhid  
 
VS 1  
Orient TV (2013) ‘A private and exclusive interview with Commander Abdel Qader 
talking about the human aspects of his life’, Huna Suriya programme, 15 July, published 
online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSXV3g34IEg, accessed June, 2016. 
 
VS 2 
al-Arabiya TV (2013) ‘An exclusive interview with Abdel Qader, leader of liwa al-tawhid 
in the Syrian Free Army’, by Hassan Muawad for nuqtat hiwar (Talking Point) 
  
328 
 
programme, 12 April; published online via the Syrian revolutionary YouTube channel: 
Syrian4allNews, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXui55Jrbi8 3, accessed 
December, 2016 
 
VS 3 
Thaer al-Shamali (2013) ‘The last appearance of the martyr Abdel Qader al-Saleh  (Hajji 
Marea) on the 80 battalion Front (in Aleppo region)’, 17 November, published on a 
revolutionary YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Spsl09fQr-0, 
accessed December, 2013 
 
VS 4 
Orient TV (2013) “A special segment on the martydom of the commander Abdel Qader al-
Saleh’, Huna Suriya (This is Syria), published on the Orient News official YouTube 
channel, 18 November.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
